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Xavier Ragot (Paris School of Economics)
TSE, 22 septembre 2014, 17h00–18h00, salle MS 001
How do fluctuations in households’ precautionary wealth contribute to the propagation of aggregate shocks? In this paper, we attempt to answer this question by formulating and estimating a tractable structural macroeconometric model of the business cycle with nominal frictions, unemployment and...
Gregory Crawford (University of Zurich)
TSE, 22 septembre 2014, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323
We measure the consequences of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the Italian market for small business lines of credit. We provide evidence that a bank’s optimal price response to an increase in adverse selection varies depending on the degree of competition in its local market....
Gabrielle Demange (Paris School of Economics - EHESS)
IDEI, 22 septembre 2014, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
Many financial assets are disseminated to final investors via chains of over-the-counter transactions between intermediaries (investors or dealers). We build a model where an agent buying some units of the asset can offer to sell part of them to an OTC partner. Intermediation chains are...
Thanh Le (University of Queensland, Australia)
Toulouse : TSE, 22 septembre 2014, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 001
This paper studies the long-run economic impact of natural resources by constructing a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model that incorporates an upstream resource intensive sector. Natural resources are extracted, processed and utilized to produce intermediate capital goods which are essential...
John McNamara (University of Bristol)
Toulouse : IAST, 19 septembre 2014, 11h30–12h30, salle MS001
Dennis Ricket (University of Dusseldorf)
TSE, 19 septembre 2014, 11h01–12h30, salle MS 003
The usefulness of price discrimination, predatory pricing and penetration pricing laws triggers debates among competition authorities and economists ever since the Robinson-Patman Act. The aim of this paper is to shed light on price discrimination strategies by empirically investigating competitive...
Tim Thomes (WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management)
Toulouse : TSE, 18 septembre 2014, 12h45–14h00, salle MS 003
This paper analyzes manufacturers incentives to sustain tacit collusion when they distribute through a common retailer as compared to distribution through independent supply chains. We consider the two scenarios with wholesale contracts being either secret or observable to the competing supply...
Eric French (University College London)
TSE, 16 septembre 2014, 15h30–17h00, salle MS 001
The old age provisions of the Medicaid program were designed to insure poor retirees against medical expenses. However, it is the rich who are most likely to live long and face expensive medical conditions when very old. We estimate a rich structural model of savings and endogenous medical spending...
Jeffrey Ely (University of Northwestern)
Toulouse : TSE, 16 septembre 2014, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 001
I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the...
Sebastian Di Tella (University of Stanford - GSB)
TSE, 15 septembre 2014, 17h00–18h30, salle MS 001
Excessive concentration of aggregate risk can lead to financial fragility and may create the need for financial regulation. This paper studies the optimal financial regulation policy in a standard model where financial frictions are derived from a moral hazard problem, with a focus on the...
