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Christian Julliard (London School of Economics)
TSE, 27 novembre 2017, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
Aggregate consumption growth reacts slowly, but significantly, to bond and stock return innovations. As a consequence, slow consumption adjustment (SCA) risk, measured by the reaction of consumption growth cumulated over many quarters following a return, can explain most of the cross-sectional...
Jennifer Alix-Garcia (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
Toulouse : TSE, 27 novembre 2017, 11h00–12h30, salle MS001
We measure the willingness to accept of contracts for environmental conditional cash transfers among applicants to Mexico's payments for ecosystem services program. These estimates are significantly lower than the payments offered by the program, suggesting a substantial transfer of surplus to...
27 novembre 2017, salle MS 001
Stéphane Villeneuve (TSE)
TSE, 23 novembre 2017, 16h15–17h00, salle MS001
Tim Lee (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, 23 novembre 2017, 15h30–16h15, salle MS001
We analyze the effect of technological change in a novel framework that integrates an economy's skill distribution with its occupational and industrial structure. Individuals become managers or workers based on their managerial vs. worker skills, and workers further sort into a continuum of tasks (...
Milo Bianchi (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, 23 novembre 2017, 14h15–15h00, salle MS001
We match administrative panel data on portfolio choices with survey data on preferences over ambiguity. We show that ambiguity averse investors bear more risk, due to a lack of diversiÖcation. In particular, they exhibit a form of home bias that leads to higher exposure to the domestic relative to...
Vera Zaporozhets (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, 23 novembre 2017, 13h30–14h15, salle MS001
We study a simple influence game, in which a single lobby may manipulate the decision of a legislature via monetary offers to one or more legislators. The legislators care both about the social welfare and political contributions. We study how the legislators' preferences and the lobby's...
Andrea Attar (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, 23 novembre 2017, 11h15–12h00, salle MS001
We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for entry to be unprofitable under adverse selection is that no buyer type be willing to trade at a price above the expected unit cost of serving the types who are as least as eager to trade than her. We provide two applications of this result....
Stéphane Straub (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, 23 novembre 2017, 10h30–11h15, salle MS001
23 novembre 2017, salle MS001
