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Alice Le brigant (ENAC)
Toulouse : TSE, 17 octobre 2019, 11h00–12h15, salle MS003
The goal of quantization is to find the best approximation of a probability distribution by a discrete measure with finite support. When dealing with empirical distributions, this boils down to finding the best summary of the data by a smaller number of points, and automatically yields a K-means-...
Ingela Alger ( Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse;Toulouse School of Economics)
17 octobre 2019, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
Sushant Acharya (New York Fed)
17 octobre 2019, BDF Paris
Daniel L. Chen
TSE & IAST, 16 octobre 2019, 12h00–13h00, salle MS003
Attitudes towards social groups such as women and racial minorities have been shown to be important determinants of individual’s decisions but are hard to measure for those in policymaking roles. We propose a way to address the challenge in the case of U.S. appellate court judges, for whom we have...
Giovanni Compiani (Haas School of Business - University of California - Berkeley)
TSE, 15 octobre 2019, 15h30–16h50, salle MS001
Demand estimates are essential for addressing a wide range of positive and normative questions in economics that are known to depend on the shape|and notably the curvature|of the true demand functions. The existing frontier approaches, while allowing flexible substitution patterns, typically...
Nuno Coimbra (Paris School of Economics)
TSE, 15 octobre 2019, 14h00–15h30, salle MF323
This paper develops a dynamic macroeconomic model with heterogeneous financial intermediaries and endogenous entry. It features time-varying endogenous macroeconomic risk that arises from the risk-shifting behaviour of the crosssection of financial intermediaries. We show that when interest rates...
Nemanja Antic (Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University)
Toulouse : TSE, 15 octobre 2019, 10h30–12h00, salle MS003
We provide a theory of conversations based on plausible deniability in the face of potential public outrage. Two experts with common preferences and some private information exchange messages in order to coordinate on a decision. An uninformed regulator (perhaps the public) has a conflict of...
John Kuong (INSEAD)
Toulouse : TSE, 14 octobre 2019, 12h30–14h00, salle MF323
We consider a model in which dealers need to raise external financing to provide immediacy to their clients, and also exert unobservable effort to improve the chance of closing their positions at a profit. This moral hazard problem reduces the amount of external finance dealers can raise, and...
Torben Mideksa (Uppsala University)
Toulouse : TSE, 14 octobre 2019, 11h00–12h15, salle MS003
What is the best way to price carbon and enhance other global public goods? To answer the question, this paper examines a policy-making game among many countries in the face of cost uncertainty. Governments choose both the type of policy: price or quantity (e.g., carbon tax or emissions quota) and...
Mohamed Baccouche (AXA)
Toulouse : TSE, 10 octobre 2019, 17h00–18h00, salle MS 001
