Abstract
An agent has different abilities in two types of tasks, which are revealed through his performance over time. He initially decides whether to engage in only one task (specialize) or to take on any task that arises (be a generalist). This decision trades off the cost of being idle against staying available for relatively lucrative tasks. We compare specializing with acting as a generalist in an infinite-horizon model and provide complete characterizations of efforts. We show how specializing acts as a means of committing to exert more effort. In a two-period version of the model, this implies that positive fees for switching strategies are desirable.
Keywords
careers; specialization; incentives; career concerns;
JEL codes
- C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
- J24: Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity
- M50: General
Reference
Heski Bar-Isaac, and Johannes Hörner, “Specialized Careers”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 23, 2014, pp. 601–627.
See also
Published in
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 23, 2014, pp. 601–627