Jump to navigation
Philippe Bontems et Estelle Gozlan
n° 14-468, 5 février 2014
In this paper, we address two questions: (i) how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly, and (ii) how does trade liberalization affect this optimal tax system, and modify the economy's levels of pollution and...
5 février 2014
Augustin Landier
Lukas Buchheim et Robert Ulbricht
n° 14-464, 1 février 2014, révision octobre 2018
We develop a quantitative theory of repeated political transitions driven by revolts and reforms. In the model, the beliefs of disenfranchised citizens play a key role in determining revolutionary pressure, which in interaction with preemptive reforms determines regime dynamics. We estimate the...
Daron Acemoglu et Ufuk Akcigit
1 février 2014
This paper argues that openness to new, unconventional and disruptive ideas has a Örstorder impact on creative innovationsó innovations that break new ground in terms of knowledge creation. After presenting a motivating model focusing on the choice between incremental and radical innovation, and on...
Stéphane Straub
Christian Gollier et Sébastien Pouget
n° 14-457, janvier 2014
This paper studies shareholder engagement in companies' strategic decisions. Differences of objective among shareholders arise in our model due to the presence of socially responsible investors. These investors take externalities into account when valuing their portfolio while conventional...
Thierry Magnac
n° 14-458, janvier 2014
Marcel Boyer et Rachidi Kotchoni
n° 14-462, 31 janvier 2014, révision juillet 2015
L’estimation des surprix des cartels est au cœur de la politique de lutte aux cartels car elle est un élément clé de la détermination des pénalités. Connor et Lande (2008) survolent la litérature sur les majorations de prix des cartels et concluent à une augmentation moyenne variant entre 31% et 49...
Philippe Bontems et Philippe Mahenc
n° 14-467, janvier 2014
This paper addresses the issue of price signaling in a model of vertical relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer who share the same information about quality, unlike consumers who do not observe it a priori. We show that delegating the price setting task to a retailer and controlling it...
