Jump to navigation
Frédéric Cherbonnier et Christophe Lévêque
n° 21-1255, octobre 2021
Competition can theoretically counter or reinforce tendency of experts to pass biased information to customers. Using data from an online company connecting real estate brokers with clients who want to sell their properties, we show that more competition or lower opportunity to collude induce...
Cristina Gualdani
vol. 224, n° 2, octobre 2021, p. 345–370
We study identification of the players’ preferences in a network formation game featuring complete information, nonreciprocal links, and a spillover effect. We decompose the network formation game into local games such that the network formation game is in equilibrium if and only if each local game...
Koen Jochmans
n° 21-1276, 29 octobre 2021
This note looks at the properties of instrumental-variable estimators of models for non-negative outcomes in the presence of individual effects. We show that fixed-effect versions of the estimators of Mullahy (1997) and Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997) are inconsistent under conventional...
Jérôme Bolte, Lilian Glaudin, Edouard Pauwels et Matthieu Serrurier
n° 21-1243, septembre 2021
We present a new algorithm to solve min-max or min-min problems out of the convex world. We use rigidity assumptions, ubiquitous in learning, making our method applicable to many optimization problems. Our approach takes advantage of hidden regularity properties and allows us to devise a simple...
Fabrice Collard et Omar Licandro
n° 21-1246, septembre 2021
This paper embeds firm dynamics into the Neoclassical model and provides a simple framework to solve for the transitional dynamics of economies moving towards more selection. As in the Neoclassical model, markets are perfectly competitive, there is only one good and two production factors (capital...
Takuro Yamashita et Takeshi Murooka
n° 21-1245, septembre 2021
We study an adverse selection environment, where a rational seller can trade a good of which she privately knows its value to a buyer, and there are gains from trade. The buyer’s types differ in their degree of inferential abilities: A rational type correctly infers the value of the good from the...
n° 21-1244, septembre 2021
We consider an adverse selection environment between an informed seller and an uninformed buyer, where no trade occurs when all buyers are rational. The buyer may be a “behavioral” type in the sense that he may take actions different from a rational type. We show that, for any incentive-feasible...
Laura Doval et Alex Smolin
n° 21-1247, septembre 2021
We study the payoffs that can arise under some information structure from an interim perspective. There is a set of types distributed according to some prior distribution and a payoff function that assigns a value to each pair of a type and a belief over the types. Any information structure induces...
Sylvain Chabé-Ferret et Anca Voia
n° 21-1248, septembre 2021
Grassland, especially when extensively managed and when replacing cropland, stores carbon in the ground. As a result, Grassland Conservation Programs, that pay farmers for maintaining grassland cover, might be an effective way to combat climate change, if they succeed in triggering an increase...
Milo Bianchi et Marie Brière
n° 21-1251, septembre 2021, révision mars 2024
We study the introduction of robo-advising on a large set of Employee Saving Plans. Differently from many services that fully automate portfolio decisions, our robo-advisor proposes investment and rebalancing strategies, leaving investors free to follow or ignore them. The resulting human-robot...
