**Economics of Innovation and Intellectual Property**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Course title – Intitulé du cours | Economics of Innovation and Intellectual Property  |
| Level / Semester – Niveau /semestre | M2/S2 |
| School – Composante  | Ecole d'Economie de Toulouse |
| Teacher – Enseignant responsable | **Doh-Shin Jeon** |
| Other teacher(s) – Autre(s) enseignant(s) |  |
| Other teacher(s) – Autre(s) enseignant(s) |  |
| Other teacher(s) – Autre(s) enseignant(s) |  |
| Other teacher(s) – Autre(s) enseignant(s) |  |
| Other teacher(s) – Autre(s) enseignant(s) |  |
| Lecture Hours – Volume Horaire CM | 30 |
| TA Hours – Volume horaire TD |  |
| TP Hours – Volume horaire TP |  |
| Course Language – Langue du cours | English |
| TA and/or TP Language – Langue des TD et/ou TP |  |

**Teaching staff contacts – Coordonnées de l’équipe pédagogique :**

**Doh-Shin Jeon**

**dohshin.jeon@tse-fr.eu**

**T675 (office)**

**Course Objectives – Objectifs du cours :**

We introduce the students to a selection of important current issues in the economics of intellectual property (IP). After the introduction to the messy current situation of the IP world and firms’ IP strategies, we review important economic contribution to topics such as licensing, litigation and injunction, settlement, weak patents, patent pool, patent trolls (or NPEs), cross-licensing, standard setting organizations etc.

**Prerequisites – Pré requis :**

Students need to have basic knowledge of industrial organization theory; the TSE M1 IO level is fine. This implies that you also need to know basic game theory.

**Practical information about the sessions – Modalités pratiques de gestion du cours :**

**Laptop and Tablet**: You should not use them but for tying.

**Grading system – Modalités d’évaluation :**

Grading will be based on the final exam (70%) and group presentations and participation in the class (30%).

**Bibliography/references – Bibliographie/références :**

* Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives, 2004, MIT Press
* Bessen, J., and Meurer, M., 2008. Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
* Jaffe, A. B. and J. Lerner, 2004, Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

**Session planning – Planification des séances :**

Session 1: Introduction

The major part is based on the slides made by Margaret Kyle on “IP Business Strategy”, which will be complemented by the following papers.

- Andrei Hagiu (2011) “Intellectual Property Intermediares”, Harvard Business School, Case study

- Andrei Hagiu, David Yoffie and Alison Berkley Wagonfeld (2011) “Intellectual Ventures” Harvard Business School, Case study

- Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg (1998) “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research” Science 280: 698-701

Session 2: Antitrust limits to settlement

- Carl Shapiro (2003) "Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements" The RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 391-411

Session 3: Injunction and weak patents

- Carl Shapiro. (2010). “Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties.” American Law and Economics Review. 12:509-557

- Farrell and Shapiro, (2008). “How strong are weak patents?”, American Economic Review, 98:1347-69

Session 4: Patent Pool

- Lerner, J., and J. Tirole. 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools." American Economic Review, 94(3): 691-711.

- Choi, Jay Pil and Heiko Gerlach (2015). “Patent Pools, Litigation and Innovation.” The RAND Journal of Economics, 46(3): 499-523

- Markus Reisinger and Emanuele Tarantino (2016), “Patent Pools in Input markets” Mimeo

Session 5: NPE (Patent Trolls)

- Lemus, Jorge and Temnyalov, Emil, (2017) “Patent Privateering, Litigation and R&D Incentives,” The RAND Journal of Economics 48(4)

- Choi, Jay Pil and Heiko Gerlach (2018). “A Model of Patent Trolls.” International Economic Review, 59(4)

Session 6: Cross-licensing

- Jeon, Doh-Shin and Yassine Lefouili (2018) "Cross-Licensing and competition", The RAND Journal of Economics, 49(3): 656-671

Session 7: Platform M&A and innovations

- Gilbert, R. J., & Newbery, D. M. (1982). “Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly”, The American Economic Review, 514-526.

- Kevin Bryan and Erik Hovenkamp (forthcoming) “Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions”, Review of Industrial Organization

Session 8: Other topics

i) Tying and dynamic leverage

- Choi, Jay Pil (1996) “Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation and the Leverage Theory”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1153-1181

ii) Patent exhaustion

* Olena Ivus, Edwin Lai and Ted Sichelman (2018) “An Economic model of Patent

Exhaustion”

iii) Two-sided platforms and biases in technology adoption

Session 9- 10: Student presentations

**Distance learning – Enseignement à distance :**

* Interactive virtual classrooms / Classe en ligne interactive
* MCQ tests and other online exercises and assignments