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Stefano Rossi (Bocconi University)
Toulouse : TSE, 23 septembre 2019, 12h30–14h00, salle MS001
Credit Cycles, Expectations, andCorporate Investment We study the real eects of credit market sentiment on corporate investment and nancing for a comprehensive panel of U.S. public and private rms over 1963-2016. In the short term, we nd that high credit market sentiment in year t correlates with...
Miquel Oliu-Barton (CEREMADE - Université Paris Dauphine)
Toulouse : TSE, 19 septembre 2019, 11h00–11h15, salle MS003
The value of a two-player zero-sum game represents what playing the game is worth to the players. The problems of existence and characterisation of the value are at the core of game theory. To illustrate the difference between the two problems, consider the game of chess. Since Zermelo (1913), we...
Yiman Sun ( Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 17 septembre 2019, 11h00–12h30, salle MF323
We model censorship as a dynamic game between an agent and an evaluator. Two types of public news are informative about the agent’s ability – a conclusive good news process and a bad news process. However, the agent can hide bad news from the evaluator, at some cost, and will do so if and only if...
Banque Centrale du Luxembourg, 17 septembre 2019
Markus Reisinger (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management)
TSE, 16 septembre 2019, 14h00–15h30, salle MS001
We analyze vertical contracting between a manufacturer and retailers who have correlated private information. The manufacturer chooses the retail market structure and secretly contracts with each retailer. We highlight a new trade-off between the manufacturer's goal to limit downstream competition...
Alon Brav (Duke University)
Toulouse : TSE, 16 septembre 2019, 12h30–14h00, salle MF323
16–17 septembre 2019, salle MS003
Nathan Miller (Georgetown University)
TSE, 9 septembre 2019, 14h00–15h30, salle MS001
We study an infinitely-repeated game of oligopolistic price leadership in which one firm, the leader, proposes a supermarkup over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. We estimate the model with aggregate scanner data on the beer industry and find the supermarkup accounts for 6% of price. Price...
Matti Keloharju (Aalto University)
Toulouse : TSE, 9 septembre 2019, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
Eric Maskin ( Harvard University)
Toulouse : TSE, 9 septembre 2019, 10h00–11h30, salle MS 001
We show that majority rule is uniquely characterized among voting rules by strategy-proofness, the Pareto principle, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness. Furthermore, there is an extension of majority rule that satisfies these axioms on any preference...
