Abstract
This paper discusses some connections among several robustness concepts of mechanisms in terms of agents' behaviors. Specifically, under certain conditions such as private values and ``rich'' interdependent values, we show that implementation in (one-round or iterative) undominated strategies, a solution concept robust to strategic uncertainty, is equivalent to Bayesian implementation with arbitrary type spaces, a solution concept robust to structural uncertainty.
Keywords
Robust implementation; Strategic and structural uncertainty;
JEL codes
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
Replaces
Takuro Yamashita, “Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation”, TSE Working Paper, n. 14-514, April 2014.
Reference
Takuro Yamashita, “Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 159, 2015, pp. 267–279.
See also
Published in
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 159, 2015, pp. 267–279