

Economics of innovation and Intellectual Property

Course title - Intitulé du cours	Economics of innovation and Intellectual Property
Level / Semester - Niveau /semestre	M2 / Semestre 3
School - Composante	TSE
Teacher - Enseignant responsable	JEON_DOH-SHIN
Other teacher(s) - Autre(s) enseignant(s)	
Other teacher(s) - Autre(s) enseignant(s)	
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Other teacher(s) - Autre(s) enseignant(s)	
Lecture Hours - Volume Horaire CM	30
TA Hours - Volume horaire TD	/
TP Hours - Volume horaire TP	/
Course Language - Langue du cours	Anglais
TA and/or TP Language - Langue des TD et/ou TP	

Teaching staff contacts - Coordonnées de l'équipe pédagogique :

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Course's Objectives - Objectifs du cours :

I introduce the students to a selection of important current issues in the economics of intellectual property (IP). After the introduction to the messy current situation of the IP world and firms' IP strategies, we review important economic contribution to topics such as litigation and injunction, settlement, weak patents, patent pool, patent trolls (or NPEs), cross-licensing, standard setting organizations, etc.

Prerequisites - Pré requis :

Students need to have basic knowledge of industrial organization theory; the TSE M1 IO level is fine. This implies that you also need to know basic game theory.

Practical information about the sessions - Modalités pratiques de gestion du cours :

They are not allowed except when you use them for typing.

Grading system - Modalités d'évaluation :

Grading will be based on the final exam (70%) and group presentations and participation in the class (30%).

Bibliography/references - Bibliographie/références :

General reading:

- Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives, 2004, MIT Press
- Bessen, J., and Meurer, M., 2008. Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jaffe, A. B. and J. Lerner, 2004, Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press

Session planning - Planification des séances :

Session 1: Introduction The major part is based on the slides made by Margaret Kyle on "IP Business Strategy", which will be complemented by the following papers.

- Andrei Hagiu (2011) "Intellectual Property Intermediaries", Harvard Business School, Case study
- Andrei Hagiu, David Yoffie and Alison Berkley Wagonfeld (2011) "Intellectual Ventures" Harvard Business School, Case study
- Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg (1998) "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research" *Science* 280: 698-701

Session 2: Antitrust limits to settlement

- Carl Shapiro (2003) "Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements" *The RAND Journal of Economics* Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 391-411

Session 3: Injunction and weak patents

- Carl Shapiro. (2010). "Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties." *American Law and Economics Review*. 12:509-557-Farrell and Shapiro, (2008). "How strong are weak patents?", *American Economic Review*, 98:1347-69

Session 4: Standard setting organization

- Gilbert, R. J., & Newbery, D. M. (1982). Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly. *The American Economic Review*, 514-526.
- Vickers, John. "The evolution of market structure when there is a sequence of innovations." *The Journal of Industrial Economics* (1986): 1-12 on increasing dominance.
- Riordan, Michael H., and David J. Salant. "Preemptive adoptions of an emerging technology." *The journal of industrial economics* (1994): 247-261
- Llanes, Gaston and Joaquin Pobleto (2015), "Technology Choice and Coalition Formation in Standards Wars." Mimeo

Session 5: Patent Pool

- Lerner, J., and J. Tirole. 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools." *American Economic Review*, 94(3): 691-711.
- Choi, Jay Pil and Heiko Gerlach (2015). "Patent Pools, Litigation and Innovation." *The RAND Journal of Economics*, 46(3): 499-523
- Markus Reisinger and Emanuele Tarantino (2016), "Patent Pools in Input markets" Mimeo

Session 6: NPE or Patent Trolls

- Lemus, Jorge and Temnyalov, Emil, (2017) "Patent Privateering, Litigation and R&D Incentives," *The RAND Journal of Economics* 48(4)
- Choi, Jay Pil and Heiko Gerlach (2016). "A Model of Patent Trolls." Mimeo

Session 7: Cross-licensing

- Jeon, Doh-Shin and Yassine Lefouili (2018) "Cross-Licensing and competition", Forthcoming, *The RAND Journal of Economics*

Session 8: Sequential Innovations

- Jerry Green and Suzanne Scotchmer (1995) "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26: 20-33
- James Bessen and Eric Maskin (2009) "Sequential Innovation, patents and imitation" RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 40: 611-635

Session 9: Tying and dynamic leverage

- Choi, Jay Pil (1996) "Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation and the Leverage Theory", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1153-1181

Session 10: Student presentations