ETIENNE GUIGUE

Department of Economics - CREST 5 Avenue Le Chatelier 91120 Palaiseau, France \square +33 6 34 60 63 35

 \bowtie etienne.guigue@ensae.fr

S https://sites.google.com/view/etienneguigue

Placement officer: Philippe Choné

RESEARCH FIELDS

philippe.chone@ensae.fr

Primary: Industrial Organization, International Trade **Secondary:** Applied Microeconomics, Labor Economics

DOCTORAL STUDIES

2019-present Ph.D in Economics, CREST - Institut Polytechnique de Paris. Supervisor: Prof. Francis Kramarz.

REFERENCES

Prof. Francis Kramarz CREST - ENSAE 5 avenue Henry Le Chatelier 91128 Palaiseau, France francis.kramarz@ensae.fr https://faculty.crest.fr/fkramarz/

Prof. Philippe Choné

CREST - ENSAE 5 avenue Henry Le Chatelier 91128 Palaiseau, France philippe.chone@ensae.fr https://faculty.crest.fr/pchone/ Prof. Isabelle Méjean Sciences Po 28 rue des Saints Pères 75006 Paris, France isabelle.mejean@polytechnique.edu http://www.isabellemejean.com/

Prof. Samuel Kortum

Yale University 37 Hillhouse Avenue New Haven, CT, US samuel.kortum@yale.edu http://kortum.elisites.yale.edu/

RELEVANT POSITIONS

Sept. 2018 - July 2019	Visiting Assistant in Research, Yale University
	Sponsor: Prof. Samuel Kortum
Sept. 2017 - Aug. 2018	Research Assistant for Prof. Francis Kramarz, CREST

PRIOR EDUCATION

2015-2017 M.Sc in Economics, Université Paris-Saclay (Ecole Polytechnique - ENSAE - ENS Paris-Saclay - HEC - Paris Sud)

2014-2018 Normalien, Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS) Paris-Saclay

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

2020-2022	Teaching Assistant, Undergraduate Microeconomics - ENSAE, Prof. Thibaud Vergé
2019-2021	Teaching Assistant, Graduate Microeconomics - ENSAE, Prof. Philippe Choné

REFEREE SERVICE

Journal of Public Economic Theory

WORKING PAPERS

Markups and Markdowns in the French Dairy Market

with Rémi Avignon

Separately measuring firm buyer and seller power is important for policy-making, but challenging. In this paper, we suggest a new methodology to do so and apply it to French dairy processors. These firms exert buyer power when purchasing raw milk, and seller power when marketing dairy products. The analysis is based on plant-level data on dairy firms, with observations on prices and quantities of raw-milk input by origin and output by product from 2003 to 2018. We rely on a production function approach to estimate total margins. The existence of a commodity, (i) substitutable as an input or as an output, and (ii) exchanged on global markets where firms are price-takers, allows us to separately estimate firm-origin markdowns and firm-product markups. We show this methodology can also be useful in other contexts, with more limited data. Markdown estimates imply that dairy firms on average purchase raw milk at a price 16% below its marginal contribution to their profits, while markup estimates indicate that firms sell dairy products at a price exceeding their marginal costs by 41%. Our results show substantial variations in the exploitation of buyer and seller power across firms, products, and time. We analyze how exogenous farmer and processor cost shocks pass through the supply chain. Processors partially absorb such shocks by adjusting markups and markdowns, thus smoothing variations in farmer revenues. It further implies that 65% of subsidies are currently diverted from farmers due to processor buyer power. A price floor on raw milk could be an alternative welfareimproving policy.

Production Quota Reforms and the Cream-Skimming of the French Milk Market with Rémi Avignon

How do input market fragmentation and liberalization affect distribution and efficiency of production? This paper analyzes the impact of production quotas and their progressive removal on the French milk market. We show that production quotas generated two types of distortions. First, by mechanically fixing production shares across French *départements* at their pre-quota (1984) level, quotas stopped a natural spatial concentration for about 25 years, a process that restarted right after the beginning of the quota removal process in 2008. Second, the design of the quota system spurred the growth of small farms while constraining the expansion possibilities of larger farms. This redistributive scheme thus successfully refrained inequalities among farms growing until then, yet at the cost of distorting the competition-led *cream-skimming* of farms. We finally document how the catching-up process in farm selection following the quota removal intervened more or less early across *départements*, depending on the stringency implied by quota constraints at the local level. We rationalize these observations with a simple model of perfect competition between heterogeneous farms. At the farm level, the effect of the liberalization ultimately depends on (i) the efficiency gains the farm can achieve with the liberalization and (ii) its location in a *département* sheltered from competition or constrained by quotas. In subsequent analysis, we plan to build a structural model to assess better the efficiency and distributional effects of such input market liberalization.

Firm-to-Firm Trade and Heterogeneous Wages

with Jonathan Eaton, Samuel Kortum and Francis Kramarz

Market Power in Input Markets: Theory and Evidence from French Manufacturing with Monica Morlacco

SEMINARS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

* Scheduled

2021 CREST

2022 RES Annual Conference (online), BECCLE Competition Policy Conference (Bergen), CREST, EEA-ESEM Annual Congress (Milan), Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Las Palmas), Sciences Po

2023 AMSE*

GRANTS

2019-2023 Full Ph.D scholarship - ENS Paris Saclay

2014-2018 Normalien scholarship - ENS Paris Saclay

2021-2023 Research grant from the Agence Nationale de Recherche

MISCELLANEOUS

Languages: French (native), English (fluent), German (basic)

Programming Skills: Matlab, SAS, Stata, R

Data: Access to French secured data (CASD)

Updated: November 2022