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Miriam Golden (UCLA)
Toulouse : IAST, 30 novembre 2018, 11h30–12h30, salle MF 323
We assemble original data from 129 countries around the world on the re-election rates of national legislators in recent elections. The data show that incumbent re-election rates increase substantially with a country's level of economic development. Using a political agency model with endogenous...
SCOR, Paris, 30 novembre 2018, 09h00–17h00, salle Room La Pérouse GOP1
Bjørn Olav Johansen (University of Bergen)
TSE, 29 novembre 2018, 14h00–15h30, salle MS 003
It is commonplace for retailers to rely on input from one of their suppliers, a “category captain”, when making some of their decisions, such as which products to stock and how to allocate shelf space. There is some concern that category captains may offer biased advice that favors their own...
David Stromberg (Institute for International Economic Studies - University of Stockholm)
Toulouse : TSE, 29 novembre 2018, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
Because of lacking public information, collective action events are hard to organize in autocracies. We study whether the explosive growth of social media in China 2009-2013 affected protests and strikes. Over these years, Sina Weibo, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter grew from none to 500 million...
Mihail Zervos (London School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 29 novembre 2018, 11h00–12h15, salle MS 001
We characterize efficient risksharing under two-sided limited commitment in a continuous-time endowment economy. Taking a dual approach based on the Lagrange multipliers on the participation constraints, we establish a strong duality result in a general setting. In a canonical application, agents...
Stéphane Bonhomme (University of Chicago)
TSE, 27 novembre 2018, 15h30–17h00, salle MS 001
We propose a framework for estimation and inference about the parameters of an economic model and predictions based on it, when the model may be misspecified. We rely on a local asymptotic approach where the degree of misspecification is indexed by the sample size. We derive formulas to construct...
Stephan Lauermann (Bonn University)
Toulouse : TSE, 27 novembre 2018, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 001
We study a model of information transmission through an informal election. Each one of partially informed senders can send a binary message to the receiver, and the receiver chooses a policy. The receiver is not committed to a policy rule that maps the distribution of messages to policy outcomes....
Edouard Challe (Ecole Polytechnique - CREST-ENSAE)
TSE, 26 novembre 2018, 17h00–18h30, salle MF 323
I study optimal monetary policy in a sticky-price economy wherein households precautionary-save against uninsured, endogenous unemployment risk. In this economy greater unemployment risk raises desired savings, causing aggregate demand to fall and feed back to greater unemployment risk. This...
Curtis R. Taylor (Duke University)
TSE, 26 novembre 2018, 14h00–15h30, salle MS 001
A principal contracts with an agent, who is protected by limited liability, to acquire information concerning the desirability of investing in a project. To motivate the agent to perform the required research, it is necessary to offer him a schedule of contingent rewards that depend on his reported...
Yue Fei (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, 26 novembre 2018, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
Exploring a novel dataset and a unique policy experiment, this paper examines the role of government intervention in the emergence of venture capital (VC) in China during 1999-2013. Using difference-in-difference methodology, I find that the central government program leads to an increase in local...
