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Marco Battaglini et Bård Harstad
vol. 128, n° 2, février 2020, p. 544–590
In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelections. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are "weak" in that...
Gaëtan Fournier, Karine Van Der Straeten et Jörgen W. Weibull
n° 20-1072, février 2020
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the real line, and the two firms simultaneously choose location in this same space. When buying from one of the firms,...
Guy Alexander Cooper, Jorge Peña, Ming Liu et Stuart Andrew West
n° 20-104, février 2020
Sereeparp Anantavrasilp, Abe De Jong, Douglas V. DeJong et Ulrich Hege
vol. 47, n° 2, février 2020, p. 253–292
Nicoletta Berardi et Paul Seabright
vol. 176, n° 3, février 2020, p. 572–594
This paper investigates an unexplored rationale for joint ownership of a production project. We model projects with autocorrelated productivity shocks as creating an option value of investing over time so that later investments benefit from the information revealed by the realization of earlier...
Caio Almeida, Kim Ardison et René Garcia
vol. 214, n° 2, février 2020, p. 349–378
Fabien Gensbittel et Miquel Oliu-Barton
vol. 10, février 2020, p. 819–835
Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (Math Oper Res 21:209–236, 1996a, Math Oper Res 21:237–251, 1996b), Rosenberg (Int J Game Theory 27:577–597, 1998) and De Meyer and Marino (Cahiers de la MSE 27, 2005) provided an explicit construction for optimal strategies in repeated games with...
Marcel Boyer
février 2020
Edmond Awad, Sydney Levine, Max Kleiman-Weiner, Sohan Dsouza, Joshua Tenenbaum, Azim Shariff, Jean-François Bonnefon et Iyad Rahwan
vol. 4, n° 2, février 2020, p. 134–143
When an automated car harms someone, who is blamed by those who hear about it? Here we asked human participants to consider hypothetical cases in which a pedestrian was killed by a car operated under shared control of a primary and a secondary driver and to indicate how blame should be allocated....
Lei XU, Tingting Nian et Luis Cabral
vol. 66, n° 2, février 2020, p. 587–604
Many online platforms rely on users to voluntarily provide content. What motivates users to contribute content for free however is not well understood. In this paper, we use a revealed preference approach to show that career concerns play an important role in user contributions to Stack Overflow,...
