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Balazs Szentes (London School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 1 octobre 2019, 11h00–12h30, salle MS001
This paper considers a Principal–Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is...
1 octobre 2019
Bert Willems (Tilburg University)
TSE, 30 septembre 2019, 14h00–15h30, salle MS001
We solve for Nash equilibria in a procurement auction with two heterogeneous divisible goods and a uniform price for each good. There are (dis)economies of scope in production and goods could be substitutes or complements for the procurer. Before demand is realized, each firm offers a vector of...
Hugues Dastarac (Toulouse School of Economics - Banque de France)
Toulouse : TSE, 30 septembre 2019, 12h30–14h00, salle MF323
Eliana Garces (Facebook)
Toulouse : TSE, 27 septembre 2019, 15h30–17h30, salle MF 323
Aude Grasset
Toulouse : TSE, 26 septembre 2019, 17h00–18h00, salle MS 001
Elyès Jouini (CEREMADE - Université Paris Dauphine)
Toulouse : TSE, 26 septembre 2019, 11h00–12h15, salle MS003
We consider a firm owned by shareholders with heterogeneous beliefs who delegate to a manager the choice of a production plan. Shareholders can trade claims that are contingent on all possible realizations of the firm's output. Shareholders cannot observe the chosen production plan and design a...
Piero Gottardi (University of Sussex)
Toulouse : TSE, 26 septembre 2019, 09h45–11h00, salle MS001
Michele Fabi (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
TSE & IAST, 25 septembre 2019, 12h30–14h00, Building S, salle MS 003
This paper develops a dynamic game with endogenous inspection costs to explain empirically salient bidding profiles in crowdfunding and to characterize how success rates vary with design parameters. In the baseline, bidders arrive at a constant rate and face an inspection cost to learn if they like...
Philippe Aghion (Collège de France)
TSE, 24 septembre 2019, 17h00–18h30, salle MF323
Growth has fallen in the U.S., while firm concentration and profits have risen. Meanwhile, labor’s share of national income is down, mostly due to the rising market share of low labor share firms. We propose a theory for these trends in which the driving force is falling firm-level costs of...
