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Sereeparp Anantavrasilp, Abe De Jong, Douglas V. DeJong et Ulrich Hege
vol. 47, n° 2, février 2020, p. 253–292
Edmond Awad, Sydney Levine, Max Kleiman-Weiner, Sohan Dsouza, Joshua Tenenbaum, Azim Shariff, Jean-François Bonnefon et Iyad Rahwan
vol. 4, n° 2, février 2020, p. 134–143
When an automated car harms someone, who is blamed by those who hear about it? Here we asked human participants to consider hypothetical cases in which a pedestrian was killed by a car operated under shared control of a primary and a secondary driver and to indicate how blame should be allocated....
Gaëtan Fournier, Karine Van Der Straeten et Jörgen W. Weibull
n° 20-1072, février 2020
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the real line, and the two firms simultaneously choose location in this same space. When buying from one of the firms,...
Stéphane Lemarié, Valérie Orozco, Jean-Pierre Butault, Antonio Musolesi, Michel Simioni et Bertrand Schmitt
n° 20-173, février 2020
This paper analyses the economic impact of agricultural research on productivity in France over the period 1959-2012. Adopting a dynamic time series model, we provide evidence that the impact of French agricultural research is in the range of values estimated for other countries, with the estimated...
Alexandre Gaillard et Sumudu Kankanamge
n° 20-1078, février 2020, révision juin 2020
How are the options to buy and sell a business relevant for entrepreneurs? Prospective entrepreneurs value the purchase of mature firms while incumbents want to recover both the tangible and intangible value of their businesses upon exit. We introduce a theory of entrepreneurial assets transfer...
Alexandre de Cornière et Greg Taylor
n° 20-1076, février 2020, révision décembre 2021
What role does data play in competition? This question has been at the center of a fierce debate around competition policy in the digital economy. We use a competition-in-utilities approach to provide a general framework for studying the competitive effects of data, encompassing a wide range of...
Fabien Gensbittel et Miquel Oliu-Barton
vol. 10, février 2020, p. 819–835
Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (Math Oper Res 21:209–236, 1996a, Math Oper Res 21:237–251, 1996b), Rosenberg (Int J Game Theory 27:577–597, 1998) and De Meyer and Marino (Cahiers de la MSE 27, 2005) provided an explicit construction for optimal strategies in repeated games with...
Marco Battaglini et Bård Harstad
vol. 128, n° 2, février 2020, p. 544–590
In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelections. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are "weak" in that...
Nicoletta Berardi et Paul Seabright
vol. 176, n° 3, février 2020, p. 572–594
This paper investigates an unexplored rationale for joint ownership of a production project. We model projects with autocorrelated productivity shocks as creating an option value of investing over time so that later investments benefit from the information revealed by the realization of earlier...
Guy Alexander Cooper, Jorge Peña, Ming Liu et Stuart Andrew West
n° 20-104, février 2020
