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Felix Bierbrauer (University of Cologne)
TSE, 13 mars 2015, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 003
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...
Nathalie Luca (EHESS)
Toulouse : IAST, 12 mars 2015, 15h30–16h30, salle MF323
Vincent Meisner (University of Mannheim)
Toulouse : TSE, 12 mars 2015, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who wants to select an optimal subset of projects to maximize her utility. Project costs are private information and the value the designer derives from their provision may vary. In this allocation problem the choice of projects - both which and...
Ivan Fernandez-Val (University of Boston)
TSE, 10 mars 2015, 15h30–17h00, salle MS 001
We consider estimation of general modern moment-condition problems in econometrics in a data-rich environment where there may be many more control variables available than there are observations. The framework allows for a continuum of target parameters and for Lasso-type or Post-Lasso type methods...
Paul Heidhues (ESMT European School of Management and Technology)
TSE, 9 mars 2015, 14h00–15h30, salle MF 323
We initiate the study of naivete-based discrimination, the practice of conditioning offers on external information about a consumer's naivete. We identify a broad class of situations in which such discrimination typically lowers social welfare. In our primary example, a credit market with time-...
Cecilia Parlatore-Siritto (The Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania)
TSE, 9 mars 2015, 12h30–14h00, salle MS 001
I study a dynamic model of optimal funding to understand why liquid financial assets are used as collateral. Firms need to borrow to invest in risky projects with non-verifiable returns. Since projects are profitable and assets allow firms to invest in them, firms with investment opportunities...
Bård Harstad (University of Oslo)
Toulouse : TSE, 9 mars 2015, 11h00–12h30, salle MS 003
Motivated by tropical deforestation, we analyze (i) a novel theory of resource ex-traction, (ii) the optimal conservation contract, (iii) the political regime preferred by the principal, and how this contrasts with the equilibrium regime.(i) This paper first presents a simple model where each...
Sebastian Dengler (Tilburg University)
Toulouse : TSE, 5 mars 2015, 12h45–14h00, salle MF 323
Perfect price discrimination has long been marginalized as a mere theoretical construct with the argument that no encompassing dataset exists as to perfectly anticipate every consumer’s willingness to pay. Recent trends in information technology, commonly referred to as “Big Data”, however, paired...
Dan Bogart (University of California-Irvine)
Toulouse : TSE, 5 mars 2015, 11h00–12h30, salle MF 323
The English East India Company helped build Britain's colonial empire, but the Company was not a leader in East Asian trade for nearly a century after its founding in 1600. This paper argues that its early performance was hindered by a problem of regulatory commitment. It gives a brief history of...
Joon Park (Indiana University)
TSE, 3 mars 2015, 15h30–17h00, salle MS 001
In this paper, we consider regressions with observations collected at small time interval over long period of time. For the formal asymptotic analysis, we assume that samples are obtained from continuous time stochastic processes, and let the sampling interval δ shrink down to zero and the sample...
