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**DOCTORAL STUDIES** Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)  
PhD, Economics, June 2020  
DISSERTATION: “*Essays on the Political Economy of Development*”

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

Professor Daron Acemoglu  
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**PRIOR EDUCATION** Universidad de los Andes 2013  
B.A. in Economics, *Summa cum laude*  
B.A. in Philosophy, *Summa cum laude*

**CITIZENSHIP** Colombian **GENDER:** Male

**LANGUAGES** English, French, Spanish

**FIELDS** Primary Fields: Development Economics, Political Economy  
Secondary Fields: Labor Economics

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE** Introductory Mathematics (CEMFI, Masters) 2021  
Instructor

	Corruption and Development (CEMFI, PhD graduate) Instructor	2020
	14.770 Introduction to Political Economy (MIT, PhD graduate) Teaching Assistant to Professors Daron Acemoglu and Ben Olken	2018
	14.661 Labor Economics (MIT, PhD graduate) Teaching Assistant to Professors Daron Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist	2017
	14.73 The Challenge of World Poverty (MIT, undergraduate) Teaching Assistant to Professors Esther Duflo, David Atkin and Frank Schilbach	2017-18
	14.31/310 Data Analysis for Social Scientists (MIT, mixed undergraduate and graduate) Teaching Assistant to Professors Esther Duflo and David Atkin	2017
	14.01 Principles of Microeconomics (MIT, undergraduate) Teaching Assistant to Professor Casey Rothchild	2016
<b>RELEVANT POSITIONS</b>	Postdoctoral Researcher, CEMFI, Madrid, Spain	2020-21
	Consultant for the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice at the World Bank, remote work	2020-21
	Research Assistant to Daron Acemoglu (MIT), Cambridge, MA	2015-18
	Research Assistant to Ben Olken (MIT) and Melissa Dell (Harvard University), Cambridge, MA	2014-15
	Research Assistant to James A. Robinson (Chicago University), Bogotá, Colombia	2012-14
<b>FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS</b>	Jameel Graduate Fellowship	2019
	J-Pal Governance Initiative Grant	2019
	George and Obie Shultz Fund Grant	2018-19
	Castle Krob Scholarship for doctoral studies	2014-16
	Ramón de Zubiría Scholarship for undergraduate studies	2010-13
<b>PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES</b>	Referee for the <i>American Economic Review</i> and <i>Economía: Journal of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association</i> .	
	Presentations and conferences: 2021: World Bank - Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Insistut d'Economia de Barcelona - Political Economy Workshop (Discussant), CEMFI.	
	2020: MIT, Inter-American Development Bank, EIEF, IE, Universidad de los Andes, Universidad del Rosario, Tecnológico de Monterrey.	

**RESEARCH  
PAPERS****“All Eyes on Them: A Field Experiment on Citizen Oversight and Electoral Integrity” (Job Market Paper)** with Natalia Garbiras

- Revise and Submit requested from the *American Economic Review*

Can Information and Communication Technologies help citizens monitor their elections? We analyze a large-scale field experiment designed to answer this question in Colombia. We leveraged Facebook advertisements sent to over 4 million potential voters to encourage citizen reporting of irregularities, and varied whether candidates were informed about the campaign in a subset of municipalities. Total reports, as well as evidence-backed ones, experienced a large increase. Across a wide array of measures, electoral irregularities decreased. Finally, the reporting campaign reduced the vote share of candidates dependent on irregularities. This light-touch intervention is more cost-effective than monitoring efforts traditionally used by policymakers.

**“State Capacity and Spillovers Across Enforcement Activities”**

This paper provides evidence about enforcement spillovers across enforcement activities. In particular, it shows that public audits, aimed at detecting and sanctioning corruption by public servants, increase tax compliance in Brazil. As a source of identification, it uses the geographic and time variation induced by a large-scale random audit program conducted by Brazilian federal government on municipal governments throughout the 2003-2015 period. I begin by showing that municipalities receiving an audit in the past experience an increase in federal, but not municipal tax collection. I show evidence that these effects operate through a state capacity signaling channel, whereby audits and the subsequent penal actions, act as signals both of the capacity and the willingness of the federal government to enforce the law in general, which induces citizens to increase tax compliance. Consistent with this interpretation I show that local information about the audits, such as the one conveyed through local media or to neighboring municipalities, is key in determining the magnitude of these spillover effects across types of enforcement.

**“How Close Is Too Close When It Comes to Public Auditing? Evidence from Colombian Municipalities”**

Are more decentralized public auditing institutions better at increasing government accountability and reducing corruption than centralized ones? In this paper, I exploit the exogenous variation in the level of decentralization of local auditing institutions created by Colombian law to implement a regression discontinuity design and study the empirical effects of decentralizing public auditing. Using data from third-party investigations on corruption, I find that more centralized auditors do a better job at curbing corruption than decentralized ones. This result is driven by types of corruption related to public procurement as well as ‘influence peddling’. Furthermore, I find that sanctions of public auditing

institutions do not change with respect to whether these institutions are decentralized or not, which validates the use of the third-party investigations about corruption as a measure that does not confound the efforts of auditing institutions.

**RESEARCH IN  
PROGRESS****“Religious Leaders and Democratization”** with Augustin Bergeron

In this project we study the role of local leaders on democratization. We study this question in the context of Brazil’s dictatorship, where a number of pro-democratic bishops encouraged social movements that ultimately led to the transition to democracy. As a source of variation, we exploit quasi-random rules regarding the appointment of bishops, and show that bishoprics where pro-democratic bishops were appointed supported democratic parties in the transition to democracy. We are currently studying the longer-term effects on political opinions and participation.

**“Reproductive Health and Religion: Evidence from Italy”**

In 1968, Paul VI upended the Catholic Church’s ambiguous stance on contraceptives and assisted birth. Through the *Humanae Vitae* encyclical, the Church declared birth control contradictory with Christian values, and it lay the foundations of future positions of the clergy regarding reproductive and marital matters such as abortion, assisted births and divorce. In this project I study the consequences of these policies in the case of Italy. In particular, I use quasi-experimental variation in the appointment of bishops by Paul VI to study their influence in the 1974 Referendum about divorce, the 1981 Referendum about abortion and over fertility rates of the Italian population.