Financial Security, Climate Shocks and Social Cohesion

Theresa Beltramo* Florence Nimoh † Matthew OBrien‡ Sandra Sequeira§

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Abstract

This paper documents the malleability of prosocial behavior and trust in response to economic shocks. We focus on a low-income setting where prosociality is central to the integration of refugees into ultra-poor host communities. We generate an exogenous positive shock to financial security through a randomized cash transfer and employment support program that increased financial security by 1.93 sd and social cohesion by 0.53 sd relative to the control group, implying an elasticity of approximately 0.25 sd. We then leverage a climate shock that negatively affected financial security for some participants. Consistent with a causal relationship, treated participants who experienced even a modest decline in financial security due to the shock reported a disproportionately large reduction in prosociality, implying an elasticity of 0.49 sd. Taken together, these findings reveal that individuals shift between cooperative and competitive mindsets in response to changes in the salience of their perceived financial security rather than shifts in preferences, incentives, or norms. Providing income and employment support to both refugees and low-income host community members led to more cooperative attitudes and behaviors, while a negative shock reduced prosociality and trust by making scarcity top of mind again.

*United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and University of Geneva. beltramo@unhcr.org

†United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. nimoh@unhcr.org

‡London School of Economics and Political Science m.obrien3@lse.ac.uk

§London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author. s.sequeira@lse.ac.uk

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1 Introduction

Trust and the willingness to share resources across group lines are foundational to social cohesion. They promote cooperation, mitigate conflict, and sustain the functioning of markets, making them essential drivers of long-term economic development and growth (Greif, 1994; Putnam, 2000; Easterly et al., 2006; Greene, 2014). But what drives trust and prosociality, particularly in low-income settings? Existing research has emphasized two broad mechanisms. One line of inquiry emphasizes formative economic experiences, showing that early or repeated exposure to economic hardship or prosperity can shape beliefs, preferences, and worldviews that persist over time and shape trust and preferences for redistribution (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Chinoy et al., 2025; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2025). Another strand in the literature emphasizes the role of economic incentives. For instance, income inequality can increase the cost of cooperation and with it the incentive to defect, which can make self-protective or self-interested behavior more individually rational (Alesina and Ferrara, 2002; Margalit, 2013; Karadja et al., 2017; Agneman et al., 2022). Economic incentives could also explain why richer individuals are less inclined to share resources since redistribution entails personal losses, whereas poorer individuals favor resource-sharing because they stand to gain from these transfers (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Karadja et al., 2017). Yet, accounts that focus solely on stable preferences or on economic incentives may not fully capture what drives trust and willingness to share resources in low-income settings, where acute financial insecurity and the immediacy of scarcity can shift prosociality even when underlying preferences and structural payoffs remain unchanged.

This paper provides causal evidence of a distinct channel: the salience of one's immediate financial situation can shift willingness to trust or share resources, even when underlying long-term preferences about fairness or cooperation, economic incentives and cultural norms remain unchanged. When salient, the lens of scarcity can reframe social and economic interactions, shaping both trust and prosocial behavior.

We leverage experimental and quasi-experimental individual-level variation in financial security to study its impact on prosociality and trust. In our setting, individuals first received a large

cash transfer, which improved their economic security, and were later affected by a destructive cyclone, which reduced it. We find that greater own financial security enhances trust and prosocial behavior, while negative income shocks have the opposite effect. These results suggest that social preferences and social trust are not fixed, but instead, respond to immediate lived experiences. It underscores both the malleability of prosociality and the fact that heterogeneity in exposure to economic shocks can generate substantial within-cohort variation in trust and cooperation among otherwise similar populations.

We focus on a setting where trust and willingness to share resources are critical: the integration of ethnically diverse refugees into ultra-poor host communities. Promoting prosocial behavior in such environments is a pressing policy priority, especially in light of the global rise in protracted displacement, and the increasing frequency of negative economic shocks driven by conflict and climate change. Our empirical strategy exploits two distinct shocks that vary in the extent to which they affect financial security: (i) a large positive income shock from a one-off cash transfer combined with an employment support program; and (ii) a smaller negative income shock induced by a natural disaster.

The positive income shock results from an intervention that was designed and implemented by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Government of Mozambique. This livelihoods program offered a combination of consumption support, skills training, individual coaching, and job-matching services targeted toward either wage or self-employment, to a randomly selected subset of ultra-poor individuals from both refugee and host populations residing near the Maratane settlement in northern Mozambique.[1] In our setting, refugees live in a managed yet open settlement, with freedom of movement, near several relatively small agglomerations of host communities that are within a radius of approximately 7 kilometers of the settlement. Refugees and host communities interact in product and labor markets as well as by sharing education and health facilities inside the refugee settlement. A total of 166 ultra-poor individuals (comprising both refugees and hosts) were randomly assigned to receive the program. An additional 301 individuals who were also deemed eligible, were assigned to a

[1]The designation of a refugee camp has shifted to that of a settlement to reflect the Government of Mozambique's official stance on promoting the local integration of refugees.

control group and received no intervention during the study period.

We construct a measure of financial security based on four indicators: (i) individual take-home income; (ii) self-reported ability to access emergency funds; (iii) the proportion of income saved in the previous month; and (iv) household income over the previous six months. Social cohesion is assessed across three key domains, capturing both attitudinal and behavioral dimensions. These include: (i) levels of trust, disaggregated by in-group and out-group; (ii) attitudes toward the allocation of economic resources, namely whether Mozambicans should have priority access to government financial support and to jobs;[2] and (iii) the share of reported friendships with members of out-groups. We collect data across four survey waves spanning nearly three years. Estimates from the second midline prior to the onset of the climate shock indicate a 2.3 standard deviation average increase in financial security due to the one-off cash transfer and employment support program.[3] This improvement in financial security was accompanied by a 0.88 standard deviation increase in social cohesion. Specifically, gains in financial security enhanced trust toward both in-group and out-group members and increased host community members' willingness to share both employment opportunities and government financial support with refugees. In addition to these attitudinal shifts, we observe changes in social behavior: treated individuals reported a higher proportion of friendships with members of out-groups. Treatment effects were economically and statistically significant for both refugee and host populations. These findings suggest that improved financial security reduces the perceived salience of inter- and intra-group competition over scarce resources, thereby facilitating socioeconomic interactions, increasing trust, and strengthening inter-group social ties.

We find no evidence supporting alternative mechanisms that could explain the observed increase in social cohesion. The results are not driven by reciprocal transfers between refugees and hosts; by changes in migration patterns (either in- or out-migration among treatment or

[2]Host community members and refugees are asked whether the Government of Mozambique should prioritize the allocation of financial support to Mozambicans and whether Mozambicans should have priority access to jobs relative to foreigners/refugees. The qualitative research that preceded the launch of the randomized control trial indicated that host communities would use the words refugee and foreigner interchangeably to refer to refugees. We mentioned both terms during the survey to make sure that the question was understood as referring to the allocation of resources between Mozambicans and refugees.

[3]These estimates are drawn from Table C.4.

control households), or by improvements in mental health attributable to program participation. Likewise, there is no evidence that the observed effects stem from increased civic or political engagement at the community level, or from greater inter-group contact during the program's implementation. After two years, participants in the treatment group were not significantly more likely than control group participants to report increased interactions with refugees. Moreover, in the cross-section at baseline, host community members residing closer to the refugee settlement reported more frequent interactions with refugees but not higher levels of trust nor greater support for sharing resources with them. In fact, improvements in financial security were associated with higher levels of prosociality even for hosts who had relatively limited contact with refugees because they lived farther from the settlement. This suggests that prosociality is not entirely driven by direct contact with refugees.[4]

A central question emerging from these findings is whether the observed improvements in social cohesion persist. One possibility is that social cohesion exhibits path dependence or increasing returns: as economic security improves, inter-group interactions deepen, trust accumulates, and cooperative behavior becomes more prevalent. Alternatively, trust and cooperation may decline when economic security weakens again, even if underlying structural conditions remain constant. This would suggest that shifts in perceived material circumstances alone can alter social preferences.

Roughly two years after the launch of the livelihoods program, and one year after the main cash transfer, a Category 3 cyclone struck the study area. Among host households in our sample, nearly 50% reported damage to their homes. This exogenous shock cross-randomized onto our sample allows us to test whether participants who experienced a deterioration in financial security due to the cyclone exhibited corresponding reversals in prosocial attitudes. We measure housing destruction using a combination of self-reported data, third-party site verification, and high-resolution satellite imagery capturing roof damage and debris near each dwelling. To

[4]Participants also understood the livelihoods program to be a one-time intervention, reducing the likelihood that changes in attitudes were shaped by economic incentives or expectations of future reciprocal aid. This mitigates concerns that the effects reflect strategic "aid-sharing" behavior between hosts and refugees, as documented in the case of Uganda in Baseler et al. (2025). "Aid-sharing" is a policy that establishes that a share of foreign aid targeting refugees should be regularly directed at natives as well as a form of compensation (Baseler et al., 2025).

address endogeneity concerns, we predict cyclone-induced damage using exogenous geographic characteristics, including elevation (to reduce vulnerability to flooding) and distance from the cyclone's path.

Our analysis shows that treated individuals who experienced greater cyclone damage reported a decline in financial security of approximately 0.94 standard deviations,[5] driven primarily by reductions in savings and diminished ability to cover emergency expenses. While this did not fully erase the 2.3 standard deviation gain in financial security induced by the livelihoods program, the resulting loss was sufficient to generate a large and disproportionate decline in social cohesion: by approximately 0.46 standard deviations.[6] Notably, this decline nearly offset the initial gains in prosociality observed post-treatment, but only among those directly affected by the shock.

One possible interpretation is that this overreaction to changes in financial security is due to a change in a potential reference point for financial security, given the sequential nature of the shocks our participants were exposed to. Having experienced prior gains, treated individuals may have developed higher expectations for financial security, amplifying the psychological cost of even moderate setbacks. We find some evidence consistent with this possibility since the implied elasticity between financial security and social cohesion is significantly larger for the climate shock (at 0.49) relative to the livelihoods intervention (at 0.25).[7] However, the control group participants who never experienced an increase in financial security reported a similar drop in prosociality (0.36 sd) due to exposure to the cyclone. This suggests that possible reference point dynamics cannot fully explain our findings.

An alternative interpretation of our results is that the observed decline in social cohesion was driven primarily by context-specific concerns over redistribution: in the aftermath of tropical

[5]This estimate is drawn from $\Delta EL - \Delta ML2$ in Figure 8 were ΔEL is the difference between damage/not at endline, and $\Delta ML2$ is the difference between damage/not at midline 2. The corresponding point estimates are found in Table E.1.

[6]This estimate is drawn from $\Delta EL - \Delta ML2$ in Figure 9 were ΔEL is the difference between damage/not at endline, and $\Delta ML2$ is the difference between damage/not at midline 2. The corresponding point estimates are found in Table E.2.

[7]The implied elasticity of the livelihoods intervention at the second midline, before the cyclone, would be 0.38, but still considerably smaller than the elasticity associated with the subsequent climate shock.

cyclone Gombe, host community members may have perceived resources to be scarcer and more uncertain, reducing their willingness to share with refugees. However, our analysis indicates that the cyclone's impact was associated with reductions across *most* components of the social cohesion index. This includes reductions in trust toward out-groups, as well as a significant drop in the reported share of out-group friendships. These patterns are more consistent with the hypothesis that direct exposure to the climate shock and the accompanying perception of resource scarcity led to a broader shift in social outlook among those most affected. This shift in mindset appears to have reframed economic and social interactions within the community in less prosocial terms: lower trust, diminished willingness to share resources, and reduced inter and intra-group social ties. These results remain robust to controls for both community-level destruction and community-level treatment assignment in the vicinity of each participating dwelling. The type of setting we study is often characterized by relatively weak community ties, so individual-level experiences may play a central role in shaping social attitudes and behaviors. As a result, within-cohort heterogeneity in economic experiences can generate corresponding heterogeneity in prosociality.

To test whether the observed shift in prosocial attitudes and trust was specific to inter-group resource dynamics, we also examine the effects of both the livelihoods program and the subsequent climate shock on other normative domains that should be less sensitive to short-term changes in material well-being. We find no significant treatment effects on gender-related beliefs (e.g., whether men should be prioritized for jobs, whether both genders should contribute to household income, or whether boys and girls should have equal access to education), nor on civic or political attitudes among treated refugees and hosts. This stability supports the interpretation that the intervention selectively influenced beliefs and attitudes related to resource competition, rather than inducing broader shifts in social or cultural values.

Our findings underscore the critical role of financial security in fostering prosocial behavior and strengthening social cohesion in ethnically diverse and resource-constrained settings. In our context, this suggests that extending income and employment support programs to include ultra-poor host community members, not just refugees, can alleviate economic grievances,

reduce inter-group tensions, and facilitate both the social and economic inclusion of displaced populations. However, the growing frequency and intensity of economic shocks, particularly those induced by climate change, pose a serious threat to the effectiveness and durability of these interventions (IPCC, 2023). In fact, climate shocks can undermine social cohesion not only by directly contributing to displacement and social fragmentation, but also by heightening the perceived scarcity of resources. These perceptions can, in turn, reshape social preferences in ways that reduce willingness to cooperate and share resources with out-groups. This highlights the importance of climate adaptation and mitigation policies that address both the economic and social consequences of environmental shocks. Reducing the salience of resource scarcity may be critical to stabilizing inter-group relations in high-fragility contexts.

Our study contributes to the literature on the determinants of social cohesion, prosociality, and trust. Prior research has emphasized group-level factors such as ethnic homogeneity and the role of implicit (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000) or institutionalized (Baseler et al., 2025) reciprocity in fostering social capital. In contrast, the evidence on how short-term income shocks affect social cohesion remains limited and inconclusive, particularly in low-income settings (Lehmann and Masterson, 2014; Camacho, 2014; Attanasio et al., 2015; Valli et al., 2019; Winkler, 2021; Burchi and Roscioli, 2022). Our findings show that in the context of large, salient shocks, trust is not necessarily fixed (Enke, 2019; Buggle and Durante, 2021) but is instead responsive to recent experiences that change outlooks. Specifically, we show that individuals can shift between cooperative, trust-based behaviors and more competitive, zero-sum attitudes in response to economic shocks that change their actual or perceived financial security.

Second, we speak to the well-established literature on the relationship between trust, social cohesion, and economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Easterly et al., 2006). While most studies emphasize how social cohesion fosters economic development (LaPorta et al., 1997; Algan and Cahuc, 2010), the reverse causal channel from economic security to social cohesion has been less explored. Our findings suggest that improvements in financial security may be an important foundation of the empirically observed correlation between higher income and greater trust (Brandt et al., 2015; Ananyev and Guriev, 2018; Bruckner et al., 2021).

Third, we contribute to a growing body of work in social psychology and economics that tests the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Betts et al., 2022). This theory posits that intergroup contact can foster tolerance and cooperation yet empirical findings have been mixed: while some studies find that contact improves attitudes (Hopkins, 2010; Rao, 2019; Barros, 2025), others report null or even negative effects (Quillian, 1996; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Paluck et al., 2018).[8] Our findings suggest that improving the level of financial security in fractionalized environments can be important for contact to improve social cohesion, even in more general settings not characterized by a commonality of goals, or by explicitly engineered opportunities for cooperation. Financial security may mediate the impact of increased contact with outgroups on prosociality and social cohesion, which could potentially help explain some of the diverging findings on the contact hypothesis in the literature to date.

Fourth, we add to the literature on bundled income and employment support programs aimed at poverty alleviation among ultra-poor populations (Banerjee et al., 2015; Bandiera et al., 2017; Bedoya et al., 2019; Banerjee et al., 2021; Balboni et al., 2022; Bossuroy et al., 2022). We make two broad contributions to this literature. We implement the first evaluation of a graduation intervention in a mixed refugee-host setting and document that inclusive targeting of both groups not only enhances financial outcomes but also improves prosociality.[9] We also highlight the importance of the graduation program in boosting the resilience of the ultra-poor to climate shocks. In our setting, all graduation program participants reported higher financial security on average, even after experiencing a major climate shock.

Fifth, our findings contribute to literature on the behavioral effects of economic scarcity. A growing body of work shows that scarcity influences economic preferences and decision-making (Shah et al., 2015; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Prediger et al., 2014; Fisman et al., 2015; Boonma-

[8] Moreover, interventions aimed at improving social cohesion through more interactions tend to generate weak effects (Paluck et al., 2018; Baseler et al., 2025). Bazzi et al. (2019) exploits a population resettlement program to identify the long-run effects of inter-group contact on national integration in Indonesia, and finds that the program leads to greater integration in fractionalized communities with many small groups, but has the opposite effect in polarized areas with a few large groups.

[9] We conduct a cost-benefit analysis which suggests that the program would take about 2.11 years to have a positive return on investment (USAID, International Rescue Committee). This is the case even without monetizing the benefits associated with improved social cohesion. See Appendix D for the full cost-benefit analysis.

nunt and Meier, 2023; Kaur et al., 2025). Recent literature has also highlighted the importance of individual experiences in shaping psychological traits and outlooks such as zero-sum thinking, which then correlate with preferences for redistribution (Chinoy et al., 2025). We extend this research by showing how salient individual-level economic shocks shape individuals' social attitudes, such as trust and willingness to share resources. As a result, within-cohort heterogeneity in exposure to shocks can produce meaningful variation in prosocial attitudes and behaviors, among otherwise similar individuals. Finally, our findings highlight the potential role of contextual framing of financial security in influencing social preferences: baseline cross-sectional differences in financial security improve trust but not willingness to share resources but then windfall gains from the livelihoods intervention increase both markers of prosociality. This builds on prior (though limited) evidence that fairness and redistribution norms are sensitive to whether resources are perceived as earned or as windfall gains, suggesting fertile ground for further theoretical development.

Sixth, we contribute to the emerging literature on the long-run consequences of climate change for poverty alleviation (Dell et al., 2012, Hirvonen et al., 2023). Our findings underscore how climate shocks not only threaten livelihoods but can also erode social cohesion, particularly in fragile, ethnically diverse settings. This points to the need for integrated approaches that combine economic support with climate adaptation strategies to safeguard both financial security and social stability.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the motivation, the study setting and empirical strategy. Section 3 presents results on the effects of the positive income shock on financial security and social cohesion. Section 4 examines the impact of the climate shock. Section 5 concludes.

2 Motivation

While the link between social cohesion and economic growth has been extensively studied, the reverse link from economic security to social cohesion and prosociality has been less explored.

And yet, there are many reasons why changes in how financially secure one feels can have an impact on how social interactions are spontaneously framed by individuals, and on whether they adopt more competitive or cooperative behaviors. First, improving an individual's financial security and reducing perceived scarcity can shift attention away from the scarcity of resources and the need to compete for them, making individuals more tolerant and less likely to adopt a zero-sum mindset in social exchanges, particularly with reference to out-groups (Michal et al., 2014; Bordalo et al., 2024; Chinoy et al., 2025). It is also possible that financial security enhances social cohesion by alleviating time or mental bandwidth, thereby enabling individuals to engage in activities that foster stronger social connections and cultivate social capital (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013, Pavanello et al., 2016). Finally, financial security can mitigate inequality aversion if an increase in own income increases tolerance for inequality with respect to others (Lambert et al., 2003; Bernhard et al., 2006).

While our framework highlights material constraints as key determinants of prosocial behavior and trust, these factors may also interact with social exposure in shaping these outcomes. Under conditions of economic hardship, intergroup contact may heighten perceived competition over scarce resources, reinforcing exclusionary preferences and reducing trust. Conversely, exposure combined with greater financial security can reduce perceived threat, narrow social distance, and facilitate more cooperative interactions across group lines, enhancing prosociality.

We test these predictions using two sources of exogenous variation in financial security: a randomized livelihoods intervention and an unanticipated climate shock. Together, these allow us to identify the causal effects of both positive and negative economic shocks on prosocial behavior and social trust. Variation in baseline physical distance between refugees and hosts can further provide suggestive evidence of how changes in the salience of scarcity interact with social exposure.

2.1 Context and Setting

At present, over 130 million people have been forcibly displaced from their homes (UNHCR 2023), with approximately 40% of those being refugees sheltering in other developing countries.

These figures have grown four-fold since 2010.[10] The vast majority of refugees today seek refuge in low and middle-income countries and are in a situation of protracted displacement, making the integration of refugees into host communities a critical policy goal.[11] But while refugees face specific vulnerabilities, including the loss of assets and psychological trauma (WB, 2017) they are often hosted by communities that are similarly impoverished and marginalized, for whom resources for survival are scarce (Chambers, 1986; Jacobsen, 2002; Verwimp and Maystadt, 2015; Sanghi et al., 2016; WB, 2017). In fact, some of the largest refugee settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa are located in marginal, arid patches of land marked by extreme levels of poverty, such as Kakuma and Dadaab settlements in Kenya, Nyarugusu in Tanzania and the Bidi Bidi settlement in Uganda, among others. Thus, though refugees normally account for less than 1 percent of the host country's population,[12] as recipients of humanitarian transfers, their presence is often highly salient to their impoverished hosts. The perceived unfairness of humanitarian assistance in an environment defined by scarce resources and limited public services can compromise social cohesion, undermine socioeconomic integration, and ultimately hinder the development and growth of host economies (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Jacobsen, 2002; Easterly et al., 2006).

Approximately 71% of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa currently live in UN-managed refugee settlements.[13] Mozambique's only refugee settlement dates back to 2001 and hosts over 13,190 refugees out of a total of 28,000 refugees in the country. The settlement is located in Northern Mozambique in Maratane, 35 kilometers from the city of Nampula, the third largest city in the country with a population of approximately 743,125. The settlement is co-managed by UNHCR and the Government of Mozambique. The majority of refugees in Maratane originated from the DRC (42%) and Burundi (32%), with the remainder coming from Somalia (11%), Rwanda (14%) and Ethiopia, Uganda and the Congo (1%).[14] The average (median) length of stay in

[10] By 2050, it is projected that over 1.2 billion people will have been forcibly displaced from their homes, driven out by a combination of conflict and climate shocks (Rigaud, 2018).

[11] In 2024, only 8% of the stock of displaced individuals was able to return home (UNHCR, Global Trends, 2024).

[12] In some countries the shares can be slightly higher such as Turkey, Chad, Djibouti and South Sudan, where refugees account for between 2 and 3.5 percent of the population (UNHCR 2024).

[13] Encampment policies are largely confined to low- and lower middle-income countries, with 75 percent and 26 percent of refugees in camps, respectively.

[14] Table B.4 in the Online Appendix reports the languages spoken by refugees.

the settlement at the time of our study was 9.5 years (8 years), with a standard deviation of 5 years. The refugees who have stayed the longest joined the settlement 23 years ago while the most recent arrivals joined in the year prior to the start of our study, in 2018.

Host communities live in areas that are either bordering the settlement or within a radius of approximately 7 kilometers, in scattered and small agglomerations. For about 16,390 host community members, the refugee settlement hosts their closest market, as well as health and education facilities, which are open to all. Importantly, our survey and historical data confirm that the majority of these agglomerations either pre-dated the opening of the settlement or sprung up shortly after the settlement was built.

Figure 1: Location of Households



Panel A: Settlement, relative to Nampula city **Panel B: Refugee Settlement and Host Agglomerations**

Notes: The figure shows the location of households in the community, by host and refugee status. The Maratane refugee settlement is located approximately 15 kilometers from the center of the city of Nampula (as the crow flies) but 35 kms on local roads. Host community members live between 0.3 and 7 kms away from the refugee settlement.

2.2 Sample and Data

We identify a sample of 467 refugees and host community members drawn from a group of individuals eligible for UNHCR's livelihoods/graduation support program. Eligibility for the program was determined by a poverty card survey, which collected information on 10 socioeconomic indicators to identify poor and extremely poor households. The poverty scorecard

classification is based on data from the most recent National Poverty Assessment in Mozambique (the 2014/15 Household Budget Survey), and it is commonly used by the Government of Mozambique to enroll citizens into different social safety net programs.[15] We stratify our sample by refugees and host community members and randomly assign 166 participants to the treatment group and 301 participants to a control group.[16] We conducted a survey in 4 waves,[17] capturing information on household demographics, beliefs, food security, mental health, together with the key outcome variables of financial security and social cohesion.[18]

We conducted a baseline survey one month before the start of the livelihoods support graduation program in September 2019. Following the baseline, the program started with language training (3 months) and job training (18 months). We conducted our first midline survey in May 2021, a couple of months prior to the large cash transfer. This cash transfer was provided in two tranches, one month apart, and represented approximately 30 months of average income for participants. We conducted a second midline survey in December 2021, 7 months after the cash transfer and 27 months after the start of the program. Our endline survey then took place in June 2022, to measure the medium-run effects of the program on social cohesion over the span of 34 months.

We measure financial security by aggregating the following variables in a single index: i) percent of monthly income saved in the previous month; ii) ease of paying a surprise bill of 6,000 meticais (approximately 94 USD); iii) monthly take-home pay;[19] and iv) household income

[15]The poverty score card asks about the number of children in the household, whether the head of the household can read and write, the material of the floor of the residence, the main source of energy in the household, whether the household has a table in good working order, how many beds and cots the house has in good working order, whether the household has a charcoal or electric iron in good working order and whether the household has access to a cell phone. For the exact questions used in the poverty score card see Online Appendix A.

[16]Our sample is balanced within, and for the most part, across strata as shown in Table B.5 in the Online Appendix.

[17]The baseline survey and first midline survey were conducted in person, while the last two surveys were conducted over the phone.

[18]See Table B.3 for summary statistics of the key variables. Attrition across the different waves was relatively low and balanced across treatment and control groups, within each stratum of refugees versus hosts as shown in Table B.9 through Table B.12 in the Online Appendix. Attrition was highest among refugees in the treatment group in our second midline and at endline. We return to this issue when we are interpreting our results (see footnote 25).

[19]Monthly pay is converted from Meticais to USD at a rate of 1 Metical = 0.16 USD.

in the previous 6 months.[20] Our measure of social cohesion includes the following indicators: i) two separate measures of trust in in-groups and trust in out-groups;[21] ii) a measure of willingness to share resources (government financial support and jobs) with out-groups;[22] and iii) the share of friends who are out-groups.[23]

2.3 Financial Security and Social Cohesion at Baseline

Figure 2 shows the baseline level of financial security across host community members (panel A) and refugees (panel B). Refugees have slightly higher levels of financial security than hosts, with this difference being driven by higher take-home monthly pay and higher 6-month income from casual employment. Panels C and D show the distribution of the social cohesion index at baseline for both refugees and hosts. Refugees are less trusting, but more likely to report that resources should be shared and more likely to befriend hosts. On average, refugees report higher levels of prosociality at baseline when compared to hosts.[24]

We begin by examining how financial security correlates with social cohesion among the cross-section of hosts and refugees at baseline.[25] Table 1 reveals that both refugee and host community members with higher financial security are more trusting overall, but financially secure

[20] Table B.6 in the Online Appendix shows the positive and sizable factor loadings for the first component and an eigenvalue well above 1 at 1.9.

[21] At baseline, all participants are asked a question about general trust in the community. In subsequent waves of the survey, refugees were asked about the degree to which they trust other refugees (in-groups) and Mozambicans (out-groups) living around the settlement, and analogously, host community members were asked about the degree to which they trust their neighbors (in-groups) and refugees living in Maratane settlement (out-groups).

[22] The specific questions asked were the extent to which the respondent agreed with the following statements: "The government of Mozambique should first provide financial support to nationals and then to foreigners" and "When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Mozambicans over foreigners". Note that in this setting, Mozambicans refer to refugees as both refugees and foreigners. We used both words interchangeably to ensure that we had a well-defined out-group. We also adjust the sign of the responses of refugees to this question to make sure that the index we are observing increases with a belief that resources should be shared.

[23] Table B.7 shows the positive and sizable factor loadings for the first component and an eigenvalue well above 1.

[24] See Table B.5 in the Online Appendix. Note also that levels of trust and patterns of interactions between in-groups and out-groups are generally low for both refugees and host community members. On a scale increasing in trust between 1 and 5, both refugees and hosts typically indicate a level of trust of 3 or less when considering entrusting their neighbors with tasks such as holding their keys, caring for their children, or shopping on their behalf.

[25] The financial security and social cohesion indexes are constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator (obtained by subtracting the control group mean for each wave and dividing it by the control standard deviation) and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group (Banerjee et al., 2015).

Figure 2: Baseline Levels of Financial Security and Social Cohesion



Panel A: Baseline Financial Security Hosts



Panel B: Baseline Financial Security Refugees



Panel C: Baseline Social Cohesion Hosts



Panel D: Baseline Social Cohesion Refugees

Notes: The figure shows baseline distributions for our Financial Security Index and Social Cohesion Index by Host/Refugee status. The Financial Security Index is an index of 4 standardized variables (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take-home monthly pay and 6-month household income). Social Cohesion Index at baseline is an index of 4 standardized variables (trust, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs). The vertical dashed line represents the average of the distribution.

hosts are less willing to share resources with refugees. Given selection into being financially secure, it is hard to firmly establish the reason for this, but we speculate that it may relate to the fact that in an environment with very scarce resources, individuals who get slightly ahead on their own might be more aware of the inherent rivalry in the allocation of resources across groups.[26]

Table 1 also explores the correlation between distance and social cohesion at baseline. When it comes to interactions across groups, being close matters – respondents in general report a higher number of interactions with out-groups per week when they live closer to them. But for hosts, more interactions and proximity to refugees at baseline do not translate, on their own, into more trust or into an increased willingness to share resources with refugees (as shown in Panel C, columns 4 and 5). On the contrary, hosts who live farther from the camp are more trusting of refugees even though they interact with them less. The fact that hosts who live farther from refugees exhibit higher levels of trust already raises questions about contact alone leading to social cohesion.[27]

3 Positive Shock to Financial Security: Experimental Evidence

3.1 Livelihoods Intervention

UNHCR and the government of Mozambique implemented a livelihoods (graduation) program as a sequenced package of economic assistance to strengthen financial security and move participants out of extreme poverty. The main intervention aimed to improve the financial security of participants by providing cash transfers, consumption support, language and financial literacy classes, vocational training and employment support for either wage or self-employment.[28] The program started in late 2019 providing language instruction, financial literacy and job training through mentors. Between July and August 2021, participants received a large cash transfer

[26] Table C.1 in the Online Appendix shows these correlations without controls.

[27] Table B.13 in the Online Appendix shows that hosts who live farther from the settlement are only slightly older, less likely to speak the official language, have slightly smaller households, and are slightly less likely to have any form of casual employment.

[28] The program provided assistance in the following areas: core skills training, language and financial literacy classes, market-oriented skills and vocational training, job support, asset transfer and coaching services.

Table 1: Correlation Between Financial Security and Social Cohesion, Baseline

	General Trust (stand)	Outgroup Intercts. (stand)	Prop Out-Group Friends (stand)	Share Fin. Support (stand)	Share Jobs (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: Full Sample					
Financial Security Index	0.29***	0.16***	0.04	-0.10**	-0.14***	0.04
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]
Distance to Out-Group	0.10**	-0.18***	0.05	0.08	-0.01	0.09*
	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]
Mean Dependent	-0.01	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.04
Nbr Participants-Waves	467	467	467	467	467	467
Adj. R-squared	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.19	0.20	0.21
	Panel B: Only Refugees					
Financial Security Index	0.34***	0.20***	-0.11	-0.07	-0.13	0.01
	[0.08]	[0.06]	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.07]
Distance to Out-Group	0.04	-0.10	-0.25***	-0.11*	-0.08	-0.17***
	[0.09]	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.06]
Mean Dependent	-0.08	0.29	0.47	0.57	0.58	0.67
Nbr Participants-Waves	143	143	143	143	143	143
Adj. R-squared	0.13	0.23	0.20	0.10	0.09	0.16
	Panel C: Only Hosts					
Financial Security Index	0.27***	0.11**	0.10*	-0.12**	-0.14***	0.05
	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.06]
Distance to Out-Group	0.12**	-0.20***	0.05	0.09	-0.00	0.11*
	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.06]
Mean Dependent	0.03	0.07	-0.12	-0.22	-0.22	-0.23
Nbr Participants-Waves	324	324	324	324	324	324
Adj. R-squared	0.10	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.10	0.04
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table shows OLS estimates of regressing the components of the Social Cohesion Index on Financial Security and Distance to the out-group at baseline. General Trust is an index of 3 proxies for baseline trust (comfort in leaving a set of keys with neighbours [1-4], comfort in having neighbour watch over kids [1-4], comfort in giving your neighbour money to pick up groceries [1-4]), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Column 2 measures the number of times the respondent interacted with a member of the opposite group in the past 7 days. Column 3 measures the proportion of the respondent's friends who are from their out-group. Columns 4-5 measure the extent to which the respondent feels that government financial support and jobs should be shared with out-groups (1-5), respectively. Social Cohesion Index (column 6) is an index which measures 4 proxies for social cohesion in columns 1, 4 and 5 (trust, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay and 6-month household income), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Distance to Out-Group measures how far (in kms) the respondent lives from the closest out-group member. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

of 1,000 USD, which was equivalent to approximately 30 months of average income. Language instruction was provided in groups but all other activities were individually taught, including financial literacy, which was conducted through an instructional video on a smartphone that we designed. While the program might have brought together refugees and host community members for the duration of certain sub-interventions, there were no specific activities explicitly designed to promote social cohesion or solidarity between refugees and host community members. Study participants were informed that the program aimed to improve livelihoods but no explicit mention was made to improving social cohesion to minimize social desirability bias in the responses to our surveys. Moreover, no explicit link was established between the program and the presence of refugees. To minimize spatial spillover effects, we split the settlement of Maratane into spatial quadrants and participants were selected at random but drawn proportionately from each quadrant, following a local skipping pattern to avoid that treatment and control households would be within a 25 to 30 meter radius of each other. A similar approach was followed for host community members.

First, we examine whether the livelihoods program improved financial security among treated refugees and hosts. Our core specification is:

$$FS_{it} = \delta T_i + \beta P_t + \theta(T_i * P_t) + \tau_t + R_i + X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where FS_{it} represents financial security for person i in time period t, T_i is treatment status with respect to the livelihoods program, P_t is an indicator variable for post-treatment time period (pooling waves 2 and 3 of the survey against the baseline), τ_t are wave fixed effects, R_i is an indicator variable for whether the respondent is a refugee, and X_{it} represents a vector of baseline control variables which include: age; gender; age interacted with gender; years of education; household size; a measure of the quality of housing at baseline;[29] whether the respondent speaks the official language in the country (Portuguese); how long the respondent has been living in

[29]This represents the first component of the principal component analysis of the following indicators: i) number of rooms in the house; ii) whether the house has working electricity; iii) whether the house has a toilet that flushes; iv) quality of roof material used in construction; v) quality of floor material; and the vi) quality of wall material used in construction. All factors load positively on the first component. See Table B.8 in the Online Appendix for the factor loadings and eigenvalues.

Mozambique (for refugees), and the distance between the respondent's dwelling and the center of the Maratane refugee settlement.[30] Our main parameter of interest, θ, measures the average treatment effect of the livelihoods program on financial security.[31]

Table 2 reveals that the increase in financial security induced by the livelihoods program was on average equivalent to 1.75 standard deviations of the control group's distribution. This can be interpreted as moving from the median to the 96th percentile of the control group's financial security. The effects are sizable across both refugees (1.54 sd) and host community members (1.93 sd). The increase in financial security is also driven by improvements in all sub-components of the main index namely monthly take-home pay, savings, household income in the previous 6 months, and ease of paying a surprise bill.

3.2 Financial Security and Social Cohesion

To examine the impact of changes in financial security on prosociality and social cohesion, we follow two approaches. First, we instrument changes in financial security with our difference-in-differences estimates, shown in Equation 2. In the second stage Equation 3, we regress Social Cohesion SC_{it} on the change in Financial Security induced by the livelihoods program, $\widehat{FS_{it}}$, and bootstrap standard errors.

$$[Stage\ 1] : FS_{it} = \delta T_i + \beta P_t + \theta(T_i * P_t) + \tau_t + R_i + X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \longrightarrow \widehat{FS_{it}} \tag{2}$$

$$[Stage\ 2] : SC_{it} = \gamma \widehat{FS_{it}} + \tau_t + R_i + X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \tag{3}$$

[30] We include these controls to correct some imbalance in the overall sample due to our stratification approach across refugees and hosts (see Table B.5 in the Online Appendix). Furthermore, our final endline was disrupted in the field due to an unexpected bureaucratic delay in the renewal of our authorization to access the settlement. This meant that by chance, some households were surveyed earlier than others as the survey did not follow any specific order. Nevertheless, we include in our baseline specification an additional control for whether the survey was delayed by two months or not in July 2022. Removing this control does not change any of our main results.

[31] No one in our sample declined treatment. As mentioned in footnote 13, we detect slightly higher attrition among treated refugees in our second midline and at endline. One concern is that this might lead us to overestimate the effect of the program if attrition happens mostly for those in the treatment group for whom treatment may not be as successful. What we observe, however, is that treatment effects are already sizable and significant even in our first midline when there is no differential attrition, but also that treatment effects for hosts are also higher across survey waves, even though unlike refugees, there is no differential attrition for hosts.

Table 2: Impact of the Livelihoods Program on Financial Security

	HH Income (6m) (stand)	Take Home Pay (1m) (stand)	Pct Inc. Saved [0-1] (stand)	Pay Surprise Bill [0-3] (stand)	Financial Security Index (stand)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Panel A: Full Sample				
Treated X Post	0.79***	0.61***	1.89***	1.24***	1.75***
	[0.15]	[0.17]	[0.17]	[0.12]	[0.15]
Pctile of Control Group	79%	73%	97%	89%	96%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,233	1,750	1,718	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.41	0.21	0.32
	Panel B: Only Refugees				
Treated X Post	0.64***	1.00***	1.59***	1.20***	1.54***
	[0.22]	[0.26]	[0.33]	[0.21]	[0.26]
Pctile of Control Group	74%	84%	94%	88%	94%
Nbr Participants-Waves	512	307	512	496	512
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.11	0.30	0.27	0.31
	Panel C: Only Hosts				
Treated X Post	0.92***	0.41*	2.16***	1.30***	1.93***
	[0.23]	[0.23]	[0.17]	[0.15]	[0.19]
Pctile of Control Group	82%	66%	98%	90%	97%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,238	926	1,238	1,222	1,238
Adj. R-squared	0.06	0.04	0.48	0.17	0.32
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the 3 period average effect of the livelihood program on financial security outcomes. HH Income (6m) measured the total household income in the previous 6 months, as the sum of all income sources. Take-Home pay (1m) is the respondent's reported take-home monthly pay in the previous month. Pct Income Saved is the % of income saved in the previous month. Pay Surprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 meticais, ranging for not at all (0) to very easily (3). Financial Security Index is an index of the 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved in the previous month, take home monthly pay, and 6-month household income), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. All specifications control for age, gender, age interacted with gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique (for refugees), distance to the center of Maratane camp and an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed 2022 survey batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, so treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the respective control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table 2 shows that exposure to the livelihoods program significantly improves financial security. The exclusion restriction further requires that the program affects social cohesion solely through its impact on financial security. A key concern is that the program may have directly influenced social cohesion through alternative channels—such as improvements in mental health, general well-being, increased interactions with out-groups, enhanced communication skills, or broader shifts in social norms. In subsection 4.2, we examine the exclusion restriction in greater detail and present evidence that does not support these alternative pathways.

Table 3, Panel A, shows the OLS estimates linking financial security to social cohesion, revealing that financial security predicts social cohesion and its sub-components. Panel B shows the reduced-form impact of the livelihoods program on social cohesion. We find that the program is associated with broad-based gains: it increases trust in both in-groups and out-groups, it increases the proportion of out-group friends, and it increases willingness to share government support and jobs with refugees. In Panel C [Stage 2], we instrument financial security with treatment and estimate that a one standard deviation increase in financial security leads to a 0.25 standard deviation increase in social cohesion. This suggests that the treatment effect on financial security (1.75) induced a 0.25 x 1.75 = 0.44 standard deviation increase in social cohesion, which is comparable to the reduced form estimate of the effect of the program on social cohesion, as reported in panel B. Further, we find that financial security triggered by the program led to a significant improvement in *all* the sub-components of our social cohesion index. Table C.2 and Table C.3 in the Online Appendix show that changes in financial security are associated with increases in the prosociality of both refugees (0.34 sd) and of hosts (0.21 sd).

3.3 Benchmarking and Interpreting Changes in Social Cohesion

We benchmark the main effects of the livelihoods program against cross-country variation in trust, drawing on data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Afrobarometer. This exercise focuses exclusively on trust, as comparable measures for other dimensions of social cohesion are not consistently available across these datasets. Our estimated effect on trust is

Table 3: Financial Security and Social Cohesion, 2SLS. **Full Sample**

	Trust In-Group (stand)	Trust Out-Group (stand)	Prop Out-Group Friends (stand)	Share Fin. Support (stand)	Share Jobs (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: OLS					
Financial Security Index	0.10***	0.13***	0.16***	0.03	-0.01	0.17***
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
Pctile of Control Group	54%	55%	56%	51%	50%	57%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,041	1,038	1,750	1,342	1,343	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.08
	Panel B: Reduced Form					
Treatment X Post	0.23***	0.36***	0.20*	0.39***	0.27**	0.53***
	[0.08]	[0.08]	[0.10]	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.11]
Pctile of Control Group	59%	64%	58%	65%	61%	70%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,041	1,038	1,750	1,342	1,343	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.05
	Panel C: 2SLS [Instrument = Treatment x Post]					
Financial $\widehat{\text{Security}}$ Index	0.11***	0.20***	0.15***	0.18***	0.11**	0.25***
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.03]
Pctile of Control Group	54%	58%	56%	57%	54%	60%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,041	1,038	1,750	1,342	1,343	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.07	-0.03	-0.02	0.06
First Stage F (KP)	381.25	380.51	153.57	109.68	109.74	153.57
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table shows OLS [Panel A], Reduced Form [Panel B] and 2SLS [Panel C] estimates for the impact of financial security on social cohesion. Trust in-group [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their in-group (ie; refugees for a refugee respondent, hosts for a host respondent). Trust out-group [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their out-group (ie; hosts for a refugee respondent, refugees for a host respondent). Prop out-group friends [0-1] asks the respondent what proportion of their friends belong to the out-group. Share Fin. Support and Share Jobs measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing government financial support and in accessing jobs (both, on a scale of 1-5). Social Cohesion Index is an index which measures 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the respective control group. All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique (for refugees), distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for having been surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, so treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the respective control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

on average 0.30 standard deviations.[32] The cross-country standard deviation in generalized interpersonal trust is 0.43 in the WVS and 0.28 in the Afrobarometer. Thus, our treatment effect corresponds to approximately 70% and 110% of the cross-country standard deviation in trust in the WVS and Afrobarometer, respectively. Similarly, to examine the generality of the link between financial security and trust we investigate whether the pattern we observe in our communities in Nampula at baseline can be found more broadly, drawing on data across several countries from the World Values Survey (WVS). We pool data from 66 countries and over 90,387 respondents from the latest waves (2017-2022), and plot the correlation between a subjective measure of financial satisfaction,[33] and a measure of trust in foreign nationals.[34]

Figure 3: Financial Security and Trust in Foreigners: World Values Survey (2017-2022)



Panel A: Perceived Financial Security and Trust **Panel B: Controlling for Income Rank**

Notes: Panel A shows the relationship between financial satisfaction, which is increasing on a scale of 1 to 10 and trust in foreign nationals. Panel B shows the same relationship as in Panel A, but additionally controlling for actual, self-reported income rank. These estimates include wave fixed effects.

Figure 3 shows that on average, respondents who feel more financially secure are more likely to trust foreigners (Panel A), even when accounting for actual income rank (Panel B).[35] When

[32] This is taken as the average reduced form estimate on in-group trust (0.23) and out-group trust (0.36) from Table 3.

[33] This measure is obtained from answers to the question: "How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?" (Q50), with a range between being completely dissatisfied (1) to being completely satisfied (10).

[34] This is measured by the response to the following question: "I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me [...] whether you trust people from a different nationality?". The respondents can select an option from "completely, somewhat, not very much", to "not at all" (Q63).

[35] We consider income rank to be a more objective measure of financial security. This variable captures the response to the following question: "On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in

examining the association between financial security and generalized trust, we find a similarly monotonic but notably weaker relationship.[36] One possible interpretation is that trust in foreigners activates considerations related to resource distribution and reciprocity, making it more sensitive to one's perceived financial security. Individuals who feel financially secure may be less concerned about economic competition, thereby increasing their openness and trust toward outsiders. While suggestive, this evidence points to a broader link between perceived financial security and trust that extends beyond our specific context.

In subsection 2.3, we had already seen that in the cross-section, at baseline, hosts with a slightly higher level of financial security were more trusting but less willing to share resources. We now compare high-income individuals at baseline with those who had higher financial security after the intervention using a nearest neighbor matching algorithm, with exact matching on gender and refugee status.[37] We find that being more financially secure at baseline is less predictive of being more prosocial compared to being high-income as a result of the program. These findings suggest that the source of financial security may matter for its social implications. This evidence is, however, only suggestive, as selection into high-income status at baseline may bias the comparison.

3.4 Sensitivity Analysis

We conduct a series of sensitivity checks on the relationship between financial security and social cohesion. First, Table C.6 and Table C.7 show that our results are not driven by covariates. Second, we examine whether our findings are driven by a particular sub-component of the financial security or social cohesion indexes. Table C.8 in the Online Appendix shows that dropping each of the sub-components in turn from the main Financial Security index delivers very similar estimates, suggesting that there is no specific sub-measure of the index that is driving the results. Similarly, Tables C.9, C.10 and C.11 show that estimates are stable when

(Q288)." Note that this relationship is also strong when we control for country GDP per capita.

[36] See Figure B.1 in the Online Appendix. Moreover, a stacked regression on trust reveals that coefficients for financial security interacted with trust in foreigners are larger than the coefficients of financial security on trust at every level of financial security

[37] See Table C.5 in the Online Appendix, column 1 presents matches based on absolute income, while column 2 uses income percentiles within each survey wave.

we drop individual components of the social cohesion index for the LS, reduced form and 2SLS estimates, respectively. Third, we confirm that our results are similar when instead of an index we use the principal component score for both financial security and social cohesion, as shown in Table C.12.[38] Fourth, we conduct a series of randomization inference tests to account for our sample size. We can easily reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the treatment and control groups, with 1,000 permutations (see Table C.13 in the Online Appendix).

A key concern in our analysis is whether the effect of program participation for an individual depends on whether their neighbors also received the treatment. To allay concerns about this possibility, we measure the share of neighbors in the vicinity of each participant who participated in the program and we directly control for this measure in our analysis. Table C.14 and Table C.15 suggest that community level spillovers, even when considering different radii of distance between respondents and their neighbors (ranging from 750 meters, 1 kilometer and 2 kilometers), are limited and cannot explain our core findings. Our community treatment variable is always small and statistically insignificant.

A similar issue is whether the estimated impact of the program is inflated because control households located near treated households are influenced by their neighbors' gains in financial security, potentially through observation or resentment over exclusion. This would represent a SUTVA violation in our estimation. Although survey data indicate limited awareness of the program among control households and our design introduced a buffer area between participating households, we verify in Table C.16 and Table C.17 that our results are robust to excluding control units in close proximity to treated ones. The estimated effects remain consistent, suggesting that proximity-based bias does not drive our findings. In addition to this, in Table C.18 we use a measure of trust specifically in neighbors, to show that our treated units also have higher levels of trust in neighbors regardless of whether we include in our control sample neighbors within 50 meters of their dwelling or not, who may have been more exposed to any observable signs of treatment. Finally, to allay concerns with a violation of the exclusion restriction, we follow a generalised random forest approach to validate the link between finan-

[38] Most variables load positively on the first principal component for both scores, with eigenvalues well above one (see Table B.6 and Table B.7 in the Online Appendix.)

cial security and social cohesion (Athey et al., 2018). Figure 4 uncovers a strong, positive and statistically significant correlation between both reduced form treatment effects: participants who had the strongest gains in financial security also experienced the largest gains in social cohesion.

Figure 4: Correlation of Treatment Effects: Financial Security and Social Cohesion



Notes: The figure shows the correlation between treatment effects on financial security (x-axis) and treatment effects on social cohesion (y-axis), computed by generalized random forests (Athey et al., 2019). The average treatment effect (ate) on financial security ≈ 1.75 (se $= 0.09$) and the average treatment effect on social cohesion ≈ 0.45 (se $= 0.06$), which are comparable to our OLS estimates. Calibration tests show that the model for treatment effects is well fit by conventional standards, both in capturing the average treatment effect, as well as heterogeneity in the underlying signal. The slope and standard error of the line is shown below the graph. The y-axis is normalized by the average treatment effect on social cohesion, and the x-axis is normalized by the average treatment effect on financial security.

3.5 Heterogeneity Analysis: Conditional Average Treatment Effects

We examine whether treatment effects vary across sub-groups in our sample. To do so, we compute heterogeneous treatment effects for both financial security and social cohesion based on baseline levels of both indicators, following a generalized random forests approach with bootstrapped sampling (Wager and Athey, 2017). Figure 5 reports treatment effects conditional on the baseline levels of financial security and social cohesion. Panel A reveals that while all participants experienced an increase in financial security, consistent with a causal effect of

financial security on social cohesion, the largest effects are felt by those with lower levels of financial security at baseline. Panel B reports that the largest effects on social cohesion are experienced by those with higher levels of social cohesion to begin with. Reassuringly, Panel C shows that the impact of the program on financial security does not depend on baseline levels of social cohesion and Panel D also suggests that the effects of the livelihoods program on social cohesion were experienced by all participants, regardless of their baseline levels of financial security. These findings are consistent with our main hypothesis that increasing financial security increases social cohesion, and that these gains were broad-based.

Figure 6 explores how physical proximity to the refugee settlement moderates the relationship between financial security and social cohesion. We use the distance between host communities and the refugee settlement as a proxy for inter-group exposure.[39] While treatment effects on social cohesion are positive across all host communities, the gains are slightly larger for hosts living closer to the settlement. This is in line with the possibility that financial security is an important mediator of the impact of contact on social cohesion. Recall that Table 1 already showed that at baseline, hosts residing near refugee settlements reported more frequent interactions with refugees but lower levels of trust. This implies that proximity without financial security may intensify perceived competition over scarce resources and erode trust. Taken together, the results suggest that contact alone is not sufficient to improve cohesion: the impact of contact may depend critically on the underlying economic conditions.

4 Negative Shock to Financial Security: a Natural Experiment

To strengthen our causal inference between financial security and social cohesion, we exploit a natural experiment in the form of an exogenous climate shock that affected participants' financial security late in the study period. In March 2022, two months after our second midline survey and three months before the endline, a Category 3 tropical cyclone made landfall in the Nampula region. The storm passed approximately 5 kilometers from the refugee settlement, causing substantial damage to several homes in the surrounding area.

[39] Table B.13 in the Online Appendix shows that these two groups of hosts (close and far from the settlement) are broadly comparable on several demographics.

Figure 5: Conditional Treatment Effects



Notes: The figure shows treatment effects on financial security and social cohesion (y-axis) conditional on baseline characteristics (x-axis), computed according to generalized random forests (Athey et al., 2019). The average treatment effect (ate) on financial security ≈ 1.75 (se $= 0.09$) and the average treatment effect on social cohesion ≈ 0.46 (se $= 0.06$), are comparable to our OLS estimates. Panel A shows the treatment effect on financial security conditional on baseline levels of financial security. Panel B shows the treatment effect on social cohesion conditional on baseline levels of social cohesion. Panel C shows the treatment effect on financial security conditional on baseline levels of social cohesion, holding baseline financial security and all other covariates constant at their median values. Panel D shows the treatment effect on social cohesion conditional on baseline levels of financial security, holding baseline social cohesion and all other covariates constant at their median values. Calibration tests show that the model for treatment effects is well fit by conventional standards, both in capturing the average treatment effect, as well as heterogeneity in the underlying signal. The slope and standard error of the lines are shown below each graph. The y-axis is normalized by the average treatment effect of each graph's respective dependent variable, with the average treatment effect shown below.

Figure 6: Treatment Effect on Social Cohesion by Distance to Settlement



Notes: The figure shows conditional treatment effects on social cohesion (y-axis) by distance to the settlement (x-axis), computed according to generalized random forests (Athey et al., 2019). The average treatment effect (ate) on social cohesion ≈ 0.45 (se $= 0.06$). Calibration tests show that the model for treatment effects is well fit by conventional standards, both in capturing the average treatment effect, as well as heterogeneity in the underlying signal. The slope and standard error of the line is shown below the graph. The y-axis is normalized by the average treatment effect on social cohesion.

We begin by measuring the impact of the cyclone on household-level damage using three sources of data: (i) self-reported damage collected through household surveys, (ii) third-party verification conducted by a partner NGO, and (iii) high-resolution Pleiades-1 satellite imagery obtained from the United Nations Satellite Centre (UNOSAT), capturing dwellings in the Maratane region before and after the cyclone. UNOSAT classifies a dwelling as severely damaged if part of the roof or walls has collapsed and debris is visible around the structure. Figure 7 illustrates the spatial variation in cyclone-related damage, both within our study sample (Panel A) and across the region (Panel B).

In this section, we focus on damage experienced by host community members residing within a 7-kilometer radius of the refugee settlement, where there is greater variation in cyclone exposure. By contrast, variation in exposure within the refugee settlement is more limited due to higher housing density and greater uniformity in the geographic location of dwellings.[40]

Figure 7: Heterogeneity in House Damage due to Cyclone Gombe



Notes: Panel A of the graph shows the spatial distribution of damaged and non-damaged households among host community members participating in our study. Panel B shows the spatial distribution of damaged dwellings in the whole Maratane area, including dwellings that were not part of our study.

We predict damage using plausibly exogenous geographic characteristics (*Geo*) that strongly

[40]The standard deviations of the latitude and longitude coordinates for hosts (refugees) is 0.016 (0.001) and 0.013 (0.004), respectively.

correlated with exposure to excessive rain, flooding and destruction by strong winds.[41] The resulting estimation of home destruction is shown in Table 4.[42] We then create a binary variable capturing whether the probability of damage is above or below the median of the distribution, and include this predicted house damage variable as a generated regressor in our triple differences estimation:

$$[\textbf{Damage}] : Damage_i = Geo_i + X_{it} \longrightarrow \widehat{Damage}_i \tag{4}$$

$$[\textbf{FS}] : FS_{it} = \beta_{FS} T_i * Surv_t * \widehat{Dam.}_i + \delta_{FS} T_i * Surv + \gamma_{FS} \widehat{Dam.}_i * Sur + X_{it} \tag{5}$$

$$[\textbf{SC}] : SC_{it} = \beta_{SC} T_i * Surv_t * \widehat{Dam.}_i + \delta_{SC} T_i * Surv + \gamma_{SC} \widehat{Dam.}_i * Surv + X_{it} \tag{6}$$

Figure 8 summarizes the differential effects of the livelihoods program (the positive shock) and the cyclone (the negative shock) on financial security, constructed via Equation 5. We plot the evolution of financial security for the treated group, benchmarked against the control group. We split the treatment group into whether the respondent was impacted by the weather shock or not. The figure shows how differences in financial security were zero at baseline (relative to the control group) and then increased significantly with the introduction of the livelihoods program. After the first midline, the increase in financial security reflects the start of the employment support scheme and the participation in savings groups but the largest increase occurs after the cash transfer takes place, by the second midline survey. When cyclone Gombe struck, we observe a marked divergence: households affected by cyclone-related damage experienced a roughly 25% decline in financial security relative to the second midline (which took place approximately two months before the cyclone's landfall). In contrast, financial security remained high and stable among treated households whose homes were not damaged.

[41] Latitude and longitude were recorded by enumerators during the baseline survey. Elevation was extracted from Google Earth Engine Catalog databases "UCSB-CHG/CHIRPS/DAILY" (precipitation), "CGIAR/SRTM90_V4" (elevation) and "WWF/HydroSHEDS/v1/FreeFlowingRivers_FeatureView" (river distance), respectively. The path of Tropical Cyclone Gombe is mapped from zoom earth at https://zoom.earth/storms/gombe-2022/map=daily. Our findings in this section are very similar if we identify instruments based on LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) applied to a wider set of geographic characteristics including the presence of trees, shrubs, and built infrastructure around the dwelling.

[42] Table B.14 in the Online Appendix shows that those whose dwellings were damaged by the cyclone were similar to those whose dwellings were not, across key pre-shock characteristics including income, financial security, housing quality, and the social cohesion index. Given the particular path of the cyclone just south of the main city of Nampula, we also show that dwellings are not substantially different in terms of distance to the city in Table B.15 of the Online Appendix.

Table 4: Geographic Exposure and House Damage. **Hosts Only**.

	Estimates From: P(Damage) = elevation + lat + lon + $X_{it} \longrightarrow \widehat{\textbf{Damage}}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elevation	-0.00	-0.66	-3.36**	-7.42***
	[0.00]	[0.79]	[1.34]	[2.31]
Latitude	2.16**	15.30	2.07**	43.03**
	[0.93]	[15.88]	[0.93]	[18.71]
Longitude	8.18***	8.74***	-18.46*	-32.72***
	[1.66]	[1.82]	[10.85]	[12.59]
Elevation * Latitude	.	-0.04	.	-0.13**
	.	[0.05]	.	[0.06]
Elevation * Longitude	.	.	0.09**	0.14***
	.	.	[0.03]	[0.04]
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196
Adj. R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
Zero Stage Instruments				
Elevation	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Longitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elevation * Latitude	N	Y	N	Y
Elevation * Longitude	N	N	Y	Y

Notes: The table reports coefficients for elevation, latitude, and longitude in predicting house destruction from Cyclone Gombe. House Damage is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports that their house was damaged during Cyclone Gombe. All models control for age, gender, age interacted with gender, age squared, years of education, first component variable for housing amenities, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance, and an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. All estimates correspond to hosts only. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

When we analyze the effect of the cyclone on the different sub-components of the financial security index in Table E.9 in the Online Appendix, we find that the key margins that were compromised by the cyclone were monthly savings (presumably as individuals had to draw on their savings to rebuild their houses) and the perceived ability to pay a surprise bill. There were no significant effects on actual economic fundamentals such as take-home monthly income as the cyclone had limited impact on employment or on household income in the previous 6 months. [43]

Figure 8: Impact of Livelihoods and Gombe Shocks on Financial Security. **Treatment Group and Hosts Only**.



Notes: The figure shows the impact of the Graduation Program and Climate Shock on Financial Security across time, for the treatment group only. Financial Security is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income for the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. The y-axis shows the predicted value of Financial Security from a regression of Financial Security on the triple interaction of Treatment x survey x $\widehat{Damage}$ (including all double interactions and base effects), where $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on latitude, longitude and elevation, controlling for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first principal component variable capturing housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbors within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance, and an indicator for being in the July 2022 survey batch. Damage is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the house has been damaged during Cyclone Gombe. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate the difference Δ between the damage/non-damage groups at endline is significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.

[43] Figure E.1 in the Online Appendix reveals that financial security did not decrease significantly among anyone in the control group, even for those in the control group who experienced damage to their dwellings due to the cyclone. Since both savings and the ability to pay a surprise bill were bottom-coded in the control group, when disaster hits, employment and take-home pay were sustained but the other sub-components of our index of financial security could not fall further below zero.

In Figure 9 we track the evolution of the social cohesion index in response to both positive and negative income shocks, constructed via Equation 6. At baseline, levels of social cohesion in the treatment group were statistically indistinguishable from those in the control group. Social cohesion started to increase following the implementation of employment support and the start of savings groups (midline 1). These gains were further amplified after the disbursement of the large cash transfer, which was captured in the second midline survey. Social cohesion then declined significantly for those experiencing damage to their homes during cyclone Gombe. Indeed, nearly all of the gains associated with the earlier income and employment shocks were effectively undone by the cyclone's impact, underscoring the fragility of social cohesion in the face of climate-induced adversity.

Figure 9: Impact of Livelihoods and Gombe Shocks on Social Cohesion. **Treatment Group and Hosts Only**.



Notes: The figure shows the impact of the Graduation Program and Climate Shock on Social Cohesion across time, for the treatment group only. Social Cohesion is an index of 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. The y-axis shows the predicted value of Social Cohesion from a regression of Social Cohesion on the triple interaction of Treatment x survey x $\widehat{Damage}$ (including all double interactions and base effects), where $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on latitude, longitude, and elevation, gender, age interacted with gender, age squared, years of education, household size, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, first component variable for housing amenities, distance to the center of Maratane camp, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance, and an indicator for being in the July 2022 survey batch. Damage is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the house has been damaged during Cyclone Gombe. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate the difference Δ between the damage/non-damage groups at endline is significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.

All results in both graphs are obtained from the triple difference model, with the full set of point estimates in the Online Appendix. Specifically, Table E.1 shows that the livelihoods intervention had a positive impact on financial security by the midline survey prior to the Gombe shock (Panel A) and that the triple interaction is negative and significant (Panel C) at endline. This reveals that those who improved their financial security through the livelihoods program then experienced a larger decrease in social cohesion with Gombe. The lack of significance of γ_{FS} (from Equation 5 in Panel B) is likely due to the fact that financial security is bottom coded for our control group. In Table E.2 in the Online Appendix we find that individuals' whose houses were damaged by the cyclone reported lower social cohesion relative to the non-damaged by endline (Panel B). This drop in social cohesion was reported by individuals affected by the cyclone, regardless of whether they were in the treatment or in the control group, as evidenced by Panel C, where the triple interaction term is not significant.

These findings reveal that prosocial behaviors underlying social cohesion are sensitive to individual economic conditions. Social cohesion improves when both refugees and host communities experience greater individual financial security, but these gains reverse once they experience negative income shocks. Although the cyclone did not fully erase the program's economic benefits, which suggests increased household resilience, it significantly undermined its prosocial effects. Among those directly affected, much of the improvement in social cohesion was lost.

Figure 8 and Figure 9 reveal an implied elasticity between social cohesion and financial security for hosts of $\frac{\Delta SC}{\Delta FS}=\frac{0.46}{0.94} = 0.49$. The implied elasticity obtained from the graduation program in comparison would correspond to the reduced-form estimate for hosts of 0.52 (from Table C.3, Panel B, last column) divided by 1.93 (from Table 2, Panel C, last column), which equals 0.27.

4.1 Sensitivity Analysis

In this section we conduct several sensitivity checks. First, our findings are similar when we omit covariates (see Table E.3 and Table E.4). Estimates for hosts are also stable across survey waves (see Table C.4). Further, our findings are similar when we employ a 2SLS strategy to estimate the link between changes in financial security and changes in social cohesion, sharp-

ening the analysis conducted in subsection 3.2 by adding a second instrument corresponding to $Treatment * Endline * \widehat{Damage}$. Tables E.5 and E.6 show similar results to our baseline approach, with and without controlling for covariates.[44]

One potential concern with our instrument is that the geographic characteristics that we use to predict damage could somehow be correlated with general social norms. We conduct falsification tests to show that this is not the case: the geographic characteristics of each dwelling are uncorrelated with each individual's general views on gender and civic attitudes (see Table E.7).

A key question in our analysis is whether individuals are affected by their own experience or by the experiences of their neighbors. The observed reduction in social cohesion following the cyclone might be sizable because of the compounding effect of both direct and indirect exposure to the damage caused by the cyclone. Mindsets may change not only because of changes to one's own financial security but because of pervasive and significant destruction in the broader community. To account for this possibility, we include in our baseline specification the share of damaged dwellings in the vicinity of each given participating household, leveraging satellite data that includes households that were damaged but that are not part of our sample. This provides a more complete picture of the potential neighborhood damage effects associated with the cyclone, even beyond our survey. As a sensitivity test, we consider different radii in the definition of "neighborhood", including 750 m, 1 kilometer or 2 kilometers from the respondent's dwelling. Using a similar approach, We also account for the share of households that were treated with the livelihoods intervention in the proximity of each participating household.[45]

[44] Table E.5 in the Online Appendix reports the 2SLS estimates: a one-standard deviation decrease in financial security is associated with a 0.17 standard deviation decrease in social cohesion. Table E.1 reports a strong first stage with the interaction between damage and exposure to the livelihoods program being sizable and significant only at the time of our endline survey, after the cyclone affected the study area (see the last row of Panel C). Table E.1 also confirms the positive impact of the treatment on financial security [Panel A], but further shows that the extent of damage is mostly uncorrelated with financial security in the earlier rounds of the survey, before the cyclone landed in the area. It also suggests that the control group did not experience significant changes to financial security, even when their dwellings were damaged [Panel B]. This is due to the fact that the control group in our setting starts with very low levels of income and savings so their financial security is effectively bottom-coded. Columns (1) through (4) test the sensitivity of our findings to different combinations of instruments. Results are broadly similar across all columns.

[45] Table E.8 in the Online Appendix shows in Panel A our first stage of the impact of damage on financial security, with columns (1) through (3) including the share of dwellings damaged across different radii, columns (4) through (6) including an indicator for the share of dwellings participating in the livelihoods program and columns (7) through (9) including both controls and their interaction.

Table E.8 shows that coefficients on the impact of the Cyclone are stable across all specifications suggesting that spillovers of the combined shocks are unlikely to fully explain our findings, and that individual circumstances appear to be the main drivers of changes in beliefs and behaviors.

Additional potential confounders include unobserved transfers or loans across experimental groups and makeshift rebuilding (with substandard materials) by controls. Yet our survey reports no private transfers or formal bank loans, and our satellite imagery through October 2023 (18 months post-shock) shows ¡8% of homes had been rebuilt with any materials. This is evidence of a broadly stalled recovery process, including for controls.

We consider whether the effects of the climate shock on social cohesion are driven solely by a change in the willingness to share resources with anyone once resources become scarcer. However, Table E.11 reveals a reduction in nearly *all* dimensions of social cohesion including trust and in the share of friends who are out-groups. This suggests that the experience of the climate shock goes beyond an immediate concern with the allocation of resources or with changes in risk aversion but that it has more far-reaching implications in changing mindsets and attitudes, as well as the predisposition to interact with, and integrate, out-groups.

A final concern relates to the functional form of the effects detected. One possibility is that we are just measuring an immediate overreaction to a salient disaster. To minimize this concern, we conducted our survey approximately 3-4 months after the cyclone had landed in the study area, to ensure that enough time had lapsed between the event and our measurement of beliefs and behaviors.

4.2 Potential Mechanisms

4.2.1 Mediation Analysis

We explore potential mechanisms through which the livelihoods program could have improved trust and prosociality. One possible channel is that it improves food security, which could have a direct impact on the physical and mental health of participants. An established literature in psychology, neuroscience and behavioral economics has documented how feeling physically

and mentally stronger may release bandwidth constraints and lead to more prosocial behavior (Fredrickson, 2001; Condon et al., 2013; Lange et al., 2013). It is also possible that participation in the program changed overall life and job satisfaction or that it made participants more optimistic about the future, all of which could plausibly lead to more trusting, more open and tolerant relationships with others. Similarly, the cyclone might have made individuals more pessimistic

To explore the relative importance of these different channels –and in this way also assess the validity of the exclusion restriction of our instrument– we conduct a mediation analysis following the approach in Imai et al. (2010). This approach allows us to quantify the extent to which the estimated treatment effect on social cohesion operates through our proposed main channel of changes in financial security, relative to these other channels. We first regress possible mechanisms such as food security, mental health,[46] the number of interactions with out-groups, overall life or job satisfaction, and a measure of expectations about future employment as a proxy for optimism,[47] on the livelihoods treatment indicator. We then model social cohesion as a function of both the treatment indicator and the impact of each potential mediator. This allows us to estimate the direct effect as the predicted difference in social cohesion for treated individuals with the mediators held constant at their baseline levels. The indirect effect is then the predicted difference in social cohesion due to changes in the mediating factor, which are induced by the treatment. We use non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors for statistical inference.

This mediation exercise, reported in Table 5 shows that financial security accounts for almost 50% of the overall changes in social cohesion.[48] Changes in food security, job satisfaction and optimism explain between 15% and 18%. Note also that although these factors may be influenced by the program, they are also closely related to financial security and likely operate as downstream effects. In contrast, mental health does not appear to explain any of the

[46] We measure mental health through the PHQ8 and GAD7 questionnaires. See Table B.2 for a description of the questions used to construct the mental health index and the food security index.

[47] We measure optimism with the following survey question: "On a scale of 1 to 5, do you expect to be engaged in this form of employment 2 years from now?" with 1 being very unlikely and 5 being very likely.

[48] Table C.19 shows the findings from the mediation analysis without controlling for covariates.

variation in social cohesion.[49] We also estimate the controlled direct effect of treatment on social cohesion using the sequential g-estimation approach suggested in Acharya et al. (2016) (and prior to that in Vansteelandt (2009)). While this approach does not allow us to estimate the mediation effect or explain explicitly the causal pathways, it confirms that the direct effect of the livelihoods treatment on social cohesion is significantly reduced when financial security is accounted for (see Appendix Table C.20). Notably, the resulting estimates are very similar to the causal (or natural) direct effects we report in Table 5. These findings are consistent with the possibility that the primary pathway from the shocks to social cohesion operate through financial security. While we cannot fully rule out all alternative channels, the dominance of the financial security mechanism and the relatively modest explanatory power of competing alternative factors lend credibility to the exclusion restriction relied on in section 3.2.

We further find no evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the livelihoods intervention increased the likelihood that participants helped solve community problems and thus build more social capital, as shown in Table C.21 in the Online Appendix. Participants also do not report any transfers taking place between groups, which could lead to feelings of reciprocity and solidarity.[50] Similarly, the livelihoods support provided by UNHCR and the government of Mozambique had no effect on in-migration of either refugees or hosts, which could have, indirectly, altered levels of financial security or social cohesion.

4.2.2 Placebo Analysis: Gender, Civic and Political Norms

This section examines whether the livelihoods intervention produced broader shifts in social norms and attitudes. Our central hypothesis is that while the intervention may have influenced more malleable and context-specific norms, such as those related to resource-sharing with refugees, it is unlikely to have affected more entrenched cultural attitudes. As a placebo test,

[49] Table C.21 in the Online Appendix further breaks down the mental health index into its different sub-components and shows no change in any of them. The quality of mental health is extremely low in our setting for both refugees and hosts so it is possible that the livelihoods program on its own, without any intervention specifically targeting mental health, was not enough to improve it (Beltramo et al., 2024).

[50] Only 1% of our sample reported having received a transfer from a distant relative during our window of analysis. Host community members at baseline lived in large extended family groups, with 82% of respondents in our sample reporting not having any contact with anyone living in the nearest city. Refugees also reported at baseline having limited contact with their places of origin (72% reported not speaking to their networks back home and only 8% intending to return someday).

Table 5: Mediation Analysis

	Mediators of Treatment → SC:						
	Financial Security Index (1)	Food Security Index (2)	Mental Health Index (3)	Job Satisfaction (4)	Life Satisfaction (5)	Outgroup Interactions (6)	Engaged in Emp. 2yrs (7)
Average Causal Mediation Effect	0.250***	0.080***	-0.005	0.073***	0.017	-0.073	0.060***
	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.042)	(0.017)
Average Direct Effect	0.280*	0.450***	0.535***	0.327***	0.383***	0.793***	0.339***
	(0.126)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.155)	(0.060)
Total Effect	0.531***	0.530***	0.530***	0.400***	0.400***	0.720***	0.399***
	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.163)	(0.061)
Prop. Mediated	0.472***	0.151***	-0.009	0.181***	0.042	-0.101	0.150***
	(0.155)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.078)	(0.043)
Nbr of Participants-Waves	1750	1750	1750	1283	1283	713	1282
Mediator Model Adj-R2	0.322	0.111	0.031	0.068	0.046	0.068	0.056
Outcome Model Adj-R2	0.08	0.074	0.074	0.091	0.055	0.187	0.103
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table shows results from the mediation analysis between Treatment and Social Cohesion following Imai et al. (2010). Each column presents a separate mediation analysis, where the mediator is Financial Security (Column 1), Food Security (Column 2), Mental Health (Column 3), Job Satisfaction (Column 4), Life Satisfaction (Column 5), Out-group Interactions (Column 6) and expectations of being employed in the next 2 years (Column 7). For each mediator, we report the Average Causal Mediation Effect, the Average Direct Effect, the Total Effect and the Proportion of the Total Effect that is mediated by the mediator. Social Cohesion Index is an index consisting of five variables: trust in-group, trust out-group, the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should get priority access to jobs and to government financial support, and the proportion of out-group friends. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 variables measuring the ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved the previous month, take-home monthly pay and the household income in the previous 6 months. Food Security Index is an index of 6 variables capturing: how many meals the respondent had eaten the day before, how many meals children in the respondent's household had eaten the day before, how many meals other adults in the respondent's household had eaten the day before, whether the respondent had not skipped any meals in the previous 30 days, whether the respondent had not been worried about food in the previous 30 days, whether the respondent had been able to eat nutritiously in the previous 30 days, and whether the respondent had gone a full day without eating in the previous 30 days. Mental Health Index is an index of four measure of mental health (depression, anxiety, self-esteem and loneliness). All Indexes are constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. All models include controls for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbors within a 1000 m radius weighted by distance, an indicator for having been surveyed in the July 2022 batch, and an indicator for survey wave. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

we investigate the effect of the livelihoods intervention on gender norms, civic attitudes and political beliefs, all of which could represent long-standing societal views.

To test this, we construct a gender norm index based on respondents' agreement with the following four statements: (i) men and women should have equal rights to jobs, (ii) more women should be in positions of power, (iii) both husband and wife should contribute to the household income, and (iv) boys and girls should have equal access to education. Table C.22 in the Online Appendix shows that gender norms together with civic attitudes towards the importance of

obeying laws and the importance of voting remained largely unchanged throughout our period of analysis, for both refugees and host community members. This implies that not all attitudes and beliefs shifted as a result of the positive and negative income and employment shocks. The beliefs that did shift were those most closely tied to the allocation of resources within the economy, across salient in-groups and out-groups.

5 Conclusion

This paper documents how trust and prosociality in a low-income setting can be shaped by shocks to one's financial circumstances. Using a field experiment that randomly assigned both refugees and host community members to a livelihoods support program, we find that improved financial security significantly strengthened social cohesion. A 2.3 standard deviation average increase in financial security due to the one-off cash transfer and employment support program was associated with a 0.88 standard deviation increase in social cohesion.

As financial security increased, host community members reported greater trust toward refugees, more inter-group friendships, and a stronger willingness to share public resources and employment opportunities. These findings highlight the potential of economic inclusion policies to promote prosocial attitudes and, ultimately, to build social cohesion between displaced populations and host communities.

However, we also document how these gains can be reversed when mindsets change. A subsequent climate shock led to moderate losses in financial security but it substantially weakened prosociality and trust for individuals directly affected by the storm. Our interpretation is that economic and social interactions are framed by one's own sense of financial security: large positive shocks make individuals more trusting and generous but negative shocks, even if relatively more moderate can make scarcity top of mind and reduce trust and willingness to share resources. The implied elasticity between financial security and social cohesion is significantly larger in the climate shock than it is in the livelihoods intervention.

The malleability of prosociality and trust underscores both the promise and the limits of eco-

nomic interventions for building durable social cohesion, particularly in fragmented communities confronting climate-related adversity.

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Online Appendix

Financial Security, Climate Shocks and Social Cohesion

(Not for Publication)

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A Poverty Score Card

The poverty score card used to identify eligibility to social protection programs by the Government of Mozambique and the World Bank included the following questions:

- "How many household members are 15-years old or younger?"
- "Can the head of the household read and write in Portuguese?"
- "What is the main material of the floor of the residence?"
- "What type of fuel does your household mainly use for cooking?"
- "Does the household have a table in good working order?"
- "How many beds and cots does the household have in good working order?"
- "Does the household have a television in good working order?"
- "Does the household have a charcoal or electric iron in good working order?"
- "Does the household have a cell phone in good working order?"

Values are benchmarked against the 2014 National Poverty Assessment conducted by the National Institute of Statistics in Mozambique.

B Descriptives

Table B.1: Description of Financial Security and Social Cohesion Indexes

Variable	**Description**	**Source**
Financial Security Index	Average of the z-scores of the responses to the following questions: "What was your household's last 6 months' income?", "What was your take-home monthly pay for your current/last job or income earning activity?", "Imagine that you have an unexpected need and you need to come up with 6000 MTN. How likely is it that you could come up with this amount within the next week?", "If you save money, approximately what part of your monthly income is saved?".	Survey
Social Cohesion Index	Average of the z-scores of the responses to the following questions: "On a scale from 1 to 10, how much can refugees living in Maratane Camp be trusted?", "On a scale from 1 to 10, how much can Mozambican nationals living close to Maratane be trusted?", "Of all your friends, how many of them are local Mozambicans (if the respondent is refugee)/refugees (if the respondent is Mozambican)?", "When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Mozambicans over foreigners/refugees", "The government of Mozambique should first provide financial support to nationals and only after these needs are met should it support foreigners/refugees".	Survey

Table B.2: Descriptions of Food Security and Mental Health Index

Variable	Description	Source
Food Security Index	Average of the z-scores of the responses to the following questions: "How many meals did you eat yesterday?", "How many meals did your children eat yesterday?", "How many meals did the adults in your household eat yesterday?", "In the past 30 days, was there a time when you or others in your household had to skip meals because there was not enough money or resources for food?", "In the past 30 days, was there a time when you or others in your household were worried you would not have enough food to eat because of lack of money or other resources?", "In the past 30 days, was there a time when you or others in your household were unable to eat healthy and nutritious food because of lack of money or other resources?", "In the last 30 days, did you or any others in your household ever not eat for a whole day because there wasn't enough money for food?" All scores were rescaled so that the food security index is increasing in food security.	Survey
Mental Health Index	Average of the z-scores resulting from standardized assessments for depression, anxiety, self-esteem, and loneliness, drawn from Patient Health Questionnaire 9 (PHQ9) and the Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7 (GAD7) questionnaires that are commonly used to measure Mental Health. **Depression** is the total score from the following set of questions: "Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you had little interest or pleasure in doing things?", "Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you experienced feeling down or hopeless?", "Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you experienced trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much?", "Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you experienced trouble concentrating in things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television?". **Anxiety** is the total score from the following set of questions: "Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you felt afraid as if something awful might happen?", "Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you experienced feeling nervous, anxious or on edge?". **Loneliness** is the total score from the following questions: "How often do you feel that there is no one you can turn to?", "How often do you feel isolated from others?", "How often do you feel that your interests and ideas are not shared by those around you?", "How often do you feel you have a lot in common with the people around you?", drawn from the UCLA loneliness scale. **Self-esteem** is the total score from the following set of questions: "I am able to do things as well as most other people", "I feel useless at times", "I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others", "I feel that I have a number of good qualities", "I feel I do not have much to be proud of", "I take a positive attitude toward myself", "In most ways my life is close to ideal". All questions were taken from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale. Drawn from Kroenke et al. (2001); Cumbe et al. (2020) and Spitzer et al. (2006)	Survey

Table B.3: Summary Statistics for Survey Variables at Baseline

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std.Dev	Range	Legend
Financial Security Index	467	0.05	0.80	[-0.6, 4.6]	-
HH Income (6m)	467	139.73	315.49	[0.0, 3200.0]	[1]
Take Home Pay (1m)	343	291.44	691.52	[0.0, 5600.0]	[1]
Pct Inc. Saved [0-1]	467	0.07	0.20	[0.0, 1.0]	[2]
Pay Surprise Bill [0-3]	459	1.45	0.77	[1.0, 4.0]	[1]
Social Cohesion Index	467	-0.02	0.56	[-1.9, 1.5]	-
Trust In-Group [1-10]	NA	-	-	-	NA
Trust Out-Group [1-10]	NA	-	-	-	NA
Prop Out-Group Friends [0-1]	467	0.18	0.21	[0.0, 1.0]	[2]
Share Gov. Fin. Support [1-5]	467	2.78	1.23	[1.0, 5.0]	[2]
Share Jobs [1-5]	467	2.74	1.28	[1.0, 5.0]	[2]
General Trust	467	2.95	0.77	[1.0, 4.0]	-
Leave Keys With Neighbors	467	2.15	0.93	[1.0, 4.0]	[4]
Leave Kids With Neighbors	467	2.92	0.84	[1.0, 4.0]	[4]
Ask Neighbor to Go Shopping	467	1.94	0.78	[1.0, 4.0]	[4]
Food Security Index	467	0.06	0.65	[-1.5, 2.1]	-
Meals Yesterday	467	1.79	0.57	[0.0, 3.0]	[2]
Meals Children Yesterday	443	1.92	0.63	[0.0, 4.0]	[2]
Meals Adults Yesterday	467	1.79	0.61	[0.0, 3.0]	[2]
Meals Skipped Last 30 Days	466	0.15	0.36	[0.0, 1.0]	[2]
Worries About Food Last 30 Days	466	0.16	0.37	[0.0, 1.0]	[2]
Unable Eat Health Last 30 Days	465	0.13	0.34	[0.0, 1.0]	[2]
Not Eat Whole Day Last 30 Days	465	0.52	0.50	[0.0, 1.0]	[2]
Mental Health Index	467	-0.10	1.05	[-3.0, 2.6]	-
Depression Score	467	4.10	2.35	[0.0, 12.0]	[3]
Anxiety Score	467	5.16	2.77	[0.0, 12.0]	[3]
Self-Esteem Issues Score	467	4.16	1.52	[1.0, 7.9]	[3]
Loneliness Score	467	6.59	2.21	[0.0, 12.0]	[3]

Notes: A higher number in the variables above indicates the following: [1] A higher amount reported, [2] More agreement with the statement, [3] A higher severity in the condition assessed, [4] More comfort with the statement. NA means that the variable was not captured at baseline.

Table B.4: Refugee Languages and Origins

	All Refugees N=144	Burundi N=36	DRC N=91	Rwanda N=15	Somalia N=2
Portuguese	0.44	0.39	0.47	0.33	1.00
French	0.51	0.42	0.59	0.33	0.00
Makonde	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Makua	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.07	0.00
Changana	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.00
Chuabo	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sena	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ajaua	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ndau	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Lomue	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
Nyanja	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Chope	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Swahili	0.96	0.92	0.99	0.93	0.50

Notes: The table shows the proportion of refugees who speak languages covered in the sample, by country of origin.

Table B.5: Sample Balance, Control vs Treatment

	Full Sample			*Refugees*			*Hosts*		
	C	T	Δ p-val	C	T	Δ p-val	C	T	Δ p-val
Age	34.74	35.87	0.34	36.59	37.04	0.84	34.23	34.83	0.69
Male	0.54	0.55	0.94	0.52	0.65	0.09	0.55	0.45	0.11
Single	0.31	0.37	0.17	0.55	0.53	0.81	0.24	0.23	0.84
Speaks Portuguese	0.48	0.57	0.04	0.41	0.47	0.44	0.49	0.66	0.01
Household Size	4.71	5.89	0.00	4.32	4.87	0.34	4.82	6.78	0.00
Religious	0.95	0.96	0.41	0.97	0.95	0.53	0.94	0.98	0.18
Housing Index	0.02	-0.03	0.70	1.30	0.79	0.04	-0.34	-0.76	0.94
Years of Education	2.59	3.37	0.01	5.35	5.45	0.86	1.82	1.52	0.20
Years in Mozambique	NA	NA	NA	9.56	9.47	0.92	NA	NA	NA
Take-Home Monthly Pay	288.60	297.96	0.91	928.60	583.54	0.21	127.77	140.25	0.60
Household Income 6m	143.32	133.21	0.74	227.25	166.61	0.46	119.75	103.62	0.49
% Income Saved Last Month	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.13	0.02
Ease Paying Suprise Bill [0-3]	1.47	1.42	0.51	1.41	1.45	0.76	1.48	1.39	0.33
Casual Employment [0,1]	0.55	0.59	0.40	0.45	0.53	0.40	0.58	0.65	0.24
Financial Security Index	-0.00	0.14	0.22	-0.00	0.21	0.38	-0.00	0.09	0.53
General Trust	2.95	2.94	0.85	2.93	2.83	0.45	2.95	3.03	0.41
Share Government Financial Support [1-5]	0.00	-0.15	0.14	-0.00	-0.08	0.66	0.00	-0.21	0.10
Share Jobs [1-5]	0.00	-0.12	0.22	-0.00	-0.02	0.92	0.00	-0.22	0.09
Prop. of Out-Group Friends [0-1]	0.16	0.20	0.06	0.23	0.28	0.24	0.14	0.13	0.61
Social Cohesion Index	-0.00	-0.09	0.35	0.00	-0.01	0.96	-0.00	-0.17	0.17
Observations	301	166		66	78		235	88	

Notes: The table shows baseline differences between treatment and control on basic demographic variables as well as key outcome variables of interest. Housing Index is the first component of 6 proxies for housing quality (number of rooms, house has electricity, has a toilet that flushes, quality of materials used to construct the roof, quality of materials used to construct the floor, and quality of materials used to construct the walls). Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 MTN, ranging from not at all (0) to very easily (3). Casual Employment captures whether the respondent has engaged in any type of casual work in the previous week. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income over the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. General Trust is an index of 3 proxies for trust (comfort in leaving a set of keys with neighbors [1-4], comfort in having a neighbor watch over kids [1-4], comfort in giving your neighbor money to pick up groceries [1-4]). Share Jobs and Share Government Financial Support measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing jobs (1-5) or in accessing government financial support (1-5), respectively. Out-Group interactions measures the number of reported weekly interactions with members of the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Proportion of Out-Group Friends [0-1] measures the proportion of friends the respondent reports belonging to the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Social Cohesion Index is an index of 4 proxies for social cohesion (general trust, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group.

Figure B.1: Financial Security and Trust: World Values Survey (2017-2022)



Panel A: Perceived Financial Security and Trust **Panel B: Controlling for Income Rank**

Notes: Panel A shows the relationship between financial satisfaction, which is increasing on a scale of 1 to 10 and generalized trust. Panel B shows the same relationship as in Panel A, but now controlling for actual, self-reported income rank. These estimates include wave fixed effects.

Table B.6: Factor Loadings and Eigenvalues for Financial Security Principal Component Analysis

Variable	**Comp 1**	**Comp 2**
Take Home Pay	0.541	-0.444
Pct. Income Saved	0.469	0.520
Pay Surprise Bill	0.457	0.548
Household Income 6m	0.527	-0.481
Eigenvalues	1.881	1.068

Table B.7: Factor Loadings and Eigenvalues for Social Cohesion Principal Component Analysis

Variable	**Comp 1**	**Comp 2**
Trust In-Group	-0.109	0.498
Trust Out-Group	0.150	0.667
Sharing Financial Support	0.686	-0.099
Sharing Jobs	0.684	-0.098
Prop. Out-Group Friends	0.166	0.537
Eigenvalues	1.739	1.377

Table B.8: Factor Loadings and Eigenvalues for Housing Principal Component Analysis

Variable	**Comp 1**	**Comp 2**
Wall Quality	-0.224	0.322
Roof Quality	0.435	-0.292
Floor Quality	0.537	0.258
Electricity	0.359	0.520
Toilet	0.540	0.055
Rooms	-0.227	0.686
Eigenvalues	1.694	1.264

Table B.9: Sample Balance, Attritors vs Respondents

	Full Sample			*Refugees*			*Hosts*		
	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val
Treatment	0.36	0.36	0.99	0.60	0.36	0.01	0.26	0.35	0.25
Age	35.40	33.78	0.30	37.61	34.50	0.21	34.56	33.08	0.48
Male	0.53	0.66	0.04	0.57	0.64	0.50	0.51	0.68	0.05
Single	0.32	0.37	0.40	0.53	0.56	0.77	0.24	0.19	0.48
Speaks Portuguese	0.52	0.45	0.28	0.45	0.42	0.70	0.55	0.49	0.50
Household Size	5.22	4.64	0.10	4.81	4.06	0.26	5.37	5.22	0.69
Religious	0.95	0.96	0.79	0.94	1.00	0.15	0.95	0.92	0.35
Housing Index	-0.05	0.29	0.04	0.88	1.44	0.04	-0.41	-0.83	0.94
Years of Education	2.83	3.07	0.53	5.57	4.89	0.28	1.80	1.30	0.13
Years in Mozambique	NA	NA	NA	9.56	9.39	0.87	NA	NA	NA
Take-Home Monthly Pay	290.51	297.28	0.95	893.58	448.56	0.15	127.45	164.16	0.29
Household Income 6m	141.26	131.44	0.81	198.13	183.20	0.87	119.79	81.08	0.24
% Income Saved Last Month	0.07	0.05	0.42	0.03	0.01	0.47	0.08	0.08	0.96
Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3]	1.44	1.49	0.59	1.38	1.58	0.17	1.46	1.41	0.66
Casual Employment [0,1]	0.57	0.53	0.57	0.50	0.47	0.78	0.60	0.59	0.98
Financial Security Index	0.06	0.01	0.77	0.14	0.05	0.75	0.03	-0.02	0.80
General Trust	2.93	3.04	0.24	2.84	2.98	0.38	2.96	3.10	0.28
Share Government Financial Support [1-5]	-0.07	0.04	0.39	-0.08	0.07	0.44	-0.07	0.01	0.67
Share Jobs [1-5]	-0.05	0.01	0.66	-0.01	0.01	0.92	-0.07	0.01	0.68
Prop. of Out-Group Friends [0-1]	0.17	0.20	0.22	0.26	0.25	0.87	0.14	0.16	0.57
Social Cohesion Index	-0.06	0.12	0.17	-0.05	0.12	0.46	-0.07	0.12	0.28
Observations	394	73		108	36		286	37	

Notes: The table shows baseline differences between respondents and attritors on basic demographic variables as well as key outcome variables of interest. Housing Index is the first component of 6 proxies for housing quality (number of rooms, house has electricity, has a toilet that flushes, quality of materials used to construct the roof, quality of materials used to construct the floor, and quality of materials used to construct the walls). Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 MTN, ranging from not at all (0) to very easily (3). Casual Employment captures whether the respondent has engaged in any type of casual work in the previous week. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income over the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. General Trust is an index of 3 proxies for trust (comfort in leaving a set of keys with neighbors [1-4], comfort in having a neighbor watch over kids [1-4], comfort in giving your neighbor money to pick up groceries [1-4]). Share Jobs and Share Government Financial Support measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing jobs (1-5) or in accessing government financial support (1-5), respectively. Out-Group interactions measures the number of reported weekly interactions with members of the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Proportion of Out-Group Friends [0-1] measures the proportion of friends the respondent reports belonging to the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Social Cohesion Index is an index of 4 proxies for social cohesion (general trust, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group.

Table B.10: Sample Balance, Attritors vs Respondents, Wave 2 (Midline 1)

	Full Sample			*Refugees*			*Hosts*		
	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val
Treatment	0.36	0.29	0.59	0.55	0.40	0.35	0.28	0.14	0.44
Age	35.32	30.47	0.11	37.24	31.40	0.16	34.51	29.14	0.24
Male	0.54	0.59	0.72	0.60	0.50	0.55	0.52	0.71	0.32
Single	0.32	0.47	0.20	0.53	0.60	0.67	0.23	0.29	0.75
Speaks Portuguese	0.51	0.41	0.41	0.46	0.30	0.34	0.54	0.57	0.86
Household Size	5.16	4.18	0.14	4.67	3.90	0.50	5.37	4.57	0.36
Religious	0.95	1.00	0.35	0.96	1.00	0.50	0.95	1.00	0.54
Housing Index	-0.02	0.61	0.05	0.97	1.70	0.13	-0.44	-0.93	0.94
Years of Education	2.87	2.88	0.99	5.51	4.00	0.16	1.75	1.29	0.52
Years in Mozambique	NA	NA	NA	9.64	7.80	0.30	NA	NA	NA
Take-Home Monthly Pay	279.00	634.67	0.08	762.92	950.86	0.70	129.80	192.00	0.41
Household Income 6m	136.04	237.36	0.19	185.12	318.72	0.41	115.23	121.14	0.93
% Income Saved Last Month	0.07	0.00	0.17	0.03	0.00	0.47	0.08	0.00	0.33
Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3]	1.44	1.59	0.45	1.42	1.60	0.47	1.45	1.57	0.69
Casual Employment [0,1]	0.57	0.47	0.43	0.51	0.30	0.21	0.59	0.71	0.52
Financial Security Index	0.05	0.12	0.81	0.11	0.19	0.86	0.02	0.02	1.00
General Trust	2.93	3.22	0.14	2.87	3.00	0.63	2.96	3.52	0.05
Share Government Financial Support [1-5]	-0.06	0.24	0.24	-0.06	0.23	0.40	-0.06	0.26	0.41
Share Jobs [1-5]	-0.04	-0.07	0.93	0.00	-0.15	0.67	-0.06	0.05	0.77
Prop. of Out-Group Friends [0-1]	0.17	0.21	0.53	0.26	0.20	0.43	0.14	0.21	0.28
Social Cohesion Index	-0.04	0.26	0.23	-0.01	0.01	0.97	-0.06	0.62	0.07
Observations	450	17		134	10		316	7	

Notes: The table shows baseline differences between respondents and attritors of wave 2 on basic demographic variables as well as key outcome variables of interest. Housing Index is the first component of 6 proxies for housing quality (number of rooms, has electricity, has a toilet that flushes, quality of materials used to construct the roof, quality of materials used to construct the floor, and quality of materials used to construct the walls). Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 MTN, ranging from not at all (0) to very easily (3). Casual Employment captures whether the respondent has engaged in any type of casual work in the previous week. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income over the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. General Trust is an index of 3 proxies for trust (comfort in leaving a set of keys with neighbors [1-4], comfort in having a neighbor watch over kids [1-4], comfort in giving your neighbor money to pick up groceries [1-4]). Share Jobs and Share Government Financial Support measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing jobs (1-5) or in accessing government financial support (1-5), respectively. Out-Group interactions measures the number of reported weekly interactions with members of the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Proportion of Out-Group Friends [0-1] measures the proportion of friends the respondent reports belonging to the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Social Cohesion Index is an index of 4 proxies for social cohesion (general trust, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group.

Table B.11: Sample Balance, Attritors vs Respondents, Wave 3 (Midline 2)

	Full Sample			*Refugees*			*Hosts*		
	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val
Treatment	0.36	0.31	0.44	0.60	0.31	0.00	0.27	0.31	0.63
Age	35.50	32.60	0.09	37.94	32.45	0.04	34.55	32.76	0.44
Male	0.53	0.69	0.02	0.57	0.66	0.43	0.51	0.72	0.03
Single	0.32	0.40	0.23	0.53	0.55	0.84	0.23	0.24	0.94
Speaks Portuguese	0.52	0.45	0.32	0.45	0.41	0.71	0.54	0.48	0.53
Household Size	5.23	4.40	0.03	4.78	3.97	0.25	5.41	4.83	0.19
Religious	0.95	0.95	0.86	0.95	1.00	0.21	0.96	0.90	0.16
Housing Index	-0.04	0.31	0.05	0.92	1.44	0.08	-0.42	-0.82	0.94
Years of Education	2.80	3.34	0.19	5.41	5.38	0.97	1.78	1.31	0.20
Years in Mozambique	NA	NA	NA	9.56	9.34	0.85	NA	NA	NA
Take-Home Monthly Pay	286.46	332.66	0.70	844.34	514.61	0.33	127.06	178.00	0.19
Household Income 6m	141.88	124.55	0.70	202.52	162.21	0.69	118.16	86.90	0.40
% Income Saved Last Month	0.07	0.04	0.37	0.03	0.00	0.18	0.08	0.09	0.93
Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3]	1.43	1.55	0.27	1.38	1.62	0.14	1.45	1.48	0.85
Casual Employment [0,1]	0.57	0.53	0.62	0.50	0.48	0.90	0.60	0.59	0.90
Financial Security Index	0.06	0.02	0.84	0.15	-0.05	0.49	0.02	0.09	0.72
General Trust	2.93	3.06	0.21	2.83	3.07	0.16	2.97	3.06	0.53
Share Government Financial Support [1-5]	-0.07	0.07	0.34	-0.08	0.11	0.39	-0.06	0.03	0.64
Share Jobs [1-5]	-0.05	0.01	0.65	-0.02	0.05	0.75	-0.06	-0.02	0.83
Prop. of Out-Group Friends [0-1]	0.17	0.21	0.15	0.26	0.23	0.55	0.13	0.19	0.12
Social Cohesion Index	-0.06	0.17	0.11	-0.05	0.17	0.35	-0.07	0.17	0.22
Observations	409	58		115	29		294	29	

Notes: The table shows baseline differences between respondents and attritors of wave 3 on basic demographic variables as well as key outcome variables of interest. Housing Index is the first component of 6 proxies for housing quality (number of rooms, has electricity, has a toilet that flushes, quality of materials used to construct the roof, quality of materials used to construct the floor, and quality of materials used to construct the walls). Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 MTN, ranging from not at all (0) to very easily (3). Casual Employment captures whether the respondent has engaged in any type of casual work in the previous week. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income over the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. General Trust is an index of 3 proxies for trust (comfort in leaving a set of keys with neighbors [1-4], comfort in having a neighbor watch over kids [1-4], comfort in giving your neighbor money to pick up groceries [1-4]). Share Jobs and Share Government Financial Support measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing jobs (1-5) or in accessing government financial support (1-5), respectively. Out-Group interactions measures the number of reported weekly interactions with members of the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Proportion of Out-Group Friends [0-1] measures the proportion of friends the respondent reports belonging to the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Social Cohesion Index is an index of 4 proxies for social cohesion (general trust, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group.

Table B.12: Sample Balance, Attritors vs Respondents, Wave 4 (Endline)

	Full Sample			*Refugees*			*Hosts*		
	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val	A = 0	A = 1	Δ p-val
Treatment	0.36	0.33	0.66	0.59	0.29	0.01	0.27	0.36	0.32
Age	35.28	33.91	0.47	36.91	36.46	0.88	34.63	31.14	0.19
Male	0.54	0.61	0.37	0.59	0.58	0.94	0.52	0.64	0.29
Single	0.32	0.41	0.19	0.52	0.62	0.33	0.24	0.18	0.54
Speaks Portuguese	0.52	0.46	0.45	0.45	0.42	0.77	0.54	0.50	0.71
Household Size	5.13	5.09	0.91	4.65	4.46	0.80	5.33	5.77	0.38
Religious	0.95	0.96	0.90	0.95	1.00	0.27	0.95	0.91	0.36
Housing Index	-0.03	0.30	0.10	0.94	1.40	0.16	-0.42	-0.90	0.94
Years of Education	2.85	3.04	0.67	5.54	4.71	0.26	1.78	1.23	0.19
Years in Mozambique	NA	NA	NA	9.53	9.46	0.96	NA	NA	NA
Take-Home Monthly Pay	285.52	349.00	0.62	829.97	556.00	0.43	130.28	142.00	0.78
Household Income 6m	135.49	178.50	0.38	178.32	274.80	0.38	118.42	73.45	0.28
% Income Saved Last Month	0.07	0.04	0.34	0.03	0.02	0.81	0.08	0.06	0.58
Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3]	1.46	1.39	0.59	1.43	1.46	0.85	1.47	1.32	0.38
Casual Employment [0,1]	0.57	0.52	0.54	0.52	0.38	0.21	0.59	0.68	0.40
Financial Security Index	0.06	-0.04	0.59	0.11	0.12	0.98	0.04	-0.21	0.29
General Trust	2.93	3.07	0.24	2.87	2.92	0.80	2.96	3.24	0.08
Share Government Financial Support [1-5]	-0.06	0.06	0.42	-0.06	0.06	0.60	-0.07	0.07	0.55
Share Jobs [1-5]	-0.04	-0.04	0.97	0.00	-0.07	0.77	-0.06	-0.01	0.80
Prop. of Out-Group Friends [0-1]	0.17	0.20	0.47	0.26	0.25	0.90	0.14	0.14	0.94
Social Cohesion Index	-0.05	0.10	0.36	-0.01	0.03	0.87	-0.06	0.18	0.27
Observations	421	46		120	24		301	22	

Notes: The table shows baseline differences between respondents and attritors of wave 4 on basic demographic variables as well as key outcome variables of interest. Housing Index is the first component of 6 proxies for housing quality (number of rooms, has electricity, has a toilet that flushes, quality of materials used to construct the roof, quality of materials used to construct the floor, and quality of materials used to construct the walls). Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 MTN, ranging from not at all (0) to very easily (3). Casual Employment captures whether the respondent has engaged in any type of casual work in the previous week. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income over the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. General Trust is an index of 3 proxies for trust (comfort in leaving a set of keys with neighbors [1-4], comfort in having a neighbor watch over kids [1-4], comfort in giving your neighbor money to pick up groceries [1-4]). Share Jobs and Share Government Financial Support measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing jobs (1-5) or in accessing government financial support (1-5), respectively. Out-Group interactions measures the number of reported weekly interactions with members of the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Proportion of Out-Group Friends [0-1] measures the proportion of friends the respondent reports belonging to the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Social Cohesion Index is an index of 4 proxies for social cohesion (general trust, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group.

Table B.13: Sample Balance, Hosts Who Live Close Vs Hosts Who Live Far From the Settlement

	Full Sample			*Control*			*Treatment*		
	N = 0	N = 1	Δ p-val	N = 0	N = 1	Δ p-val	N = 0	N = 1	Δ p-val
Age	36.20	33.25	0.03	36.21	32.83	0.04	36.18	34.20	0.40
Male	0.57	0.50	0.23	0.59	0.53	0.38	0.50	0.43	0.56
Single	0.23	0.24	0.91	0.24	0.24	0.97	0.21	0.23	0.84
Speaks Portuguese	0.44	0.60	0.00	0.37	0.58	0.00	0.68	0.65	0.80
Household Size	4.98	5.60	0.02	4.43	5.09	0.02	6.86	6.75	0.83
Religious	0.92	0.97	0.05	0.91	0.96	0.07	0.96	0.98	0.58
Housing Index	-0.55	-0.39	0.13	-0.47	-0.25	0.09	-0.84	-0.72	0.94
Years of Education	1.51	1.88	0.08	1.63	1.96	0.19	1.11	1.72	0.15
Take-Home Monthly Pay	119.28	138.19	0.37	104.94	143.19	0.07	171.89	125.81	0.42
Household Income 6m	106.12	121.18	0.49	104.28	130.62	0.31	112.51	99.47	0.73
% Income Saved Last Month	0.08	0.09	0.67	0.06	0.07	0.61	0.14	0.12	0.78
Ease Paying Suprise Bill [0-3]	1.46	1.46	0.98	1.42	1.53	0.32	1.57	1.30	0.11
Casual Employment [0,1]	0.51	0.65	0.01	0.48	0.64	0.01	0.62	0.67	0.73
Financial Security Index	-0.03	0.06	0.47	-0.13	0.09	0.09	0.31	-0.02	0.28
General Trust	3.04	2.93	0.21	2.98	2.94	0.67	3.25	2.93	0.04
Share Government Financial Support [1-5]	0.13	-0.18	0.01	0.21	-0.15	0.01	-0.13	-0.24	0.66
Share Jobs [1-5]	-0.02	-0.09	0.54	0.13	-0.09	0.11	-0.50	-0.09	0.10
Prop. of Out-Group Friends [0-1]	0.15	0.13	0.33	0.16	0.13	0.25	0.12	0.13	0.83
Social Cohesion Index	0.12	-0.15	0.02	0.20	-0.14	0.01	-0.15	-0.18	0.88
Observations	125	198		97	138		28	60	

Notes: The table shows baseline differences between hosts who live close to the settlement (within 1km, N=1) and hosts who live far from the settlement (outside 1km, N=0) on basic demographic variables as well as key outcome variables of interest. Housing Index is the first component of 6 proxies for housing quality (number of rooms, house has electricity, has a toilet that flushes, quality of materials used to construct the roof, quality of materials used to construct the floor, and quality of materials used to construct the walls). Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 MTN, ranging from not at all (0) to very easily (3). Casual Employment captures whether the respondent has engaged in any type of casual work in the previous week. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income over the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. General Trust is an index of 3 proxies for trust (comfort in leaving a set of keys with neighbors [1-4], comfort in having a neighbor watch over kids [1-4], comfort in giving your neighbor money to pick up groceries [1-4]). Share Jobs and Share Government Financial Support measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing jobs (1-5) or in accessing government financial support (1-5), respectively. Out-Group interactions measures the number of reported weekly interactions with members of the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Proportion of Out-Group Friends [0-1] measures the proportion of friends the respondent reports belonging to the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Social Cohesion Index is an index of 4 proxies for social cohesion (general trust, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group.

Table B.14: Sample Balance, Damage vs No Damage

	Full Sample			*Refugees*			*Hosts*		
	D = 0	D = 1	Δ p-val	D = 0	D = 1	Δ p-val	D = 0	D = 1	Δ p-val
Age	35.83	34.88	0.57	37.49	36.17	0.85	34.82	34.52	0.41
Male	0.53	0.55	0.64	0.63	0.55	0.68	0.47	0.54	0.28
Single	0.34	0.30	0.32	0.54	0.49	0.55	0.22	0.25	0.67
Speaks Portuguese	0.52	0.51	0.74	0.45	0.45	0.96	0.56	0.53	0.79
Household Size	5.21	5.07	0.87	4.70	4.58	0.95	5.53	5.21	0.34
Religious	0.96	0.95	0.80	0.96	0.94	0.51	0.96	0.95	0.54
Wall Quality	3.32	3.40	0.23	2.88	2.51	0.09	3.58	3.65	0.21
Roof Quality	1.20	1.23	0.79	1.21	1.25	0.28	1.19	1.22	0.15
Floor Quality	1.35	1.17	0.01	1.78	1.64	0.74	1.09	1.04	0.26
Has Electricity	0.32	0.23	0.12	0.54	0.60	0.76	0.18	0.13	0.19
Housing Index	0.09	-0.12	0.06	0.93	0.97	0.37	-0.42	-0.43	0.94
Years of Education	3.05	2.71	0.47	5.54	5.55	0.52	1.53	1.92	0.09
Take-Home Monthly Pay	361.45	232.40	0.24	863.67	788.66	0.71	149.40	118.96	0.37
Household Income 6m	178.40	104.36	0.04	232.72	109.55	0.27	145.32	102.92	0.10
% Income Saved Last Month	0.05	0.09	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.97	0.06	0.10	0.23
Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3]	1.47	1.44	0.81	1.51	1.32	0.42	1.45	1.48	0.64
Casual Employment [0,1]	0.57	0.57	0.82	0.45	0.60	0.14	0.65	0.56	0.21
Financial Security Index	0.13	0.01	0.50	0.25	-0.06	0.49	0.06	0.03	0.56
General Trust	2.89	2.96	0.29	2.86	2.88	0.96	2.90	2.99	0.13
Share Government Financial Support [1-5]	-0.01	-0.10	0.48	-0.07	-0.05	0.87	0.02	-0.12	0.43
Share Jobs [1-5]	-0.02	-0.06	0.92	-0.07	0.10	0.67	0.01	-0.11	0.63
Prop. of Out-Group Friends [0-1]	0.20	0.15	0.03	0.29	0.21	0.16	0.15	0.13	0.76
Social Cohesion Index	0.01	-0.09	0.41	0.02	-0.06	0.92	0.00	-0.10	0.39
Observations	177	244		67	53		110	191	

Notes: The table shows baseline differences between respondents affected by Cyclone Gombe and respondents unaffected by Cyclone Gombe on basic demographic variables as well as key outcome variables of interest. Housing Index is the first component of 6 proxies for housing quality (number of rooms, house has electricity, has a toilet that flushes, quality of materials used to construct the roof, quality of materials used to construct the floor, and quality of materials used to construct the walls). Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 MTN, ranging from not at all (0) to very easily (3). Casual Employment captures whether the respondent has engaged in any type of casual work in the previous week. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income over the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. General Trust is an index of 3 proxies for trust (comfort in leaving a set of keys with neighbors [1-4], comfort in having a neighbor watch over kids [1-4], comfort in giving your neighbor money to pick up groceries [1-4]). Share Jobs and Share Government Financial Support measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing jobs (1-5) or in accessing government financial support (1-5), respectively. Out-Group interactions measures the number of reported weekly interactions with members of the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Proportion of Out-Group Friends [0-1] measures the proportion of friends the respondent reports belonging to the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Social Cohesion Index is an index of 4 proxies for social cohesion (general trust, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group.

Table B.15: Sample Balance, Hosts Who Live Close Vs Hosts Who Live Far From Nampula

	All Hosts			*Control*			*Treatment*		
	N = 0	N = 1	Δ p-val	N = 0	N = 1	Δ p-val	N = 0	N = 1	Δ p-val
Age	36.75	31.67	0.00	36.50	31.64	0.00	37.38	31.77	0.01
Male	0.60	0.44	0.00	0.63	0.46	0.01	0.52	0.38	0.18
Single	0.21	0.27	0.22	0.23	0.25	0.81	0.15	0.33	0.05
Speaks Portuguese	0.49	0.60	0.04	0.44	0.55	0.08	0.60	0.72	0.24
Household Size	5.38	5.33	0.87	4.70	4.96	0.33	7.15	6.35	0.08
Religious	0.95	0.95	0.77	0.94	0.95	0.76	1.00	0.95	0.12
Housing Index	-0.51	-0.40	0.29	-0.32	-0.36	0.74	-0.98	-0.48	0.94
Years of Education	1.63	1.87	0.26	1.71	1.95	0.35	1.42	1.65	0.56
Take-Home Monthly Pay	141.27	119.39	0.29	135.28	118.79	0.44	160.15	120.94	0.46
Household Income 6m	113.26	117.77	0.83	110.76	129.96	0.46	119.77	84.24	0.32
% Income Saved Last Month	0.10	0.07	0.29	0.08	0.04	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.83
Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3]	1.46	1.46	0.98	1.51	1.45	0.59	1.32	1.47	0.34
Casual Employment [0,1]	0.59	0.61	0.67	0.57	0.59	0.70	0.64	0.67	0.83
Financial Security Index	0.07	-0.03	0.44	0.05	-0.06	0.38	0.10	0.07	0.90
General Trust	3.05	2.89	0.06	3.03	2.87	0.09	3.09	2.96	0.37
Share Government Financial Support [1-5]	0.01	-0.13	0.20	0.12	-0.14	0.05	-0.27	-0.13	0.53
Share Jobs [1-5]	-0.03	-0.10	0.54	0.04	-0.05	0.47	-0.21	-0.23	0.93
Prop. of Out-Group Friends [0-1]	0.16	0.12	0.04	0.16	0.12	0.14	0.16	0.10	0.11
Social Cohesion Index	0.08	-0.19	0.01	0.15	-0.17	0.01	-0.10	-0.25	0.46
Observations	173	150		125	110		48	40	

Notes: The table shows baseline differences between hosts who live close to Nampula (within the median distance of 15.48km, N=1) and hosts who live far from Nampula (beyond 15.48km, N=0) on basic demographic variables as well as key outcome variables of interest. Housing Index is the first component of 6 proxies for housing quality (number of rooms, house has electricity, has a toilet that flushes, quality of materials used to construct the roof, quality of materials used to construct the floor, and quality of materials used to construct the walls). Ease Paying Surprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 MTN, ranging from not at all (0) to very easily (3). Casual Employment captures whether the respondent has engaged in any type of casual work in the previous week. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income over the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. General Trust is an index of 3 proxies for trust (comfort in leaving a set of keys with neighbors [1-4], comfort in having a neighbor watch over kids [1-4], comfort in giving your neighbor money to pick up groceries [1-4]). Share Jobs and Share Government Financial Support measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing jobs (1-5) or in accessing government financial support (1-5), respectively. Out-Group interactions measures the number of reported weekly interactions with members of the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Proportion of Out-Group Friends [0-1] measures the proportion of friends the respondent reports belonging to the opposite group (refugees for hosts, hosts for refugees). Social Cohesion Index is an index of 4 proxies for social cohesion (general trust, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group.

C Robustness

Table C.1: Correlation Between Financial Security and Social Cohesion, Baseline. **Not Controlling for Covariates**

	General Trust (stand)	Outgroup Intercts. (stand)	Prop Out-Group Friends (stand)	Share Fin. Support (stand)	Share Jobs (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: Full Sample					
Financial Security Index	0.29***	0.17***	0.05	-0.09*	-0.14***	0.05
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]
Distance to Out-Group	0.14***	-0.17***	-0.06	-0.06	-0.14***	-0.05
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.05]
Mean Dependent	-0.01	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.04
Observations	467	467	467	467	467	467
Adj. R-squared	0.09	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.00
	Panel B: Only Refugees					
Financial Security Index	0.33***	0.28***	-0.03	-0.07	-0.15*	0.04
	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.08]
Distance to Out-Group	0.09	-0.09	-0.24***	-0.09	-0.05	-0.13*
	[0.09]	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.06]
Mean Dependent	-0.09	0.29	0.47	0.57	0.59	0.66
Observations	144	144	144	144	144	144
Adj. R-squared	0.09	0.09	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.01
	Panel C: Only Hosts					
Financial Security Index	0.27***	0.11**	0.10*	-0.12**	-0.14***	0.05
	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.06]
Distance to Out-Group	0.14***	-0.18***	0.06	0.10*	0.01	0.14**
	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.06]
Mean Dependent	0.03	0.07	-0.11	-0.23	-0.23	-0.23
Observations	323	323	323	323	323	323
Adj. R-squared	0.09	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N

Notes: The table shows OLS estimates of various measures of Social Cohesion variables on Financial Security. General Trust is an index of 3 proxies for baseline trust (comfort in leaving a set of keys with neighbours [1-4], comfort in having neighbour watch over kids [1-4], comfort in giving your neighbour money to pick up groceries [1-4]), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Column 2 measures the number of times the respondent interacted with a member of the opposite group in the past 7 days. Column 3 measures the proportion of the respondent's friends who are from their out-group. Columns 4-5 measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not get priority access to jobs or to government financial support (1-5). Social Cohesion Index (column 6) is an index of 4 proxies for social cohesion (general trust, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 measures of financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and 6-month household income), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Distance to Out-Group measures how far (kms) the respondent lives from the closest out-group member. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.2: Financial Security and Social Cohesion, 2SLS. **Refugees Only**

	Trust In-Group (stand) (1)	Trust Out-Group (stand) (2)	Prop Out-Group Friends (stand) (3)	Share Fin. Support (stand) (4)	Share Jobs (stand) (5)	Social Cohesion Index (stand) (6)
	Panel A: OLS					
Financial Security Index	0.03	0.11***	0.16***	0.06*	0.02	0.18***
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.03]
Pctile of Control Group	51%	54%	56%	52%	51%	57%
Nbr Participants-Waves	368	368	512	398	400	512
Adj. R-squared	0.01	0.05	0.14	0.02	0.02	0.13
	Panel B: Reduced Form					
Treatment X Post	0.10	0.30**	0.14	0.38*	0.17	0.53**
	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.19]	[0.22]	[0.21]	[0.21]
Pctile of Control Group	54%	62%	56%	65%	57%	70%
Nbr Participants-Waves	368	368	512	398	400	512
Adj. R-squared	0.02	0.05	0.11	0.03	0.02	0.12
	Panel C: 2SLS [Instrument = Treatment x Post]					
Financial $\widehat{\text{Security}}$ Index	0.06	0.17**	0.19***	0.25***	0.12*	0.34***
	[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.06]
Pctile of Control Group	52%	57%	58%	60%	55%	63%
Nbr Participants-Waves	368	368	512	398	400	512
Adj. R-squared	0.01	0.04	0.10	-0.06	-0.00	0.06
First Stage F (KP)	141.98	141.98	55.46	29.82	29.98	55.46
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table shows OLS [Panel A], Reduced Form [Panel B] and 2SLS [Panel C] estimates for the impact of financial security on social cohesion. Trust ingroup [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their ingroup (ie; refugees for a refugee respondent, hosts for a host respondent). Trust outgroup [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their outgroup (ie; hosts for a refugee respondent, refugees for a host respondent). Prop outgroup friends [0-1] asks the respondent what proportion of their friends belong to the outgroup. Share Fin. Support and Share Jobs measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing government financial support and in accessing jobs when they are scarce (both, on a scale of 1-5). Social Cohesion Index is an index which measures 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for having been surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, so treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively

Table C.3: Financial Security and Social Cohesion, 2SLS. **Hosts Only**

	Trust In-Group (stand) (1)	Trust Out-Group (stand) (2)	Prop Out-Group Friends (stand) (3)	Share Fin. Support (stand) (4)	Share Jobs (stand) (5)	Social Cohesion Index (stand) (6)
	Panel A: OLS					
Financial Security Index	0.13***	0.13***	0.16***	0.00	-0.02	0.16***
	[0.02]	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.02]
Pctile of Control Group	55%	55%	56%	50%	49%	56%
Nbr Participants-Waves	673	670	1,238	944	943	1,238
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.08	0.05	-0.00	-0.00	0.05
	Panel B: Reduced Form					
Treatment X Post	0.30***	0.24**	0.22*	0.43***	0.37**	0.52***
	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.13]	[0.16]	[0.16]	[0.12]
Pctile of Control Group	62%	59%	59%	67%	64%	70%
Nbr Participants-Waves	673	670	1,238	944	943	1,238
Adj. R-squared	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02
	Panel C: 2SLS [Instrument = Treatment x Post]					
Financial $\widehat{\text{Security}}$ Index	0.13***	0.20***	0.11***	0.14**	0.12*	0.21***
	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.04]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.04]
Pctile of Control Group	55%	58%	54%	56%	55%	58%
Nbr Participants-Waves	673	670	1,238	944	943	1,238
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.03	0.05	-0.03	-0.03	0.05
First Stage F (KP)	245.26	244.75	99.83	90.19	90.09	99.83
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table shows OLS [Panel A], Reduced Form [Panel B] and 2SLS [Panel C] estimates for the impact of financial security on social cohesion. Trust ingroup [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their ingroup (ie; refugees for a refugee respondent, hosts for a host respondent). Trust outgroup [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their outgroup (ie; hosts for a refugee respondent, refugees for a host respondent). Prop outgroup friends [0-1] asks the respondent what proportion of their friends belong to the outgroup. Share Fin. Support and Share Jobs measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing government financial support and in accessing jobs when they are scarce (both, on a scale of 1-5). Social Cohesion Index is an index which measures 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for having been surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, so treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively

Table C.4: **Diff-Diff** Estimates for Financial Security and Social Cohesion

	Financial Security Index (1)	Financial Security Index (2)	Social Cohesion Index (3)	Social Cohesion Index (4)
	Panel A: Full Sample			
Treated x Midline1	1.01***	1.02***	0.37***	0.37***
	[0.16]	[0.16]	[0.11]	[0.11]
Treated x Midline2	2.28***	2.29***	0.88***	0.88***
	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.15]	[0.15]
Treated x Endline	1.95***	2.00***	0.36***	0.37***
	[0.20]	[0.19]	[0.14]	[0.14]
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.33	0.35	0.05	0.06
	Panel B: Refugees Only			
Treated x Midline1	1.16***	1.18***	0.19	0.19
	[0.28]	[0.29]	[0.21]	[0.22]
Treated x Midline2	1.97***	1.98***	1.24***	1.24***
	[0.29]	[0.29]	[0.28]	[0.28]
Treated x Endline	1.54***	1.55***	0.29	0.27
	[0.33]	[0.33]	[0.27]	[0.27]
Nbr Participants-Waves	512	512	512	512
Adj. R-squared	0.30	0.31	0.12	0.15
	Panel C: Hosts Only			
Treated x Midline1	0.89***	0.93***	0.53***	0.54***
	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.13]	[0.14]
Treated x Midline2	2.54***	2.58***	0.58***	0.59***
	[0.29]	[0.29]	[0.17]	[0.17]
Treated x Endline	2.31***	2.35***	0.42***	0.43***
	[0.23]	[0.24]	[0.16]	[0.16]
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238
Adj. R-squared	0.35	0.36	0.02	0.02
Controls	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: The table shows difference in difference estimates for Financial Security and Social Cohesion. Social Cohesion Index is an index which measures 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs). Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, and take home monthly pay). All Indexes are constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup. All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance, and an indicator for July 2022 batch. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.5: Comparison Between High Baseline and High Endline Financial Security on Social Cohesion

	Social Cohesion Index at Endline (1)	Social Cohesion Index at Endline (2)
High Income at Baseline [0,1]	-0.94***	-1.13***
	[0.32]	[0.33]
Avg Income (High Baseline Income)	297.96	-
Avg Income (High Endline Income)	343.41	-
Avg Percentile (High Baseline Percentile)	-	76.36
Avg Percentile (High Endline Percentile)	-	77.39
Observations	289	278

Notes: The table reports nearest neighbor matching estimators on differences in Social Cohesion. High Income Baseline = 1 is the group of respondents above the 50th percentile of income at baseline (income > 160 MTN), and High Income Baseline = 0 represents the group of individuals who achieved similarly high income at endline, due to the livelihoods intervention (income > 160 MTN). Baseline participants with high income are matched to an endline participant with comparably high income via nearest-neighbor matching, with exact matching on refugee status and gender. Column 1 matches participants on absolute income, and column 2 matches participants on income percentile within each survey. Social Cohesion is an index of 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs). All models control for age, gender, age interacted with gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, community treatment intensity (within 1 km), and an indicator for being in the delayed July 2022 survey batch. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.6: Impact of Livelihoods Program on Financial Security. **Not Controlling for Covariates**

	HH Income (6m) (stand) (1)	Take Home Pay (1m) (stand) (2)	Pct Inc. Saved [0-1] (stand) (3)	Pay Surprise Bill [0-3] (stand) (4)	Financial Security Index (stand) (5)
	Panel A: Full Sample				
Treated X Post	0.76***	0.59***	1.88***	1.24***	1.73***
	[0.15]	[0.17]	[0.18]	[0.12]	[0.15]
Pctile of Control Group	78%	72%	97%	89%	96%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,233	1,750	1,718	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.41	0.20	0.31
	Panel B: Only Refugees				
Treated X Post	0.65***	0.91***	1.58***	1.15***	1.52***
	[0.22]	[0.26]	[0.33]	[0.22]	[0.26]
Pctile of Control Group	74%	82%	94%	88%	94%
Nbr Participants-Waves	509	305	509	493	509
Adj. R-squared	0.04	0.09	0.30	0.24	0.30
	Panel C: Only Hosts				
Treated X Post	0.87***	0.39*	2.13***	1.30***	1.90***
	[0.21]	[0.22]	[0.17]	[0.14]	[0.18]
Pctile of Control Group	81%	65%	98%	90%	97%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,241	928	1,241	1,225	1,241
Adj. R-squared	0.04	0.02	0.47	0.17	0.31
Controls	N	N	N	N	N
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the 3 period average treatment effect on financial security outcomes. HH Income (6m) measured the total household income in the past 6 months, as measured but the sum of all income sources. Take Home pay (1m) is the respondent's reported take home monthly pay in the past month. Pct Income Saved is the % of income saved in the past month. Pay Suprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 mtc, ranging for not at all (0) to very easily (3). Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and 6-month household income), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. No model includes controls for covariates. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.7: Financial Security and Social Cohesion, 2SLS. Not Controlling for Covariates.
Full Sample

	Trust In-Group (stand) (1)	Trust Out-Group (stand) (2)	Prop Out-Group Friends (stand) (3)	Share Fin. Support (stand) (4)	Share Jobs (stand) (5)	Social Cohesion Index (stand) (6)
	Panel A: OLS					
Financial Security Index	0.09***	0.13***	0.16***	0.03	-0.01	0.17***
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
Pctile of Control Group	54%	55%	56%	51%	50%	57%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,041	1,038	1,750	1,342	1,343	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.07
	Panel B: Reduced Form					
Treatment X Post	0.20***	0.35***	0.20*	0.39***	0.27**	0.53***
	[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.10]	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.10]
Pctile of Control Group	58%	64%	58%	65%	61%	70%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,041	1,038	1,750	1,342	1,343	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.04
	Panel C: 2SLS [Instrument = Treatment x Post]					
Financial $\widehat{\text{Security}}$ Index	0.09***	0.19***	0.14***	0.16***	0.10**	0.24***
	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.03]
Pctile of Control Group	54%	58%	56%	56%	54%	59%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,041	1,038	1,750	1,342	1,343	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.02	0.03	0.05	-0.03	-0.02	0.05
First Stage F (KP)	403.10	401.73	157.49	112.83	112.94	157.49
Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table shows OLS [Panel A], Reduced Form [Panel B] and 2SLS [Panel C] estimates for the impact of financial security on social cohesion. Trust ingroup [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their ingroup (ie; refugees for a refugee respondent, hosts for a host respondent). Trust outgroup [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their outgroup (ie; hosts for a refugee respondent, refugees for a host respondent). Prop. outgroup friends [0-1] asks the respondent what proportion of their friends belong to the outgroup. Share Fin. Support and Share Jobs measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing government financial support and in accessing jobs when they are scarce (both, on a scale of 1-5). Social Cohesion Index is an index which measures 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. No model includes controls for covariates. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, and so treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.8: Impact of Livelihoods Program on Financial Security Index, **Robustness**

	Dependent Variable: Financial Security Index				
Dropped Variable:	-	HH Income (6m)	Take Home Monthly Pay	Pct. Income Saved	Pay Suprise Bill
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Panel A: Full Sample				
Treated X Post	1.75***	1.92***	1.89***	1.22***	1.57***
	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.16]
Pctile of Control Group	96%	97%	97%	89%	94%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.32	0.39	0.35	0.16	0.27
	Panel B: Only Refugees				
Treated X Post	1.53***	1.76***	1.54***	1.16***	1.36***
	[0.26]	[0.29]	[0.26]	[0.21]	[0.28]
Pctile of Control Group	94%	96%	94%	88%	91%
Nbr Participants-Waves	509	509	509	509	509
Adj. R-squared	0.31	0.35	0.32	0.19	0.25
	Panel C: Only Hosts				
Treated X Post	1.93***	2.05***	2.18***	1.27***	1.75***
	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.19]	[0.19]
Pctile of Control Group	97%	98%	99%	90%	96%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,241	1,241	1,241	1,241	1,241
Adj. R-squared	0.32	0.40	0.36	0.15	0.27
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures treatment effects on the Financial Security Index, constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Column 1 shows the full index, which icludes 4 proxies for financial security (6-month household income, take home monthly pay, % of income saved last month, and ease of paying a surprise bill). Columns 2-5 show estimates where the indicated proxy is dropped from the index. All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.9: Financial Security and Social Cohesion. **OLS Estimates**, **Robustness**

	Dependent Variable: Social Cohesion Index					
Dropped Variable:	-	Trust In-Group	Trust Out-Group	Share Financial Support	Share Jobs	Prop. Out-Group Friends
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: Full Sample					
Financial Security Index	0.15***	0.13***	0.14***	0.16***	0.17***	0.10***
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
Pctile of Control Group	56%	55%	56%	56%	57%	54%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.03
	Panel B: Only Refugees					
Financial Security Index	0.14***	0.15***	0.15***	0.12***	0.15***	0.09***
	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.03]
Pctile of Control Group	56%	56%	56%	55%	56%	54%
Nbr Participants-Waves	512	512	512	512	512	512
Adj. R-squared	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.04
	Panel C: Only Hosts					
Financial Security Index	0.14***	0.12***	0.13***	0.17***	0.17***	0.10***
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
Pctile of Control Group	56%	55%	55%	57%	57%	54%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238
Adj. R-squared	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.02
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table shows OLS estimates for the effect of Financial Security on Social Cohesion, dropping one subcomponent of the Social Cohesion index at a time. Social Cohesion is constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Column 1 shows the full index, which includes 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs). Columns 2-6 show estimates where the indicated proxy is dropped from the index. All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for July 2022 batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so effect sizes are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.10: Financial Security and Social Cohesion. **Reduced-Form Estimates**, **Robustness**

	Dependent Variable: Social Cohesion Index					
Dropped Variable:	-	Trust In-Group	Trust Out-Group	Share Financial Support	Share Jobs	Prop. Out-Group Friends
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: Full Sample					
Treatment X Post	0.53***	0.51***	0.50***	0.45***	0.50***	0.51***
	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.11]
Pctile of Control Group	70%	69%	69%	67%	69%	69%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.04
	Panel B: Only Refugees					
Treatment X Post	0.46**	0.47**	0.47**	0.30	0.41**	0.45**
	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.21]	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.20]
Pctile of Control Group	68%	68%	68%	62%	66%	67%
Nbr Participants-Waves	512	512	512	512	512	512
Adj. R-squared	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.06
	Panel C: Only Hosts					
Treatment X Post	0.58***	0.54***	0.52***	0.55***	0.55***	0.56***
	[0.13]	[0.13]	[0.14]	[0.14]	[0.13]	[0.13]
Pctile of Control Group	72%	71%	70%	71%	71%	71%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238
Adj. R-squared	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table shows Reduced Form estimates for the effect of Financial Security on Social Cohesion, dropping one subcomponent of the Social Cohesion index at a time. Social Cohesion is constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Column 1 shows the full index, which includes 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs). Columns 2-6 show estimates where the indicated proxy is dropped from the index. All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so effect sizes are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.11: Financial Security and Social Cohesion. **2SLS Estimates, Robustness**

	Dependent Variable: Social Cohesion Index					
Dropped Variable:	-	Trust In-Group	Trust Out-Group	Share Financial Support	Share Jobs	Prop. Out-Group Friends
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: Full Sample					
$\widehat{FinancialSecurityIndex}$	0.25***	0.24***	0.23***	0.24***	0.25***	0.22***
	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]
Pctile of Control Group	60%	59%	59%	59%	60%	59%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.01
	Panel B: Only Refugees					
$\widehat{FinancialSecurityIndex}$	0.33***	0.33***	0.33***	0.27***	0.31***	0.27***
	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.06]
Pctile of Control Group	63%	63%	63%	61%	62%	61%
Nbr Participants-Waves	512	512	512	512	512	512
Adj. R-squared	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.06	-0.02
	Panel C: Only Hosts					
$\widehat{FinancialSecurityIndex}$	0.21***	0.19***	0.18***	0.23***	0.22***	0.19***
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]
Pctile of Control Group	58%	58%	57%	59%	59%	58%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238
Adj. R-squared	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.01
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table shows 2SLS estimates for the effect of Financial Security on Social Cohesion, dropping one subcomponent of the Social Cohesion index at a time. Social Cohesion is constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Column 1 shows the full index, which includes 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs). Columns 2-6 show estimates where the indicated proxy is dropped from the index. All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so effect sizes are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.12: Impact of the Livelihoods Program on **Principal Component Variables, 2SLS**.

	Full Sample		*Refugees Only*		*Hosts Only*	
	FS PC (stand) (1)	SC PC (stand) (2)	FS PC (stand) (3)	SC PC (stand) (4)	FS PC (stand) (5)	SC PC (stand) (6)
	Panel A: OLS					
Financial Security PC	-	0.07***	-	0.14***	-	0.14***
	-	[0.02]	-	[0.04]	-	[0.04]
Pctile of Control Group	84%	53%	84%	56%	84%	56%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,750	1,750	512	512	512
Adj. R-squared	1.00	0.01	1.00	0.02	1.00	0.02
	Panel B: Reduced Form					
Treatment X Post	1.68***	0.53***	1.68***	0.40	1.65***	0.40
	[0.13]	[0.15]	[0.13]	[0.28]	[0.19]	[0.28]
Pctile of Control Group	95%	70%	95%	66%	95%	66%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,750	1,750	512	512	512
Adj. R-squared	0.27	0.01	0.27	0.02	0.27	0.02
	Panel C: 2SLS [Instrument = Treatment x Post]					
$\widehat{FinancialSecurityPC}$	-	0.21***	-	0.27***	-	0.27***
	-	[0.05]	-	[0.08]	-	[0.08]
Pctile of Control Group	84%	58%	84%	61%	84%	61%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,750	1,750	512	512	512
Adj. R-squared	1.00	-0.01	1.00	0.01	1.00	0.01
First Stage F (KP)	135.39	135.39	135.39	43.55	43.55	43.55
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the 3 period average treatment effect on financial security and social cohesion. Panel A shows OLS estimates, Panel B shows reduced form estimates for the effect of treatment on financial security and social capital, and Panel C shows IV estimates where we instrument financial security with treatment. Financial Security PC (in columns 1, 4, and 7) is the first component of a PC variable which measures 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and 6-month household income). Social Cohesion PC (in columns 2, 5, 8) is the first component of a principal component analysis variable which measures 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs). All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.13: **Randomized Inference** For Treatment Effects

	TE ($\widehat{\beta*}$)	$\#\|\widehat{\beta}\| >= \|\widehat{\beta}*\|$ (c)	Permutations (n)	p-val (p = c/n)	p-val ci-lower	p-val ci-upper
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Financial Security						
HH Income (6m)	0.789	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Take Home Pay (1m)	0.614	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Pct Inc. Saved [0-1]	1.891	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Pay Surprise Bill [0-3]	1.243	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Financial Security Index	1.749	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Social Cohesion						
Trust In-Group [1-10]	0.214	1	1000	0.001	0.000	0.006
Trust Out-Group [1-10]	0.373	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Prop Out-Group Friends [0-1]	0.205	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Share Gov. Fin. Support [1-5]	0.391	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Share Jobs [1-5]	0.272	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0.004
Social Cohesion Index	0.730	0	1000	0.000	0.000	0.004

Notes: The table presents randomized inference tests for treatment on financial security and social cohesion, where treatment is randomly permuted 1000 times. $\widehat{B*}$ is the original treatment effect. $\#|\widehat{\beta}| >= |\widehat{\beta}*|$ (c) represents the number of times (out of 1000) that the permuted treatment effect was larger than the treatment effect found in our sample. P-value represents the number of times the permuted treatment effect exceeded our realized treatment effect (c) divided by the number of permutations (n). HH Income (6m) measured the total household income in the past 6 months, as measured but the sum of all income sources. Take Home pay (1m) is the respondent's reported take home monthly pay in the past month. Pct Income Saved is the % of income saved in the past month. Pay Suprise Bill [0-3] measures the extent to which the respondent feels they can pay a surprise bill of 6000 mtc, ranging for not at all (0) to very easily (3). Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, household income 6m), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Trust ingroup [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their ingroup (ie; refugees for a refugee respondent, hosts for a host respondent). Trust outgroup [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their outgroup (ie; hosts for a refugee respondent, refugees for a host respondent). Prop outgroup friends [0-1] as the respondent what proportion of their friends belong to the outgroup. Share Gov. Fin. Support [1-5] and Share Jobs [1-5] measure the extent to which the respondent feels that members of the opposite group should have priority access to financial support, and should have priority access to jobs, respectively. Social Cohesion Index is an index of 5 proxies for social cohesion in the table, constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, community treatment intensity (within 1km), and an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the control group.

Table C.14: Impact of the Livelihood Program on Financial Security. **Controlling for Community Treatment.**

	Financial Security Index (stand) (1)	Financial Security Index (stand) (2)	Financial Security Index (stand) (3)	Financial Security Index (stand) (4)
	Panel A: Full Sample			
Treated X Post	1.73***	1.75***	1.75***	1.75***
	[0.15]	[0.15]	[0.15]	[0.15]
Community Treatment	.	-0.02	-0.05	-0.10
	.	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.19]
Pctile of Control Group	96%	96%	96%	96%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	1,750	1,750	1,750
Adj. R-squared	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.32
	Panel B: Only Refugees			
Treated X Post	1.53***	1.54***	1.54***	1.54***
	[0.25]	[0.26]	[0.26]	[0.26]
Community Treatment	.	-0.21	-0.28	-0.37
	.	[0.34]	[0.36]	[0.38]
Pctile of Control Group	94%	94%	94%	94%
Nbr Participants-Waves	512	512	512	512
Adj. R-squared	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.31
	Panel C: Only Hosts			
Treated X Post	1.89***	1.93***	1.93***	1.93***
	[0.18]	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.19]
Community Treatment	.	0.18	0.16	0.22
	.	[0.16]	[0.17]	[0.20]
Pctile of Control Group	97%	97%	97%	97%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,238	1,238	1,238	1,238
Adj. R-squared	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.32
Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Community Treatment	.	0.75	1	2

Notes: The table measures the 3 period average treatment effect on financial security outcomes. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and 6-month household income), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Model in column (1) does not include any controls. All other models control for age, gender, age interacted with gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch and community treatment intensity at varying radii of 0.75 km, 1km and 2km. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.15: Financial Security and Social Cohesion, 2SLS. Controlling for Community Treatment. **Full Sample**

	Social Cohesion Index (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: OLS			
Financial Security Index	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
Community Treatment	.	0.16	0.13	0.12
	.	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.18]
Pctile of Control Group	57%	57%	57%	57%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,323	1,323	1,323	1,323
Adj. R-squared	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08
	Panel B: Reduced Form			
Treatment X Post	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***
	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.11]
Community Treatment	.	0.12	0.08	0.06
	.	[0.16]	[0.16]	[0.19]
Pctile of Control Group	73%	73%	73%	73%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,323	1,323	1,323	1,323
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
	Panel C: 2SLS [Instrument = Treatment x Post]			
Financial $\widehat{\text{Security}}$ Index	0.31***	0.32***	0.32***	0.32***
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]
Community Treatment	.	0.08	0.06	0.04
	.	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.19]
Pctile of Control Group	62%	63%	63%	63%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,323	1,323	1,323	1,323
Adj. R-squared	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
First Stage F (KP)	118.49	108.99	109.60	108.77
Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Radius (km)	.	0.75	1	2

Notes: The table shows OLS [Panel A], Reduced Form [Panel B] and 2SLS [Panel C] estimates for the impact of financial security on social cohesion. Social Cohesion Index is an index which measures 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs). Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and 6-month household income). Both indices are constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardizing these again with reference to the control group. Model in column (1) does not control for any covariates. All other models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch, and community treatment intensity at varying radii. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.16: Impact of the Livelihoods Program on Financial Security. **Proximity to Treated Units**.

	Financial Security Index (stand)	Financial Security Index (stand)	Financial Security Index (stand)	Financial Security Index (stand)	Financial Security Index (stand)	Financial Security Index (stand)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment x Post	1.73***	1.79***	1.70***	1.75***	1.80***	1.74***
	[0.15]	[0.18]	[0.16]	[0.15]	[0.18]	[0.16]
Pctile of Control Group	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%	96%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	988	1,391	1,750	988	1,391
Adj. R-squared	0.31	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.34
Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sample	Full Sample	Control group only near (50m) treated	Excl. near (50m) treated	Full Sample	Control group only near (50m) treated	Excl. near (50m) treated

Notes: The table measures the 3 period average effect of the livelihood programon on financial security for three sample selections. Columns (1) and (4) include the full sample, columns (2) and (5) only include control group units that are within 50m from a treated unit, while columns (3) and (6) exclude all control group units that are within 50m of a treated unit. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, household income in the past 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. The models in columns (1)-(3) include no controls, while models in columns (4)-(6) control for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for being in the delayed July 2022 survey batch. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.17: Impact of the Livelihoods Program on Social Cohesion. **2SLS Estimates. Proximity to Treated Units**.

	Social Cohesion Index (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)	Social Cohesion Index (stand)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: OLS					
Financial Security Index	0.17***	0.15***	0.16***	0.17***	0.15***	0.16***
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
Pctile of Control Group	57%	56%	56%	57%	56%	56%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	988	1,391	1,750	988	1,391
Adj. R-squared	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09
	Panel B: Reduced Form					
Treatment X Post	0.53***	0.60***	0.49***	0.53***	0.60***	0.50***
	[0.10]	[0.15]	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.15]	[0.11]
Pctile of Control Group	70%	73%	69%	70%	73%	69%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	988	1,391	1,750	988	1,391
Adj. R-squared	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.06
	Panel C: 2SLS [Instrument = Treatment x Post]					
Financial $\widehat{\text{Security}}$ Index	0.24***	0.28***	0.23***	0.25***	0.27***	0.26***
	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.04]
Pctile of Control Group	59%	61%	59%	60%	61%	60%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,750	988	1,391	1,750	988	1,391
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.07
First Stage F (KP)	157.49	120.81	150.78	153.89	119.39	142.75
Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sample	Full Sample	Control group only near (50m) treated	Excl. near (50m) treated	Full Sample	Control group only near (50m) treated	Excl. near (50m) treated

Notes: The table shows OLS [Panel A], Reduced Form [Panel B] and 2SLS [Panel C] estimates for the impact of financial security on social cohesion for three sample selections. Columns (1) and (4) include the full sample, columns (2) and (5) only include control group units that are within 50m from a treated unit, while columns (3) and (6) exclude all control group units that are within 50m of a treated unit. Social Cohesion Index is an index of 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on latitude, longitude, and elevation. The models in columns (1)-(3) include no controls, while models in columns (4)-(6) control for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for being in the delayed July 2022 survey batch. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.18: Impact of the Livelihoods Program On Trust in Neighbors. **Proximity to Treated Units**.

	Trust in Neighbors	Trust in Neighbors	Trust in Neighbors	Trust in Neighbors	Trust in Neighbors	Trust in Neighbors
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.40***	0.73***	0.47***	0.40**	0.70***	0.47***
	[0.15]	[0.19]	[0.16]	[0.16]	[0.21]	[0.17]
Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Nbr Participants-Waves	368	205	264	368	205	264
R2	0.03	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.10	0.05
Sample	Full Sample	Control group only near (50m) treated	Excl. near (50m) treated	Full Sample	Control group only near (50m) treated	Excl. near (50m) treated

Notes: The table measures the treatment effect on Trust in Neighbors for three sample selections. Columns (1) and (4) include the full sample, columns (2) and (5) only include control group units that are near (50m) a treated unit, while columns (3) and (6) exclude all control group units that are near (50m) a treated unit. Social Cohesion Index is an index of 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on latitude, longitude, and elevation. The models in columns (1)-(3) include no controls, while models in columns (4)-(6) control for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.19: Mediation Analysis, **Not Controlling For Covariates**

	Mediators of Treatment → SC:						
	Financial Security Index	Food Security Index	Mental Health Index	Job Satisfaction	Life Satisfaction	Outgroup Interactions	Engaged in Emp. 2 yrs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
Average Causal Mediation Effect	0.249***	0.086***	-0.006	0.085***	0.019	-0.084*	0.078***
	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.042)	(0.016)
Average Direct Effect	0.280*	0.443***	0.534***	0.351***	0.416***	0.830***	0.357***
	(0.125)	(0.093)	(0.114)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.157)	(0.055)
Total Effect	0.529***	0.528***	0.529***	0.435***	0.435***	0.745***	0.435***
	(0.120)	(0.095)	(0.114)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.169)	(0.057)
Prop. Mediated	0.470***	0.162***	-0.011	0.195***	0.045	-0.113*	0.180***
	(0.158)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.081)	(0.039)
Observations	1750	1750	1750	1283	1283	713	1282
Mediator Model Adj-R2	0.313	0.104	0.015	0.053	0.028	0.038	0.035
Outcome Model Adj-R2	0.068	0.062	0.064	0.082	0.048	0.151	0.094
Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Notes: The table shows results from the mediation analysis between Treatment and Social Cohesion following Imai et al. (2010). Each column presents a separate mediation analysis, where the mediator is Financial Security (Column 1), Food Security (Column 2), Mental Health (Column 3), Job Satisfaction (Column 4), Life Satisfaction (Column 5), Outgroup Interactions (Column 6) and expectations of being employed in the next 2 years (Column 7). For each mediator, we report the Average Causal Mediation Effect, the Average Direct Effect, the Total Effect and the Proportion of the Total Effect that is mediated by the mediator. Social Cohesion Index is an index which measures 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, the extent to which the respondent feels that Refugees should be prioritized for work, the extent to which the respondent feels that Refugees should be supported first in times of crisis, and proportion of out-group friends). Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and 6-month household income). Food Security Index is an index of 6 proxies for food security (how many meals the respondent ate yesterday, how many meals children in the respondent's household ate yesterday, how many meals other adults in the respondent's household ate yesterday, whether the respondent has not skipped any meals in the last 30 days, whether the respondent has not been worried about food in the past 30 days, whether the respondent has been able to eat nutritiously in the past 30 days, and whether the respondent has gone a full day without eating in the past 30 days). Mental Health Index is an index of 4 proxies for mental health (depression, anxiety, self-esteem and loneliness). All Indexes are constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. No model includes for any covariates apart from an indicator for survey wave. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.20: Controlled Direct Effects After Adjusting For Potential Mediators

	Mediators of Treatment → SC						
	Financial Security Index	Food Security Index	Mental Health Index	Job Satisfaction	Life Satisfaction	Outgroup Interactions	Engaged in Emp. 2 yrs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Controlled Direct Effect	0.286**	0.453***	0.539***	0.336***	0.393***	0.798***	0.349***
	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.156)	(0.061)
Nbr Participants-Waves	1750	1750	1283	1283	1750	713	1282
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: This table presents the direct effects of treatment on social cohesion after adjusting for each potential mediator in a separate model. The analysis uses a bootstrap procedure with 5,000 replications to estimate the controlled direct effect (CDE) of treatment on social cohesion after removing the variation explained by each mediator, following Acharya et al. (2016) and Vansteelandt (2009). Social Cohesion Index is an index which measures 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, the extent to which the respondent feels that the members of the opposite group should be prioritized for work, and the extent to which the respondent feels that the members of the opposite group should be supported first in times of crisis) Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income in the past 6 months). Food Security Index is an index of 6 proxies for food security (how many meals the respondent ate yesterday, how many meals children in the respondent's household ate yesterday, how many meals other adults in the respondent's household ate yesterday, whether the respondent has not skipped any meals in the last 30 days, whether the respondent has not been worried about food in the past 30 days, whether the respondent has been able to eat nutritiously in the past 30 days, and whether the respondent has gone a full day without eating in the past 30 days). Mental Health Index is an index of 4 proxies for mental health (depression, anxiety, self-esteem and loneliness). All Indexes are constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup. All models include controls for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, a variable capturing average damage for neighbours, within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance, an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch, and an indicator for survey wave. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.21: Impact of Shocks on **Mental Health** and **Community Engagement**

	Depression	Anxiety	Low Self-Esteem	Loneliness	Mental Health PC	Mental Health Index	Solve Community Problem
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Panel A: Full Sample						
Treated X Post	0.09	-0.03	-0.09	0.12	0.24	0.04	-0.03
	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.13]	[0.16]	[0.12]	[0.05]
Pctile of Control Group	54%	49%	46%	55%	59%	52%	49%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1749	1749	1750	1748	1750	1750	1750
Adj. R-squared	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.06
	Panel B: Only Refugees						
Treated X Post	-0.07	-0.14	-0.28	-0.14	-0.17	-0.22	0.01
	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.21]	[0.21]	[0.26]	[0.19]	[0.09]
Pctile of Control Group	47%	44%	39%	44%	43%	41%	50%
Nbr Participants-Waves	511	512	512	510	512	512	512
Adj. R-squared	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.06	0.05	0.08
	Panel C: Only Hosts						
Treated X Post	0.21	0.07	0.06	0.34**	0.46**	0.25	-0.00
	[0.16]	[0.17]	[0.15]	[0.17]	[0.21]	[0.16]	[0.05]
Pctile of Control Group	58%	53%	52%	63%	68%	60%	50%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1238	1237	1238	1238	1238	1238	1238
Adj. R-squared	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.06
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the 3 period average treatment effect on alternative mechanisms. Depression is total score from the following set of questions: Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you had little interest or pleasure in doing things?; Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you experienced feeling down or hopeless?; Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you experienced trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much?; Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you experienced trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television? . Anxiety is the total score from the following set of questions: Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you felt afraid as if something awful might happen?; Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you experienced feeling nervous, anxious or on edge? . Loneliness is the total score from the following questions: How often do you feel that there is no one you can turn to?; How often do you feel isolated from others?; How often do you feel that your interests and ideas are not shared by those around you?; How often do you feel you have a lot in common with the people around you? Self esteem is the total score from the following set of questions: I am able to do things as well as most other people; I feel useless at times; I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others; I feel that I have a number of good qualities; I feel I do not have much to be proud of; I take a positive attitude toward myself; In most ways my life is close to ideal. Mental Health PCA is the first component of a PCA variable of 4 proxies for mental health (depression, anxiety, loneliness and self esteem). Mental Health Index is an index of 4 proxies for mental health in columns 1-4, constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Solve Community Problem is whether the respondent has engaged with local community leadership in the past 12 months. All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, whether the respondent's house was damaged by Cyclone Gombe, age interacted with gender, and an indicator for having been surveyed in the July 2022 batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the control group. The mean and standard deviation of the original (non-standardized) variable is shown in the table below. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table C.22: Impact of Shocks on **Gender, Political and Civic Norms**

	Men Right To Jobs	More Women In Power	Both Husband And Wife Should Contribute	Education For Boys	Gender Norm Index	Must Obey Laws	Voting Is Important
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Panel A: Full Sample						
Treated X Post	-0.26**	0.21	-0.08	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05	-0.06
	[0.13]	[0.13]	[0.13]	[0.13]	[0.13]	[0.12]	[0.14]
Pctile of Control Group	40%	58%	47%	50%	49%	48%	48%
Nbr Participants-Waves	1343	1344	1344	917	1344	917	917
Adj. R-squared	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.03
	Panel B: Only Refugees						
Treated X Post	-0.40*	0.21	-0.09	-0.00	-0.12	-0.10	-0.13
	[0.22]	[0.23]	[0.23]	[0.24]	[0.23]	[0.23]	[0.25]
Pctile of Control Group	34%	58%	46%	50%	45%	46%	45%
Nbr Participants-Waves	400	400	400	278	400	278	278
Adj. R-squared	0.02	0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04
	Panel C: Only Hosts						
Treated X Post	-0.14	0.18	-0.07	-0.01	0.05	0.00	0.01
	[0.16]	[0.17]	[0.15]	[0.17]	[0.18]	[0.15]	[0.18]
Pctile of Control Group	44%	57%	47%	50%	52%	50%	50%
Nbr Participants-Waves	943	944	944	639	944	639	639
Adj. R-squared	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.04	-0.00	0.06	0.03
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the 3 period average treatment effect on gender norms. The outcome variables are agreement from 1 (no agreement) to 5 (full agreement) with statements and questions 1. "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women", 2. "Do you believe there should be more women in positions of power in government?", 3. "Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income", 4. "An education is more important for a boy than for a girl", 5. an index constructed as the mean of the previous questions (a higher gender norm index indicates more egalitarian views), 6. "How important do you think it is for people to always obey laws and regulations?" and 7. "How important do you think it is for citizens to vote in elections?". All models control for age, gender, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, and an indicator for being in the delayed July 2022 survey batch. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, so the treatment effects are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

D Cost-Benefit Analysis

The full program cost amounted to 2789.50 USD per beneficiary, which was split into the following three categories of expenditures:

Category 1: includes indirect costs (10%) of i) UNHCR's office overhead costs; ii) 30% time for each year of the UNHCR livelihoods team staff; and iii) program start-up costs (equipment, engagement with local authorities and community leaders, beneficiary recruitment and contracting financial service providers).[51]

Category 2: includes the per unit estimated cost of implementing the program (35%), corresponding to 1,014 USD. This represents the amount transferred directly to the program beneficiaries in the form of cash for consumption support, assets, and livelihoods start-up capital. The cash grant was given in two even lump-sum instalments in May and August, 2021.

Category 3: The remaining 55% of the total estimated costs went to UNHCR's implementing partner who implemented the coaching and hired and oversaw all the technical training on language skills, life skills, and individualized business plan coaching. The coaching sessions were conducted by a local community trained social worker at the household level and lasted anywhere between 1.5-3 hours per session. There were 10 coaching sessions per year, or 20 sessions over the life of the program.

For each year we used the annual exchange rate for USD/Meticais following the IMF annual exchange rate for 2020 (1 USD=69.465 Meticais and 1 USD=65.465 for 2021, IMF).

Future costs could be lower should the program be scaled up further so that the Program Management and Support work would be spread over more participating households.

Return on Investment: We find that by the endline survey, livelihoods/graduation program beneficiaries increased their monthly household income by 1.75 standard deviations. This

[51] This costing exercise benefitted from the use of Dioptra, which is a web-based cost analysis software that allows program staff in country offices, who are most familiar with day-to-day program implementation, to rapidly estimate the cost-efficiency of their program activities. It guides users through a standardized costing methodology, ensuring that all analysis results are methodologically consistent and can be meaningfully compared across different contexts and organizations.

translates into income increasing from 297 USD/month to 407 USD/month. To estimate when we would see a positive return on investment, we net out the direct cash transfer (1,014 USD) and estimate how long it would take to reach beyond the remaining 1,775.5 USD. We would need to assume that participants are able to sustain this increase over time for 16 months to have a positive return on investment. Alternatively, if we estimate the entire beneficiary program cost of 2,789.50 USD, based on the endline assessment of a monthly savings of 110/month on average per beneficiary or a total savings of 1320/year, the program would require 2.11 years to have a positive return on investment.

This is likely to represent a significant underestimate of the real returns to the program given the observed impact on social cohesion and social integration, which are both harder to quantify.

An alternative scenario is one in which instead of implementing the livelihoods/graduation program, UNHCR could have made a direct transfer of the full program costs to participating households. From our sample, average household size is about 5 persons - 4.9 persons for refugees and hosts 5.3. Moreover, the most recent estimates by the IMF show the average GDP/capita in Mozambique in 2022 per annum is about 588USD/person. This means that this alternative approach would have been equivalent to subsidizing the full income of a family of 5 for a year.

While we did not perform an experiment to test the impact of a direct transfer of the full estimated program costs vs the impact of the program, there is growing evidence that employment has intrinsic value, particularly for refugees. Hussam et al. (2022) conducts a direct comparison between providing cash grants and employment to refugees in Bangladesh and finds that employed males were 30 percent less likely to be depressed than their non-employed counterparts. Notably some 66 percent of those employed were willing to forgo cash payments to continue working temporarily for free.

E Climate Shock

Figure E.1: Impact of Livelihoods and Gombe Shock on Financial Security. **Control Group and Hosts Only**.



Notes: The figure shows the impact of the Graduation Program and Climate Shock on Financial Security across time, for the control group only. Financial Security is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income for the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. The y-axis shows the predicted value of Financial Security from a regression of Financial Security on the triple interaction of Treatment x survey x $\widehat{Damage}$ (including all double interactions and base effects), where $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on latitude, longitude and elevation. The model controls for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance, and an indicator for July 2022 batch. Damage is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports that their house has been damaged during Cyclone Gombe. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate the difference Δ between the damage/non-damage groups at endline is significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.

Figure E.2: Impact of Livelihoods and Gombe Shock on Social Cohesion. **Control Group and Hosts Only**.



Notes: The figure shows the impact of the Graduation Program and Climate Shock on Social Cohesion across time, for the control group only. Social Cohesion is an index of 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. The y-axis shows the predicted value of Social Cohesion from a regression of Social Cohesion on the triple interaction of Treatment x survey x $\widehat{Damage}$ (including all double interactions and base effects), where $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on latitude, longitude, and elevation. The model controls for age, gender, age interacted with gender, age squared, years of education, household size, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, first component variable for housing amenities, distance to the center of Maratane camp, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance, and an indicator for July 2022 batch. Damage is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports that their house has been damaged during Hurricane Gombe. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. ***, **, and * indicate the difference Δ between the damage/non-damage groups at endline is significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively.

Table E.1: Impact of Cyclone Gombe On Financial Security. **Hosts Only**.

	Estimates From: $\text{FS} = \text{T}_i * Survey_i * \widehat{Damage} + X_{it} \longrightarrow \widehat{\textbf{FS}}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Livelihoods Program on FS [Panel A]				
Treatment x ML1	1.04***	1.00***	1.03***	1.08***
	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]
Treatment x ML2	2.75***	2.73***	2.98***	3.06***
	[0.42]	[0.42]	[0.52]	[0.52]
Treatment x EL	2.94***	2.91***	2.76***	2.88***
	[0.33]	[0.33]	[0.32]	[0.32]
Damage on FS [Panel B]				
$\widehat{Damage}$ x ML1	0.26	0.19	0.18	0.27
	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.19]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x ML2	0.21	0.17	0.13	0.14
	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.20]	[0.19]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x EL	0.19	0.14	0.11	0.22
	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]
Triple Interaction [Panel C]				
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML1	-0.14	-0.07	-0.13	-0.23
	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML2	-0.22	-0.18	-0.68	-0.85
	[0.60]	[0.60]	[0.60]	[0.60]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x EL	-1.16**	-1.12**	-0.80*	-1.05**
	[0.46]	[0.46]	[0.47]	[0.47]
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196
Adj. R-squared	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37
Zero Stage Instruments				
Elevation	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Longitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elevation * Latitude	N	Y	N	Y
Elevation * Longitude	N	N	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the impact of the livelihoods program on financial security [Panel A] and the impact of Cyclone Gombe [Panel C] on Financial Security. Financial Security Index is an index of four variables (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved in the previous month, take- home monthly pay, and household income in the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on the zero stage instruments indicated below the table. All models control for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours, within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance and an indicator for having been surveyed in the July 2022 batch. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table E.2: Impact of Cyclone Gombe On Social Cohesion. **Hosts Only**.

	Estimates From: $\text{SC} = \text{T}_i * Survey_i * \widehat{Damage} + X_{it}$			
	Reference Period = Midline2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Livelihoods Program on SC [Panel A]				
Treatment x BL	-0.69***	-0.71***	-0.67**	-0.70***
	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.26]	[0.26]
Treatment x ML1	0.08	0.03	0.12	0.04
	[0.23]	[0.23]	[0.23]	[0.22]
Treatment x EL	-0.10	-0.12	-0.21	-0.14
	[0.28]	[0.28]	[0.29]	[0.28]
Damage on SC [Panel B]				
$\widehat{Damage}$ x BL	-0.36*	-0.40**	-0.33*	-0.37*
	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.20]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x ML1	0.17	0.07	0.20	0.06
	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.19]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x EL	-0.36**	-0.41**	-0.38**	-0.31*
	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]
Triple Interaction [Panel C]				
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x BL	0.17	0.21	0.13	0.20
	[0.35]	[0.35]	[0.35]	[0.35]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML1	-0.34	-0.23	-0.42	-0.25
	[0.32]	[0.32]	[0.32]	[0.32]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x EL	-0.09	-0.05	0.14	-0.01
	[0.37]	[0.37]	[0.38]	[0.38]
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196
Adj. R-squared	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Zero Stage Instruments				
Elevation	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Longitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elevation * Latitude	N	Y	N	Y
Elevation * Longitude	N	N	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the impact of the livelihoods program on Social Cohesion [Panel A] and the impact of Cyclone Gombe [Panel C] on Social Cohesion. Social Cohesion is an index of 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends,willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on the zero stage instruments indicated below the table. All models control for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours, within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance and an indicator for having been surveyed in the July 2022 batch. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table E.3: Impact of Cyclone Gombe On Financial Security. **Omitting Control Variables**. **Hosts Only**.

	Estimates From: $\text{FS} = \text{T}_i * Survey_i * \widehat{Damage} + X_{it} \longrightarrow \widehat{\textbf{FS}}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Livelihoods Program on FS [Panel A]				
Treatment x ML1	1.01***	0.97***	1.01***	1.06***
	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]
Treatment x ML2	2.71***	2.69***	2.94***	3.02***
	[0.41]	[0.41]	[0.51]	[0.51]
Treatment x EL	2.90***	2.88***	2.73***	2.85***
	[0.33]	[0.33]	[0.32]	[0.32]
Damage on FS [Panel B]				
$\widehat{Damage}$ x ML1	0.24	0.17	0.16	0.26
	[0.18]	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.18]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x ML2	0.19	0.15	0.11	0.12
	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.19]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x EL	0.17	0.13	0.09	0.21
	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]
Triple Interaction [Panel C]				
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML1	-0.14	-0.06	-0.13	-0.24
	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML2	-0.20	-0.16	-0.66	-0.83
	[0.60]	[0.60]	[0.59]	[0.59]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x EL	-1.15**	-1.10**	-0.79*	-1.03**
	[0.46]	[0.46]	[0.47]	[0.47]
Controls	N	N	N	N
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196
Adj. R-squared	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Zero Stage Instruments				
Elevation	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Longitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elevation * Latitude	N	Y	N	Y
Elevation * Longitude	N	N	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the impact of the livelihoods program on financial security [Panel A] and the impact of Cyclone Gombe [Panel C] on Financial Security. Financial Security Index is an index of four variables (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved in the previous month, take- home monthly pay, and household income in the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on the zero stage instruments indicated below the table. The table omits all control variables. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table E.4: Impact of Cyclone Gombe On Social Cohesion. **Omitting Control Variables. Hosts Only**.

	Estimates From: $\text{SC} = \text{T}_i * Survey_i * \widehat{Damage} + X_{it}$			
	Reference Period = Midline2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Livelihoods Program on SC [Panel A]				
Treatment x BL	-0.70***	-0.72***	-0.67**	-0.71***
	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.26]	[0.26]
Treatment x ML1	0.08	0.03	0.12	0.04
	[0.23]	[0.23]	[0.23]	[0.22]
Treatment x EL	-0.10	-0.12	-0.21	-0.14
	[0.28]	[0.28]	[0.29]	[0.28]
Damage on SC [Panel B]				
$\widehat{Damage}$ x BL	-0.36*	-0.40**	-0.33*	-0.37*
	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.20]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x ML1	0.17	0.06	0.20	0.06
	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.19]	[0.19]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x EL	-0.37**	-0.41**	-0.38**	-0.31*
	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]
Triple Interaction [Panel C]				
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x BL	0.17	0.21	0.13	0.19
	[0.35]	[0.35]	[0.35]	[0.35]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML1	-0.34	-0.23	-0.42	-0.25
	[0.32]	[0.32]	[0.32]	[0.32]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x EL	-0.10	-0.05	0.13	-0.01
	[0.37]	[0.37]	[0.38]	[0.37]
Controls	N	N	N	N
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196
Adj. R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Zero Stage Instruments				
Elevation	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Longitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elevation * Latitude	N	Y	N	Y
Elevation * Longitude	N	N	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the impact of the livelihoods program on Social Cohesion [Panel A] and the impact of Cyclone Gombe [Panel C] on Social Cohesion. Social Cohesion is an index of 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends,willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on the zero stage instruments indicated below the table. The table omits all control variables. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

E.1 2SLS Estimates of Cyclone Gombe on Social Cohesion

Our 2SLS estimation follows the following specification, using the treatment intervention and the weather shocks as instruments:

$$[Stage\ 0] : Damage_i = Geo_i + X_{it} \longrightarrow \widehat{Damage}_i \tag{7}$$

$$[Stage\ 1] : FS_{it} = T_i * Survey_t * \widehat{Damage}_i + X_{it} \longrightarrow \widehat{FS}_{it} \tag{8}$$

$$[Stage\ 2] : SC_{it} = \beta \cdot \widehat{FS}_{it} + X_{it} \longrightarrow \widehat{\beta} \tag{9}$$

Table E.5: Impact of Cyclone Gombe On Social Cohesion. **2SLS Estimates. Hosts Only**.

	Estimates From: $SC = \widehat{\mathbf{FS}} + X_{it}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\widehat{FinancialSecurity}$	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***
	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.03]
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
KP F-Stat	26.60	26.50	31.72	31.46
Zero Stage Instruments				
Elevation	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Longitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elevation * Latitude	N	Y	N	Y
Elevation * Longitude	N	N	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the impact of Financial Security on Social Cohesion. Social Cohesion is an index of 5 variables (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Financial Security is an index of 4 variables (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income in the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. $\widehat{FS}$ is the first-stage predicted value from a regression of Financial Security on the three way interaction (and base effects) of Survey x Treatment x $\widehat{Damage}$. $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on latitude, longitude, and elevation. All models control for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours, within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance and an indicator for having been surveyed in the July 2022 batch. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table E.6: Impact of Cyclone Gombe On Social Cohesion. **2SLS Estimates. Hosts Only**. **Omitting Control Variables.**

	Estimates From: $SC = \widehat{\mathbf{FS}} + X_{it}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\widehat{FinancialSecurity}$	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***
	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.03]
Controls	N	N	N	N
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
KP F-Stat	26.60	26.50	31.72	31.46
Zero Stage Instruments				
Elevation	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Longitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elevation * Latitude	N	Y	N	Y
Elevation * Longitude	N	N	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the impact of Financial Security on Social Cohesion. Social Cohesion is an index of 5 variables (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Financial Security is an index of 4 variables (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, and household income in the previous 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. $\widehat{FS}$ is the first-stage predicted value from a regression of Financial Security on the three way interaction (and base effects) of Survey x Treatment x $\widehat{Damage}$. $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on latitude, longitude, and elevation. The table omits all control variables. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table E.7: Falsification Tests for Geographic IV. **Hosts Only**.

	Gender Norm Index (1)	Gender Norm Index (2)	Must Obey Laws (3)	Must Obey Laws (4)	Voting is Important (5)	Voting is Important (6)
Elevation	0.01	-0.99	-0.00	-1.11	0.01	5.62
	[0.00]	[6.18]	[0.00]	[7.05]	[0.00]	[7.47]
Latitude	-2.08	22.12	0.71	-46.41	0.30	-96.85*
	[2.50]	[47.25]	[2.85]	[54.00]	[3.02]	[57.22]
Longitude	-8.81**	-6.13	2.92	-26.31	-4.60	-2.48
	[4.36]	[36.16]	[4.97]	[41.18]	[5.28]	[43.63]
Elevation * Latitude	.	-0.08	.	0.15	.	0.32*
	.	[0.15]	.	[0.18]	.	[0.19]
Elevation * Longitude	.	-0.01	.	0.09	.	-0.02
	.	[0.12]	.	[0.14]	.	[0.14]
Nbr Participants-Waves	909	909	604	604	604	604
Adj. R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03
Zero Stage Instruments						
Elevation	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latitude	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Longitude	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elevation * Latitude	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Elevation * Longitude	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: The table reports coefficients for elevation, latitude, and longitude in predicting baseline levels of gender, political, civic and norms. All dependent variables are standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey, so effects are measured in standard deviations of the control group. All models control for age, gender, age interacted with gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, years since arrival in Mozambique, distance to the center of Maratane camp, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance, an indicator for being surveyed in the delayed July 2022 batch. All estimates correspond to hosts only. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table E.8: Impact of Cyclone Gombe On Financial Security and Social Cohesion.
Controlling for Community Experiences. Hosts Only.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Panel A (First Stage)								
	Estimates From: FS = Treat x Survey x $\widehat{Damage} \longrightarrow$ **$\widehat{FS}$**								
Treatment x ML1	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***
	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.27]
Treatment x ML2	2.75***	2.75***	2.75***	2.75***	2.75***	2.75***	2.75***	2.75***	2.75***
	[0.42]	[0.42]	[0.42]	[0.42]	[0.42]	[0.42]	[0.42]	[0.42]	[0.42]
Treatment x EL	2.94***	2.94***	2.94***	2.94***	2.94***	2.94***	2.93***	2.94***	2.93***
	[0.33]	[0.33]	[0.33]	[0.34]	[0.34]	[0.33]	[0.33]	[0.33]	[0.34]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML1	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14
	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]	[0.39]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML2	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22
	[0.60]	[0.60]	[0.60]	[0.60]	[0.60]	[0.60]	[0.60]	[0.60]	[0.60]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x EL	-1.16**	-1.16**	-1.16**	-1.17**	-1.17**	-1.17**	-1.16**	-1.16**	-1.16**
	[0.46]	[0.46]	[0.46]	[0.46]	[0.46]	[0.46]	[0.46]	[0.46]	[0.46]
Community Damage	0.36**	0.30*	0.38*	.	.	.	0.30	0.29	0.24
	[0.16]	[0.17]	[0.20]	.	.	.	[0.26]	[0.28]	[0.36]
Community Treatment	.	.	.	0.14	0.11	0.21	0.03	0.05	0.03
	.	.	.	[0.17]	[0.18]	[0.20]	[0.19]	[0.20]	[0.23]
Com. Damage x Com. Treatment	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.19	0.03	0.46
	.	.	.	.	.	.	[0.73]	[0.79]	[1.09]
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196
Adj. R-squared	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37
	Panel B (2SLS)								
	Estimates From: SC = $\widehat{FS}$								
$\widehat{FinancialSecurity}$	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.17***	0.18***	0.18***
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]
Community Damage	0.02	-0.01	-0.10	.	.	.	-0.11	-0.14	-0.12
	[0.14]	[0.14]	[0.17]	.	.	.	[0.20]	[0.21]	[0.31]
Community Treatment	.	.	.	0.01	-0.04	-0.19	-0.13	-0.16	-0.21
	.	.	.	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.21]	[0.21]	[0.22]	[0.27]
Com. Damage x Com. Treatment	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.53	0.51	0.20
	.	.	.	.	.	.	[0.58]	[0.63]	[0.96]
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196	1,196
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
F-First	25.08	25.14	25.22	25.76	25.82	25.83	24.86	24.91	24.98
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Community Controls									
Community Damage	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Community Treatment	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Radius (km)	0.75	1	2	0.75	1	2	0.75	1	2

Notes: The table shows first-stage estimates for the impact of Cyclone Gombe on Financial Security [Panel A], and 2SLS estimates for the impact of Financial Security on Social Cohesion [Panel B]. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, household income in the past 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Social Cohesion is an index of 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support, and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. All models control for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours, within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance and an indicator for having been surveyed in the July 2022 batch. Columns (1)-(3) control for average community damage at varying radii, columns (4)-(6) control for community treatment at varying radii and columns (7)-(9) control for both community variables at varying radii. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table E.9: Impact of Cyclone Gombe On Financial Security. Components of Financial Security. **Hosts Only**.

	Estimates From: FS Component$_{it}$= T$_i * Survey_t * \widehat{Damage}_{it} + X_{it}$			
	Take Home Monthly Pay	HH Inc 6m	Pct Income Saved [0-1]	Pay Suprise Bill [1-5]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment x ML1	0.59	0.27	1.16***	0.76***
	[0.36]	[0.27]	[0.24]	[0.23]
Treatment x ML2	0.48	0.90	3.18***	2.18***
	[0.53]	[0.59]	[0.26]	[0.28]
Treatment x EL	0.73*	1.36***	3.03***	1.87***
	[0.38]	[0.43]	[0.25]	[0.27]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x ML1	0.32	0.01	0.12	0.26
	[0.21]	[0.17]	[0.20]	[0.20]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x ML2	0.12	-0.02	0.18	0.19
	[0.24]	[0.20]	[0.18]	[0.20]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x EL	0.01	-0.18	0.13	0.47***
	[0.20]	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.18]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML1	-0.49	0.52	-0.09	-0.37
	[0.49]	[0.40]	[0.37]	[0.34]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML2	-0.23	0.75	-0.66*	-0.07
	[0.63]	[1.04]	[0.38]	[0.45]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x EL	-0.24	-0.75	-0.79*	-1.03***
	[0.55]	[0.49]	[0.44]	[0.40]
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nbr Participants-Waves	892	1,196	1,196	1,180
Adj. R-squared	0.04	0.07	0.54	0.22
Zero Stage Instruments				
Elevation	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latitude	Y	Y	Y	Y
Longitude	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the treatment effect and the impact of Cyclone Gombe on Financial Security. $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on latitude, longitude, and elevation. All models control for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours, within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance and an indicator for having been surveyed in the July 2022 batch. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table E.10: Impact of Cyclone Gombe On Components of Social Cohesion. **Hosts Only**.

	Estimates From: $Y = T_i * Survey_i * \widehat{Damage} + X_{it}$				
	Trust In-Group	Trust Out-Group	Prop Out-Group Friends	Share Fin. Support	Share Jobs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Damage [Panel A]					
$\widehat{Damage}$ x BL	.	.	-0.22	-0.36*	-0.23
	.	.	[0.20]	[0.18]	[0.18]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x ML1	0.10	0.73	0.11	.	.
	[0.58]	[0.62]	[0.19]	.	.
$\widehat{Damage}$ x EL	0.15	-0.39**	-0.30	-0.43**	-0.39**
	[0.18]	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.20]	[0.19]
Triple Interaction [Panel B]					
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x BL	.	.	0.34	0.77**	-0.06
	.	.	[0.34]	[0.34]	[0.35]
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x ML1	-0.42	-0.16	0.13	.	.
	[0.66]	[0.76]	[0.39]	.	.
$\widehat{Damage}$ x Treatment x EL	-0.28	0.14	0.32	0.48	0.18
	[0.38]	[0.35]	[0.34]	[0.37]	[0.35]
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nbr Participants-Waves	661	658	1,196	909	908
Adj. R-squared	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01
Reference Period	M2	M2	M2	M1	M1
Zero Stage Instruments					
Elevation	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latitude	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Longitude	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table measures the impact of Cyclone Gombe on components of Social Cohesion. Trust ingroup [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their ingroup (ie; refugees for a refugee respondent, hosts for a host respondent). Trust outgroup [1-10] asks the respondent how trusting they are of members of their outgroup (ie; hosts for a refugee respondent, refugees for a host respondent). Prop outgroup friends [0-1] asks the respondent what proportion of their friends belong to the outgroup. Share Fin. Support and Share Jobs measure the extent to which the respondent feels that Mozambicans should not be prioritized in accessing government financial support and in accessing jobs when they are scarce (both, on a scale of 1-5). $\widehat{Damage}$ is the fitted value from a regression of Damage on the zero stage instruments indicated below the table.All models control for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours, within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance and an indicator for having been surveyed in the July 2022 batch. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.

Table E.11: Impact Of Cyclone Gombe On Social Cohesion. Components Of Social Cohesion. 2SLS Estimates. **Hosts Only**.

	Estimates From: SC = $\widehat{FS}$					
	Social Cohesion Index (stand)	Trust In-Group (stand)	Trust Out-Group (stand)	Prop Out-Group Friends (stand)	Share Gov. Fin. Support (stand)	Share Jobs (stand)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\widehat{FinancialSecurity}$	0.18***	0.12***	0.10***	0.11***	0.12**	0.06
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.05]	[0.05]
Nbr Participants-Waves	1,196	661	658	1,196	909	908
Adj. R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.05	-0.02	-0.02
F-First	24.47	31.64	31.41	24.47	23.37	23.32
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: The table 2SLS estimatates for the impact of Financial Security on Social Cohesion. Financial Security Index is an index of 4 proxies for financial security (ease of paying a surprise bill, % of income saved last month, take home monthly pay, household income in the past 6 months), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. Social Cohesion Index is an index which measures 5 proxies for social cohesion (trust in-group, trust out-group, proportion of out-group friends, willingness to share financial support and willingness to share jobs), constructed by first equally weighting the average z-scores of each indicator that composes each dimension, and then by standardising these again with reference to the control group. All models control for age, gender, age squared, years of education, household size, first component variable for housing amenities, whether the respondent speaks Portuguese, distance to the center of Maratane camp, age interacted with gender, a variable that captures average damage for neighbours, within a 1000m radius, weighted by distance and an indicator for having been surveyed in the July 2022 batch. The dependent variable is standardized to the control group's distribution, within each survey and host/refugee subgroup, and so point effects are measured in standard deviations. All models include survey fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99%, confidence level, respectively.