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James Dow
TSE, 4 juin 2018, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323
Will arbitrage capital flow into a market experiencing a liquidity shock, mitigating the adverse effect of the shock on liquidity? Using a stochastic dynamic model of equilibrium pricing with privately informed capital-constrained arbitrageurs, we show that arbitrage capital may actually flow out...
Jean-Marc Robin (Sciences Po, Paris)
Toulouse : TSE, 4 juin 2018, 11h15–12h00, salle MS001
In this paper, we propose an estimation method that allows for unrestricted interactions between worker and firm unobserved characteristics in both wages and the mobility patterns along with a model of mobility that allows us to quantify sources of sorting. Related to Bonhomme et al. (2017) (BLM),...
Drew Fudenberg (MIT)
Toulouse : TSE, 4 juin 2018, 10h30–11h15
Jura Liaukonyte (Cornell University)
TSE, 31 mai 2018, 14h00–15h30, salle MS 003
Firms are increasingly using technology to enable targeted, or "personalized" pricing strategies. In settings where prices are transparent to all consumers, however, there is the potential that inter-personal price differences will be perceived as inherently unfair. In response, firms may...
Salvatore Nunnari (Bocconi University)
Toulouse : TSE, 31 mai 2018, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
This paper develops a model of voters’ and politicians’ behavior based on the notion that voters focus disproportionately on, and hence overweight, certain attributes of policies. We assume that policies have two attributes - benefits and costs - and that voters focus more on the attribute in which...
Alfred Galichon (New York University)
Toulouse : TSE, 31 mai 2018, 11h00–12h15, salle MC 204
In this paper, we address the problem of estimating transport surplus (a.k.a. matching affinity) in high dimensional optimal transport problems. Classical optimal transport theory specifies the matching affinity and determines the optimal joint distribution. In contrast, we study the inverse...
Moshe Hoffman (Harvard University)
TSE, 31 mai 2018, 10h30–12h00, salle MS 003
In many instances, moral hazard can be curtailed via deterrence mechanisms that a governing body can unilaterally enforce and commit to follow through on. However, in many other instances, good behavior is induced via coordinated punishment, such as when democratic norms are maintained via the...
Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France, du 31 mai au 1 juin 2018, salle MS001
Marc flandreau
31 mai 2018
Katja O'Mann
TSE & IAST, 30 mai 2018, 12h30–13h30, salle MS003
We provide a new measure of automation based on patent texts and study its impact on employment. Classifying all 5 million U.S. patents granted between 1976 and 2014 as automation or non-automation patents, we document a rise in the share of automation patents from 25 percent to 67 percent. We link...
