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Emmanuelle Auriol et Hillel Rapoport
n° 67, novembre 2021
David Bardey, Samuel Kembou Nzalé et Bruno Ventelou
vol. 191(C), novembre 2021, p. 472–500
We study physicians’ incentives to use personalised medicine techniques, replicating the physician’s trade-offs under the option of personalised medicine information. In a laboratory experiment conducted in two French Universities, prospective physicians played a real-effort game. We vary both the...
Francesca Barigozzi et Helmuth Cremer
n° 21-1257, novembre 2021
We study how workers’ concern for coworkers’ ability (CfCA) affects competition in the labor market. We consider two firms offering nonlinear contracts to a unit mass of prospective workers. Firms may differ in their marginal productivity, while workers are heterogeneous in their ability (high or...
Yuzuru Kumon
n° 21-125, novembre 2021
This paper uses a new dataset of Japanese village censuses, 1637-1872, to measure inequality in landownership. Surprisingly, lands were relatively equally distributed, and most peasants were de-facto landowners. Further, there was no trend in wealth inequality. This contrasts with Western Europe...
Christian Bontemps, Kevin Remmy et Jiangyu Wei
n° 21-1258, novembre 2021
In this paper, we estimate a structural model of the domestic US airline market to analyze the effect of the recent merger between American Airlines and US Airways. Our results show that, between 2011 and 2016, a substantial fuel price drop in conjunction with changes in consumer preferences toward...
Marc Ivaldi, Milena J Petrova et Miguel Urdanoz
n° 21-1259, novembre 2021
Airline alliances have a long history yet there is no academic consensus on how they affect price levels and their impact on price dispersion has not yet been studied. We address this question using a novel methodology motivated by the service homogenization and increased price competiton in this...
Hien Pham et Takuro Yamashita
n° 21-1260, novembre 2021, révision mars 2023
We consider an auction design problem with private values, where the seller and bidders may enjoy heterogeneous priors about their (possibly correlated) valuations. Each bidder forms an (interim) belief about the others based on his own prior updated by observing his own value. If the seller faces...
Daniil Larionov, Hien Pham, Takuro Yamashita et Shuguang Zhu
n° 21-1261, novembre 2021, révision avril 2022
We study a mechanism design model with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and I ≥ 4 agents. The principal and the agents share a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states of the world. The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents who can then acquire...
Andreea Enache, Jean-Pierre Florens et Erwann Sbaï
n° 21-1264, novembre 2021
This paper introduces new methods of identification and estimation of the first-price sealed bid auction model and compares them with the previous existing ones. The first method of estimation allows us to estimate directly (through an iterative algorithm) the cumulative distribution function of...
Mariann Ollar et Antonio Penta
n° 21-1262, novembre 2021
