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Manufacture des tabacs, Toulouse, 7–8 juin 2018, salle MS 001
Drew Fudenberg (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Toulouse : TSE, 5 juin 2018, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 001
A principal specifies time paths of knowledge transfer, effort provision, and task allocation for a cash-constrained apprentice, who is free to walk away at any time. In the optimal contract the apprentice pays for training by working for low or no wages and by working inefficiently hard. The...
Katrina Jessoe (University of California - Davis)
Toulouse : TSE, 5 juin 2018, 11h00–12h15, salle MS 003
This paper demonstrates that the establishment of well-functioning water markets may substantially mitigate the costs of drought. We develop a framework to model the costs of incomplete water regulation, and simulate the efficiency gains from water trading across the agricultural and urban sectors...
James Dow (London Business School)
TSE, 4 juin 2018, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323
Will arbitrage capital flow into a market experiencing a liquidity shock, mitigating the adverse effect of the shock on liquidity? Using a stochastic dynamic model of equilibrium pricing with privately informed capital-constrained arbitrageurs, we show that arbitrage capital may actually flow out...
Jean-Marc Robin (Sciences Po, Paris)
Toulouse : TSE, 4 juin 2018, 11h15–12h00, salle MS001
In this paper, we propose an estimation method that allows for unrestricted interactions between worker and firm unobserved characteristics in both wages and the mobility patterns along with a model of mobility that allows us to quantify sources of sorting. Related to Bonhomme et al. (2017) (BLM),...
Drew Fudenberg (MIT)
Toulouse : TSE, 4 juin 2018, 10h30–11h15
Jura Liaukonyte (Cornell University)
TSE, 31 mai 2018, 14h00–15h30, salle MS 003
Firms are increasingly using technology to enable targeted, or "personalized" pricing strategies. In settings where prices are transparent to all consumers, however, there is the potential that inter-personal price differences will be perceived as inherently unfair. In response, firms may...
Alfred Galichon (New York University)
Toulouse : TSE, 31 mai 2018, 11h00–12h15, salle MC 204
In this paper, we address the problem of estimating transport surplus (a.k.a. matching affinity) in high dimensional optimal transport problems. Classical optimal transport theory specifies the matching affinity and determines the optimal joint distribution. In contrast, we study the inverse...
Salvatore Nunnari (Bocconi University)
Toulouse : TSE, 31 mai 2018, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
This paper develops a model of voters’ and politicians’ behavior based on the notion that voters focus disproportionately on, and hence overweight, certain attributes of policies. We assume that policies have two attributes - benefits and costs - and that voters focus more on the attribute in which...
Moshe Hoffman (Harvard University)
TSE, 31 mai 2018, 10h30–12h00, salle MS 003
In many instances, moral hazard can be curtailed via deterrence mechanisms that a governing body can unilaterally enforce and commit to follow through on. However, in many other instances, good behavior is induced via coordinated punishment, such as when democratic norms are maintained via the...
