Recherche avancée

Simon P. Anderson (University of Virginia)

TSE, 7 mars 2016, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323

We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games and use inclusive best reply func- tions to compare long-run market structures. We show strong neutrality properties across market structures. The IIA property of demands (CES and logit) implies that consumer surplus depends on the aggregate alone, and...

Séminaire

Darrell Duffie (Stanford University)

IDEI, 7 mars 2016, 12h30–13h45, salle MF 323

Size discovery is the use of trade mechanisms by which large quantities of an asset can be exchanged at a price that does not respond to price pressure. Primary examples of size discovery include \workup" in Treasury markets and block-trading \dark pools" in equity markets. By freezing the...

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Kyle Meng (University of California - Santa Barbara)

Toulouse : TSE, 7 mars 2016, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 003

Planetary-scale events, such as climate change, generate heterogeneous impacts across individuals. If risks are shared completely, aggregate risk is a sufficient statistic for the global welfare e↵ects of such events. However, if risk sharing is incomplete, then the global welfare consequences of...

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Boualem Djehiche (KTH- Department of Mathematics – Stockholm)

Toulouse : TSE, 4 mars 2016, 14h00–15h15, salle MF 323

We suggest a method of characterizing optimal contracts in the classical setting of Principal- Agent problem under hidden action for time inconsistent utility functions. We consider two different models; Hidden Action in the weak formulation and Hidden Contract in the strong formulation. In the...

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Jörgen W. Weibull

Toulouse : IAST, 4 mars 2016, 11h30–12h30, salle MS001

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Ali Shourideh (University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School)

TSE, 1 mars 2016, 17h00–18h30, salle MS 001

We study optimal fiscal and redistributive policies in an open economy without commitment. Due to its redistributive motives, the government’s incentive to default on its external debt is affected by inequality. We show that in equilibrium the economy endogenously fluctuates between two regimes. In...

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James Venit (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP)

Toulouse : TSE, 19 février 2016, 15h30–17h30, salle MF 323

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Bernard Salanié (University of Columbia)

TSE, 16 février 2016, 15h30–17h00, salle MS 001

Multivalued treatment models have only been studied so far under restrictive assumptions: ordered choice, or more recently unordered monotonicity. We show how marginal treatment effects can be identified in a more general class of models. Our results rely on two main assumptions: treatment...

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Ulf Axelson (London School of Economics)

TSE, 15 février 2016, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323

We study how efficient primary financial markets are in allocating capital wheninformation about investment opportunities is dispersed across market participants.Paradoxically, the very fact that information is valuable for making real investmentdecisions destroys the efficiency of the market. To...

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William Kovacic (Geoge Washington University Law School)

Toulouse : TSE, 22 janvier 2016, 15h30–17h30, salle MF323

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