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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, Stanford University,
Expected Completion: June 2023.

M.A. in Economics, Sciences Po (France), 2014-2016 (Summa cum Laude).

B.A. in Economics, Paris Dauphine University (France), 2011-2014.

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

Prof. Adrien Auclert (co-primary)
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RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

Field: Macroeconomics.

JOB MARKET PAPER

The Pass-through of Productivity Shocks to Wages and the Cyclical Competition for Workers

Using French matched employer-employee data, I document that after positive firm-level productivity shocks, the wage of stayers rises and job-to-job transitions fall whereas after positive sectoral productivity shocks wages rise significantly more, and job-to-job transitions rise. To explain this difference, I build a model with dynamic wage contracts subject to two-sided limited commitment and imperfect information and in which sectoral productivity shocks generate a cyclical competition for workers. After a positive firm-level shock, a firm increases its wages to reduce the quit rate of its workers. This increase is limited because workers are risk-averse and value insurance against shocks and there is no increase in the cyclical competition from other firms. In contrast, after positive sectoral shocks, the cyclical competition for workers heats up and workers become more likely to switch jobs. In response, all firms increase their wages more aggressively to retain them. I quantify how much insurance firms provide to workers over the

cycle and evaluate the role of policy. Firing costs play a new role when contracts are endogenous: lowering them reduces the commitment power of firms and makes income risk larger and counter-cyclical.

RESEARCH PAPER

Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents: Sizing up the Real Income Channel (with A. Auclert, M. Rognlie and L. Straub), Under Revision for the **American Economic Review**

Introducing heterogeneous households to a New Keynesian small open economy model amplifies the real income channel of exchange rates: the rise in import prices from a depreciation lowers households' real incomes, and leads them to cut back on spending. When the sum of import and export elasticities is one, this channel is offset by a larger Keynesian multiplier, heterogeneity is irrelevant, and expenditure switching drives the output response. With plausibly lower short-term elasticities, however, the real income channel dominates, and depreciation can be contractionary for output. This weakens monetary transmission and creates a dilemma for policymakers facing capital outflows. Delayed import price pass-through weakens the real income channel, while heterogeneous consumption baskets can strengthen it.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Monopsony Power with Worker Mobility and Private Amenity Values

I revisit the implications of firm monopsony power generated by amenity values in labor markets where job-to-job transitions are frequent. I build a model with dynamic wage contracts and search frictions in which workers have heterogeneous preferences for firm amenities. I find that the information that firms have about worker amenity values is a critical determinant of market power. When amenity values are public information, monopsony power is strong despite worker mobility and wages are depressed. When amenities are private information and i.i.d., firms try to retain workers by increasing the wage over time and as a result profits converge quickly towards 0. In the intermediate case where amenities are private information but persistent, firms use dynamic wage contracts to learn about them and maintain some degree of market power. I use administrative data from France to estimate the persistence of amenity values and quantify the amount of market power of firms.

Survival of the Unfit? Short-run Gains and Long-run Pains from Zombie Lending (with A. Baksy)

We argue that “Zombie lending”, where banks keep lending to insolvent and unproductive firms, attenuates the effects of recessions in the short-run at the expense of output in the long-run. We build a quantitative model in which heterogeneous firms finance themselves through retained earnings and bank debt. Banks face capital requirements, but have private information on whether a given loan is in default, allowing them to hide losses and bypass these requirements. In a recession, higher firm defaults lead to larger bank losses, raising the incentives to hide losses by keeping insolvent firms alive. In the short-run this allows banks to keep lending, which supports output. In the long-run however, this leads to misallocation due to the survival of relatively unfit firms and lower entry. We use the model to quantify the contribution of zombie lending during and after the 2008-09 crisis in Europe and to evaluate the implications of pro-cyclical capital requirements.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

2020 Teaching Assistant for Prof. A. Admati, Stanford University, Econ 143 (Finance, Corporations and Society).
 Teaching Assistant for M. Tendall, Stanford University, Econ 52 (Intermediate

Macroeconomics).
2019 Teaching Assistant for Prof. I. Segal, Stanford University, Econ 180 (Honors Game Theory).
2015 Teaching Assistant for Prof. B. Masson, Paris Dauphine University (Macroeconomics).

RELEVANT POSITIONS

2020-22 Research Assistant for Prof. A. Auclert, Stanford University.
2020-22 Research Assistant for Prof. P. Kehoe, Stanford University.
2016-17 Trainee, European Central Bank, Monetary Policy Strategy Division, Frankfurt.
2015 Intern, OECD, Environment Directorate, Paris.

SCHOLARSHIPS, HONORS AND AWARDS

2022 SIEPR Dissertation Fellowship.
2021 SIEPR George P. Shultz Dissertation Fund.
2017-2019 Stanford Graduate Fellowship.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Seminar presenter, Inflation and Business Cycle Dynamics in Open Economies, New York Federal Reserve Bank, 2021.
Seminar presenter, NuCamp PhD Workshop, Oxford University, 2021.

LANGUAGES

French (native), English (fluent), Turkish (novice)