Informed Trading and Maker-Taker Fees in a Low-Latency Limit Order Market∗

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Abstract

We model a financial market where privately informed investors trade in a limit order book monitored by professional liquidity providers. Price competition between informed limit order submitters and professional market makers allows us to capture tradeoffs between informed limit and market orders in a methodologically simple way. We apply our model to study maker-taker fees — a prevalent, but controversial exchange fee system that pays a maker rebate for liquidity provision and levies a taker fee for liquidity removal. When maker-taker fees are passed through to all traders, only the total exchange fee per transaction has an economic impact, consistent with previous literature. However, when investors pay only the average exchange fee through a flat fee per transaction — as is common practice in the industry — maker-taker fees have an impact beyond that of a change in the total fee. An increase in the maker rebate lowers trading costs, increases trading volume, improves welfare, but decreases market participation by investors.

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The most recent decade has brought dramatic changes to the organization of equity markets worldwide. Equity trading is now highly automated: exchanges maintain limit order books, where orders to trade pre-specified quantities at pre-specified prices are arranged in a queue, according to a set of priority rules. A trade occurs when an arriving trader finds the terms of limit orders at the top of the queue sufficiently attractive and posts a market order that executes against these the posted limit orders.

To improve the trading terms, or liquidity, offered in their limit order books, many exchanges provide cash incentives for executed limit orders. These incentives, together with advances in technology, have facilitated the entry of “a new type of professional liquidity provider”: proprietary trading firms that provide liquidity electronically, using sophisticated computer algorithms that do not require a trade-by-trade human intervention. That the cash incentives for liquidity provision give rise to a new type of trader begs the question: how do these incentives affect the trading decisions and trading costs of the other market participants, for instance, long-term investors?

In this paper, we propose a parsimonious model to study these decisions in the new trading environment, namely, in a limit order book where professional traders act as de facto market makers. Crucially, the model captures tradeoffs between market and limit orders in presence of private information. We then apply our model to study the role that cash incentives for liquidity provision play in the current markets.

Exchanges that pay cash rebates to limit order traders that provide, or “make”, liquidity typically levy higher fees to remove, or “take” liquidity on submitters of market orders. This practice is referred to as “maker-taker” pricing and it has been a contentious issue in regulatory and policy debates on market structure.

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1Most exchanges sort limit orders first by price, and then by the time of arrival, maintaining a so-called price-time priority.

2SEC Concept Release on Market Structure, Securities and Exchange Commission (2010), p. 17. These new electronic liquidity providers are often referred to as high-frequency traders, though liquidity provision is only one of the high-frequency trading (HFT) strategies; see Hagströmer and Norden (2013) for details on the diversity of HFT strategies and Jones (2013) for an overview.

The industry debates notwithstanding, the academic literature has questioned whether the maker-taker pricing per se can play an economically meaningful role. Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2011) and Colliard and Foucault (2012) argue that maker-taker fees affect trading only through the total fee that is retained by the exchange, and that in the absence of regulatory and market frictions, the split of this fee into a maker rebate and a taker fee is irrelevant. If a maker rebate is introduced in competitive markets, the bid-ask spread will decline by (twice) the maker rebate. Provided the exchange finances the maker rebate by an increase in the taker fee, the takers’ cum-fee trading costs, i.e. the bid-ask spread plus (twice) the taker fee, remain unaffected.

As a practical matter, however, many long-term investors do not pay taker fees directly and do not receive maker rebates but instead pay a flat fee per trade to their broker, while professional liquidity providers incur per-trade exchange fees and rebates. We investigate this variant on maker-taker pricing by applying our model to a setting where we assume that investors pay only the average maker-taker fee.

Existing models typically either study markets where all available liquidity is provided by competitive market makers or assume that all traders strategically choose between supplying and demanding liquidity and that they have temporal market power in liquidity provision. Analyzing a trader’s choice between market and limit orders is methodologically challenging. When liquidity providers have market power, a limit order submitter must optimally choose the limit order price, while accounting for the impact of the price choice on the probability of the limit order execution. The resulting dynamic optimization problem is especially difficult with informed liquidity provision, as the limit order price may reveal the liquidity provider’s private information.

In this paper, we build on Kaniel and Liu (2006) to provide a model of informed

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trading in a limit order book with competitive market makers. Traders (who we refer to as “investors”) are either informed or uninformed, and trade with market and limit orders; when submitting a limit order, investors compete with uninformed market makers. Price competition in liquidity provision between potentially informed investors and uninformed market makers is a key methodological insight in our paper — it allows us to circumvent the complexity of the optimization problem, because all limit orders are posted at prices that yield zero-profits to professional liquidity providers.

Our setup captures the professional liquidity providers’ advantage in interpreting market data, such as trades and quotes. In practice, the monitoring advantage comes at a cost and professional liquidity providers are arguably at a disadvantage (relative to humans or sophisticated algorithms) when processing more complex information, such as news reports. We capture this difference in information processing skills by allowing some investors an informational advantage with respect to the security’s fundamental value. Investors who are not informed have private valuations (e.g., liquidity needs) for the security.

In equilibrium, an investor’s behavior is governed by his valuation, which is given by his private valuation of the security if he is uninformed, or his private information about the security’s fundamental value if he is informed. Investors with extreme valuations optimally choose to submit market orders, investors with moderate valuations submit limit orders, and investors with valuations close to the public expectation of the security’s value abstain from trading.

Changes in exogenous market factors (e.g., a trading platform’s fee structure) lead to changes in the marginal valuations that investors require to submit market or limit orders, and subsequently, to changes in liquidity, trading volume, and market participation by investors. When investors pay a flat fee in a maker-taker pricing environment,

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5 Assuming that traders have liquidity needs is common practice in the literature on trading with asymmetric information, to avoid the no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey (1982); modelling these needs as private valuations allows use to derive welfare implications.
ceteris paribus, an increase in a maker rebate lowers the bid-ask spread and induces investors previously indifferent to market and limit orders to trade with market orders (since an investor’s trading costs consists, loosely, of the bid-ask spread and the flat fee levied by their broker). Consequently, the probability of a market order submission increases, and so does the trading volume. This would lead to brokers paying taker fees more frequently and consequently charging investors a higher flat fee.

We support this intuition numerically and find further that the increase in the flat fee is more than offset by the decline in the bid-ask spread. For a fixed total exchange fee, investors’ overall trading costs thus decline with an increase in the maker rebate. The marginal submitter of a market order then requires weaker information, and the price impact of a trade declines.

To analyze the impact of maker-taker fees on welfare, we follow Bessembinder, Hao, and Lemmon (2012) and define a social welfare measure to reflect allocative efficiency. Specifically, with each trade, the social gains from trade increase by the difference between the buyer’s and the seller’s private valuations, net of differences in trading fees, and we define the social welfare to be the expected social gains per period. We find numerically that, for a fixed total exchange fee, the welfare increases in the maker rebate, provided the maker rebate is not too large.

The increase in welfare is driven by investors switching from submitting limit orders to trading with market orders, increasing the probability that gains from trade are realized. Limit order provision by investors is inefficient for two reasons. First, an investor who submits a limit order risks non-execution of his own order. Second, this investor possibly imposes a negative externality on the previous period investor — if the earlier investor submitted a limit order on the opposite side, then that order does not execute. In the presence of professional liquidity providers who collect (some of)

\footnote{When the maker rebate is sufficiently large, the spread becomes sufficiently small, and, in equilibrium, investors choose to trade exclusively with market orders. Any further increase in the maker rebate that is financed by an increase in the taker fee leads to a decline in the quoted spreads, but yields no further economically meaningful implications.}
the maker rebates, the flat fee levied on investors acts as a tax on limit orders and as a subsidy on market orders; it thus mitigates the negative externality.

Our paper is most closely related to Colliard and Foucault (2012) and Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013), who theoretically analyze the impact of maker-taker fees. Colliard and Foucault (2012) study trader behavior in a model where symmetrically informed traders choose between limit and market orders. They show that, absent frictions, the split between maker and taker fees has no economic impact, and they focus on the impact of the total fee charged by an exchange. Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013) argue that in the presence of a minimum tick size, limit order book prices may not adjust sufficiently to compensate traders for changes in the split between maker and taker fees. They then show that exchanges may use maker-taker pricing to balance supply and demand of liquidity, when traders exogenously act as makers or takers. Skjeltorp, Sojli, and Tham (2013) support theoretical predictions of Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013) empirically, using exogenous changes in maker-taker fee structure and a technological shock for liquidity takers. Rosu (2009) finds that the prediction of Colliard and Foucault (2012) on the neutrality of the breakdown of the total fees holds in presence of asymmetric information. Our predictions on spreads, price impact, and volume, and the prediction of Colliard and Foucault (2012) are supported empirically by Malinova and Park (2013), who study the impact of the introduction of maker rebates on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

Our work is also closely linked to Degryse, Achter, and Wuyts (2012), who study the impact of the post-trade clearing and settlement fees. In their model, the clearing house may set a flat fee for all trades or impose different fees, depending on whether a trade was internalized. They find that the fee structure affects the welfare of market participants, and that the optimal structure depends on the size of the clearing fee.

The maker-taker pricing model is related to the payment for order flow model, see, e.g., Kandel and Marx (1999), Battalio and Holden (2001), or Parlour and Rajan
(2003), in the sense that both systems aim to incentivize order flow; Battalio, Shkilko, and Van Ness (2012) and Anand, McCormick, and Serban (2013) empirically compare market quality under the maker-taker pricing with that under the payment for order flow model.

Our analysis of a limit order market with competitive informed liquidity provision to the broader theoretical literature on specialist and limit order markets, see, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987), and Glosten (1994), for competitive uninformed liquidity provision; Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005), Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2005), Rosu (2009), Back and Baruch (2013), and Baruch and Glosten (2013) for limit order books with strategic uninformed liquidity provision; Kaniel and Liu (2006), Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009), and Rosu (2013), for strategic informed liquidity provision. The pricing rule model is very closely related to the equilibrium pricing rule in Kaniel and Liu (2006); differently to them, all traders in our model behave strategically. We complement the theoretical literature that focuses on the trading strategies of professional liquidity providers, see e.g., Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2013), Foucault, Hombert, and Rosu (2013), Hoffmann (2012), and McInish and Upson (2012).

1 The Model

We model a financial market where risk-neutral investors enter the market sequentially to trade a single risky security for informational and liquidity reasons (as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Trading is conducted via limit order book. Investors choose between posting a limit order to trade at pre-specified prices and submitting a market order to trade immediately with a previously posted limit order. Additionally, we assume the presence of professional liquidity providers, who choose to act as market makers, and to only submit limit orders. These traders possess a monitoring

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7 See also the survey by Parlour and Seppi (2008) for further related papers.
advantage that allows them to react to changes in the limit order book faster than other market participants. We assume that they are uninformed and that they have no liquidity needs. Professional liquidity providers compete in the sense of Bertrand competition, are continuously present in the market, and ensure that the limit order book is always full.

**Security.** There is a single risky security with an unknown liquidation value. This value follows a random walk, and at each period $t$ experiences an innovation $\delta_t$, drawn independently and identically from a density function $g$ on $[-1, 1]$. Function $g$ is symmetric around zero on $[0, 1]$. The fundamental value in period $t$ is given by,

$$V_t = \sum_{\tau \leq t} \delta_{\tau}$$

We assume that the security is traded throughout a “trading day” where, each period the trading process continues with probability $\rho > 0$; with probability $1 - \rho$ the day ends, and the payoff to the security is realized.

**Investors.** There is a continuum of risk-neutral investors. At each period $t$, a single investor randomly arrives at the market. Upon entering the market, the investor is either informed about the fundamental value or endowed with liquidity needs. Specifically, with probability $\mu \in (0, 1)$ the investor learns the period $t$ innovation to the fundamental value, $\delta_t$, and with probability $1 - \mu$, the investor has a private value for the security, denoted by $y_t$, uniformly distributed on $[-1, 1]$. Informed investors do not have liquidity needs ($y_t = 0$ if an investor is informed).

**Investor Actions.** An investor can submit an order upon arrival and only then. He can buy or sell a single unit (round lot) of the risky security, or abstain from trading.\(^9\) If the investor chooses to buy, he either submits a market order and trades with an existing order at the previously posted ask price $\text{ask}_t$ in period $t$, or he posts

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\(^8\)Assuming that traders have liquidity needs is common practice in the literature on trading with asymmetric information, to avoid the no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey (1982).

\(^9\)We will refer to investors in the male form, and we will refer to the professional liquidity providers in the female form.
a limit buy order at the bid price $\text{bid}_{t+1}$ in period $t$, for execution in period $t+1$. Similarly for the decision to sell. Limit orders that are submitted in period $t$ and that do not execute in period $t+1$ are automatically cancelled. An investor may submit at most one order, and upon the order’s execution or cancellation the investor leaves the market forever.

**Professional Liquidity Providers.** There is continuum of professional liquidity providers who are always present in the market. They hold a monitoring advantage over investors and react to changes in the limit order book quicker than other market participants. These traders act as market makers and post limit orders in response to changes in the limit order book. They compete in prices in the sense of Bertrand competition. Professional liquidity providers are risk-neutral, they do not receive any information about the security’s fundamental value, and they do not have liquidity needs.

**The Limit Order Book.** Trading is organized via limit order book, which is comprised of limit orders. Limit orders last for one period. Arguably, this simplifying assumption is particularly realistic in presence of professional liquidity providers, as investors with lower monitoring intensities may fear that their orders become stale and will be “picked off” by the professional liquidity providers. Professional liquidity providers ensure that the limit order book is always “full” by submitting a limit order when there is no standing limit order on the buy or the sell side. The limit order book thus always contains one buy limit order and one sell limit order, upon arrival of an investor in period $t$. A trade occurs in period $t$ when the investor that arrives in period $t$ chooses to submit a market order.

**Exchange Fees.** The limit order book is maintained by an exchange that charges time-invariant fees for executing orders. The focus of this paper is on maker-taker fees, which depend on the order type (market or limit), but do not depend on whether an order is a “buy” or a “sell”. To simplify the exposition, in the current version we assume that the total exchange fee per transaction is 0 and focus on the split of this
fee into a taker fee, which we denote by \( f \) and a maker rebate \((= f)\)\(^{10}\). For most of our discussion, we focus on the prevalent practice where the taker fee is positive.

Professional liquidity providers receive maker rebates for executed limit orders. We study two settings. In the first, investors pay the taker fees and maker rebates on a trade-by-trade basis. In the second, “flat-fee” setting, investors only pay the average maker-taker fee, through a flat fee per transaction. Our “flat-fee” setting reflects a common practice in the industry: long-term investors typically access exchanges via brokers, who pay the exchange maker-taker fees but levy a flat fee per transaction on their customers\(^{11}\).

**Public Information.** Investors and professional liquidity providers observe the history of transactions as well as limit order submissions and cancellations. We denote the history of trades and quotes up to (but not including) period \( t \) by \( H_t \). The structure of the model is common knowledge among all market participants, but an investor’s liquidity needs and his knowledge of an innovation to the fundamental value are private.

**Professional Liquidity Provider Information.** Professional liquidity providers are able to detect whether a newly posted limit order stems from an investor with liquidity and informational needs or from other professional liquidity providers. This assumption ensures that the model is tractable. We believe that it is consistent with reality, because professional, typically high-frequency, liquidity providers are allegedly good at identifying, for instance, larger institutional orders. Further, within our model, professional liquidity providers react virtually instantaneously to changes in the limit order book (compared to other traders), whereas investors who trade for liquidity and informational reasons arrive at discrete time intervals — consequently, limit orders that are posted by professional liquidity providers are identified by the reaction time. Finally, from a technical perspective, this assumption is equivalent to assuming presence of a single professional liquidity provider who chooses to act competitively.

\(^{10}\)Colliard and Foucault (2012) study the impact of a total exchange fee.

**Timing of Actions.** We model intraday trading. Periods are measured in discrete units (denoted by $t$). Each period marks the arrival of an investor. At the beginning of any period $t$, the limit order book is full in the sense that it contains one buy limit order and one sell limit order. In each period $t$, an investor enters the market, observes the transaction and quote history $H_t$, and either his private valuation $y_t$, or the innovation $\delta_t$ to the security’s value. This investor posts a limit or a market order, or abstains from trading.

When a market order is posted, it executes against a limit order that was posted in period $t - 1$, and the investor leaves the market forever. The limit order book immediately reacts to the information contained in the period $t$ market order and the professional liquidity providers post limit orders to buy and sell.

When a limit order is posted in period $t$, this order remains in the market until the period $t + 1$ investor makes his trading choice or the market closes (whichever occurs first).\footnote{The assumption that limit orders last for a single period is common in the literature, see, e.g., Foucault (1999), and it ensures that the model is tractable.} This limit order possibly interacts with the period $t + 1$ investor’s market order. As with market orders, the limit order book reacts to the information contained in the period $t$ limit order, with a professional liquidity provider posting a limit order on the opposite side of the book.

**Investor Payoffs.** The payoff to an investor who buys one unit of the security in period $t$ is given by the difference between the security’s fundamental value in period $t$, $V_t$, and the price that the investor paid for this unit; similarly for a sell decision. We normalize the payoff to a non-executed order to 0. Investors are risk neutral, and they aim to maximize their expected payoffs. The period $t$ investor has the following expected payoffs to submitting, respectively, a market buy order to trade
immediately at the prevailing ask price \( \text{ask}_t \) and a limit buy order at price \( \text{bid}_{t+1} \):

\[
\pi_{t, \text{inv}}^{MB}(y_t, \text{info}_t, H_t) = y_t + \mathbb{E}[V_t \mid \text{info}_t, H_t] - \text{ask}_t - \text{fee}_t^M
\]

\[
\pi_{t, \text{inv}}^{LB}(y_t, \text{info}_t, H_t, \text{bid}_{t+1}) = \rho \Pr(\text{MS}_{t+1}(\text{bid}_{t+1}) \mid \text{info}_t, H_t, )
\]

\[
\times (y_t + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1} \mid \text{info}_t, H_t, \text{MS}_{t+1}(\text{bid}_{t+1})] - \text{bid}_{t+1} - \text{fee}_{t, \text{inv}}^L)
\]

where \( \text{MS}_{t+1}(\text{bid}_{t+1}) \) represents the period \( t + 1 \) investor’s decision to submit a market order to sell at price \( \text{bid}_{t+1} \) (this decision is further conditional on the additional information available to the period \( t + 1 \) investor); \( \text{info}_t \) represents information of the time-\( t \) investor about the innovation \( \delta_t \), this investor knows the innovation \( \delta_t \) if informed and does not if uninformed; \( \text{fee}_t^M \) and \( \text{fee}_t^L \) denote the exchange fees levied on investors trading with market and limit orders, respectively. An investor’s payoff to submitting a limit order in period \( t \) accounts for the fact that a limit order submitted in period \( t \) either executes or is cancelled in period \( t + 1 \). We focus on the intraday trading, and we assume no discounting. Payoffs to sell orders are analogous.

**Professional Liquidity Provider Payoffs.** A professional liquidity provider observes the period \( t \) investor’s action before posting her period \( t \) limit order. Moreover, she will post a limit buy order in period \( t \) only if the period \( t \) investor does not post a buy limit order. A professional liquidity provider in period \( t \) has the following payoff to submitting a limit buy order at price \( \text{bid}_{t+1} \) is given by

\[
\pi_{t, \text{LP}}^{LB}(\text{bid}_{t+1}) = \rho \Pr(\text{MS}_{t+1}(\text{bid}_{t+1}) \mid \text{investor action at } t, H_t)
\]

\[
\times (\mathbb{E}[V_{t+1} \mid H_t, \text{investor action at } t, \text{MS}_{t+1}(\text{bid}_{t+1})] - \text{bid}_{t+1} - \text{fee}_{t, \text{LP}}^L)
\]

where the exchange fee \( \text{fee}_{t, \text{LP}}^L \) incurred by a liquidity provider when her limit order is executed equals the maker rebate, i.e., \( \text{fee}_{t, \text{LP}}^L = -f < 0 \); analogously for sell orders.

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\(^{13}\)With unit demands of investors, a professional liquidity provider has no incentive to post a limit order “into a queue”: a market sell order that executes against the “first in the queue” order is informative, thus the liquidity provider will want to modify her “second in the queue” order upon execution of the first.
2 Equilibrium: All Pay Maker-Taker Fees

In this section, we assume that maker rebates and taker fees are passed through to all market participants on a per-trade basis.

2.1 Pricing and Decision Rules

**Equilibrium Pricing Rule.** We look for an equilibrium, in which professional liquidity providers post competitive limit orders and make zero profits, in expectation. We denote the equilibrium bid and ask prices in period $t$ by $\text{bid}_t^*$ and $\text{ask}_t^*$, respectively, and we use $\text{MB}_t^*$ and $\text{MS}_t^*$ denote, respectively, the period $t$ investor’s decisions to submit a market buy order price $\text{ask}_t^*$ and a market sell order at price $\text{bid}_t^*$.

The professional liquidity provider payoffs, given by equation (4), then imply the following competitive equilibrium pricing rules, for the maker rebate $f$:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{bid}_t^* &= E[V_t \mid H_t, \text{MS}_t(\text{bid}_t^*]) + f \\
\text{ask}_t^* &= E[V_t \mid H_t, \text{MB}_t(\text{ask}_t^*]) - f
\end{align*}
\]

where we used the fact that history $H_{t-1}$ together with the period $t - 1$ investor’s action yield the same information about the security’s value $V_t$ as history $H_t$ (because information about $V_t$ is only publicly revealed through investors’ actions).

**Investor Actions with Competitive Liquidity Provision.** We focus on investor choices to buy; sell decisions are analogous. An investor can choose to submit a market order or a limit order, and, if he chooses to submit a limit order, technically, he may also choose the limit price. We search for an equilibrium where professional liquidity providers ensure that bid and ask prices are set competitively and equal the expected security value, conditional on the information available to these liquidity providers. An investor’s choice of the limit price is thus mute, since a limit order that
is posted at a price other than the prescribed, competitive equilibrium prices either yields the submitter negative profits in expectation or does not execute, because of the presence of professional liquidity providers. Because an investor is always able to obtain a zero profit by abstaining from trade, we restrict attention to limit orders posted at the competitive, equilibrium prices.

**Non-Competitive Limit Orders.** Formally, the zero probability of execution for limit orders posted at non-competitive prices is achieved by defining appropriate beliefs of market participants, regarding the information content of a limit order that is posted at an “out-of-the-equilibrium” price (e.g., when the period $t$ investor posts a limit order to buy at a price different from $\text{bid}_{t+1}^*$) — so-called out-of-equilibrium beliefs. The appropriate definition of out-of-equilibrium beliefs is frequently necessary to formally describe equilibria with asymmetric information. To see the role of these beliefs in our model, observe first that when an order is posted at the prescribed, competitive equilibrium price, market participants derive the order’s information content by Bayes’ Rule, using their knowledge of equilibrium strategies. The knowledge of equilibrium strategies, however, does not help market participants to assess the information content of an order that cannot occur in equilibrium — instead, traders assess such an order’s information content using out-of-the-equilibrium beliefs. We describe these beliefs in Appendix A and we focus on prices and actions that occur in equilibrium in the main text.

**Investor Equilibrium Payoffs.** Because innovations to the fundamental are independent across periods, all market participants interpret the transaction history in the same manner. A period $t$ investor decision then does not reveal any additional information about innovations $\delta_{\tau}$, for $\tau < t$, and the equilibrium pricing conditions
can be written as

\begin{align*}
\text{bid}_t^* &= E[V_{t-1} \mid H_t] + E[\delta_t \mid H_t, \text{MS}_t(\text{bid}_t^*)] + f \tag{7} \\
\text{ask}_t^* &= E[V_{t-1} \mid H_t] + E[\delta_t \mid H_t, \text{MB}_t(\text{ask}_t^*)] - f \tag{8}
\end{align*}

The independence of innovations across time further allows us to decompose investors’ expectations of the security’s value, to better understand investor equilibrium payoffs. The period \(t\) investor’s expectation of the security’s value in period \(t\) is given by

\[ E[V_t \mid \text{info}_t, H_t] \] = \[ E[\delta_t \mid \text{info}_t] \] + \[ E[V_{t-1} \mid H_t] \], \tag{9}

where \( E[\delta_t \mid \text{info}_t] \) equals \( \delta_t \) if the investor is informed and 0 otherwise. When the period \(t\) investor submits a limit order to buy, his order will be executed in period \(t+1\) (or never), and we thus need to understand this investor’s expectation of the time \(t+1\) value, conditional on his private and public information and on the order execution, \( E[V_{t+1} \mid \text{info}_t, H_t, \text{MS}_{t+1}(\text{bid}_{t+1}^*)] \). Since the decision of the period \(t+1\) investor reveals no additional information regarding past innovations, we obtain

\[ E[V_{t+1} \mid \text{info}_t, H_t, \text{MS}_{t+1}(\text{bid}_{t+1}^*)] = E[V_{t-1} \mid H_t] + E[\delta_t \mid \text{info}_t] \]
\[ + E[\delta_{t+1} \mid \text{info}_t, H_t, \text{MS}_{t+1}(\text{bid}_{t+1}^*)] \] \tag{10}

Further, the independence of innovations implies that, conditional on the period \(t\) investor submitting a limit buy order at price \(\text{bid}_{t+1}^*\), the period \(t\) investor’s private information of the innovation \(\delta_t\) does not afford him an advantage in estimating the innovation \(\delta_{t+1}\) or the probability of a market order to sell in period \(t+1\), relative to the information \(H_{t+1}\) that will be publicly available in period \(t+1\) (including the information that will be revealed by the period \(t\) investor’s order). Consequently, the period \(t\) investor’s expectation of the innovation \(\delta_{t+1}\) coincides with the corresponding
expectation of the professional liquidity providers, conditional on the period $t$ investor’s limit buy order at price $\text{bid}^*_t$.

The above insight, together with conditions (7)-(8) on the equilibrium bid and ask prices, allows us to rewrite investor payoffs, given by expressions (2)-(3) as:

$$
\pi^{\text{MB}}_t(y_t, \text{info}_t, H_t) = y_t + E[\delta_t | \text{info}_t] - E[\delta_t | H_t, \text{MB}_t(\text{ask}^*_t)] 
$$

(11)

$$
\pi^{\text{LB}}_t(y_t, \text{info}_t, H_t) = \rho \Pr(MS_{t+1}(\text{bid}^*_t)) | \text{LB}_t(\text{bid}^*_t), H_t) 
\times (y_t + E[\delta_t | \text{info}_t] - E[\delta_t | \text{LB}_t(\text{bid}^*_t), H_t])
$$

(12)

where we used the fact that when investors pay exchange fees per-trade, an investor’s fees for trading with market and limit orders, respectively, are $\text{fee}^{\text{M}_{\text{inv}}} = f$ and $\text{fee}^{\text{L}_{\text{inv}}} = -f$.

Equations (11)-(12) illustrate, in particular, that investor payoffs are independent of the exchange fees, provided the total exchange fee is 0. In the Internet Appendix, we further show that, for a non-zero exchange fee, the levels of maker the rebate and the taker fee only affect investor payoffs through the total exchange fee, consistent with Colliard and Foucault (2012).

Proposition 1 (Independence of the Maker-Taker Split) For a fixed total exchange fee, investors’ equilibrium strategies and payoffs do not depend on the split of the total fee into maker and taker fees.

Investor Equilibrium Decision Rules. An investor submits an order to buy if, conditional on his information and on the submission of his order, his expected profits are non-negative. Moreover, conditional on the decision to trade, an investor chooses the order type that maximizes his expected profits. An investor abstains from trading if he expects to make negative profits from all order types.

Expressions (11)-(12) illustrate that the period $t$ investor payoffs, conditional on the order’s execution, are determined by this investor’s informational advantage with respect to the period $t$ innovation to the fundamental value (relative to the infor-
tion content revealed by the investor’s order submission decision) or by the investor’s private valuation of the security. Our model is stationary, and in what follows, we restrict attention to investor decision rules that are independent of the history but are *solely* governed by an investor’s private valuation or his knowledge of the innovation to the security’s value.

When the decision rules in period $t$ are independent of the history $H_t$, the public expectation of the period $t$ innovation, conditional on the period $t$ investor’s action, does not depend on the history either. Expressions (11)-(12) reveal that neither do investor equilibrium payoffs. Our setup is thus internally consistent in the sense that the assumed stationarity of the investor decision rules does not preclude investors from maximizing their payoffs.

Expected payoffs of a period $t$ investor are affected by the sum of the realizations of his private value $y_t$ and his expectation of $\delta_t$, conditional on the period $t$ investor’s information. We thus focus on decision rules with respect to this sum, which we refer to as investor’s valuation. We denote the period $t$ investor’s valuation by

$$z_t = y_t + E[\delta_t \mid \text{info}_t]$$

(13)

Informed investors in our model have no liquidity needs; thus $z_t$ equals $\delta_t$ if the investor is informed and it equals $y_t$ if the investor is uninformed. Since $y_t$ and $\delta_t$ are symmetrically distributed on $[-1,1]$, the valuation $z_t$ is symmetrically distributed on $[-1,1]$.

### 2.2 Equilibrium Characterization

We first derive properties of market and limit orders that must hold in equilibrium.

Our setup is symmetric, and we focus on decision rules that are symmetric around the zero valuation, $z_t = 0$. We focus on equilibria where investors use both limit and
market orders. Appendix A establishes the following result on the market’s reaction to market and limit orders.

**Lemma 1 (Informativeness of Trades and Quotes)** In an equilibrium where investors use both limit and market orders, both trades and investors’ limit orders contain information about the security’s fundamental value; a buy order increases the expectation of the security’s value and a sell order decreases it.

Lemma 1 implies that a price improvement stemming from a period $t$ investor’s limit buy order at the equilibrium price $\text{bid}_t^* > \text{bid}_{t+1}^*$ increases the expectation of a security’s value. In our setting, such a buy order will be immediately followed by a cancellation of a sell limit order at the best period $t$ price $\text{ask}_t^*$ and a placement of a new sell limit order at the new ask price $\text{ask}_{t+1}^* > \text{ask}_t^*$ by a professional liquidity provider.

**Lemma 2 (Equilibrium Market and Limit Order Submission)** In any equilibrium with symmetric time-invariant strategies, investors use threshold strategies: investors with the most extreme valuations submit market orders, investors with moderate valuations submit limit orders, and investors with valuations around 0 abstain from trading.

To understand the intuition behind Lemma 2, observe first that, conditional on order execution, an investor’s payoff is determined, loosely, by the advantage that his valuation provides relative to the information revealed by his order (see expressions (11)-(12)). Second, since market orders enjoy guaranteed execution, whereas limit orders do not, for limit orders to be submitted in equilibrium, the payoff to an executed limit order must exceed that of an executed market order. Consequently, the public expectation of the innovation $\delta_t$, conditional on, say, a limit buy order in

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14 Any equilibrium where professional liquidity providers are the only liquidity providers closely resembles equilibria in market maker models in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In such an equilibrium, trading roles are pre-defined and maker-taker fees have no economic impact.
period $t$, must be smaller than the corresponding expectation, conditional on a market buy order in period $t$ (in other words, the price impact of a limit buy order must be smaller than that of a market buy order). For this ranking of price impacts to occur, investors who submit limit orders must, on average, observe lower values of the innovation than investors who submit market buy orders. With symmetric distributions of both, the innovations and investor private values, we arrive at the previous lemma.

### 2.3 Equilibrium Existence

Utilizing Lemmas 1 and 2, we look for threshold values $z^M$ and $z^L < z^M$ such that investors with valuations above $z^M$ submit market buy orders, investors with valuations between $z^L$ and $z^M$ submit limit buy orders, investors with valuations between $-z^L$ and $z^L$ abstain from trading. Symmetric decisions are taken for orders to sell. Investors with valuations of $z^M$ and $z^L$ are marginal, in the sense that the investor with the valuation $z^M$ is indifferent between submitting a market buy order and a limit buy order, and the investor with the valuation $z^L$ is indifferent between submitting a limit buy order and abstaining from trading. Using (11)-(12), and the definition of the valuation (13), thresholds $z^M$ and $z^L$ must solve the following equilibrium conditions

\begin{align}
  z^M &- \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid MB^*_t] = \rho \Pr(MS^*_{t+1}) \times (z^M - \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid LB^*_t]) \\
  z^L & = \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid LB^*_t]
\end{align}

where the stationarity assumption on investors’ decision rules allows us to omit conditioning on the history $H_t$; $MB^*_t$ denotes an equilibrium market buy order in period $t$, which occurs when the period $t$ investor valuation $z_t$ is above $z^M$ ($z_t \in [z^M, 1]$), $LB^*_t$ denotes an equilibrium limit buy order in period $t$ ($z_t \in [z^L, z^M]$), and $MS_{t+1}$ denotes a market order to sell in period $t + 1$ ($z_{t+1} \in [-1, -z^M]$). Given thresholds $z^M$ and $z^L$, these expectations and probabilities are well-defined and can be written out explicitly,
as functions of $z^M$ and $z^L$ (and independent of the period $t$).

Further, when investors use thresholds $z^M$ and $z^L$ to determine their decision rules, the bid and ask prices that yield zero profits to professional liquidity providers, given by the expressions in (8)-(10), can be expressed as

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{bid}_t^* &= p_{t-1} + \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid z_t \leq -z^M] + f \\
\text{ask}_t^* &= p_{t-1} + \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid z_t \geq z^M] - f
\end{align*}
\]

where $p_{t-1} \equiv \mathbb{E}[V_{t-1} \mid H_t]$. The choice of notation for the public expectation of the security’s value recognizes that this expectation coincides with a transaction price in period $t - 1$ (when such a transaction occurs). Since the innovations are distributed symmetrically around 0, the public expectation of the period $t$ value of the security at the very beginning of period $t$, $\mathbb{E}[V_t \mid H_t]$, also equals $p_{t-1}$.

Expanding the above expressions one step further, for completeness, investors who submit limit orders to buy and sell in period $t$, in equilibrium, will post them at prices $\text{bid}_{t+1}^*$ and $\text{ask}_{t+1}^*$, respectively, given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{bid}_{t+1}^* &= p_{t-1} + \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid z_t \in [z^L, z^M]) + \mathbb{E}[\delta_{t+1} \mid z_{t+1} \leq -z^M] + f \\
\text{ask}_{t+1}^* &= p_{t-1} + \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid z_t \in (-z^M, -z^L]) + \mathbb{E}[\delta_{t+1} \mid z_{t+1} \geq z^M] - f
\end{align*}
\]

For an equilibrium to exist, we require that the bid-ask spread is positive. In the absence of fees, the bid-ask spread is positive as long as market orders are informative. When $f \neq 0$, however, this is no longer the case. Equations (16)-(17) imply that in the equilibrium where all pay maker-taker fees, $\text{ask}_t^* - \text{bid}_t^* > 0$ if and only if

\[
f < \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid z_t \geq z^M]
\]

Finally, as discussed above, the equilibrium is supported by out-of-the-equilibrium
beliefs such that professional liquidity providers outid all non-competitive prices. We prove the following existence theorem in Appendix A:

**Theorem 1 (Equilibrium Characterization and Existence)** There exist values $z^M$ and $z^L$, with $0 < z^L < z^M < 1$, that solve indifference conditions (14)-(15). These threshold values constitute an equilibrium in a setting where investors pay maker-taker fees on a per-trade basis, for any history $H_t$, given competitive equilibrium prices, $\text{bid}_t^*$ and $\text{ask}_t^*$ in (16)-(17), for the following trader decision rules, if condition (20) is satisfied. The investor who arrives in period $t$ with valuation $z_t$

- places a market buy order if $z_t \geq z^M$,
- places a limit buy order at price $\text{bid}_{t+1}^*$ if $z^L \leq z_t < z^M$,
- abstains from trading if $-z^L < z_t < z^L$.

Investors’ sell decisions are symmetric to buy decisions.

### 3 Equilibrium: Investors Pay Flat Fees

We now study the market where investors pay only the average exchange fee, through a flat fee per trade. Long-term investors typically trade through a broker, and the flat-fee setting reflects a common practice by brokers of levying a flat fee per trade on their clients. Conditional upon a transaction, the exchange fee incurred by the broker is the taker fee $f$ for the period $t$ investor’s market order (with certainty) plus, if this order traded against the period $t-1$ investor’s limit order, the broker will receive the maker rebate $f$. The expected fee $\bar{f}_{t}^{\text{MS}}$ per investor that the exchange receives from the broker upon an execution of a market sell order in period $t$ is given by:

$$\bar{f}_{t}^{\text{MS}} = \frac{f + (-f) \cdot \Pr(\text{LB}^*_{t-1})}{1 + \Pr(\text{LB}^*_{t-1})}$$

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15 Appendix A further provides the out-of-the-equilibrium beliefs that support the equilibrium prices and decision rules, described in Theorem 1.
where $LB_{t-1}^*$ denotes the period $t-1$ investor’s limit order to buy at the equilibrium bid. As in Section 2, we focus on an equilibrium where investors use stationary, time-invariant threshold strategies with respect to their valuation $z_t$. Since innovations $\delta_t$ to the security’s value and investor private valuations $y_t$ are identically and independently distributed across time, probabilities of market and limit orders to buy and to sell are time-invariant. We continue to focus on a symmetric equilibrium, where investors decisions to buy and sell are symmetric with respect to the valuation $z_t = 0$, so that the probability of a market buy order then equals the probability of a market sell order; likewise for limit orders. Consequently, the expected per-investor fee does not depend on the type of the market order or on the period $t$. Denoting this fee by $\bar{f}$ and writing $\Pr(LB^*)$ for the probability of a limit (buy) order in equilibrium, we simplify (21) to

$$\bar{f} = \frac{1 - \Pr(LB^*)}{1 + \Pr(LB^*)} \cdot f$$  (22)

Since professional liquidity providers receive maker rebates and act competitively, limit order book prices are determined by the same conditions as in the “all-pay” maker-taker fees setting (conditions (7)-(8)). Investor payoffs, however, are affected by the flat fee $\bar{f}$. With the decision rules being stationary, these payoffs are given by

$$\pi_{MB}^*(z_t) = z_t - (E[\delta_t | MB_t^*] - f) - \bar{f}$$  (23)

$$\pi_{LB}^*(z_t) = \rho \Pr(MS_{t+1}^* | LB_t^*) (z_t - (E[\delta_t | LB_t^*] + f) - \bar{f})$$  (24)

where $LB_t^*$ and $MB_t^*$ denote investors’ limit and market buy orders at the equilibrium competitive prices; the stationarity of investor decision rules allows us to drop the
dependence on the history. Substituting in the expression (22) for the flat fee, we obtain

$$\pi^{MB^*}(z_t) = z_t - E[\delta_t \mid MB_t^*] + \frac{2Pr(LB_t^*)}{1 + Pr(LB_t^*)} \cdot f$$  \hspace{1cm} (25)$$

$$\pi^{LB^*}(z_t) = \rho Pr(MS_{t+1} \mid LB_t^*) \left( z_t - E[\delta_t \mid LB_t^*] - \frac{2}{1 + Pr(LB_t^*)} \cdot f \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (26)$$

Equations (25)-(26) illustrate, in particular, that when only investors pay a flat fee per trade, their payoffs are affected by the maker (or taker) fee beyond the effect of the total exchange fee. The split between the taker fee and the maker rebate will thus be economically relevant in this setting.

### 3.1 Equilibrium Characterization

Expression (22) illustrates that the flat fee coincides with the sign of the maker rebate. In particular, when the maker rebate is positive, brokers always set a positive flat fee (despite the zero total fee). The presence of professional liquidity providers ensures that market orders always execute, whereas limit orders only execute when another investor submits a market order. Professional liquidity providers must capture a fraction of the maker rebates, leaving investors to pay a positive exchange fee.

**Lemma 3 (Flat Fee)** The average exchange fee per investor trade \( \bar{f} \) is positive when the maker rebate is positive, and it is negative when the maker rebate is negative.

Our further results on the flat fee setting are numerical. We employ the following family of distributions of the innovation parameter \( \delta_t \), for \( \alpha \geq 1 \).

$$\bar{g}(\delta, \alpha) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{(1-\delta)(\alpha-1)}{\alpha} & \text{if } \delta \geq 0 \\
\frac{(1+\delta)(\alpha-1)}{\alpha} & \text{if } \delta \leq 0
\end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (27)$$

\[16\]Density \( 2\bar{g} \) is a Beta-distribution on \([0,1]\).
We numerically search for an equilibrium, with properties similar to those in Section 2. Specifically, we look for an equilibrium where investors use threshold rules that are symmetric and that do not depend on the history, such that investors with most extreme valuations trade with market orders, investors with moderate valuations trade with limit orders, and investors with valuations around 0 abstain from trading. The equilibrium indifference conditions are analogous to conditions (14)-(15), except that they are adjusted for the exchange fees, using (25)-(26):\(^1\)

\[ z^M - E[\delta_t | MB^*_t] + f - \bar{f} = Pr(MS^*_{t+1}) \left( z^M - E[\delta_t | LB^*_t] - f - \bar{f} \right) \]  
\[ z^L = E[\delta_t | LB^*_t] + f + \bar{f} \]

where the flat fee \(\bar{f}\) is given by (22).

4 Impact of Maker-Taker Fees

We analyze the impact of an increase in the maker rebate (and the taker fee), measured by an increase in \(f\), on quoted and cum-fee bid-ask spreads, trading volume, and market participation. The quoted bid-ask spread is the difference between the ask and bid prices. The cum-fee spread additionally accounts for the fee paid by a submitter of a market order; this fee is the taker fee in the all pay maker-taker fees setting and the flat fee \(\bar{f}\) in the flat fee setting. We measure market participation by the probability that an investor does not abstain from submitting an order, and we measure trading volume by the probability that an investor submits a market order (since market orders always execute in our setting).

Theorem 1 implies the following result for the setting where all market participants pay maker-taker fees per-trade.

\(^1\)Numerically, the solution is always unique. If it were not unique, we would focus on the one that delivers the smallest bid-ask spread in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 (Impact of Maker-Taker Fees: All Pay Maker Taker Fees) In an equilibrium of the symmetric fee setting, thresholds $z^M$ and $z^L$, market participation, trading volume, and cum-fee bid-ask spreads are independent of $f$. Quoted bid ask-spreads decline in $f$.

**Trading Volume and Market Participation.** Equations (23)-(24), which define investor payoffs in the flat fee setting, illustrate that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the maker rebate provides investors with incentives to switch from limit to market orders. All else equal, such an increase will decrease the spread, thus increasing the payoff to market orders and simultaneously reducing the payoff to limit orders. In contrast to the all-pay maker-taker fee setting, however, changes in the bid-ask spread are not offset by the changes in investor fees — because the flat fee charged by brokers does not depend on the order type. Since trade occurs in our model when a market order is submitted, an increase in the probability of a market order implies an increase in trading volume.

The impact on investors who were previously indifferent between submitting a limit order and abstaining from trading is more complex. On the one hand, ceteris paribus, as traders increase their usage of market orders, limit orders are submitted by less informed traders, the price impact of a limit order declines, and limit orders become more attractive. On the other hand, an increase in the maker rebate leads to a decline in the bid-ask spread, making limit order prices less attractive to investors who do not receive the rebate. Numerical simulations reveal that the latter effect dominates in our setting; that is, market participation declines.

**What happens when the maker rebate is very large?** As the taker fee and the maker rebate increase, threshold $z^M$ decreases and threshold $z^L$ increases. When the maker rebate is sufficiently high (relative to the spread), a limit order yields negative profits to investors in expectation, because they do not receive maker rebates. When this happens, professional liquidity providers become the only submitters of limit
orders, while investors trade exclusively with market orders. As a consequence, the flat fee equals the taker fee. The marginal submitter of a market order is then exactly indifferent between submitting a market order and abstaining from trading, and he earns zero expected profits. We denote the valuation of such a marginal submitter by $z_0$, and the value of $f$ that yields $z^M = z^L = z_0$ in equilibrium by $f_0$. Using investor payoffs, given by expressions (23)-(24), together with $\bar{f} = f$, we find that $z_0$ solves

$$z_0 - E[\delta_t | z_t \geq z_0] = 0$$

(29)

A further increase in the maker rebate (above $f_0$) then leads to a further decline in the quoted spread but does not have an effect on investors payoffs, because a decline in the quoted spread is exactly offset by an increase in the average fee, which equals the taker fee. As with the all pay maker-taker fees setting, an equilibrium fails to exist when the maker rebate is so large that the bid-ask spread becomes nonpositive. Similarly to condition (??) for the setting where all market participants pay maker-taker fees per-trade, the bid-ask spread remains positive for fees $f$ that are below value $f_1$ that solves

$$f_1 = E[\delta_t | z_t \geq z^M_0]$$

(30)

**What happens when the maker rebate is negative?** When $f < 0$, i.e. limit order submitters pay a positive fee for executed orders, whereas market order submitters receive a positive taker rebate, liquidity providers offer less than the expected value of the security when buying and they demand more than the expected value when selling the security. Consequently, as the maker fee ($-f$) increases from 0, quoted spreads widen. Investors pay a flat fee (in this case, the fee is negative, so they receive a flat positive rebate), therefore market orders become less attractive to them and limit orders become more attractive.

Intuitively, when the maker fee is positive and high ($f$ is low and negative), the
bid ask spread becomes too wide, market orders earn negative profits for all investors (even after accounting for the positive flat rebate that investors receive on each transaction), and trade does not occur. The equilibrium of the model relies on the ability of professional liquidity providers to compete with investors. In the present setting, the spread will widen to the point where a professional liquidity provider is unable to outbid investors with sufficiently high valuations without making a loss. In the present version of the paper, we thus restrict attention to a positive maker rebate.

Figure 2 illustrates the following observation on order submission decisions.

**Numerical Observation 1 (Fee Thresholds and Equilibrium Actions: Flat Fee)**

There exist $f_0, f_1$, with $0 < f_0 < f_1$, such that in the flat fee setting

(i) investors submit both market and limit orders in equilibrium with $f < f_0$;

(ii) investors submit only market orders in equilibrium when $f_0 \leq f < f_1$;

(iii) a stationary equilibrium with trade does not exist when $f \geq f_1$.

Threshold $f_0$ is the value of $f$ that yields solutions $z^M = z^L = z^M_0$ to equations (28), and threshold $f_1$ solves (30).

Figure 3 illustrates the following observation on probabilities of order submissions and the implications for trading volume and market participation.

**Numerical Observation 2 (Volume and Market Participation: Flat Fee)** As the maker rebate $f$ increases, for $0 \leq f \leq f_0$, the probability that an investor

(i) submits a market order increases (trading volume increases);

(ii) submits a limit order decreases;

(iii) abstains from trading (weakly) increases (market participation declines).

These probabilities do not depend on $f$ when $f_0 < f < f_1$ (i.e., when the maker rebate is sufficiently large and investors trade only with market orders).
**Quoted Bid-Ask Spread.** As the maker rebate increases \((f \text{ increases})\), more investors submit market orders, that is they submit aggressive orders for lower values of the innovations \(\delta_t\). Furthermore, as \(f\) increases, the bid-ask spread declines because professional liquidity providers compete the benefits of the increased rebate away. Both of these effects lead to a decline in the quoted bid-ask spread.

**Cum-Fee Bid-Ask Spread.** The cum-fee spread accounts for the fee that an investor pays to his broker:

\[
\text{cum-fee spread} = \text{ask}_t^* - \text{bid}_t^* + 2 \bar{f}
\]

where the factor 2 accounts for the fact that the bid-ask spread is a cost of a round-trip transaction, so that the fee is paid twice. As the maker rebate increases \((f \text{ increases})\), the probability of a limit order declines, and expression \([22]\) reveals that \(\bar{f}\) increases as long as \(f < f_0\). Numerically, this increase is more than offset by the decline in the quoted spread, so that the cum-fee spread declines. Figure 4 illustrates the following observation

**Numerical Observation 3 (Quoted and Cum-Fee Spreads: Flat Fee)** As the taker fee and the maker rebate increase \((f \text{ increases})\), for \(0 < f < f_1\),

(i) the quoted bid-ask spread declines;

(ii) the broker flat fee \(\bar{f}\) increases;

(iii) the cum-fee spread declines for \(f < f_0\), and it is independent of \(f\) for \(f \geq f_0\) (when investors trade only with market orders).

**Price Impact.** The price impact of a trade measures the change in the public expectation following the execution of a trade. In our model, this change is determined, loosely, by the information content of market orders about the time-\(t\) innovation \(\delta_t\). Specifically, the price impact of a buyer-initiated transaction is given by:

\[
\text{price impact}_{\text{buy},t} = \mathbb{E}[V_t \mid \text{MB}_t] - p_{t-1} = \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid \text{MB}_t]
\]

(32)
Using expression (17) for the equilibrium ask price $a_{k_t}^*$, we find that for a positive maker rebate ($f > 0$) the price impact of a trade is higher than indicated by a transaction price:

$$\text{price impact}_{buy,t} = E[\delta_t \mid MB_t] = a_{k_t}^* + f - p_{t-1} > a_{k_t}^* - p_{t-1}$$

Figure 5 illustrates the above relation between the quoted half-spread, $a_{k_t}^* - p_{t-1}$.

Numerical Observation 2 illustrated, in particular, that as the taker fee $f$ increases, the marginal submitter of a market order requires a lower valuation. Market orders are then submitted for lower absolute values of realizations of the innovations $\delta_t$. This insight explains the following numerical observation, illustrated by Figure 5.

**Numerical Observation 4 (Price Impact: Flat Fee)** The price impact of a trade is decreasing in the level of the maker rebate $f$ on $[0, f_0]$, and constant on $(f_0, f_1]$ (when investors trade only with market orders).

Numerical Observation 4 is supported empirically by Malinova and Park (2013).

**Welfare.** Each investor in our setting has a private valuation for the security, and we follow Bessembinder, Hao, and Lemmon (2012) to define a social welfare measure that reflects allocative efficiency. Specifically, we define welfare as the expected gain from trade in the market for a given period $t$. If a transaction occurs in period $t$, then the welfare gain is given by the private valuation of a buyer, net of the exchange fee paid by the buyer, minus the private valuation of a seller, net of the exchange fee paid by the seller.

A transaction in period $t$ occurs when the period $t$ investor submits a market buy or a market sell order. Focusing on a submitter of a buy market order: this investor trades with the period $t-1$ investor if the period $t-1$ investor submitted a limit sell order and he trades with a professional liquidity provider otherwise. With a flat fee set to equal the average fee paid by an investor, the expected aggregate fee on each
transaction is zero. Accounting for the fact that a professional liquidity supplier has a zero private valuation, by symmetry, we obtain the following expression for the welfare:

\[ W_t = 2 \cdot \Pr(MB_t) (E[y_t \mid H_t, MB_t] - \rho \cdot \Pr(LS_{t-1}) \cdot E[y_{t-1} \mid H_{t-1}, MB_t, LS_{t-1}]) \quad (34) \]

Theorem 1 implies the following result for the case where investors pay maker-taker fees on a trade-by-trade basis.

**Corollary 2 (Social Welfare: All Pay Maker-Taker Fees)**  In a setting where investors pay maker-taker fees on a per-trade basis, expected total welfare \( W_t \) is not affected by the split of the total exchange fee into a maker rebate and a taker fee.

When the maker fee increases (and the taker fee increases by the same amount), the quoted spread narrows, and two changes occur. First, some investors switch from submitting limit orders to trading with market orders, increasing the execution probability of their own order (to certainty), and also increasing the execution probability of a limit order, the so-called fill rate, for the remainder of the limit order submitters. Second, some investors switch from submitting limit orders to abstaining from trade, failing to realize any potential gains from trade. Figure 6 and Numerical Observation 5 illustrate that the benefit of an increased fill rate to investors who remain in the market exceeds the loss of potential gains from trade to investors who choose to leave the market.

**Numerical Observation 5 (Social Welfare: Flat Fee)**  In a setting where investors pay a flat fee per trade, expected total welfare \( W_t \) is increasing in the level of the maker rebate \( f \) on \([0, f_0]\), and it is constant in \( f \) on \((f_0, f_1]\) (when investors trade only with market orders).

In a world where exchange maker-taker fees are only passed through on average, our results suggest that positive maker rebates have a positive effect on social welfare.
Allocative efficiency is highest when investors only trade with market orders (or not at all). An implication of our result on social welfare is that it is socially beneficial for investors and professional liquidity providers to specialize: investors submitting market orders, and; professional liquidity providers providing liquidity.

The intuition for the welfare increase stems from the increased frequency of investors realizing their gains from trade. Professional liquidity providers do not have any private values and thus do not receive any gains from trade. Since these traders ensure that the limit order book is always full, liquidity provision by investors is socially inefficient. An investor who submits a limit order faces the risk of non-execution for his own limit order and also possibly imposes a negative externality on the previous period investor if that investor’s limit order did not get executed. As discussed above, in the presence of professional liquidity providers, the flat fee is positive but below the taker fee. Under the flat fee structure, market orders incur the taker fee but their submitters pay the lower flat fee, whereas limit orders deliver the rebate, yet their submitters pay the fee. Flat fee thus effectively works as a tax that redistributes the exchange fee among investors with heterogeneous valuations and mitigates the aforementioned externality.

5 Conclusion

We provide a model to analyze a financial market where investors trade for informational and liquidity reasons in a limit order book that is monitored by professional liquidity providers. Methodologically, price competition between informed investors and uninformed market makers is a key feature of our model; it allows us study the impact of exogenous market factors on the tradeoffs between market and limit orders.

We apply our model to study the impact of maker-taker fees. When all traders pay the maker-taker fees, investor behavior is affected only through the total fee charged by the exchange (the taker fee minus the maker rebate), consistent with Colliard and
Foucault (2012). When, however, we study the most common implementation of the maker-taker fees through a flat fee levied on investors (e.g., Fidelity cites a flat fee of $7.95 per trade on their website), the split of the total exchange fee into the maker fee and the taker fee also plays a meaningful role (even when the maker-taker fees are passed through to investors on average).

Our empirical predictions support the industry’s opinions on the impact of maker-taker pricing on long-term investors. Indeed, we predict that if a positive maker rebate is introduced (financed by an increase in the taker fee), investors trade on the liquidity demanding side more frequently, submit fewer limit orders, and choose to abstain from trading more often. As investors realize their gains from trade more frequently, allocative efficiency improves. Our model also predicts an increase in the average exchange fee that a broker incurs when executing client orders, consistent with industry concerns. Contrary to industry opinions, we find that trading costs for liquidity demanders decrease, because a decline in the quoted spreads more than offsets the increase in the average exchange fee. One key contributor to the decline in trading costs for liquidity demanders is the decrease in price impact of trades — as more less-informed investors trade aggressively, using market orders, trades become less informative. Malinova and Park (2013) find empirical support for our predictions.

Our results have several policy implications. First, we find that in markets where brokers charge investors a flat fee per trade, the levels of maker and taker fees have an economic effect beyond that of the total exchange fee. Our results show, in particular, that when the fee is passed through only on average, through a flat commission, investors’ trading incentives are different to the situation where investors pay taker fees and receive maker rebates for each executed trade. The flat fee improves welfare by acting as a tax on the socially inefficient liquidity provision by investors and as a subsidy for investors who trade with market orders.

Second, we reiterate the importance of accounting for the exchange trading fees
(see, e.g., Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2011), Colliard and Foucault (2012), or Battalio,
Shkilko, and Van Ness (2012).) A lower quoted spread need not imply lower trading
costs for investors, and consequently, routing orders to the trading venue that is quoting
the best price need not guarantee the best execution.

Third, we caution that the causal relations among trading volume, trading costs,
and competition for liquidity providers are more complex than the taken-at-face-value
intuition would suggest. An increase in volume in our setting is driven by changes in
investor trading behavior. These changes necessitate a higher rate of participation by
professional liquidity providers, which may manifest itself empirically as an increase in
competition among professional liquidity providers.\footnote{In our model, professional liquidity providers compete in prices; empirical assessments typically
measure competition in quantities.} Hence, an empirically observed
increase in competition need not be the driving force of changes in trading volume and
trading costs.
A Appendix

A.1 Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2

Proof. In the main text, we present the two lemmas separately, for the ease of exposition. Here we establish the two results simultaneously. We restrict attention to an equilibrium where investors use symmetric, time-invariant strategies and trade with both, market and limit orders. Since we search for an equilibrium with competitive pricing, an investor’s equilibrium action does not affect the price that he pays or the probability of his limit order execution. We show, in 5 steps, that in any such equilibrium investors must use decision rules that lead to Lemmas 1 and 2.

Step 1: In any equilibrium, an investor with the valuation $z_t$ prefers a market (limit) buy order to a market (limit) sell order if and only if $z_t \geq 0$.

Proof: Using (11), an investor’s payoff to a market buy order is $z_t - \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid H_t, MB_t(ask_t^*)]$. When innovations $\delta_t$ are independent across time and investors’ equilibrium strategies are time-invariant functions of $z_t$, the expectation $\mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid H_t, MB_t(ask_t^*)]$ does not depend on the history $H_t$ or on the ask price $ask_t^*$. With symmetric decision rules, $\mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid MB_t] = -\mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid MS_t]$; investor payoff (11) and an analogous payoff for sell orders then yield Step 1 for market orders. Similarly, symmetry, expression (12) and an analogous expression for limit sell orders yield the result for limit orders.

Step 2: In any equilibrium, there must exist $z^* \in (0, 1)$ such that an investor with valuation $z_t$ prefers a market buy order to a limit buy order if and only if $z_t \geq z^*$, with indifference if and only if $z_t = z^*$.

Proof: Comparing investor equilibrium payoffs (11) and (12), an investor with valuation $z_t$ prefers a market buy order to a limit buy order if and only if

$$z_t \geq \frac{\mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid MB_t] - \Pr(\text{MS}_t)\mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid LB_t]}{1 - \Pr(\text{MS}_t)} \equiv z^*.$$

(35)
The fraction in (35) is well-defined in an equilibrium where investors submit both market and limit orders, since $0 < \Pr(MS_t) < 1$. Next, for investors to submit limit orders with positive probability, there must exist $z$ such that for the investor with the valuation $z_t = z$, the payoff to a limit buy order $(i)$ exceeds that to the market buy order and $(ii)$ is non-negative. For this $z$, we then have

$$z - \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | MB_t] \leq \Pr(MS_t)(z - \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | LB_t]) \leq z - \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | LB_t]$$  \hspace{1cm} (36)$$

Hence, $\mathbb{E}[\delta_t | MB_t] \geq \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | LB_t]$. Since $0 < \Pr(MS_t) < 1$, the following inequalities are strict: $\mathbb{E}[\delta_t | MB_t] > \Pr(MS_t)\mathbb{E}[\delta_t | LB_t]$ and $z^* > 0$.

**Step 3:** In any equilibrium, submitting the market buy order is strictly optimal for an investor with valuation $z_t > z^*$.

*Proof:* By Steps 1 and 2, an investor with valuation $z_t$ such that $z_t > z^* > 0$ strictly prefers a market buy order to a market sell order and to a limit buy order (and, consequently, by Step 1, to a limit sell order). Finally, an investor with valuation $z_t > z^*$ strictly prefers submitting a market order to abstaining from trade, as:

$$z_t - \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | MB_t] > \frac{\mathbb{E}[\delta_t | MB_t] - \Pr(MS_t)\mathbb{E}[\delta_t | LB_t]}{1 - \Pr(MS_t)} - \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | MB_t] \geq 0,$$

where the last inequality follows since $\mathbb{E}[\delta_t | LB_t] \leq \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | MB_t]$ by Step 2.

**Step 4:** In any equilibrium, an optimal action for an investor with valuation $z_t \in (0, z^*)$ must be either a limit buy order or a no trade.

*Proof:* This investor prefers a limit buy order to a market buy order by Step 2, and the investor prefers a limit buy order to a limit sell order by Step 1, which in turn is preferred by a market sell order by symmetry and Step 2.
**Step 5:** There exists \( z^{**} \in (0, z^*) \) such that an investor with the valuation \( z_t = z^{**} \) is indifferent between submitting a limit buy order and abstaining from trade; it is strictly optimal for an investor with valuation \( z_t \in (z^{**}, z^*) \) to submit a limit buy order, and it is strictly optimal for an investor with valuation \( z_t \in [0, z^{**}) \) to abstain from trading.

**Proof:** In an equilibrium where investors submit both market and limit orders the probability of a limit order is strictly positive, consequently, the limit buy order is preferred to abstaining from trade if and only if an investor’s valuation \( z_t > \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | \text{LB}_t] \) (and, by Step 4, the limit buy order is then the optimal action for this investor, and abstaining from trade is optimal for an investor with \( z_t < \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | \text{LB}_t] \)). For investors to submit both market and limit orders with non-zero probability, in equilibrium we must have \( \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | \text{LB}_t] < z^* \) (otherwise, by Step 3, any investor, except for the zero-probability case of \( z_t = z^* \) that prefers the limit order to abstaining from trade also strictly prefers the market buy order to the limit buy order). We are looking for a stationary equilibrium and the distribution of \( \delta_t \) does not depend on \( t \), hence \( \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | \text{LB}_t] \) does not depend on \( t \) and we can thus set \( z^{**} = \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | \text{LB}_t] \).

What remains to be shown is that \( \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | \text{LB}_t] > 0 \). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose not and \( \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | \text{LB}_t] \leq 0 \). Then, by Steps 1-4, in a symmetric equilibrium, the limit buy is strictly optimal for an investor with \( z \in (0, z^*) \); it is strictly optimal for an investor with \( z > z^* \) to submit the market buy order; it is strictly optimal for an investor with valuation \( z_t < 0 \) to submit either the market or the limit sell orders; finally, investors with \( z_t = 0 \) and \( z_t = z^* \) are indifferent between the limit buy and a different action (the limit sell and the market buy, respectively) and they occur with zero probability. This implies that limit buy orders are only submitted by investors whose valuations are (weakly or strictly) in the interval of \([0, z^*]\) and only by these investors. But then \( \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | \text{LB}_t] = \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | z_t \in (0, z^*)] > 0 \), a contradiction.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\)The inequality follows because \( z = y_t + \delta_t \), where \( y_t \) and \( \delta_t \) are independent and symmetrically distributed on \([-1, 1]\); the explicit derivation of this expectation is in the Internet Appendix.
Steps 1-5 show that threshold rules are optimal in any symmetric, time-invariant equilibrium where traders submit both market and limit orders, and that investors with the more extreme valuations submit market orders, investors with moderate valuations submit limit orders, and investors with valuations close to zero abstain from trade. Given threshold rules described in these steps, (investors’) quotes are informative because $E[\delta_t | LB_t] = E[\delta_t | z \in (z^{**}, z^*)] > 0$ and trades are informative because $E[\delta_t | MB_t] = E[\delta_t | z \in (z^*, 2)] > 0$. Furthermore, by the proof of Step 2, a trade has a higher price impact than a quote. ■

A.2 Proof of Theorem 1

Proof. To prove existence of a symmetric, stationary equilibrium in threshold strategies, we show that there exist a $z_L$ and $z_M$, such that $z_L \leq z_M$. We then prove the optimality of the threshold strategy. The equilibrium conditions (14) and (15) can be written as:

$$z_M - E[\delta_t | MB_t^*] - \rho \Pr(MS_{t+1}^* \times (z^M - E[\delta_t | LB_t^*]) = 0 \quad (37)$$

$$z_L - E[\delta_t | LB_t^*] = 0 \quad (38)$$

where an investor submits a market buy over a limit buy as long as $z_t \geq z^M$, submits a limit buy if $z^M > z_t \geq z^L$, and abstains from trading otherwise.

The probability of a market sell order $\Pr(MS_{t+1})$ is a function of $z^M$:

$$\Pr(MS_{t+1}) = \mu \int_{-1}^{1} g(\delta) d\delta + (1 - \mu)(1 - z^M),$$

where as in the main text, $\mu \in (0, 1)$ is the probability that an investor is informed, $g$ denotes the density function of the time-$t$ innovation $\delta_t$ and it is symmetric on $[-1,1]$; private values are distributed uniformly on $[-1,1]$. The price impacts of market and limit buy orders, $E[\delta_t | MB_t^*]$ and $E[\delta_t | LB_t^*]$, are functions of $z^M$ and of $z^M$ and $z^L$, respectively.
respectively:

\[
E[\delta_t \mid MB_t^*] = \frac{\mu \int_{z_M}^{1} \delta g(\delta) d\delta}{\mu \int_{z_M}^{1} g(\delta) d\delta + (1 - \mu)(1 - z^M)}
\]  

\[
E[\delta_t \mid LB_t^*] = \frac{\mu \int_{z_L}^{z_M} \delta g(\delta) d\delta}{\mu \int_{z_L}^{z_M} g(\delta) d\delta + (1 - \mu)(z^M - z^L)},
\]  

We proceed in 3 steps. In step 1, we show that for any \(z^M \in [0, 1]\), there exists a unique \(z^L = z_L^*\) that solves (38). Defining function \(z^*(\cdot)\) for each \(z^M\) as \(z^*(z^M) = z_L^*\), we show that \(z^*(\cdot)\) is continuous. In Step 2, we show that there exists a \(z^M \in (0, 1)\) that solves (37). Finally, in Step 3, we argue the optimality of the threshold strategy.

A.2.1 Step 1: Existence and Uniqueness of \(z_L^*(z^M)\)

Denote the left-hand side of (38) by \(\Delta_{LB}(z^M, z^L)\). First, using (40), \(\Delta_{LB}(z^M, 0) < 0\). Second, when \(z^L = z^M\), by L’Hospital’s Rule,

\[
\Delta_{LB}(z^M, z^M) = z^M - \frac{\mu z^M g(z^M)}{\mu g(z^M) + (1 - \mu) z^M} = \frac{(1 - \mu) z^M}{\mu g(z^M) + (1 - \mu) z^M} > 0.
\]  

Function \(\Delta_{LB}(\cdot, \cdot)\) is continuous, and the above two observations imply that there exists \(z^L = z_L^* \in (0, z^M)\) that solves equation (38).

Next, we will show that at \(z^L = z_L^*\), the derivative of \(\Delta_{LB}(z^M, \cdot)\) with respect to the second argument is \(> 0\) for all \(z^M\). This step ensures uniqueness of \(z_L^*\) and also, by the Implicit Function Theorem, the existence of a differentiable (and therefore continuous) function \(z^*(\cdot)\) such that \(z^*(z^M) = z_L^*\). Denoting the probability of an equilibrium limit order (which is given by the denominator of the right-hand-side of (41)), given thresholds \(z^M\) and \(z^L = z_L^*\), by \(Pr(LB^*)\) and denoting the partial derivative of \(\Delta_{LB}(\cdot, \cdot)\) with respect to the second argument by \(\Delta_{z_L}^{LB}(\cdot, \cdot)\), we obtain:
\[
\Delta_{LB}(z^M, z^L)|_{z^L = z^*} = 1 - \frac{1}{\Pr(LB^*)} \times \left[ -\mu z^* g(z^*) - E[\delta_t | LB^*] \right] \\
\times (-\mu g(z^*) - (1 - \mu)) = 1 - (1 - \mu) \frac{E[\delta_t | LB^*]}{\Pr(LB^*)},
\]

where the last equality follows from \(E[\delta_t | LB^*] = z^L\). Hence, the desired inequality
\[
\Delta_{LB}(z^M, z^L)|_{z^L = z^*} > 0 \text{ holds if and only if } \Pr(LB^*) > (1 - \mu)E[\delta_t | LB^*].
\]

To show the latter inequality, we use \(z^L = E[\delta_t | LB^*]\) and rewrite (41) as follows:
\[
z^L = \frac{\int_{z^L}^{z^*} \delta g(\delta) d\delta}{\int_{z^L}^{z^*} g(\delta) d\delta} - \frac{\mu \int_{z^L}^{z^*} g(\delta) d\delta}{\mu \int_{z^L}^{z^*} g(\delta) d\delta + (1 - \mu)(z^M - z^*)}
\]

where the inequality obtains because \(z^L \in (0, z^M)\). Subtracting \(z^M\) from both sides of (44), and rearranging:
\[
z^M - z^L > z^M \times \left( 1 - \frac{\mu \int_{z^L}^{z^*} g(\delta) d\delta}{\Pr(LB^*)} \right)
\]

where the last inequality follows from \(z^L < z^M\). The above inequality implies the desired inequality \(\Pr(LB^*) > (1 - \mu)E[\delta_t | LB^*]\) and thus \(\Delta_{LB}(z^M, z^L)|_{z^L = z^*} > 0\).

Thus, there exists a unique \(z^L\) that solves indifference equation (38) for any \(z^M \in [0, 1]\), and a continuous function \(z^*(\cdot)\) such that \(z^*(z^M) = z^L\).

A.2.2 Step 2: Existence of \(z^M\)

Similarly, we denote the left-hand side of equation (37) as \(\Delta_{MB}(z^M, z^L)\). Function \(\Delta_{MB}(\cdot, \cdot)\) is continuous in both arguments, and therefore function \(\Delta_{MB}(\cdot, z^*(\cdot))\) is con-
tinuous in $z^M$. We have:

$$\Delta^{MB}(0, z^*(0)) = 0 - E[\delta_t | MB_t^*] - \rho \Pr(MS_{t+1}^*) \times (0 - 0) < 0 \quad (46)$$

$$\Delta^{MB}(1, z^*(1)) = 1 - E[\delta_t | MB_t^*] - 0 \times (z^{M*} - z^{L*}) > 0, \quad (47)$$

where the inequalities follow directly from expressions (39)-(41). □

A.2.3 Step 3: Optimality of the Threshold Strategies

The intuition for the optimality of the threshold strategies stems from competitive pricing and stationarity of investor decisions. An investor’s deviation from one equilibrium action to another equilibrium action will not affect equilibrium bid and ask prices or probabilities of the future order submissions. Consequently, it is possible to show that the difference between a payoff to a market order and a payoff to a limit order at the equilibrium price to an investor with an valuation above $z^M$ is strictly greater than 0. (The formal argument is to be typeset).

Out-Of-The-Equilibrium-Beliefs. A more complex scenario arises when an investor deviates from his equilibrium strategy by submitting a limit order at a price different to the prescribed competitive equilibrium price. Whether or not this investor expects to benefit from such a deviation depends on the reaction to this deviation by the professional liquidity providers and investors in the next period. For instance, can an investor increase the execution probability of his limit buy order by posting a price that is above the equilibrium bid price?

We employ a perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept. This concept prescribes that investors and professional liquidity providers update their beliefs by Bayes rule, whenever possible, but it does not place any restrictions on the beliefs of market participants when they encounter an out-of-equilibrium action.

To support competitive prices in equilibrium we assume that if a limit buy order
is posted at a price different to the competitive equilibrium bid price $\text{bid}_{t+1}^*$, then market participants hold the following beliefs regarding this investor’s knowledge of the period $t$ innovation $\delta_t$.

If a limit buy order is posted at a price $\hat{\text{bid}} < \text{bid}_{t+1}^*$, then market participants hold the same beliefs regarding the investor’s information as they would in equilibrium (i.e., they assume that this investor followed the equilibrium threshold strategy, but “made a mistake” when pricing his orders). A professional liquidity provider then updates his expectation about $\delta_t$ to the equilibrium value and posts a buy limit order at $\text{bid}_{t+1}^*$. The original investor’s limit order then executes with zero probability.

If a limit buy order is posted at a price $\hat{\text{bid}} > \text{bid}_{t+1}^*$, then we posit that market participants believe the this order stems from an informed investor with the highest possible valuation (i.e., $\delta_t = 1$). They then update their expectation to $\mathbb{E}[\delta_t | \hat{\text{bid}}] = 1$. The new posterior expectation of $V_t$ equals to $p_{t-1} + \mathbb{E}[\delta_t | \hat{\text{bid}}] = p_{t-1} + 1$. A professional liquidity provider is then willing to post a bid price $\text{bid}_{t+1}^{**} \leq p_{t-1} + 1 + \mathbb{E}[\delta_{t+1} | \text{MS}_{t+1}]$. A limit order with the new price $\text{bid}_{t+1}^{**}$ outbids any limit buy order that yields investors positive expected profits (for an investor to make positive profits, their valuation would need to exceed 1).

The beliefs upon an out-of-equilibrium sell order are symmetric. The above out-of-equilibrium beliefs ensure that no investor deviates from his equilibrium strategy.

We want to emphasize that these beliefs and actions do not materialize in equilibrium. Instead, they can be loosely thought of as a “threat” to ensure that investors do not deviate from their prescribed equilibrium strategies.
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Figure 1: Entry and Order Submission Timeline

This figure illustrates the timing of events upon the arrival of an investor at an arbitrary period, $t$, until their departure from the market. Value $y_t$ is the private valuation of the period $t$ investor and $\delta_t$ is the innovation to the security’s fundamental value in period $t$. 

Professional liquidity providers post limit orders to empty side(s) of the book.

Period $t$ investor enters market, learns $y_t$ and $\delta_t$

Period $t - 1$ investor leaves market

Period $t - 1$ limit orders either trade against the period $t$ market order or get cancelled

Period $t + 1$ investor enters market, learns $y_{t+1}$ and $\delta_{t+1}$

Period $t$ investor leaves market

Period $t + 1$ limit orders either trade against the period $t + 1$ market order or get cancelled
Figure 2: Equilibrium Thresholds and Payoffs to the Marginal Market and Limit Orders: Flat Fee

The left panel depicts the equilibrium valuations $z^M$ (red line) and $z^L$ (blue line) for the marginal market and limit order submitters, respectively. The right panel depicts the expected payoff that the investors with an valuation of $z^M$ and $z^L$ receive in equilibrium, as functions of the taker fee $f$. Both panels are for the setting where investors pay a flat, average fee per trade. An investor submits a market buy order when his valuation $z_t$ is above $z^M$, a limit buy order when $z^L \leq z_t < z^M$, and abstains from trading when $|z_t| < z^L$; sell decision are symmetric to buy decisions. The plot illustrates that as $f$ increases, investors submit more market orders and fewer limit orders. There exist the level of the taker fee $f_0 > 0$, at which the investor with valuation $z^M$ receives zero profit from submitting a market order. The plot illustrates that investors do not submit limit orders for values of $f \geq f_0$. Parameter $\alpha$ in the distribution of innovations is set to $\alpha = 1$, the measure of informed investors, $\mu = 0.5$, and the probability that the trading day continues, $\rho = 0.95$. 

Equilibrium Thresholds

Profit of Marginal Market and Limit Orders
The left panel plots trading volume, measured as $\Pr(\text{market order})$, as a function of the taker fee $f$, for the setting where investors pay a flat fee per trade. The right panel plots the level of market participation, measured as $\Pr(\text{market order}) + \Pr(\text{limit order})$, as a function of the taker fee level $f$. The value $f_0$ represents the taker fee level at which the equilibrium threshold values $z^M$ and $z^L$ coincide, and the marginal market order submitter $z^M$ earns zero profits in expectation. Parameter $\alpha$ in the distribution of innovations is set to $\alpha = 1$, the measure of informed investors, $\mu = 0.5$, and the probability that the trading day continues, $\rho = 0.95$. 
Figure 4: Quoted and Cum-Fee Spreads

The left panel plots the quoted spread (the inner, blue lines) and the cum-fee spread (the outer, red lines) as a function of the taker fee $f$, for the setting where all traders pay maker-taker fees. The right panel plots the quoted spread (the inner, blue lines) and the cum-fee spread (the outer, red lines) as a function of the taker fee $f$, for the setting in which the investor pays a flat fee per trade. The value $f_0$ represents the taker fee level at which the equilibrium threshold values $z^M$ and $z^L$ coincide, and the marginal market order submitter $z^M$ earns zero profits in expectation. Parameter $\alpha$ in the distribution of innovations is set to $\alpha = 1$, the measure of informed investors, $\mu = 0.5$, and the probability that the trading day continues, $\rho = 0.95$. 
Figure 5: Price Impact

The left panel plots price impact, quoted, and cum-fee half-spreads as functions of the taker fee $f$ for the setting where all traders pay maker-taker fees per trade. The right panel plots price impact, quoted, and cum-fee half-spreads as functions of the taker fee $f$ for the setting in which investors pay a flat fee per trade. The value $f_0$ represents the taker fee level at which the equilibrium threshold values $z^M$ and $z^L$ coincide, and the marginal market order submitter $z^M$ earns zero profits in expectation. Parameter $\alpha$ in the distribution of innovations is set to $\alpha = 1$, the measure of informed investors, $\mu = 0.5$, and the probability that the trading day continues, $\rho = 0.95$. 
The figure plots total expected social welfare, as defined in Section 4, as a function of the taker fee $f$, for the setting where investors pay a flat fee per trade. The value $f_0$ represents the taker fee level at which the equilibrium threshold values $z^M$ and $z^L$ coincide, and the marginal market order submitter $z^M$ earns zero profits in expectation. Parameter $\alpha$ in the distribution of innovations is set to $\alpha = 1$, the measure of informed investors, $\mu = 0.5$, and the probability that the trading day continues, $\rho = 0.95$. 

**Figure 6: Social Welfare: Flat Fee**