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Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Crémer et André Veiga
n° 19-1038, septembre 2019, révision mars 2020
We study incumbency advantage in platform industries, where the utility of participating in a platform is increasing in the mass of users participating in that platform. Individuals receive stochastic opportunities to migrate from an incumbent to a new (entrant) platform, which they can accept or...
Olivier Faugeras et Ludger Rüschendorf
n° 19-1039, septembre 2019, révision juin 2021
A notion of multivariate depth, resp. quantile region, was introduced in [Chernozhukov et al., 2017], based on a mass transportation approach. In [Faugeras and Ruschendorf, 2017], this approach was generalized by dening quantiles as Markov morphisms carrying suitable algebraic, ordering and...
Y. De Castro, Sébastien Gadat, Clément Marteau et Cathy Maugis
n° 19-1040, septembre 2019, révision septembre 2020
Susan Athey, Juan Camilo Castillo et Bharat Chandar
septembre 2019
The rise of marketplaces for goods and services has led to changes in the mechanisms used to ensure high quality. We analyze this phenomenon in the Uber market, where the system of pre-screening that prevailed in the taxi industry has been diminished in favor of (automated) quality measurement,...
Bruno Jullien et Wilfried Sand-Zantman
septembre 2019, révision juillet 2020
Over the past 20 years, the development of the internet has transformed the global economy and had an impact on almost every aspect of our lives. Designed primarily as a means of communication, the internet has revolutionized the way we produce and exchange services and goods, whether they are...
Fabien Gensbittel
vol. 9, n° 3, septembre 2019, p. 671–699
We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was already studied in Cardaliaguet et al (Math Oper Res 41(1):49–71...
Philippe Bontems et Céline Nauges
vol. 46, n° 4, septembre 2019, p. 579–608
Emmanuelle Auriol et Josepa Miquel-Florensa
vol. 14, n° 3, septembre 2019, p. 453–477
We present a model with two donors-principals that provide funds to a unique recipient-agent. Each donor decides how to allocate his aid funds between a pooled and a donor specific unilateral project. Both principals and the agent value the output produced with the principals' pooled and two...
Alberto Grillo
vol. 59, septembre 2019, p. 252–265
Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer et Kerstin Roeder
vol. 118, septembre 2019, p. 37–50
The tax regimes applied to couples in many countries including the US, France, and Germany imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. We study how they affect the decision to get married by considering two potential spouses who play a marriage proposal game. At the end of the game they...
