Document de travail

Personalization and Privacy Choice

Andrew Rhodes et Jidong Zhou

Résumé

This paper studies consumers’ privacy choices when firms can use their data to make personalized offers. We first introduce a general framework of personalization and privacy choice, and then apply it to personalized recommendations, personalized prices, and personalized product design. We argue that due to firms’ reaction in the product market, consumers who share their data often impose a negative externality on other consumers. Due to this privacy-choice externality, too many consumers share their data relative to the consumer optimum; moreover, more competition, or improvements in data security, can lower consumer surplus by encouraging more data sharing.

Mots-clés

personalization; consumer data; privacy; personalized pricing; personalized recommendations; personalized product design;

Codes JEL

  • D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Référence

Andrew Rhodes et Jidong Zhou, « Personalization and Privacy Choice », TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1525, avril 2024.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1525, avril 2024