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Redmond, Washington, E. U., 4–5 octobre 2019
Jean-Paul Azam
3 octobre 2019, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
Eric Gautier ( Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 3 octobre 2019, 11h00–12h00, salle MS003
This paper considers a nuclear norm penalized estimator for panel data models with interactive effects. The low-rank interactive effects can be an approximate model and the rank of the best approximation unknown and grow with sample size. The estimator is solution of a well-structured convex...
Augustin Tapsoba
Being able to assess conflict risk at local level is crucial for preventing political violence or mitigating its consequences. This paper develops a new methodological approach for measuring violence risk across space and time that improves the prediction of future conflict events. Violence is...
David Reiley (UC Berkeley)
TSE & IAST, 2 octobre 2019, 12h30–14h00, Building S, salle MS003
A randomized experiment with almost 35 million Pandora listeners enables us to measure the sensitivity of consumers to advertising, an important topic of study in the era of ad-supported digital content provision. The experiment randomized listeners into nine treatment groups, each of which...
Abigail Adams (Oxford University)
TSE, 1 octobre 2019, 15h30–16h50, salle MS 001
Consideration set models generalize discrete choice models by relaxing the assumption that consumers are aware of all available options. Thus far, identification arguments for these models have relied either on auxiliary data on what options were considered or on instruments excluded from...
Balazs Szentes (London School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 1 octobre 2019, 11h00–12h30, salle MS001
This paper considers a Principal–Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is...
1 octobre 2019
Bert Willems (Tilburg University)
TSE, 30 septembre 2019, 14h00–15h30, salle MS001
We solve for Nash equilibria in a procurement auction with two heterogeneous divisible goods and a uniform price for each good. There are (dis)economies of scope in production and goods could be substitutes or complements for the procurer. Before demand is realized, each firm offers a vector of...
Hugues Dastarac (Toulouse School of Economics - Banque de France)
Toulouse : TSE, 30 septembre 2019, 12h30–14h00, salle MF323
