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David Martimort et Jérôme Pouyet
vol. 72, septembre 2020, p. 102643
Daniel F. Garrett
n° 20-1140, septembre 2020
In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payo implications of introducing optimally-structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does knowthat the principal knows them. We provide, in...
Nina Hestermann, Yves Le Yaouanq et Nicolas Treich
n° 20-1141, septembre 2020
Many individuals have empathetic feelings towards animals but frequently consume meat. We investigate this “meat paradox” using insights from the literature on motivated reasoning in moral dilemmata. We develop a model where individuals form self-serving beliefs about the suffering of animals...
Bernard Bercu, Manon Costa et Sébastien Gadat
n° 20-1142, septembre 2020
This paper is devoted to two dierent two-time-scale stochastic ap- proximation algorithms for superquantile estimation. We shall investigate the asymptotic behavior of a Robbins-Monro estimator and its convexied version. Our main contribution is to establish the almost sure convergence, the...
Jay Pil Choi et Doh-Shin Jeon
n° 20-1143, septembre 2020, révision février 2022
We investigate the relationship between market structure and platforms'incentives to adopt technological innovations in two-sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and to extract surplus on the ad- vertising side. We consider innovations that a¤...
Haina Ding, Alexander Guembel et Alessio Ozanne
n° 20-1144, septembre 2020, révision octobre 2024
The Basel committee views market discipline as complementing banking supervision. This paper studies how supervisors should design stress tests when markets discipline banks via price signals their traded securities provide to bank creditors. We show that the optimal stress test is coarse and...
Jeremy Bowles, Horacio Larreguy et Anders Woller
n° 20-1154, septembre 2020
n° 20-113, septembre 2020
We examine the incentives incumbents face when creating new polling places. First, doing so improves incumbents’ ability to monitor brokers and voters by reducing the number of registered voters per polling station. Second, it reduces the distance traveled by citizens to vote, which undercuts...
F.S. Fall, H. Tchakoute Tchuigoua, Anne Vanhems et Léopold Simar
n° 20-1147, septembre 2020
The main objective of this study is to assess the impact of gender on microfinance social efficiency. Our methodology is based on the most recent nonparametric techniques to estimate the gender effect. We use a conditional directional free disposal hull (FDH) approach as well as its robust version...
Yassine Lefouili et Joana Pinho
vol. 72, n° 102656, septembre 2020
We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp...
