30 juin - Soutenance de thèse de Matias PIETOLA

30 Juin 2020 Recherche

Monsieur Matias PIETOLA soutiendra sa thèse de doctorat en Sciences économiques le 30 juin 2020 à 11h (Visioconférence)

Si vous souhaitez assister à la présentation, merci de contacter Patrick Rey

Sur le sujet : «Essays on Pricing and Competition »

Directeur de thèse: Professeur Patrick REY

Le jury se compose comme suit :

  • Professeur Massimo MOTTA, ICREA-Université POMPEU FABRA
  • Professeur Paul BELLEFLAMME, Université de LOUVAIN
  • Professeur Juuso VÄLIMÄKI, Université AALTO
  • Professeur Takuro YAMASHITA, TSE
  • Professeur Yassine LEFOUILI, TSE
  • Professeur Patrick REY, TSE

Résumé de thèse (en anglais):

The thesis consists of an introduction and three self-contained chapters. The first and the third chapters analyze the interaction between competition and cooperation, whereas the second one is about pricing and incentives.

Motivated by recent antitrust cases in the pharmaceutical industry, the first chapter studies the interplay between pay-for-delay settlements, licensing deals and litigation. The analysis highlights the externalities that they generate: pay-for-delay settlements reduce competition which encourages entry; licensing and litigation make entering less profitable. Faced with multiple entrants, the incumbent exploits these externalities by offering licensing deals to some entrants or by pursuing litigation in order to decrease the cost of delaying contracts offered to others. The number of delayed entrants increases with patent strength. Entrants without pay-for-delay settlements pursue litigation for patents of intermediate strength; otherwise, they receive licensing deals.

The second chapter studies the conditions under which an intermediary can decentralize the pric- ing decisions of a transaction to privately informed parties. The analysis shows that decentralized pricing is both necessary and sufficient for ex post incentive compatibility if the parties have nega- tively interdependent transaction values (as is often the case in transactions between buyers and sellers: an increase in the quality of the good makes purchasing it more attractive, but increases the seller’s opportunity cost). On the contrary, with positive interdependence, we obtain a negative result. The results provide new insights into robust trading mechanisms, the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation, tax incidence, and pricing in two-sided markets.

The third chapter studies advertising sales’ cooperation between media platforms (television or radio channels, newspapers, etc.) that compete over content offered to consumers. A sales represen- tation agreement, whereby one of the platforms delegates its advertising sales to another platform, in exchange for a fee per subscriber, not only increases the price of advertising, but also reduces content investment. Revenue sharing leads to even less content investment, as the platforms free-ride on the content paid by the othe