

CONTACT DETAILS

Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 85 66

GREMAQ

Fax : +33 (0)5 61 22 55 63

21 Allée de Brienne

F-31000 Toulouse

Email: soenje.reiche@tse-eu.fr

RESEARCH FIELDS

Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization

EMPLOYMENT

2010 – Chargé de Recherche, CNRS

2004 – 2010 University Lecturer, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Fellow of Newnham College

2001 – 2004 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of
Pennsylvania

VISITING POSITIONS

2008 – 2010 Lecturer, Toulouse School of Economics

2003 – 2004 Visiting Lecturer, Department of Economics, London School of
Economics

2000 – 2001 Visiting Researcher, IDEI, University of Toulouse

EDUCATION

- 1996 – 2001 PhD in Economics, London School of Economics
- 1995 – 1996 MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, London School of Economics
- 1992 – 1995 “Diplom” (MSc) in Mathematics, University of Bonn
- 1989 – 1992 “Vordiplom” (BSc) in Mathematics, University of Heidelberg

ACADEMIC HONOURS AND AWARDS

- Marie Curie Fellowship, IDEI, Toulouse (2000 – 2001)
- ECONOMICA Scholarship, London School of Economics (1999 – 2000)
- Marie Curie Fellowship, TMR Program, European Commission (1996 – 1999)
- Scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (1995 – 1996)
- Teaching Prize for economics part time teachers, LSE (1997)

PUBLICATIONS

- “Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: the Multi-Agent Case with Transferable Utility”, (with Bob Evans), 2008, 99(3), 611-614, *Economics Letters*.
- “Ambivalent Investment and the Hold-Up problem”, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, December 2006, 4(6), 1148-1164.
- “Dynamic Yardstick Mechanisms”, (with Antoine Faure-Grimaud), *Games and Economic Behaviour*, February 2006, 52(2), 316-335.

WORKING PAPERS

“Robust Incentives and Non-Exclusive Contracts”, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics No. 729, revise and resubmit *Games and Economic Behaviour*.

“Sequential Screening and Renegotiation”, revise and resubmit *Journal of Economic Theory*.

“Mechanism Design and Non-Cooperative Renegotiation”, with Robert Evans, revise and resubmit *Journal of Economic Theory*

“Sequential Communication: Ally or Rival first?”, with Robert Evans

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Optimal contracts and communication in agency problems with renegotiation”, with Andrea Attar and Roland Strausz

REFERREEING

American Economic Review, Econometrica, Economic Journal, European Economic Review, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of the European Economic Association, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies

SEMINARS

Toulouse School of Economics (2011), University of Mannheim (2011),
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (2011), Rome Tor Vergata (2010), Birkbeck (2004),
Boston University (2000), University of Cambridge (2004/2000), GSB Chicago (2000),
City University (2010, 2006), University of Edinburgh (2006), University of Essex
(2003), Humboldt University (2001), MEDS Kellogg (2000), London School of

Economics (2005), University of Munich (2001), Oxford University (2000), HEC Paris (2004/2000), University of Pennsylvania (2001/2000), Royal Holloway (2003), IDEI Toulouse (2001/2000), UCL (2000).

CONFERENCES

EEA (2010/2006/2002/2001/1999), ESEM (1999), Symposium in Economic Theory, Gerzensee (20012/2006/2004/2001), Conference on Contract Theory, Stony Brook (2001), Conference on Contract Enforcement and Incompleteness, Siena (2000), Summer in Tel Aviv (1999), Royal Economic Easter School on Evolutionary Game Theory and Incomplete Contracts, Birmingham (1997)

TEACHING

TSE: Microeconomics (M2), Dynamic Optimization (DEQA)

University of Cambridge: Linear Algebra (Paper 6, Part IIA), General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics (Paper 1, IIA), Corporate Finance (Paper 1, Part IIB), Choice under Uncertainty and Information; General Equilibrium (Paper 4, Part IIB), Choice under Uncertainty; General Equilibrium (MPhil, PhD), Corporate Finance (MPhil), Microeconomics (Paper 1, Diploma)

University of Pennsylvania: Microeconomics (Undergraduate), Industrial Organization (Undergraduate)

London School of Economics: Advanced Microeconomics (PhD), Advanced Economic Theory (PhD), Microeconomics (Undergraduate), Mathematics for Economists (PhD), Economics B (Undergraduate), Game Theory for Mathematicians (Undergraduate)