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Pierre Fleckinger (Mines ParisTech - Paris School of Economics)
TSE, 14 septembre 2017, 14h00–15h15, salle MF 323
We build a model of collective reputation under moral hazard and adverse selection to analyze the incentive effects of different collective reputation structures. Heterogeneous producers need to exert effort to produce high quality. The demand side a priori does not observe the true quality,...
Theophile Bougna (The World Bank - IBRD - IDA)
Toulouse : TSE, 14 septembre 2017, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
This paper estimates the impacts of road improvements on local employment structure and specialization in Mexico over the period 1985-2016. Using geo-referenced panel data, it measures access to domestic markets for each locality and time as a weighted sum of surrounding populations (market access...
Toulouse, France, 14–15 septembre 2017
Alexandre Cornière (de) (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE & IAST, 13 septembre 2017, 12h30–13h30, salle MS003
Motivated by recent investigations over Google's practices in the smartphone industry, we study bundling in markets for devices that allow consumers to use applications. The presence of applications on a device increases demand for it, and application developers earn revenues by interacting with...
Gianluca Violante (New York University)
TSE, 13 septembre 2017, 09h30–11h00, salle MF323
We build a model of the U.S. economy with multiple aggregate shocks (income, housing finance conditions, and beliefs about future housing demand) that generate fluctuations in equilibrium house prices. Through a series of counterfactual experiments, we study the housing boom and bust around the...
Nicolas Werquin
Toulouse : TSE, 11 septembre 2017, 17h00–18h00, salle Amphi Cujas
Philippe Aghion (Harvard University - Collège de France - London School of Economics)
TSE, 11 septembre 2017, 14h00–15h30, salle MS003
Matthieu Bouvard (Invité TSE 2017-2018 - McGill University)
TSE, 11 septembre 2017, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
We study how a decision maker uses his reputation to simultaneously influence the actions of multiple receivers with heterogenous biases. The reputational payoff is single-peaked around a bliss reputation at which the incentives of the average receiver are perfectly aligned. We evidence two...
Dan Phaneuf's (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
Toulouse : TSE, 11 septembre 2017, 11h00–12h15, salle MS 003
We develop a residential sorting model based on a panel of county-to-county migration flows to estimate the marginal valuation of air pollution. Our approach exploits annual crosssectional variation in migration flows to estimate mean location utilities at the county level, while flexibly...
Jakob Hennig et Milena J Petrova (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE & IAST, 6 septembre 2017, 12h30–13h30, salle MS 003
Reputation systems are a cornerstone of internet commerce: they discipline seller behavior in a setting of one-time, anonymous interactions. When moral hazard is present, reputation systems incentivize sellers to exert effort by creating a link between reviews by past clients and demand by new...
