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Panayotis Mertikopoulos (Inria Grenoble)
Toulouse : TSE, 21 novembre 2014, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323
We investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics in which each player plays a “regularized best response” to a score vector consisting of his actions’ cumulative payoffs. Regularized best responses are single-valued regularizations of ordinary best responses obtained by maximizing the...
John Aldrich (Duke University)
Toulouse : TSE, 21 novembre 2014, 10h00–11h15, salle MS001
Toulouse : IAST, 20 novembre 2014, 18h00–20h00, salle Amphi Cujas UT1
Evangelina Pateli (University of Stockholm)
Toulouse : TSE, 20 novembre 2014, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
This paper turns to intermediate import dependence and proposes a relatively simple and tractable framework to examine how real devaluations affect firms' export decisions, their export performance, as well as aggregate trade flows. The model accommodates some well documented facts on the...
Timothy Christensen (New York University)
TSE, 18 novembre 2014, 15h30–17h00, salle MS 001
We study the problem of nonparametric regression when the regressor is endogenous, which is an important nonparametric instrumental variables (NPIV) estimation in econometrics and a difficult ill-posed inverse problem with unknown operator in statistics. We contribute to the NPIV literature as...
Moritz Jirak (Humboldt Universitat zu Berlin)
Toulouse : TSE, 18 novembre 2014, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323
Motty Perry (University of Warwick)
Toulouse : TSE, 18 novembre 2014, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 001
We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents each arrive sequentially and choose one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information revealed by the principal affects the incentives of the agents to explore and generate new information. We characterize the optimal...
Kerem Cosar (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
TSE, 17 novembre 2014, 17h00–18h30, salle MS 001
No paper
Vincenzo Denicolò
TSE, 17 novembre 2014, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323
We propose a new theory of exclusive dealing. The theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals, and that the buyers' willingness to pay for the product is private information. In this setting, we show that the dominant firm can impose...
Philip Bond (University of Washington)
IDEI, 17 novembre 2014, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323
We investigate the consequences of allowing for repeated capital market transactions in a model with asymmetric information between a firm and its investors. All firms in the model possess a profitable project that they need to raise cash to undertake. However, equilibria exist in which firms...
