Recherche avancée

Leslie Marx (Duke University)

Toulouse : TSE, 19 juin 2018, 11h00–12h30, salle MF323

Clock auctions are weakly group strategy-proof, make bidding truthfully an obviously dominant strategy, and preserve trading agents’ privacy. They have proved useful in practice but challenging to implement in a prior-free, asymptotically optimal way. We characterize the Bayesian optimal clock...

Séminaire

Giovanna Nicodano (University of Turin)

TSE, 18 juin 2018, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323

This paper argues that a survivorship bias is able to distort upwards the measurement of the average ex-post firm value, because bankruptcy cancels firms with low realized cash flows from databases. This bias increases in bankruptcy probability, giving rise to known pricing puzzles across types of...

Séminaire

Toulouse, France, 18–19 juin 2018

Conférence

Daniel Ershov (Toulouse School of Economics)

TSE, 14 juin 2018, 14h00–15h15, salle MS 003

Standard discrete choice models used to evaluate mergers assume that different product varieties are substitutes. However, legal defences in some recent high-profile mergers rested on demand complementarity (e.g., GE/Honeywell). Since complements tend to be priced lower by a monopolist than by a...

Séminaire

Sebastien Gerchinovitz (Institut de Mathématiques de Toulouse - Université Paul Sabatier)

Toulouse : TSE, 14 juin 2018, 11h00–12h15, salle MC 204

We propose a new analysis of Piyavskii's algorithm for deterministic or stochastic Lipschitz global optimization. More precisely, we address the problem of finding a global maximizer of a (locally) Lipschitz function f on [0,1]^d with known Lipschitz constant, using as few (possibly noisy)...

Séminaire

Toulouse, France, 14–15 juin 2018

Conférence

Timothy Simcoe

TSE & IAST, 13 juin 2018, 12h30–13h30, salle MS003

Séminaire

Leslie Marx (Duke University)

TSE, 11 juin 2018, 14h00–15h30, salle MS 001

Procurement auctions have been successfully applied in a variety of settings. We study optimal procurement mechanisms for a buyer with a fixed budget that wishes to purchase units of a homogeneous good, up to a maximum demand amount, from symmetric suppliers with privately known constant marginal...

Séminaire

Guillaume Rocheteau (University of California, Irvine)

TSE, 11 juin 2018, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323

We introduce a new approach to bargaining, with both axiomatic and strategic foundations, into models of decentralized asset market. Gradual bargaining, which assumes that portfolios of assets are sold sequentially, one unit of asset at a time, has strong normative justifications: it increases the...

Séminaire

Manufacture des Tabacs MS 001, Toulouse, France, 11 juin 2018

L'objectif du TSE Student Workshop est de présenter les travaux des doctorants de TSE et de favoriser les interactions entre chercheurs et doctorants. Pendant cette journée, des étudiants sélectionnés auront l'occasion de présenter leur travail (20 minutes) qui sera discuté dans un second temps (5...

Workshop