Recherche avancée

Sandra Brée, Victor Gay, Marion Leturcq, Yoann Doignon et Baptiste Coumon

vol. 16, février 2026, p. 3–28, 26 pages

Georgy Lukyanov et Anna Vlasova

n° 26-1715, février 2026

We develop a tractable career–concerns model of expert recommendations with a continuous private signal. In equilibrium, advice obeys a cutoff rule: the expert recommends the risky option if and only if the signal exceeds a threshold. Under a mild relative–diagnosticity condition, the threshold is...

Georgy Lukyanov et Samuel Safaryan

n° 26-1714, février 2026

We study public persuasion when a sender communicates with a large audience that can fact-check at heterogeneous costs. The sender commits to a public information policy before the state is realized, but any verifiable claim she makes after observing the state must be truthful (an ex-post...

Georgy Lukyanov et Anastasia Makhmudova

n° 26-1713, février 2026

We study a regime change game in which the state and an opposition leader both observe the regime’s true strength and may engage in costly communication by manipulating the mean of citizens’ private signals. Each citizen then decides whether to attack the regime. From the perspective of both the...

Andrei Gyarmathy et Georgy Lukyanov

n° 26-1712, février 2026

Costly pre-play messages can deter unnecessary wars—but the same messages can also entrench stalemates once violence begins. We develop an overlapping-generations model of a security dilemma with persistent group types (normal vs. bad), one-sided private signaling by the current old to the current...

Emin Ablyatifov et Georgy Lukyanov

n° 26-1711, février 2026

We study optimal taxation when the conversion of tax revenue into public goods is uncertain. In a static Ramsey framework with a representative household, a competitive firm, and two broad instruments (a labor-income tax and a commodity/output tax), a simple measure of trust— the perceived...

Andrea Attar, Lorenzo Bozzoli et Roland Strausz

n° 26-1710, février 2026

We revisit the tension between the legal doctrine of renegotiation and economic efficiency. We introduce self-revealing mechanisms that combine bidirectional communication (the agent sends and receives information) with conditional disclosure (communication remains private during renegotiation but...

Piotr Dworczak et Alex Smolin

n° 26-1709, février 2026

An agent chooses an action using her private information combined with recommendations from an informed but potentially misaligned adviser. With a known alignment probability, the adviser reports his signal truthfully; with remaining probability, the adviser can send an arbitrary message. We...

Olivier Perrin

n° 26-1708, février 2026

We show that the Lorentz Transformation, that appears in the Einstein’s Special Relativity Theory, is necessarily linear.

Alexander Hijzen, Mateo Montenegro et Ana Sofia Pessoa

vol. 98, n° 102826, février 2026

This paper provides an assessment of the 2019 minimum-wage hike in Spain, which increased the minimum wage by 22 % and directly concerned 7 % of dependent employees. We make use of two complementary approaches, one that follows incumbent workers over time and hence does not take account of any...