Résumé
Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (Math Oper Res 21:209–236, 1996a, Math Oper Res 21:237–251, 1996b), Rosenberg (Int J Game Theory 27:577–597, 1998) and De Meyer and Marino (Cahiers de la MSE 27, 2005) provided an explicit construction for optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information on both sides, in the independent case. In this note, we extend both the duality techniques and the construction of optimal strategies to the dependent case.
Référence
Fabien Gensbittel et Miquel Oliu-Barton, « Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Dependent Case », Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 10, février 2020, p. 819–835.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 10, février 2020, p. 819–835