Jump to navigation
Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault et Tristan Tomala
vol. 17, n° 2, 2022, p. 883–927
We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further information...
Gilles Lafforgue, Jean-Pierre Amigues, Ujjayant Chakravorty et Michel Moreaux
n° 147, 2022, p. 51–78
In order to encourage substitution of fossil fuels by cleaner renewables, regulatory agencies have generally chosen between two types of renewable energy standards. They have either mandated a minimum volume of renewable energy as in the case of ethanol in transport fuels, and for electricity in...
Jad Beyhum, Jean-Pierre Florens et Ingrid Van Keilegom
vol. 40, n° 3, 2022, p. 1034–1045
This article analyzes the effect of a discrete treatment Z on a duration T. The treatment is not randomly assigned. The confounding issue is treated using a discrete instrumental variable explaining the treatment and independent of the error term of the model. Our framework is nonparametric and...
Atle Haugen
TSE, 2022, révision 10 juin 2026
Helmuth Cremer et Jean-Marie Lozachmeur
vol. 84, n° 102642, 2022
This paper studies a market for a medical product in which there is perfect competition among health insurers, while the good is sold by a monopolist. Individuals differ in their severity of illness and there is ex post moral hazard. We consider two regimes: one in which insurers use coinsurance...
Alessandra Fratini
François Seyler et Arthur Silve
vol. 31, n° 2, 2022, p. 185–190
Sarah Lemaire (Toulouse School of Economics)
Diane Coyle (Bennett Institute for Public Policy)
Ariel Stern
Paris, 2022, révision 10 juin 2026
