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Francesca Carta (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 17 octobre 2013, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
This paper explores the effect of longer husband's commuting time/distance on: 1) family's time allocation; 2) the spouse's participation and willingness to commute. In a model of family labour supply, we analyze how individual participation costs (namely commuting time) may a ffect the partner's...
Pascaline Dupas (University of Stanford)
Toulouse : TSE, 17 octobre 2013, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
Using detailed data on labor supply and daily shocks, we show that the daily supply of manual, physically-demanding labor responds to both unexpected and expected daily demands on income. What's more, we find that the quitting hazard within a given work day increases discontinuously as earned...
Stefan Hoderlein (Boston College)
Toulouse : TSE, 15 octobre 2013, 15h30–17h00, salle MS 001
Individual players in a simultaneous equation binary choice model act differently in different environments in ways that are frequently not captured by observables and a simple additive random error. This paper proposes a random coeffcient specification to capture this type of heterogeneity in...
Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology)
Toulouse : TSE, 15 octobre 2013, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 001
We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while at the same time expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict...
Amit Ghandi (University of Wisconsin - Madison)
TSE, 14 octobre 2013, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323
In this paper we introduce a new approach to estimating differentiated product demand system that allows for error in market shares as measures of choice probabilities. In particular, our approach allows for products with zero sales in the data, which is a frequent phenomenon that arises in product...
Katya Malinova (University of Toronto)
TSE, 14 octobre 2013, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
We model a financial market where privately informed investors trade in a limit order book monitored by professional liquidity providers. Price competition between informed limit order submitters and professional market makers allows us to capture tradeoffs between informed limit and market orders...
Jan Johannes (Université Catholique de Louvain)
Toulouse : TSE, 11 octobre 2013, 14h00–15h15, salle MF 323
We consider the nonparametric estimation of the slope function in functional linear regression, where scalar responses are modeled in dependence of random functions. The theory in this presentation covers both the estimation of the slope function or its derivatives (global case) as well as the...
Gérard Roland (UC Berkeley)
Toulouse : IAST, 10 octobre 2013, 15h30–17h00, salle MS001
We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under an individualist and a collectivist culture. We show that countries having a more individualistic culture, despite potentially being less able to overcome collective action problems, are more likely to end up adopting democracy...
Yaping Wu (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 10 octobre 2013, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
This paper examines the optimal non-linear reimbursement rule of physicians under three payment methods: pay-for-performance, fee-for-service and capitation, in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard. I provide an argument for the criticism on the shortcomings of fee-for-service....
Olivier Gossner (Paris School of Economics - London School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 10 octobre 2013, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 001
We prove that there exist equilibrium payoffs arbitrarily close to the efficient payoff in the two-player prisoner’s dilemma with low discounting under imperfect private monitoring, provided that the monitoring structure satisfies two restrictions. We assume no communication, and no public...
