Résumé
This paper considers a monopolist selling two objects to a single buyer with privately observed valuations. We prove that if each buyer’s type has a non-negative virtual valuation for each object, then the optimal price schedule is such that the objects are sold only in a bundle; weaker conditions suffice if valuations are independently and identically distributed. Under somewhat stronger conditions, pure bundling is the optimal sale mechanism among all individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms.
Mots-clés
Monopoly Pricing; Price discrimination; Multi-dimensional mechanism design; Pure Bundling;
Codes JEL
- D42: Monopoly
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- L11: Production, Pricing, and Market Structure • Size Distribution of Firms
Remplace
Domenico Menicucci, Sjaak Hurkens et Doh-Shin Jeon, « On the Optimality of Pure Bundling for a Monopolist », 7 juillet 2014.
Remplacé par
Domenico Menicucci, Sjaak Hurkens et Doh-Shin Jeon, « On the Optimality of Pure Bundling for a Monopolist », 7 juillet 2014.
Référence
Domenico Menicucci, Sjaak Hurkens et Doh-Shin Jeon, « On the Optimality of Pure Bundling for a Monopolist », 7 juillet 2014.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
7 juillet 2014