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Marie-Laure Breuillé (INRA)
TSE, 18 septembre 2015, 11h00–12h30, salle MS003
We consider a multi-tier government in charge of providing a bun- dle of public goods to a large and diverse population. Public goods differ in both their provision cost and their access cost for the citizens. We characterize the optimal territorial organization, i.e. the number of tiers and...
Kathryn Edin (Johns Hopkins University)
Toulouse : IAST, 17 septembre 2015, 15h30–16h30, salle MS001
Abraham Neyman (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Toulouse : TSE, 17 septembre 2015, 14h00–15h15, salle MF 323
Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we definea cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of boththe competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We proveexistence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU case.Our main result is an extension of...
Jean-Pierre Zigrand (London School of Economics)
17 septembre 2015, BDF, Paris
Sylvain Chabé-Ferret
Toulouse : IAST, 16 septembre 2015, 14h00–15h15, Toulouse, salle MS003
This is a joint seminar that is organized on a rotating basis by the IAST history program along with historians from UT2, IAE, and Toulouse-Science Po. This time it is organized by the IAST history program.
Sophocles Mavroeidis (University of Oxford)
Toulouse : TSE, 15 septembre 2015, 15h30–17h00, salle MS001
Long-run restrictions (Blanchard and Quah, 1989) are a very popular method for identifying structural vector autoregressions (SVARs). A prominent exam- ple is the debate on the effect of technology shocks on employment, which has been used to test real business cycle theory (Gali, 1999, Christiano...
Takuo Sugaya (Stanford Graduate School of Business)
Toulouse : TSE, 15 septembre 2015, 11h00–12h30, salle MS001
We show that the folk theorem generically holds for the repeated two-player game with private monitoring if the support of each playerís signal distribution is sufficiently large. Neither cheap talk communication nor public randomization is necessary.
Pascal Michaillat (LSE)
TSE, 14 septembre 2015, 17h00–18h30
This paper explains the nonneutrality of money from two psychological assumptions: (1) consumers dislike paying prices that exceed some fair markup on firms' marginal costs; and (2) consumers only partially update their beliefs about marginal costs from available information. After an increase in...
Jean François Houde (Wharton)
TSE, 14 septembre 2015, 14h00–15h30, salle MF323
Laurent Calvet (HEC)
Toulouse : TSE, 14 septembre 2015, 12h30–13h30, salle MF323
