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Charles Pébereau ( Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, 5 octobre 2020, 14h00–15h30, salle Zoom
While disclosing personal information makes individuals accountable for their actions, many laws restrict access to such information. This paper studies the efficient disclosure of information in principal-agent relationships with moral hazard and multiple audiences. The agent's talents are task-...
Matti Liski (Aalto University School of Business - Helsinki)
Toulouse : TSE, 5 octobre 2020, 11h00–12h15, salle Auditorium 6 - Level 3
How to plan for catastrophes that may be under way? In a simple but general model of experimentation, a decision-maker chooses a ow variable contributing to a stock that may trigger a catastrophe at each untried level. Once triggered, the catastrophe itself occurs only after a stochastic delay....
Chanwoo Kim (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE, 2 octobre 2020, 11h00–12h30, salle Zoom
Horacio Larreguy (Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse)
1 octobre 2020, 11h00–12h30, salle Auditorium 3
While inexpensive digital technologies like Facebook can spread misinformation, they could also enhance electoral accountability. We study electoral responses to incumbent performance information disseminated through social media and how these responses vary with information campaign saturation—the...
Laurent Miclo ( Toulouse School of Economics; Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS);IMT)
Toulouse : TSE, 1 octobre 2020, 11h00–12h15, salle Auditorium 5 - 2° floor
By acting on the transmission rate of an infectious disease through various measures, which with we are all familiar today, it is possible to control the epidemic so that the health system is not overwhelmed. Such policies have an economic cost, assumed to be (semi-)linear with respect to the...
Daniel Ershov (Toulouse School of Economics)
TSE & IAST, 30 septembre 2020, 12h30–13h30, Zoom Meeting
Economic theory provides ambiguous and conflicting predictions about the association between algorithmic pricing and competition. In this paper we provide the first empirical analysis of this relationship. We study Germany’s retail gasoline market where algorithmic-pricing software became widely...
Susanne Goldlücke (University of Konstanz)
Toulouse : TSE, 29 septembre 2020, 17h00–18h30, salle Zoom
Chao Fu (University of Wisconsin - Madison)
TSE, 29 septembre 2020, 15h30–17h00, salle Zoom
We build and estimate an equilibrium model of the labor market of public school teachers, where districts are given the autonomy in choosing their teacher salary schemes. In the model, teachers, who differ in their comparative advantages in teaching low- and high-achieving students, care about...
Harold Cole (University of Pennsylvania)
TSE, 29 septembre 2020, 14h00–15h30, salle Zoom
We combine novel data and theory to show that asymmetric information amonginvestors is an important friction in primary sovereign debt markets. We exploit aunique dataset of Mexican auctions for Cetes bonds. Auctions are pay-your-bid, andour data includes all bids made by all individual bidders...
Gernot Müller (University of Tübingen)
29 septembre 2020, BDF, Paris
