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Benjamin Moll (London School of Economics)
TSE, 10 mars 2026, 14h00–15h30, salle Auditorium 4
We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a...
Martin Holm (University of Oslo)
10 mars 2026, 11h30–12h30, BDF, Paris, salle 3 Grand Hall
This paper proposes a novel approach to estimate the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) of firm owners using a unique quasi-natural experiment and new theoretical insights regarding the spending response to news about future dividend tax changes. We study the Norwegian dividend tax...
Kelsey Allen (University of British Columbia)
Toulouse : IAST, 10 mars 2026, 11h30–12h30, salle Auditorium 4 (First floor - TSE Building)
Creating and re-purposing objects as tools are universal human capabilities. However, it appears that only a handful of other animals exhibit these behaviors, and these are often regarded as a hallmark of advanced intelligence. In this talk, I will discuss my research aiming to illuminate the...
Martino Banchio (Bocconi University)
Toulouse : TSE, 10 mars 2026, 11h00–12h15, salle Auditorium 3
A seller wants to sell a good to a set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller has private information about her cost, it is impossible for a static mechanism to achieve the optimal revenue. In particular, even the optimal first-price auction is not credible. We show...
Huseyin Yildirim (Duke University)
TSE, 9 mars 2026, 14h15–15h30, salle Auditorium 4
We study how firms design training content to manage the skill distribution of careerconcerned workers. Core training builds common skills, leveling the playing field for promotions, whereas idiosyncratic training (e.g., mentorship) builds unique skills that improve the signaling value of...
Nicholas Vreugdenhil (Arizona State University)
Toulouse : TSE, 9 mars 2026, 11h00–12h15, salle Auditorium 4
Utilities increasingly sell electricity using complex menus of time-constant and time-varying price schedules. We study how to design such a menu to maximize social welfare in a secondbest environment where the marginal private and external costs of generating electricity vary over time,...
Thierry Foucault
Toulouse : TSE, 9 mars 2026, 11h00–12h30, salle Auditorium 6
Private information in financial markets enhances the informational content of asset prices and thereby supports efficient resource allocation. Yet, informed traders extract rents at the expense of uninformed traders, generating a trade-off between price informativeness and liquidity costs....
9 mars 2026, 09h15–17h00, salle Auditorium 3
Michela Boldrini (Bocconi University)
5 mars 2026, 14h00–15h00, Zoom
Online marketplaces rely on opaque ranking algorithms that steer consumers’ choices. We study how transparency about such algorithms affects consumer behavior on Amazon’s marketplace, focusing on the Buy Box—the feature that preselects a default seller for most products. We conduct an online (...
Steven Ongena (University of Zurich, Switzerland)
19 février 2026, 11h30–12h30, BDF, Paris, salle Room 4GH and online
How does pay transparency affect bank opacity? We answer this question by studying the impact of the introduction of pay transparency laws across nine U.S. states with both advert-, individual- and bank-level data. We find that after the introduction: (1) more adverts include pay information; (2)...
