

Non-paternalistic social discounting

By ANTONY MILLNER*

The long-run social discount rate converts the long-term costs and benefits of public projects into present values. Its value depends on parameters of social preferences that capture social impatience and aversion to intertemporal consumption inequalities. Experts disagree about these ethical parameters, leading to substantial disagreements on the benefits of projects with long-term consequences. However, I show that if experts with diverse opinions on social preferences wish to avoid being paternalistic (i.e. imposing their opinions on others), they must agree on these parameters. Addressing one common critique of normative social discounting (paternalism) thus helps to resolve another operational difficulty (disagreement).

JEL: H43,D61,D90

Keywords: Social discount rate, heterogeneous preferences, non-paternalism, interdependent preferences, cost-benefit analysis.

The social discount rate tells us how to convert the future consequences of public projects into present values, and is thus a critical input to public cost-

* Millner: London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton St, London, WC2A 2AE, UK, a.millner@lse.ac.uk. I am grateful to Partha Dasgupta, Simone Galperti, Ben Groom, Geoff Heal, Derek Lemoine, Lucija Muehlenbachs, Frikk Nesje, Bruno Strulovici, the audiences of numerous seminars and conferences, four anonymous referees, and the editor, for helpful comments. I acknowledge financial support from the ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, and the Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment.

benefit analysis. Small changes in its value can have an enormous effect on the net present values of public projects with long-run consequences such as infrastructure investments, climate change mitigation measures, and nuclear waste management (Arrow et al., 2013). Yet despite almost a century of economic research on intertemporal public decision-making (cf. Ramsey, 1928), opinion is still divided on how costs and benefits that occur more than a few decades in the future should be discounted.

Most estimates of social discount rates rely on one of two methodologies, commonly referred to as the ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ approaches (see e.g. Gollier and Hammitt, 2014). The difference between these approaches turns on whether one believes the economy to be at an intertemporal social optimum or not. The discount factor¹ used to convert marginal changes in consumption in the future into present values should coincide with the social marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and consumption in the future. If the economy is at a social optimum, the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate of transformation, which is in turn related to market interest rates in a competitive equilibrium (see e.g. Gollier, 2012). Proponents of the positive approach believe that social discount rates should be chosen to reflect risk-free market interest rates, thus implicitly assuming that the economy is at a social optimum. An often-claimed advantage of this approach is that it does not require judgments about social preferences, as interest rates already reflect the preferences of market participants. The positive approach is thus often seen as democratic and non-paternalistic, but relies on strong optimality assumptions.

By contrast, proponents of the normative approach are unwilling to as-

¹The discount factor $D(s)$ on payoffs s years from now is related to the discount rate $r(s)$ at maturity s via $D(s) = e^{-r(s)s}$.

sume that the economy is at (or close to) a social optimum, citing e.g. incomplete markets, externalities, and divergences between individualistic preferences exhibited in the marketplace and ethically motivated social preferences.² Market imperfections are seen as particularly salient for long-run social discount rates. Gollier and Hammitt (2014) argue that ‘the positive approach cannot be applied for time horizons exceeding 20 or 30 years, because there are no safe assets traded on markets with such large maturities’, while Gollier (2012) observes that ‘[inefficiencies due to] the existence of overlapping generations imply that...the interest rate observed on financial markets should not be used...to evaluate public policies impacting several generations.’

Since the normative approach to social discounting assigns no welfare significance to market interest rates it must work directly with social marginal rates of substitution. This requires a choice for the intertemporal social welfare function. In a seminal paper, Ramsey (1928) showed that if social preferences are discounted utilitarian, the social discount rate $r(s)$ at maturity s must be chosen to be

$$(1) \quad r(s) = \rho + \eta g(s)$$

where ρ is the Pure Rate of Social Time Preference (PRSTP), η is the elasticity of the marginal social utility of consumption, and $g(s)$ is the compound annual consumption growth rate between today and year s .³ Implementing

²Arrow, Dasgupta and Mäler (2003), for example, state that ‘using market observables to infer social welfare can be misleading in imperfect economies. That we may have to be explicit about welfare parameters...in order to estimate marginal rates of substitution in imperfect economies is not an argument for pretending that the economies in question are not imperfect after all.’

³The formula (1) assumes consumption growth is deterministic; additional terms are

this formula in practice requires choices for the ethical parameters ρ and η , which measure social impatience and aversion to intertemporal consumption inequalities respectively, as well as a forecast of consumption growth. Two related criticisms are often leveled at this approach. First, experts⁴ *disagree* on the appropriate values of ρ and η (Drupp et al., 2015), so whose opinion should count? Second, unlike the positive approach, the normative approach is *paternalistic*, since it requires experts to impose their opinion on the appropriate social welfare function on everyone, whether they share this opinion or not.⁵

This paper pursues a ‘third way’ for setting social discount rates. I develop a model of experts’ opinions on intertemporal social welfare that combines features of both the positive and normative approaches. The model is rooted in the normative approach, and thus does not require us to assume that the economy is at a social optimum. However, inspired by the positive approach, the model adopts non-paternalism as a desirable feature of social evaluation. Experts in the model may have any opinion on social utility functions, and may discount future social wellbeing in any way they deem appropriate. However, they may *not* impose their views on social preferences on others – the heterogeneity in opinions on social evaluations in the

required in the presence of uncertainty (Gollier, 2012). I focus on the deterministic case throughout the paper for simplicity – see the appendix for an analysis that incorporates uncertainty. In general the parameter η may depend on consumption, but is constant if social utilities are iso-elastic.

⁴I use the term ‘expert’ to refer to anyone with an informed normative view on how society should compute intertemporal social welfare. This could be a policymaker, economist, philosopher, or informed member of the public.

⁵Disagreements about social welfare parameters largely explain the substantial differences between the climate policy recommendations of Stern (2007) and Nordhaus (2007), for example. Nordhaus views Stern’s analysis, which is based on a normative approach to intertemporal social choice, as paternalistic, criticizing him for taking ‘the lofty vantage point of the world social planner, perhaps stoking the dying embers of the British Empire.’

future is recognized, and future opinions are fully internalized. The central result of the paper is that addressing the paternalistic critique of the normative approach also helps to resolve disagreements about welfare parameters. Non-paternalistic experts must agree on the welfare parameters to use when calculating long run social discount rates, despite arbitrary disagreements about the constituents of intertemporal social welfare functions. The intuition for this finding is explained in a simple example below; it is a consequence of the interdependence between non-paternalistic experts' opinions on social preferences. A calibration of the model to data on experts' opinions on the parameters ρ and η suggests that adopting non-paternalism as a principle of social evaluation could also substantially reduce disagreements about social discount rates at shorter maturities.

Formally, the model adapts existing models of non-paternalistic intertemporal preferences (Ray, 1987; Saez-Marti and Weibull, 2005; Galperti and Strulovici, 2017), extending them to account for heterogeneous preferences, and reinterpreting them in the context of social cost-benefit analysis. These models, and mine, correspond to a version of Bergstrom's (1999) model of interdependent preferences with an infinite sequence of forward looking agents. Unlike these papers, which focus on intergenerational altruism, I am concerned with opinion formation amongst a group of experts who are tasked with recommending an annual term structure of social discount rates for cost-benefit analysis. Weitzman (2001) and Freeman and Groom (2015) study the aggregation of heterogeneous opinions on social discount rates. Differences in opinion in these studies stem from different beliefs about facts (i.e. $g(s)$ in (1)), and disagreements about values (i.e. ρ and η in (1)). I focus on the latter in this paper, and am concerned with the nor-

mative opinions of individual experts, rather than opinion aggregation by an external analyst. Similarly, Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) and Heal and Millner (2014) study utilitarian aggregation of time preferences, showing that all utilitarian planners' preferences are determined by the most patient individual in a group at long maturities. Unlike the experts in my model, utilitarian planners have no personal view on social utility functions or how to discount future wellbeings; they may only choose how to aggregate others' preferences. Utilitarian planners are also still paternalistic, as they do not fully internalize future decision-makers' preferences. Finally, consensus long-run discount rates are only determined by the most patient expert in a special case of the model I develop; in general they are a non-trivial mixture of all opinions. The model also bears a family resemblance to the *ad hoc* model of belief updating in DeGroot (1974). Unlike this work however, I focus on the formation of opinions on intertemporal social preferences, and the preferences I study are a direct consequence of requiring that social evaluations be non-paternalistic.

I. Model

A. A simple example

The essential features of the model can be illustrated in a simple example. Suppose that expert opinion on intertemporal social preferences is split into two camps, or types, indexed by $i \in \{1, 2\}$. At time τ representatives of each camp are asked for their opinion on the term structure of social discount rates for cost-benefit analysis. That is, for each future year s each type must specify a discount rate $r^i(s)$, from which their opinion on the net present value (NPV) of public projects with sequences of annual payoffs

$\boldsymbol{\pi} = (\pi_0, \pi_1, \dots)$ will be computed thus:

$$(2) \quad NPV^i(\boldsymbol{\pi}) = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \pi_s e^{-r^i(s)s}.$$

For the sake of simplicity in this example assume that both types care only about society's current consumption utility and the discounted value of next year's social wellbeing. The two types *disagree* about the social utility of consumption and the discount factor on future wellbeing, and insist on evaluating next year's wellbeing using their preferred social preferences. They thus effectively impose their own opinions on types that disagree with them next year – they are paternalistic. Denote type i at time τ 's opinion on social wellbeing by V_{τ}^i , her opinion on the social utility of consumption by $U^i(c)$, and her opinion on the appropriate discount factor by $\beta_i \in (0, 1)$. Thus, types' opinions on social preferences can be written as

$$(3) \quad V_{\tau}^i = U^i(c_{\tau}) + \beta_i V_{\tau+1}^i, i \in \{1, 2\}.$$

It is clear that these preferences have the following equivalent representation:

$$(4) \quad V_{\tau}^i = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta_i)^s U^i(c_{\tau+s}).$$

If project payoffs π_s are small relative to consumption, type i should choose the discount factor $e^{-r^i(s)s}$ in (2) to reflect the current value of a marginal change in consumption s years from now (see e.g. Dasgupta, Sen and Marglin, 1972; Gollier, 2012):

$$e^{-r^i(s)s} = MRS_s^i = (\beta_i)^s \frac{(U^i)'(c_{\tau+s})}{(U^i)'(c_{\tau})},$$

where MRS_s^i denotes type i 's opinion on the Marginal Rate of Substitution between consumption at times $\tau + s$ and τ . Clearly, there is no possibility of the two types agreeing on any part of the term structure $r^i(s)$ in this case.

Now suppose that instead of insisting on imposing their own opinions on social preferences on others, the two types recognize the plurality of opinions that exists in the next year. If current types wish to avoid paternalism towards types that do not share their views next year their social preferences might take the following form:

$$(5) \quad V_\tau^1 = U^1(c_\tau) + \beta_1(w_1 V_{\tau+1}^1 + (1 - w_1) V_{\tau+1}^2),$$

$$(6) \quad V_\tau^2 = U^2(c_\tau) + \beta_2((1 - w_2) V_{\tau+1}^1 + w_2 V_{\tau+1}^2)$$

where $w_i \in (0, 1)$ is the weight type i assigns to type i opinions in the next year. Note that experts with such non-paternalistic social preferences can still express any view on social impatience through their choice of the discount factor β_i , and are also free to choose any social utility function they deem appropriate. So long as $w_i < 1$, these preferences are immune to a charge of paternalism towards types in the next year.⁶

To analyze this coupled system of preferences, define

$$\vec{V}_\tau = \begin{pmatrix} V_\tau^1 \\ V_\tau^2 \end{pmatrix}; \vec{U}_\tau = \begin{pmatrix} U^1(c_\tau) \\ U^2(c_\tau) \end{pmatrix}; \mathbf{F} = \begin{pmatrix} \beta_1 w_1 & \beta_1 (1 - w_1) \\ \beta_2 (1 - w_2) & \beta_2 w_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

⁶Throughout the paper I define non-paternalism in a binary manner: either all future opinions on social wellbeing are internalized, or they are not. A stronger definition would require types to choose the w_i in proportion to the weight of opinion on view i . I refer to types who respect this condition as 'democratic' below.

Then we can write the system (5–6) as:

$$(7) \quad \vec{V}_\tau = \vec{U}_\tau + \mathbf{F}\vec{V}_{\tau+1} = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{F}^s \vec{U}_{\tau+s}.$$

Types' attitudes to consumption changes in the distant future depend on the behaviour of \mathbf{F}^s for large s . If preferences are non-paternalistic (i.e. $w_i < 1$), the matrix \mathbf{F} is strictly positive. The Perron-Frobenius theorem (see e.g. Sternberg (2014)) then tells us that there is a matrix \mathbf{A} , with elements $a^{ij} > 0$, such that

$$(8) \quad \lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\mathbf{F}^s}{\mu^s} = \mathbf{A},$$

where $\mu \in (0, 1)$ is the largest eigenvalue of \mathbf{F} . Thus when s is large both types' weights on future utilities are proportional to a common factor μ^s , where μ is a non-trivial mixture of both types' discount factors.⁷

To understand the intuition for this result notice that current types at τ only care about utilities at future times $\tau + 1, \tau + 2, \dots$ indirectly through a mixture \mathbf{F} of the preferences of types at $\tau + 1$. Types at $\tau + 1$ in turn only care about utilities at times $\tau + 2, \tau + 3, \dots$ through a mixture \mathbf{F} of the preferences of types at time $\tau + 2$. Thus we see that current types' preferences over utilities at time $\tau + s$ are obtained by iterating the preferences of types at $\tau + s$ backwards to τ , passing through the preferences of types at times $\tau + s - 1, \tau + s - 2, \dots, \tau + 1$. With each step back in this iteration the discount factors of different types are mixed by the matrix \mathbf{F} . As the number of mixing operations grows (i.e. as s increases), types' discount factors become homogenized. For large s the mixing process converges, and both

⁷For example, if $w_1 = w_2 = \frac{1}{2}$, $\mu = \frac{1}{2}(\beta_1 + \beta_2)$.

types' long run utility weights are proportional to a common discount factor μ^s .

Substituting (8) into (7) we see that according to type i , the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at τ and consumption at distant future times $\tau + s$ is

$$(9) \quad MRS_s^i = \frac{\mu^s [a^{i1}(U^1)'(c_{\tau+s}) + a^{i2}(U^2)'(c_{\tau+s})]}{(U^i)'(c_\tau)}.$$

With a few calculations we can simplify this expression further. Denote the long run growth rate of consumption by g , i.e. $c_{\tau+s} = e^{gs}c_\tau$ for large s . In addition, define the long run PRSTP $\rho = -\ln \mu$, and assume for simplicity that utility functions are iso-elastic, i.e. $(U^i)'(c) = c^{-\eta_i}$. Since $(U^i)'(c_{\tau+s}) \propto e^{-g\eta_i s}$ for large s , MRS_s^i is dominated by the exponential term with the lowest value of $\eta_i g$. Substituting these definitions and assumptions into (9), we see that for *both* types,

$$(10) \quad e^{-r^i(s)s} = MRS_s^i \propto e^{-(\rho + \min\{\eta_1 g, \eta_2 g\})s}$$

when s is large. Thus, although types may have arbitrary disagreements about the welfare parameters β_i, η_i and the weights w_i , they both agree that $r^i(s) \rightarrow \rho + \min\{\eta_1 g, \eta_2 g\}$ when s is large. The interdependence between non-paternalistic social preferences resolves disagreements about the welfare parameters that should be used to compute long run social discount rates. I will show below that disagreements may reduce dramatically even for maturities of e.g. 30 years.

B. General model

This finding can be extended to a more general model in which there is an arbitrary number of types with idiosyncratic opinions on intertemporal social preferences. Moreover, each type may care about social wellbeing in all future years, and not just in the next year as in the example above. Although the mathematics is more complex in the general model, the intuition for the main finding that non-paternalistic types agree on the parameters of the long-run social discount rate is similar to that in the example above.

Assume that the distribution of opinion on intertemporal social wellbeing is represented by N types, indexed by i , in each year τ . As before I denote type i at time τ 's opinion by V_τ^i , and let i 's opinion on the social utility function be $U^i(c)$. Types' preferences are non-paternalistic, i.e. they internalize future opinions on social wellbeing. In addition, social preferences are assumed to be forward looking and time separable in utilities,⁸ and the distribution of opinions on social preferences is assumed to be stationary over time. The most general model that meets these assumptions is:

$$(11) \quad V_\tau^i = U^i(c_\tau) + \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^N f_s^{ij} V_{\tau+s}^j,$$

where $f_s^{ij} \geq 0$ is the weight type i at time τ assigns to type j 's conception of social wellbeing at time $\tau + s$, i.e. $V_{\tau+s}^j$.⁹ Lemma 1 in the Appendix shows that (11) defines a unique set of preferences, which are non-decreasing in all

⁸The wellbeing measure V_τ^i is time separable in utilities if and only if it is a linear function of $V_{\tau+s}^j$ for all $j = 1 \dots N, s \in \mathbb{N}$. See Galperti and Strulovici (2017).

⁹There is no difficulty allowing type i at time τ to place positive weight on V_τ^j for $j \neq i$ (see the appendix). I have ruled this out for simplicity by assuming types are only non-paternalistic towards the future. This yields a model that is a natural analogue of familiar forward-looking models of intertemporal choice.

utilities, if and only if

$$(12) \quad \max_i \left\{ \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^N f_s^{ij} \right\} < 1.$$

I assume this condition from now on. We will say that preferences are *fully non-paternalistic* if $f_s^{ij} > 0$ for all $i, j = 1 \dots N, s = 1 \dots \infty$.

As in the simple example above, V_{τ}^i has an equivalent representation in terms of sums of future utilities which may be determined by solving the infinite system of equations (11) (see appendix). We write the solution of this system as

$$(13) \quad V_{\tau}^i = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^N a_s^{ij} U^j(c_{\tau+s}),$$

where a_s^{ij} is the weight type i in period τ gives to type j 's preferred measure of social utility in period $\tau + s$. Type i 's opinion on the social discount rate at maturity s in this model is given by

$$(14) \quad r^i(s) = -\frac{1}{s} \ln \left(\frac{1}{(U^i)'(c_{\tau})} \sum_{j=1}^N a_s^{ij} (U^j)'(c_{\tau+s}) \right).$$

As before, the social discount rate is the compound annual rate of decline of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time $\tau + s$ and consumption in the present.

Define the elasticity of type i 's marginal social utility function as

$$(15) \quad \eta^i(c) = -c \frac{(U^i)''(c)}{(U^i)'(c)}.$$

If $\eta^i(c)$ is uniformly larger than $\eta^j(c)$, type i is more averse to intertemporal consumption inequalities than type j . I assume that $\eta^i(c) \geq 0$, is bounded for all c , and that $\lim_{c \rightarrow \infty} \eta^i(c) > 0$; $\lim_{c \rightarrow 0} \eta^i(c) > 0$ for all i . In addition, define the long run growth rate of consumption to be

$$(16) \quad g = \lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{s} \ln \left(\frac{c_{\tau+s}}{c_\tau} \right)$$

and let

$$(17) \quad \hat{\eta} = \begin{cases} \min_i \{ \lim_{c \rightarrow \infty} \eta^i(c) \} & \text{if } g > 0 \\ \max_i \{ \lim_{c \rightarrow 0} \eta^i(c) \} & \text{if } g < 0. \end{cases}$$

With these definitions in place the main result can be stated.

PROPOSITION 1: *If the social preferences (11) are fully non-paternalistic all types agree on the long run social discount rate:*

$$(18) \quad \forall i = 1 \dots N, \lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} r^i(s) = \hat{\rho} + \hat{\eta}g.$$

$\hat{\rho} = -\lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \ln \mu(M)$, where $\mu(M) \in (0, 1)$ is the largest eigenvalue of an $NM \times NM$ matrix constructed from the weights $f_1^{ij}, \dots, f_M^{ij}$.

Thus, despite arbitrary disagreements about how to discount future social wellbeings, how to compute social utilities, and how much weight to give to different types' opinions on social preferences, non-paternalistic types will agree on the welfare parameters that enter the long-run social discount rate.¹⁰ The proof of this result provides details of how $\hat{\rho}$ can be computed (see the appendix). It also shows that full non-paternalism is a stronger

¹⁰The formula (18) is readily extended to the case where consumption growth is uncertain. See the appendix for details.

condition than is required for the result to hold.¹¹ Full non-paternalism is however the normatively relevant case, as only then will types avoid paternalism across all types and all times.

Proposition 1 provides a simple characterization of the consensus long run elasticity of marginal social utility $\hat{\eta}$. The consensus long run PRSTP $\hat{\rho}$ is, however, a much more complex quantity, which depends on the full set of intertemporal weights f_s^{ij} . The appendix provides further discussion of $\hat{\rho}$, including some comparative statics results. We will content ourselves with describing two intuitive properties of $\hat{\rho}$ here.

PROPOSITION 2: 1) $\hat{\rho}$ is decreasing in f_s^{ij} for all i, j, s .

2) Suppose that the intertemporal weights f_s^{ij} are given by

$$f_s^{ij}(\epsilon) = \begin{cases} f_s^{ii} & j = i \\ h_s^{ij}(\epsilon) & j \neq i. \end{cases}$$

where the functions $h_s^{ij}(\epsilon)$ are continuous, $h_s^{ij}(\epsilon) > 0$ for $\epsilon > 0$, and $h_s^{ij}(0) = 0$. Let $\hat{\rho}_i$ be type i 's idiosyncratic long-run PRSTP when $\epsilon = 0$, and let $\hat{\rho}(\epsilon)$ be the consensus long-run PRSTP when $\epsilon > 0$. Then

$$(19) \quad \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \hat{\rho}(\epsilon) = \min_i \hat{\rho}_i.$$

The first part of the proposition is intuitive – any increase in f_s^{ij} increases the weight type i places on future wellbeings. Since all types' preferences

¹¹It is sufficient for each type to place positive weight on some other type in some future period, in such a way that if we look far enough ahead, all types' preferences influence each other. Type i need not place positive weight on type j directly – they could influence one another through the preferences of several intermediate types, only some of which they care about directly.

depend on type i 's preferences, all types are less impatient if f_s^{ij} increases. Thus the consensus long-run PRSTP decreases if f_s^{ij} increases. The second part of the proposition shows that if all types assign arbitrarily small, but positive, weight to the opinions of other types, they will agree to discount distant utilities at the rate that is the *lowest* of all of their paternalistic PRSTPs. To understand the intuition for this finding, note that although type i places arbitrarily small weight on opinions that do not coincide with her own as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, each type's preferences still enter into her social evaluation V_τ^i for all $\epsilon > 0$. When $\epsilon = 0$ type j 's paternalistic weights on future utilities decline like $e^{-\hat{\rho}^j s}$ as $s \rightarrow \infty$. Thus the type with the lowest value of $\hat{\rho}^j$ will place exponentially more weight on distant future utilities than any more impatient type as $s \rightarrow \infty$ when $\epsilon = 0$. Since the most patient type's preferences are part of each type's preferences for $\epsilon > 0$, continuity of preferences in ϵ requires that the consensus long run PRSTP is given by the most patient type's paternalistic PRSTP as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$.

Part 2 of Proposition 2 invokes related findings on the aggregation of opinions on uncertain interest rates (Weitzman, 2001; Freeman and Groom, 2015), and on the utilitarian aggregation of time preferences (e.g. Gollier and Zeckhauser, 2005). In each of these cases averaging over a distribution of discount factors leads to a 'certainty equivalent' discount rate, or a representative discount rate, that declines to the lowest rate as the time horizon tends to infinity. Proposition 2 differs from these results as it pertains to the preferences of *each individual expert*, rather than an external analysts' average across preferences or real discount rates. The proposition also shows that $\hat{\rho}$ is only determined by the most patient type in a very special case of the model, i.e. when types are 'minimally' non-paternalistic. In all other

cases $\hat{\rho}$ is a non-trivial mixture of all types' opinions on how to discount future social wellbeing.

II. Consequences for cost-benefit analysis

While Proposition 1 emphasizes the emergence of a consensus on the welfare parameters that enter the long run social discount rate when experts are non-paternalistic, this result implies a more general phenomenon that has relevance for cost benefit analysis. As (2) shows, calculations of the net present value of public projects depend on the full term structure of social discount rates $r(s)$. Since non-paternalistic types' opinions on $r^i(s)$ converge completely as $s \rightarrow \infty$, their opinions on $r^i(s)$ must also exhibit partial convergence at finite maturities. Thus non-paternalism could reduce disagreement about project NPVs by acting through the entire term structure of the social discount rate. In this section I illustrate the effect of non-paternalism on cost-benefit analysis of public projects using some simple numerical examples. These examples also serve to demonstrate how quickly opinions on social discount rates can converge as a function of maturity.

To facilitate this analysis I will work with data on economists' opinions on the appropriate values of the welfare parameters that enter social discounting formulae, collected by Drupp et al. (2015). Although there is no deep reason why economists' opinions on welfare parameters should be seen as representative of the distribution of considered views, they do arguably have an advantage in understanding the quantitative implications of different recommendations for cost benefit analysis. Rawls (1971), in his notion of 'reflective equilibrium', argues that this is an essential feature of good normative reasoning. For my purposes these economists' opinions merely

provide an interesting and informed distribution of views on these matters. Calibrating the model to their responses allows me to demonstrate how their opinions on social discount rates *might* change *if* they accepted non-paternalism as a principle of social evaluation.¹²

The Drupp et al. (2015) survey contains 173 complete responses from scholars who have published papers on social discounting. The 5-95% ranges of opinions on the PRSTP and elasticity of marginal social utility were $[0, 3.85\%/yr]$ and $[0.2, 3]$ respectively. A full description of the survey data and the calibration procedures I describe below is provided in the appendix. To map the survey data into my model I use a model of non-paternalistic social preferences in which the intertemporal wellbeing weights f_s^{ij} in (11) take the following form:

$$(20) \quad f_s^{ij} = \begin{cases} x\gamma\alpha_i^s & i = j \\ \frac{1-x}{N-1}\gamma\alpha_i^s & i \neq j \end{cases}$$

where $x \in [1/N, 1]$. When $x = 1/N$ in this model all types are democratic, i.e. they give equal weight to all future types' opinions in all future years. For $x > 1/N$ types give their own opinions a larger weight x in future periods, with the remaining weight distributed equally between all other types. When $x = 1$, the model reduces to a set of N paternalistic social preferences, and there is no consensus on long-run social discount rates. I calibrate the values of γ, α_i so that when $x = 1$ types' preferences are consistent with survey respondents' opinions on the PRSTP. Social utility functions $U^i(c)$ are taken to be iso-elastic, with the elasticity of marginal

¹²This exercise assumes that the opinions expressed in the survey data do not already account for the effects of non-paternalism.


utility calibrated to respondents' opinions.

Given this calibration types' opinions on the term structure of the social discount rate $r^i(s)$ can be computed for different values of the parameter x . Figure 1a depicts the results of this exercise, assuming a constant consumption growth rate of 2%/yr. The figure shows that disagreements over the appropriate social discount rate $r(s)$ could reduce dramatically if types accept non-paternalism as a principle of social evaluation. Reductions in disagreement are greatest at longer maturities, but are substantial even for maturities of 30 years if types are democratic (i.e. $x = 1/N$). When types assign large weight to their own views the range of opinions on discount rates expands, but even for $x = 90\%$ disagreement is reduced by more than a factor of eight at maturities greater than 50 years (relative to paternalism).


Of course, non-paternalistic types may still disagree about values of the social discount rate at shorter maturities. Nevertheless, non-paternalism may still substantially reduce disagreements on project NPVs, even for projects whose payoffs occur mainly in the relatively near term. This is illustrated in Figure 1b. The figure depicts five project payoff sequences π . To quantify the reduction in disagreement about the NPVs of these payoffs let $\sigma(y^i)$ denote the standard deviation of data y^i , and compute the following ratio for each sequence π :

$$(21) \quad \frac{\sigma_{NP}}{\sigma_P}(\pi; x) = \frac{\sigma(NPV^i(\pi; x))}{\sigma(NPV^i(\pi; 1))}$$

where $NPV^i(\pi; x)$ is the net present value of π according to expert i when the weight placed on own opinions in (20) is x . This ratio captures the reduction in disagreement about NPVs under non-paternalism (NP), relative to the paternalistic (P) benchmark. The markers on top of each dashed



(a) Simulated 5-95% range for types' opinions on social discount rates $r^i(s)$. Curves marked with \circ , $+$, \times , \diamond denote ranges when $x = 90\%$, 75% , 50% , $1/N$ respectively in (20), while the solid black curve denotes the range when $x = 1$, i.e. when types are paternalistic. Consumption growth is assumed to be a constant $2\%/yr$.



(b) Reduction in disagreement about project NPVs as a consequence of non-paternalism. Each curve in the figure denotes a hypothetical time sequence of project payoffs. The markers centered on each curve denote the values of σ_{NP}/σ_P , defined in (21), for this payoff sequence. \circ , $+$, \times , \diamond denote values of σ_{NP}/σ_P when $x = 90\%$, 75% , 50% , $1/N$ respectively in (20).

Figure 1. : Consequences of non-paternalism for cost-benefit analysis.

payoff sequence in Figure 1b denote the values of σ_{NP}/σ_P for that project, for several values of x . The figure shows that even for the project on the far left whose payoffs are concentrated in the near term, the spread of opinions on NPVs is reduced by approximately two thirds relative to the paternalistic case if types are democratic (i.e. $x = 1/N$). Reductions in disagreements are more modest if types favour their own preferences ($x > 1/N$), but increase strongly as payoffs move further into the future. For the project on the far right, whose benefits largely occur more than 60 years in future, disagreements are reduced by approximately a factor of 20 even if types assign 90% weight to their own views.

III. Conclusion

This paper introduced a model of experts' normative opinions on intertemporal social preferences. Experts are permitted any normative view on social impatience and aversion to intertemporal consumption inequalities, but they cannot impose their views on social preferences on those who disagree with them – they are non-paternalistic. The key finding is that non-paternalism helps to resolve disagreements about the welfare parameters that determine long-run social discount rates. While the normative approach to social discounting is commonly seen as irredeemably paternalistic, this paper shows that not only may it be made non-paternalistic, but doing so generates consensus values of the welfare parameters that enter the long-run social discount rate.

Although non-paternalism is most effective at reducing disagreements about the net present value of 'long run' projects, the problems with the positive approach to social discounting are most acute for precisely these

long maturities, as discussed in the introduction. The model developed here provides a normative method for setting long-run discount rates that retains an often claimed advantage of the positive approach (non-paternalism), but does not require the strong optimality assumptions it relies on. Happily, the model works best at achieving consensus precisely where the positive approach is most problematic. Addressing the paternalistic critique of the normative approach to social discounting could thus help to resolve a long-standing issue with the application of this method: disagreements about the values of welfare parameters.

REFERENCES

- Arrow, Kenneth J., Partha Dasgupta, and Karl-Göran Mäler.** 2003. "Evaluating Projects and Assessing Sustainable Development in Imperfect Economies." *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 26(4): 647–685.
- Arrow, K., M. Cropper, C. Gollier, B. Groom, G. Heal, R. Newell, W. Nordhaus, R. Pindyck, W. Pizer, P. Portney, T. Sterner, R. S. J. Tol, and M. Weitzman.** 2013. "Determining Benefits and Costs for Future Generations." *Science*, 341(6144): 349–350.
- Bergstrom, Theodore C.** 1999. "Systems of Benevolent Utility Functions." *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, 1(1): 71–100.
- Dasgupta, Partha, Amartya Sen, and Stephen A Marglin.** 1972. *Guidelines for project evaluation*. New York:United Nations.
- DeGroot, Morris H.** 1974. "Reaching a Consensus." *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 69(345): 118.

- Drupp, Moritz, Mark Freeman, Ben Groom, and Frikk Nesje.** 2015. "Discounting Disentangled." *Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 172*.
- Freeman, Mark C., and Ben Groom.** 2015. "Positively Gamma Discounting: Combining the Opinions of Experts on the Social Discount Rate." *The Economic Journal*, 125(585): 1015–1024.
- Galperti, Simone, and Bruno Strulovici.** 2017. "A Theory of Intergenerational Altruism." *Econometrica* (forthcoming).
- Gollier, Christian.** 2012. *Pricing the Planet's Future: The Economics of Discounting in an Uncertain World*. Princeton University Press.
- Gollier, Christian, and James K. Hammitt.** 2014. "The Long-Run Discount Rate Controversy." *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, 6(1): 273–295.
- Gollier, Christian, and Richard Zeckhauser.** 2005. "Aggregation of Heterogeneous Time Preferences." *Journal of Political Economy*, 113(4): 878–896.
- Heal, Geoffrey M., and Antony Millner.** 2014. "Agreeing to disagree on climate policy." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 111(10): 3695–3698.
- Nordhaus, William D.** 2007. "A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 45(3): 686–702.
- Ramsey, F. P.** 1928. "A Mathematical Theory of Saving." *The Economic Journal*, 38(152): 543–559.

- Rawls, John.** 1971. *A theory of justice*. Harvard University Press.
- Ray, Debraj.** 1987. “Nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism.” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 41(1): 112–132.
- Saez-Marti, Maria, and Jörgen W. Weibull.** 2005. “Discounting and altruism to future decision-makers.” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 122(2): 254–266.
- Sternberg, Shlomo.** 2014. *Dynamical Systems*. Dover Publications.
- Stern, N. H.** 2007. *The economics of climate change : the Stern review*. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
- Weitzman, Martin L.** 2001. “Gamma Discounting.” *The American Economic Review*, 91(1): 260–271.

FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION

CONTENTS OF APPENDIX

- 1) Proof of Lemma 1
- 2) Non-paternalism towards current decision-makers
- 3) Proof of Proposition 1
- 4) Consensus long-run social discount rates under uncertainty
- 5) Proof of Proposition 2
- 6) Comparative statics of the consensus long-run PRSTP
- 7) Details of calibration

1) PROOF OF LEMMA 1

LEMMA 1: *The preference system (11) defines a unique set of preferences, which are non-decreasing in all utilities, if and only if*

$$\max_i \left\{ \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^N f_s^{ij} < 1 \right\}.$$

PROOF:

The system of preferences (11) can be written as a single matrix equation

as follows:

$$\begin{pmatrix} V_\tau^1 \\ \vdots \\ V_\tau^N \\ V_{\tau+1}^1 \\ \vdots \\ V_{\tau+1}^N \\ \vdots \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} U^1(c_\tau) \\ \vdots \\ U^N(c_\tau) \\ U^1(c_{\tau+1}) \\ \vdots \\ U^N(c_{\tau+1}) \\ \vdots \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \vec{0}_N & f_1^{11} & \dots & f_1^{1N} & f_2^{11} & \dots & f_2^{1N} & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \vec{0}_N & f_1^{N1} & \dots & f_1^{NN} & f_2^{N1} & \dots & f_2^{NN} & \dots \\ \vec{0}_N & \vec{0}_N & f_1^{11} & \dots & f_1^{1N} & f_2^{11} & \dots & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \vec{0}_N & \vec{0}_N & f_1^{N1} & \dots & f_1^{NN} & f_2^{N1} & \dots & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} V_\tau^1 \\ \vdots \\ V_\tau^N \\ V_{\tau+1}^1 \\ \vdots \\ V_{\tau+1}^N \\ \vdots \end{pmatrix}$$

where $\vec{0}_N$ is an $1 \times N$ vector of zeros. Letting \vec{X}_τ denote the vector on the left hand side of this expression, $\mathbf{\Lambda}$ the infinite dimensional square matrix on the right hand side, and \vec{U}_τ denote the vector of U s on the right hand side, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{X}_\tau &= \vec{U}_\tau + \mathbf{\Lambda} \vec{X}_\tau \\ \Rightarrow \vec{X}_\tau &= (\mathbf{1}_\infty - \mathbf{\Lambda})^{-1} \vec{U}_\tau, \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{1}_\infty$ is the infinite dimensional identity matrix.

In general infinite dimensional matrices do not have unique inverses. However, Lemma 1 in Bergstrom (1999) shows that $(\mathbf{1}_\infty - \mathbf{\Lambda})^{-1}$ exists, is unique, and has non-negative elements if and only if $\mathbf{1}_\infty - \mathbf{\Lambda}$ is a dominant diagonal matrix. A matrix \mathbf{B} is dominant diagonal iff its elements B_{ij} satisfy $|B_{ii}| > \sum_{j \neq i} |B_{ij}|$ for all i . Thus, $\mathbf{1}_\infty - \mathbf{\Lambda}$ is dominant diagonal iff $\sum_{s=1}^\infty \sum_{j=1}^N f_s^{ij} < 1$ for all i .

2) NON-PATERNALISM TOWARDS CURRENT DECISION-MAKERS

The model developed in the main body of the paper assumes that non-paternalism is exclusively forward-looking. It is straightforward to extend the model to account for non-paternalism towards current decision-makers too.

Consider social preferences of the form

$$V_\tau^i = U^i(c_\tau) + \sum_{j=1}^N q^{ij} V_\tau^j + \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^N f_s^{ij} V_{\tau+s}^j,$$

where $q^{ii} = 0$ and $q^{ij} \geq 0$ for $j \neq i$. Let \mathbf{Q} be the $N \times N$ matrix of coefficients q^{ij} , and let $\mathbf{1}_N$ be the $N \times N$ identity matrix. We can write this preference system using the vector notation of Proposition 3 as

$$(C1) \quad \vec{V}_\tau = \vec{U}_\tau + \mathbf{Q} \vec{V}_\tau + \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \mathbf{F}_s \vec{V}_{\tau+s}.$$

If $(\mathbf{1}_N - \mathbf{Q})^{-1}$ exists and has positive entries, we find

$$\vec{V}_\tau = (\mathbf{1}_N - \mathbf{Q})^{-1} \vec{U}_\tau + \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} [(\mathbf{1}_N - \mathbf{Q})^{-1} \mathbf{F}_s] \vec{V}_{\tau+s}.$$

This system is of exactly the same form as the preferences studied in Proposition 3, and so all the results go through. A sufficient condition for $(\mathbf{1}_N - \mathbf{Q})^{-1}$ to exist and be positive is if $(\mathbf{1}_N - \mathbf{Q})$ is strictly dominant diagonal, i.e. $\max_i \{\sum_j q_{ij}\} < 1$.

A word of caution is in order however. In general, if $\max_i \{\sum_j q_{ij}\} < 1$ the row sums of $(\mathbf{1}_N - \mathbf{Q})^{-1}$ will exceed 1, so it is not guaranteed that the analogous condition to (12), which ensures that preferences are well defined,

will always be satisfied in this model if $\max_i \{\sum_{s,j} f_s^{ij}\} < 1$. This condition must be modified to require that the row sums of $\sum_{s=1}^{\infty} (\mathbf{1}_N - \mathbf{Q})^{-1} \mathbf{F}_s$ not exceed 1 for any row.

I neglect \mathbf{Q} in the body of the paper because it is difficult to interpret in the context of intertemporal social decision-making, and it is unclear how to calibrate its values in the empirical application in Section II.

3) PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1

We prove a more general version of the result in Proposition 1. The proof has two main steps. First we find conditions under which all types' utility weights a_s^{ij} are proportional to a common discount factor $\hat{\mu}^s$ for large s . We then show that when these conditions are satisfied all types opinions on the long-run social discount rate will converge.

STEP 1:

Begin by defining the sequence of $N \times N$ matrices

$$(D1) \quad \mathbf{F}_s := \begin{pmatrix} f_s^{11} & f_s^{12} & \dots & f_s^{1N} \\ f_s^{21} & f_s^{22} & \dots & f_s^{2N} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ f_s^{N1} & f_s^{N2} & \dots & f_s^{NN} \end{pmatrix}$$

and the sequences of $N \times 1$ vectors

$$(D2) \quad \vec{V}_\tau = \begin{pmatrix} V_\tau^1 \\ V_\tau^2 \\ \vdots \\ V_\tau^N \end{pmatrix}, \quad \vec{U}_\tau = \begin{pmatrix} U^1(c_\tau) \\ U^2(c_\tau) \\ \vdots \\ U^N(c_\tau) \end{pmatrix}.$$

Our general model (11) can be written as:

$$(D3) \quad \vec{V}_\tau = \vec{U}_\tau + \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \mathbf{F}_s \vec{V}_{\tau+s}.$$

We seek an equivalent representation of this system of the form

$$(D4) \quad \vec{V}_\tau := \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{A}_s \vec{U}_{\tau+s},$$

where \mathbf{A}_s is a sequence of $N \times N$ matrices of the form,

$$(D5) \quad \mathbf{A}_s := \begin{pmatrix} a_s^{11} & a_s^{12} & \dots & a_s^{1N} \\ a_s^{21} & a_s^{22} & \dots & a_s^{2N} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ a_s^{N1} & a_s^{N2} & \dots & a_s^{NN} \end{pmatrix}$$

where a_s^{ij} is the weight type i at time τ assigns to consumption utility according to type j at time $\tau + s$, i.e. $U^j(c_{\tau+s})$.

We now prove the following:

PROPOSITION 3: *Assume that the condition (12) is satisfied, and that $f_s^{ii} > 0$ for all $i = 1 \dots N$, $s = 1 \dots \infty$. Construct a directed graph G with N nodes labelled $1, 2, \dots, N$. Draw an edge from node i to node $j \neq i$ iff $f_s^{ij} > 0$ for at least one $s \geq 1$. If G contains a directed cycle of length N , then there exists a $\hat{\mu} \in (0, 1)$ such that*

$$\lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \frac{a_s^{ij}}{\hat{\mu}^s} = K_{ij} > 0$$

where the K_{ij} are finite constants.

Notice that if preferences are fully non-paternalistic the graph G in the statement of this proposition is complete (i.e. all edges exist), and the directed cycle condition is satisfied. However, the directed cycle condition itself is considerably weaker than full non-paternalism.

PROOF:

Substitute (D4) into (D3) to find

$$(D6) \quad \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{A}_s \vec{U}_{\tau+s} = \vec{U}_{\tau} + \sum_{p=1}^{\infty} \mathbf{F}_p \left(\sum_{q=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{A}_q \vec{U}_{\tau+p+q} \right)$$

Equating coefficients of $\vec{U}_{\tau+s}$ in this expression, we see that \mathbf{A}_s must satisfy

$$(D7) \quad \mathbf{A}_0 = \mathbf{1}_N$$

$$(D8) \quad \mathbf{A}_s = \sum_{p=1}^s \mathbf{F}_p \mathbf{A}_{s-p} \text{ for } s > 0.$$

where $\mathbf{1}_N$ is the $N \times N$ identity matrix. The solution of this recurrence relation determines the utility weights a_s^{ij} . It will be convenient to split this matrix recurrence relation into a set of N vector recurrence relations as follows. Let \vec{A}_s^j be the j -th column vector of \mathbf{A}_s , i.e.

$$(D9) \quad \vec{A}_s^j = \begin{pmatrix} a_s^{1j} \\ a_s^{2j} \\ \vdots \\ a_s^{Nj} \end{pmatrix}.$$

Define \vec{e}^j to be the unit vector with elements

$$(D10) \quad (\vec{e}^j)_i = \begin{cases} 0 & i \neq j \\ 1 & i = j \end{cases}$$

Then (D8) is equivalent to the N vector recurrence relations

$$(D11) \quad \begin{aligned} \vec{A}_0^j &= \vec{e}^j \\ \vec{A}_s^j &= \sum_{p=1}^s \mathbf{F}_p \vec{A}_{s-p}^j \text{ for } s > 0. \end{aligned}$$

for $j = 1 \dots N$.

The proof now has the following steps. We consider finite order models, i.e. $\mathbf{F}_{M'} = 0$ for all M' greater than some finite M . We show that if a certain augmented matrix constructed from the matrices $\mathbf{F}_1, \dots, \mathbf{F}_M$ is *primitive*, all types will have a common long-run utility discount factor. A square matrix \mathbf{B} is primitive if there exists an integer $k > 0$ such that $\mathbf{B}^k > 0$. We then extend this result to infinite order models by taking an appropriate limit of finite order models. Finally, we show that primitivity of the required matrices in the infinite order case is ensured by the graph theoretic condition in the statement of the proposition.

Begin with the finite order case. Let $M = \max\{s | \exists i, j \ f_s^{ij} > 0\} < \infty$. In this case, for all $s > M$, (D11) reduces to

$$(D12) \quad \vec{A}_s^j = \sum_{p=1}^M \mathbf{F}_p \vec{A}_{s-p}^j.$$

Define the $NM \times NM$ matrix

$$(D13) \quad \Phi_M = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{F}_1 & \mathbf{F}_2 & \dots & \mathbf{F}_{M-1} & \mathbf{F}_M \\ \mathbf{1}_N & 0 & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \mathbf{1}_N & \dots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \dots & \mathbf{1}_N & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

where $\mathbf{1}_N$ is the $N \times N$ identity matrix. In addition, define the ‘stacked’ vector

$$(D14) \quad \vec{Y}_s^j = \begin{pmatrix} \vec{A}_s^j \\ \vec{A}_{s-1}^j \\ \vdots \\ \vec{A}_{s-M+1}^j \end{pmatrix}$$

Then we can rewrite the M th order recurrence (D12) as a first order recurrence as follows:

$$(D15) \quad \begin{aligned} \vec{Y}_s^j &= \Phi_M \vec{Y}_{s-1}^j \\ \Rightarrow \vec{Y}_{M+s}^j &= (\Phi_M)^s \vec{Y}_M^j. \end{aligned}$$

We now assume that Φ_M is a primitive matrix. By the Perron-Frobenius theorem for primitive matrices (Sternberg, 2014), this implies

- 1) Φ_M has a positive eigenvalue, which we label as $\mu(M)$.
- 2) All other eigenvalues of Φ_M have complex modulus strictly less than $\mu(M)$.

3) There exists a matrix $\mathbf{C} > 0$ such that

$$\lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\Phi_M^s}{[\mu(M)]^s} = \mathbf{C}$$

4) $\mu(M)$ increases when any element of Φ_M increases.

5)

$$(D16) \quad \mu(M) < \max_i \sum_j \phi_{ij}.$$

where ϕ_{ij} is the ij th element of Φ_M .

Since the first N elements of \vec{Y}_s^j coincide with a_s^{ij} , the third of these conclusions implies that

$$(D17) \quad \forall i, j, \lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \frac{a_s^{ij}}{[\mu(M)]^s} = \mathbf{C} \vec{Y}_M^j > 0.$$

To bound the value of $\mu(M)$, note that from point 5 of the Perron-Frobenius theorem in (D16), and the definition of Φ_M in (D13), we have

$$(D18) \quad \mu(M) < \max_i \left\{ \sum_{s=1}^M \sum_{j=1}^N f_s^{ij} \right\}$$

Thus, if

$$(D19) \quad \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^N f_s^{ij} < 1$$

for all i , $\mu(M) < 1$, and hence $\lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} a_s^{ij} = 0$. Thus (12) guarantees that the preferences (11) are complete (i.e. finite on bounded utility streams) for

all finite M . This concludes the finite M case.

We now extend this result to the case of infinite M . Assume that there exists an $M' > 0$ such that the matrix Φ_M , defined in (D13), is primitive for all $M > M'$. For $M > M'$, define

$$(D20) \quad \vec{V}_\tau(M) = \vec{U}_\tau + \sum_{s=1}^M \mathbf{F}_s \vec{V}_{\tau+s}(M)$$

and let

$$(D21) \quad \hat{\vec{V}}_\tau = \lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \vec{V}_\tau(M).$$

Define the equivalent representations of these preferences by

$$(D22) \quad \vec{V}_\tau(M) = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{A}_s(M) \vec{U}_{\tau+s}$$

$$(D23) \quad \hat{\vec{V}}_\tau = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \hat{\mathbf{A}}_s \vec{U}_{\tau+s}$$

In addition, let $\mu(M)$ be the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of Φ_M . We begin by proving that:

LEMMA 2:

$$(D24) \quad \hat{\mu} := \lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \mu(M) \text{ exists.}$$

PROOF:

Consider the eigenvalue $\mu(M+1)$, where $M > M'$. This is the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of Φ_{M+1} . The M -th order preferences $\vec{V}_\tau(M)$ are equivalent to an $M+1$ th order model, with $\mathbf{F}_{M+1} = 0$. The matrix Φ_M , which

controls the asymptotic behavior of $\vec{V}_\tau(M)$ can thus be thought of as an $N \times (M + 1)$ matrix, where the last M rows and columns are zeros. Call this matrix $\tilde{\Phi}_{M+1}$. The matrix Φ_{M+1} , associated with the asymptotic behavior of $\vec{V}_\tau(M + 1)$, has entries that are strictly larger than those of $\tilde{\Phi}_{M+1}$ in at least some elements. Thus, by point 4 in our statement of the Perron-Frobenius theorem, $\mu(M+1) > \mu(M)$. We also know that $\mu(M) < 1$ for all M . Since the sequence $\mu(M)$ is increasing and bounded above, the monotone convergence theorem implies that $\hat{\mu}$ exists.

We have thus proved that if the matrices Φ_M are primitive for $M > M'$,

$$(D25) \quad \lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \frac{a_s^{ij}(M)}{a_s^{ij}(M)} = \lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \mu(M) = \hat{\mu}.$$

Note that since (D16) and (D19) are strict inequalities, $\hat{\mu} < 1$. We now wish to know whether it is also true that:

$$(D26) \quad \lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \frac{a_{s+1}^{ij}(M)}{a_s^{ij}(M)} = \hat{\mu}.$$

That is, can we change the order of the limits in (D25)? For limit operations to be interchangeable we require the sequence of functions they operate on to be uniformly convergent. The functions in question here are $V_\tau^i(M)$ and \hat{V}_τ^i , which we can think of as linear functions from the infinite dimensional space $\mathbb{R}^\infty \times \mathbb{R}^N = \{(\vec{U}_\tau, \vec{U}_{\tau+1}, \vec{U}_{\tau+2}, \dots)\}$ to \mathbb{R} . If the sequence of functions $V_\tau^i(M)$ converges uniformly to \hat{V}_τ^i on any bounded subset of $\mathbb{R}^\infty \times \mathbb{R}^N$, then (D26) will be satisfied. We now prove a second lemma:

LEMMA 3: *Let B be a compact subset of $\mathbb{R}^\infty \times \mathbb{R}^N$, and assume that (12) is satisfied. Then $V_\tau^i(M)$ converges uniformly to \hat{V}_τ^i on B .*

PROOF:

Equation (D11) shows that for all $s \leq M$, $a_{\tau+s}^{ij}(M) = \hat{a}_{\tau+s}^{ij}$. Let $\bar{U} = \max_j \{\sup_s \{U^j(c_{\tau+s})\}\}$ be the largest component of any $\vec{U} \in B$. For any $\vec{U} \in B$,

$$\begin{aligned} \sup_{\vec{U} \in B} \left| V_\tau^i(M) - \hat{V}_\tau^i \right| &= \sup_{\vec{U} \in B} \left| \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^N a_{\tau+M+s}^{ij}(M) U^j(c_{\tau+M+s}) - \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^N \hat{a}_{\tau+M+s}^{ij} U^j(c_{\tau+M+s}) \right| \\ &\leq \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^N \left[|a_{\tau+M+s}^{ij}(M)| + |\hat{a}_{\tau+M+s}^{ij}| \right] \bar{U} \end{aligned}$$

By Lemma 1, $\hat{\mu} < 1$ also implies $\mu(M) < 1$ for all M , so we know that $\lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} a_{\tau+M+s}^{ij}(M) = 0 = \lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \hat{a}_{\tau+M+s}^{ij}$ for all i, j . Thus

$$\lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \sup_{\vec{U} \in B} \left| V_\tau^i(M) - \hat{V}_\tau^i \right| = 0.$$

Hence $V_\tau^i(M)$ converges uniformly to \hat{V}_τ^i .

This concludes the infinite order case.

The final step of the proof is to show that if the graph G , defined in the statement of the proposition, has a directed cycle of length N , then there exists an $M' > 0$ such that for all $M > M'$ the matrix Φ_M is primitive. We demonstrate this using a graphical argument.

Consider an arbitrary $R \times R$ matrix B_{ij} , and form a directed graph $H(B)$ on nodes $1 \dots R$, where there is an edge from node i to node j iff $B_{ij} > 0$. The matrix B_{ij} is primitive if there exists an integer $k \geq 1$ such that there is a path of length k from each node i to every other node j in $H(B)$. If $H(B)$ is *strongly connected*, i.e. there exists a path from every node to every other node, then a sufficient condition for B_{ij} to be primitive is if there exists at least one node that is connected to itself.




Figure D1. : The directed graph $H(\Phi_3)$ associated with the matrix in our example. The vertical black edges arise from the identity matrices in the definition of Φ_M (see (D13)). The dashed blue edges arise from $f_s^{ii} > 0$, and the dashed red edges from $f_1^{12}, f_1^{23}, f_1^{31} > 0$.

Now consider our $NM \times NM$ matrices Φ_M . To construct the directed graph $H(\Phi_M)$ associated with Φ_M in a convenient form, follow the following procedure: Construct an $M \times N$ grid of nodes (where N is the number of types), with node (m, n) representing type n at time $\tau + m$. For all $m > 1, n$, construct a directed edge from node (m, n) to node $(m - 1, n)$. In addition, construct a directed edge from node $(1, n)$ to node (m', n') if $f_{m'}^{nn'} > 0$.

As an example, take the case $M = N = 3$, i.e. a third order model with three types. In this case Φ_M is a 9×9 matrix. Assume that $f_s^{ii} > 0$ for all $i, s = 1 \dots 3$, that $f_1^{12}, f_1^{23}, f_1^{31} > 0$, and that $f_s^{ij} = 0$ otherwise. Figure D1 represents the directed graph associated with the matrix Φ_3 in this case.

Examination of the figure shows that since $f_s^{ii} > 0$, each of the ‘column’ subgraphs $\{(m, 1)\}, \{(m, 2)\}, \{(m, 3)\}, m = 1 \dots 3$ is strongly connected.

Moreover, the cycle between columns (the red dashed edges) connects the columns to each other, and causes the entire graph to be strongly connected. Since each node in the first row is connected to itself, the matrix Φ_3 in this example is primitive.

Returning to the general case, suppose that $f_s^{ii} > 0$ for all i and s . From the example in Figure D1 it is clear that this implies that for each fixed i the subgraph $\{(m, i) | m = 1 \dots \infty\}$ is strongly connected, with each of the nodes $(1, i)$ connected to itself. Thus, if there is a directed cycle between all of the ‘columns’ of the graph $H(\Phi_{M'})$ for some M' , then for all $M > M'$, $H(\Phi_M)$ is strongly connected, and contains nodes that are connected to themselves. Hence for all $M > M'$, Φ_M is a primitive matrix. This concludes the proof.

STEP 2:

We now show that when the conditions of Proposition 3 are satisfied, all types will agree on the long run social discount rate, and we compute an explicit formula for this consensus discount rate.

Begin by defining

$$\hat{\rho} = -\ln \hat{\mu}.$$

When the conditions of Proposition 3 hold we know that

$$(D27) \quad a_s^{ij} \sim K_{ij}(s)e^{-\hat{\rho}s}$$

where \sim denotes $s \rightarrow \infty$ asymptotic behaviour, and the multiplicative factors $K_{ij}(s)$ satisfy $\lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{s} \ln K_{ij}(s) = 0$.

Now integrate the definition of $\eta^j(c)$ in (15) to find

$$(U^j)'(c) = \exp \left(- \int_0^c \frac{\eta^j(x)}{x} dx \right)$$

Make the change of variables $x = c_\tau e^{gs'}$ in the integral in the exponent (recall that g is the long run consumption growth rate), and evaluate $(U^j)'(c)$ at $c = c_\tau e^{gs}$ to find

$$(U^j)'(c_\tau e^{gs}) = \exp \left(-g \int_0^s \eta^j(c_\tau e^{gs'}) ds' \right)$$

Defining

$$(D28) \quad \hat{\eta}^j = \begin{cases} \lim_{c \rightarrow \infty} \eta^j(c) & g > 0 \\ \lim_{c \rightarrow 0} \eta^j(c) & g < 0 \end{cases}$$

we see that the $s \rightarrow \infty$ asymptotic behaviour of marginal utility is given by

$$(D29) \quad (U^j)'(c_\tau e^{gs}) \sim L_j(s) e^{-g \hat{\eta}^j s}$$

where $\lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{s} \ln L_j(s) = 0$. Combining (D27) and (D29), we find

$$\begin{aligned} r^i(s) &= -\frac{1}{s} \ln \left(\frac{1}{(U^i)'(c_\tau)} \sum_{j=1}^N a_s^{ij} (U^j)'(c_{\tau+s}) \right) \\ &\sim -\frac{1}{s} \ln \left(\sum_j K_{ij}(s) L_j(s) e^{-\hat{\rho}s} e^{-\eta^j g s} \right) \\ &\sim \hat{\rho} - \frac{1}{s} \ln \left(\sum_j K_{ij}(s) L_j(s) e^{-\eta^j g s} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Define $\tilde{K}_{ij}(s) = K_{ij}(s) L_j(s)$, and let q be the index of the type with the

lowest (highest) value of $\hat{\eta}^j$ when $g > 0$ ($g < 0$). Then

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_j K_{ij}(s) L_j(s) e^{-\eta^j g s} &= \sum_j \tilde{K}_{ij}(s) e^{-\eta^j g s} \\ &= \tilde{K}_{iq}(s) e^{-\eta^q g s} \left(1 + \sum_{j \neq q} \frac{\tilde{K}_{ij}(s)}{\tilde{K}_{iq}(s)} e^{-(\eta^j - \eta^q) g s} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Since $\eta^j - \eta^q > 0$ for all $j \neq q$ when $g > 0$, and $\eta^j - \eta^q < 0$ for all $j \neq q$ when $g < 0$,

$$\sum_j K_{ij}(s) L_j(s) e^{-\eta^j g s} \sim \tilde{K}_{iq}(s) e^{-\hat{\eta} g s},$$

where $\hat{\eta}$ is given by (17). Thus

$$\begin{aligned} r^i(s) &\sim \hat{\rho} - \frac{1}{s} \ln \left(\tilde{K}_{iq}(s) e^{-\hat{\eta} g s} \right) \\ \Rightarrow \lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} r^i(s) &= \hat{\rho} + \hat{\eta} g. \end{aligned}$$

4) CONSENSUS LONG-RUN SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATES UNDER UNCERTAINTY

It is straightforward to extend the proof of Proposition 3 to the case where future consumption is uncertain. If consumption is uncertain types' social preferences are simply the expectation over their deterministic preferences, i.e.

$$V_\tau^i = \mathbb{E}_{c_{\tau+1}, c_{\tau+2}, \dots} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^N a_s^{ij} U^j(c_{\tau+s})$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{c_{\tau+1}, c_{\tau+2}, \dots}$ denotes the expectation over future consumption values, and the coefficients a_s^{ij} are determined by the dynamical system in (D8), as in the deterministic case.

The analysis of the consensus long-run social discount rate now proceeds

in close analogy to the second part of the proof of Proposition 3. The consensus long-run PRSTP is unchanged, however examination of the proof shows that we need to account for the effect of expectations on the growth terms in the Ramsey formula.

Under uncertainty types' opinions on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and consumption s years from now are given by:

$$(E1) \quad e^{-r^i(s)s} = MRS_s^i = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^N a_s^{ij} \mathbf{E}_{c_{\tau+s}}(U^j)'(c_{\tau+s})}{(U^i)'(c_{\tau})}$$

Define a type specific 'certainty equivalent' long-run growth rate \hat{g}_j by requiring that

$$(E2) \quad (U^j)'(e^{\hat{g}_j s} c_{\tau}) \equiv \mathbf{E}_g(U^j)'(e^{g s} c_{\tau})$$

as $s \rightarrow \infty$, i.e.

$$(E3) \quad \hat{g}_j \equiv \lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{s} \log \left[((U^j)')^{-1} \left(\mathbf{E}_g(U^j)'(e^{g s} c_{\tau}) \right) \right].$$

The long-run consumption growth rate g is uncertain in this expression, and \mathbf{E}_g denotes expectations over the value of g . In analogy with (D28), define

$$(E4) \quad \hat{\eta}_j(\hat{g}_j) = \begin{cases} \lim_{c \rightarrow \infty} \eta^j(c) & \hat{g}_j > 0 \\ \lim_{c \rightarrow 0} \eta^j(c) & \hat{g}_j < 0 \end{cases}$$

Then for large s , we know from (D29) that

$$\mathbf{E}_{c_{\tau+s}}(U^j)'(c_{\tau+s}) = (U^j)'(e^{\hat{g}_j s} c_{\tau}) \sim e^{-\hat{g}_j \hat{\eta}_j(\hat{g}_j) s}$$

where \sim denotes $s \rightarrow \infty$ asymptotic behaviour, as before.

As in the deterministic case, we see from (E1) that type i 's opinion on the long-run elasticity of marginal social utility is determined by the term that dominates the sum

$$\sum_{j=1}^N a_s^{ij} \mathbb{E}_{c_{\tau+s}} (U^j)'(c_{\tau+s}) \sim \sum_j a_s^{ij} e^{-\hat{g}_j \hat{\eta}_j (\hat{g}_j)s}$$

as $s \rightarrow \infty$. This sum is dominated by the exponential with the minimum value of $\hat{g}_j \hat{\eta}_j (\hat{g}_j)$ (which may be negative), for all i . We thus conclude that the consensus long-run SDR under uncertainty is given by

$$(E5) \quad \hat{\rho} + \min_i \{\hat{g}_i \hat{\eta}_i (\hat{g}_i)\}$$

As an example of the application of this formula suppose that types' utility functions are iso-elastic with elasticities of marginal utility η_i , i.e. $(U^i)'(c) = c^{-\eta_i}$. In addition, assume that consumption growth is asymptotically log-normally distributed, i.e.

$$\log g \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2).$$

From (E2) type i 's certainty equivalent long run growth rate \hat{g}_i is thus defined by requiring that at large s ,

$$\begin{aligned} e^{-\eta_i \hat{g}_i s} (c_\tau)^{-\eta_i} &\equiv \mathbb{E}_g e^{-\eta_i g s} (c_\tau)^{-\eta_i} = e^{-(\eta_i \mu - \frac{1}{2} \eta_i^2 \sigma^2)s} (c_\tau)^{-\eta_i} \\ \Rightarrow \hat{g}_i &= \mu - \frac{1}{2} \eta_i \sigma^2 \end{aligned}$$

Since elasticities of marginal utility are constant by assumption we know

that $\hat{\eta}_i(\hat{g}_i) = \eta_i$, and thus the consensus long run SDR in this example is given by

$$\hat{\rho} + \min_i \{ \mu \eta_i - \frac{1}{2} \eta_i^2 \sigma^2 \}.$$

5) PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2

Part 1 of the proposition is immediate from point 4 in our statement of the Perron-Frobenius theorem in Proposition 3. Part 2 of the proposition follows from the fact that the eigenvalues of a matrix are continuous in its entries. Consider a set of N paternalistic models, in which each type assigns weight only to its own preferences in future periods. This set of models can be represented as a single model with N types where $f_s^{ij} = 0$ if $j \neq i$. As in the proof of Proposition 3, begin by considering a model of finite order M . Equation (D15) shows that the asymptotic behaviour of such a model can be described by first order difference equations of the form:

$$(F1) \quad \vec{Y}_s^j = \Phi_M^0 \vec{Y}_{s-1}^j.$$

In this case however, the matrix Φ_M^0 , defined in (D13), is reducible. The largest eigenvalue of Φ_M^0 is the rate of decline of the utility weights of the most patient type in the long run. As $M \rightarrow \infty$, the set of eigenvalues of Φ_M^0 contains $\hat{\mu}_1^i$, the long run utility discount factor of model i , and all eigenvalues of Φ_M^0 are less than or equal to $\max_i \{\hat{\mu}_1^i\}$.

Now consider the continuous set of models with weights $f_s^{ij}(\epsilon)$, where $\epsilon > 0$. Let $\Phi_M(\epsilon)$ be the corresponding Φ_M matrix for this set of models, where by assumption $\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0+} \Phi_M(\epsilon) = \Phi_M^0$. The consensus long run discount factor in model ϵ of order M , denoted $\mu_1(\epsilon, M)$ is the largest eigenvalue of

$\Phi_M(\epsilon)$. Define

$$\hat{\mu}_1(\epsilon) = \lim_{M \rightarrow \infty} \mu_1(M, \epsilon).$$

We know that this limit exists, due to the proof of Proposition 3. Since the matrix $\Phi_M(\epsilon)$ is continuous in $\epsilon > 0$, and in the limit as $M \rightarrow \infty$ the largest eigenvalue of $\Phi_M(0) = \Phi_M^0$ is equal to $\max_i \{\hat{\mu}_1^i\}$, we must have

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0^+} \hat{\mu}_1(\epsilon) = \max_i \{\hat{\mu}_1^i\}.$$

Since $\hat{\rho}(\epsilon) = -\ln \hat{\mu}_1(\epsilon)$ by definition, the result follows.

6) COMPARATIVE STATICS OF THE CONSENSUS LONG-RUN PRSTP

It is naturally of interest to ask how the consensus long run PRSTP $\hat{\rho}$ depends on the intertemporal wellbeing weights f_s^{ij} . Unfortunately strong comparative statics results on this question are likely out of reach. Technically, we need to understand how the spectral radius (i.e. largest eigenvalue) of the matrices Φ_M from Proposition 3 behaves when we spread out or contract the distribution of weights f_s^{ij} . In order to sign the effect of a spread in the weights we require something akin to a convexity property for the spectral radius. Unfortunately, it is known that the spectral radius of a matrix is a convex function of its diagonal elements, but not of the off-diagonal elements (Friedland, 1981).¹³

This section describes a special case of the model in which clean comparative statics are possible.

¹³Similarly, it is not possible to sign the effect of premultiplying Φ_M by a doubly stochastic matrix, as the spectral radius of a product of two matrices is not sub-multiplicative in general. Gelfand's formula shows that the spectral radius of a matrix product is sub-multiplicative if the matrices in question commute, but this is not much use for our purposes.

Assume that type i 's intertemporal weights f_s^{ij} depend on a parameter $\lambda_i \in I \subset \mathbb{R}^+$, i.e. $f_s^{ij} = f_s^{ij}(\lambda_i)$. Let $\vec{\lambda} = (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_N)$ be the vector of types' λ parameters. Using the notation of Proposition 3 we write the matrix of weights f_s^{ij} at a fixed value of s as $\mathbf{F}_s(\vec{\lambda})$, where we now emphasize the dependence of these weights on the parameter vector $\vec{\lambda}$. We will say that preferences are **symmetric in $\vec{\lambda}$** iff for all permutation matrices¹⁴ \mathbf{P} ,

$$(G1) \quad \mathbf{F}_s(\mathbf{P}\vec{\lambda}) = \mathbf{P}\mathbf{F}_s(\vec{\lambda})\mathbf{P}^T$$

for all s . Intuitively, if preferences are symmetric in $\vec{\lambda}$, switching any two types' values of λ is equivalent to switching their entire set of intertemporal weights, as this induces a permutation of the weight matrix $\mathbf{F}_s(\vec{\lambda})$. The parameters λ_i are thus 'sufficient statistics' for types' intertemporal weights, and switching $\lambda_i \leftrightarrow \lambda_j$ is equivalent to relabelling $i \leftrightarrow j$.

As an example of preferences that are symmetric in $\vec{\lambda}$ consider the following:

$$(G2) \quad f_s^{ij} = \begin{cases} g(s, \lambda_i)x_s & j = i \\ g(s, \lambda_i)\frac{1-x_s}{N-1} & j \neq i \end{cases}$$

where $x_s \in [1/N, 1)$ for all $s = 1 \dots \infty$, and $\sum_{s=1}^{\infty} g(s, \lambda) < 1$ for all $\lambda \in I \subset \mathbb{R}^+$. In this model the time dependence of types' intertemporal weights f_s^{ij} has a common functional form, given by a discount function $g(s, \lambda)$ on wellbeings s years in the future, where $\lambda > 0$ is a parameter. Variations in types' attitudes to time are solely due to differences in their values of λ .

¹⁴A square matrix is a permutation matrix if each of its rows and each of columns contains exactly one entry of 1, and zeros elsewhere.

This model is a generalization of the model defined in (20), which we used in Section II of the paper.

Let $\hat{\rho}(\vec{\lambda})$ be the consensus long-run PRSTP in a model that is characterized by the parameter vector $\vec{\lambda}$.

PROPOSITION 4: *Assume that preferences are symmetric in $\vec{\lambda}$ and that $f_s^{ij}(\lambda)$ is strictly log-convex in $\lambda > 0$ for all i, j, s . Then if the parameter vector $\vec{\lambda}^A$ majorizes¹⁵ $\vec{\lambda}^B$,*

$$\hat{\rho}(\vec{\lambda}^A) < \hat{\rho}(\vec{\lambda}^B).$$

In words, this result says that if preferences are symmetric in $\vec{\lambda}$, intertemporal weights are log-convex functions of λ , and experts in group A disagree more about the parameter λ than experts in group B, the consensus long-run PRSTP will be *lower* in group A than in group B.

I will provide some interpretation of the log-convexity condition in examples below, but first we turn to the proof.

PROOF:

The proof relies on the following result due to Kingman (1961):

LEMMA 4: *Let $b_{ij}(\theta) > 0$ be the elements of a non-negative matrix \mathbf{B} , where $\theta \in \mathbb{R}$ is a parameter. If $b_{ij}(\theta)$ is log-convex in θ for all i, j , the spectral radius of \mathbf{B} is a log-convex function of θ .*

We will employ the usual trick of working with finite order models first (i.e. setting f_s^{ij} to zero for $s > M$), and taking a limit as $M \rightarrow \infty$ at the

¹⁵ $\vec{\lambda}^A$ majorizes $\vec{\lambda}^B$ iff there exists a doubly stochastic matrix \mathbf{W} such that $\vec{\lambda}^B = \mathbf{W}\vec{\lambda}^A$. Intuitively, the elements of $\vec{\lambda}^A$ are ‘more spread out’ than those of $\vec{\lambda}^B$, and the sums of their elements are equal. See e.g. Marshall (2010) for a discussion of majorization and its relationship to e.g. stochastic orders and inequality measures.

end. The consensus long run PRSTP in a model of order M is determined by the largest eigenvalue of Φ_M , defined in (D13). Denote this eigenvalue by $\hat{\mu}_M(\vec{\lambda})$, where I have suppressed the dependence on the parameters X for simplicity.

Now consider a parametric family of matrices of the form $\Phi_M(\theta)$, where the matrices in this family are constructed by analogy with (D13), and where the intertemporal weights are of the form

$$(G3) \quad f_s^{ij}(\theta) = f_s^{ij}(\lambda_i \theta)$$

The matrix we are actually interested in corresponds to $\theta = 1$. Let $\hat{\mu}_M(\vec{\lambda}, \theta)$ be the spectral radius of $\Phi_M(\theta)$. Since λ_i only enters the matrix elements of $\Phi_M(\theta)$ as a product with θ , the spectral radius can only depend on λ_i through such products, i.e.

$$\hat{\mu}_M(\vec{\lambda}, \theta) = Z(\lambda_1 \theta, \lambda_2 \theta, \dots, \lambda_N \theta)$$

for some unknown function Z .

Since $f_s^{ij}(\lambda)$ is log convex in λ by assumption, the elements of $\Phi_M(\theta)$ are log convex functions of θ . Thus by Kingman's result the spectral radius $\hat{\mu}_M(\vec{\lambda}, \theta)$ is also log convex in θ . We now show that this implies that $\log Z(\lambda_1 \theta, \dots, \lambda_N \theta)$ is a convex function of $\vec{\lambda}$ for all θ , and in particular for $\theta = 1$:

Let $u_i = \lambda_i \theta$, so that $Z = Z(u_1, u_2, \dots, u_N)$

$$(G4) \quad \frac{d \log Z}{d\theta} = \frac{\sum_i \frac{\partial Z}{\partial u_i} \lambda_i}{Z}$$

$$(G5) \quad \frac{d^2 \log Z}{d\theta^2} = \frac{\sum_i \lambda_i \sum_j \left(\frac{\partial Z}{\partial u_i \partial u_j} \lambda_j \right) - \sum_{i,j} \frac{\partial Z}{\partial u_i} \frac{\partial Z}{\partial u_j} \lambda_i \lambda_j}{Z^2}$$

Now since

$$\frac{\partial Z}{\partial u_i} = \frac{\partial Z}{\partial \lambda_i} \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial u_i} = \frac{\partial Z}{\partial \lambda_i} \frac{1}{\theta}$$

we have

$$(G6) \quad \frac{d^2 \log Z}{d\theta^2} \propto \sum_{i,j} \frac{\lambda_i \lambda_j}{\theta^2} \left(\frac{\partial^2 Z}{\partial \lambda_i \partial \lambda_j} - \frac{\partial Z}{\partial \lambda_i} \frac{\partial Z}{\partial \lambda_j} \right)$$

$$(G7) \quad \propto \sum_{i,j} \frac{\lambda_i \lambda_j}{\theta^2} \left(\frac{\partial^2 \log Z}{\partial \lambda_i \partial \lambda_j} \right) > 0.$$

where the last inequality follows from the log-convexity of Z in θ . Since this inequality holds for all values of λ_i , it must be true that

$$\frac{\partial^2 \log Z}{\partial \lambda_i \partial \lambda_j} > 0$$

for all i, j . Thus, setting $\theta = 1$, we conclude that the spectral radius of our original matrix, $\hat{\mu}_M(\vec{\lambda})$, is a log convex function of $\vec{\lambda}$.

The final step of the proof is to observe that because of the symmetry of the set of intertemporal weights in (G1) the spectral radius must be a symmetric function of $\vec{\lambda}$, i.e. any permutation of the elements of $\vec{\lambda}$ will leave the spectral radius unchanged. This follows since the eigenvalues of a matrix are invariant under the permutations (G1). Since $\hat{\mu}_M(\vec{\lambda})$ is a log convex, symmetric function of $\vec{\lambda}$, its log is Schur-convex. Since $\hat{\mu}_M(\vec{\lambda}) = e^{-\hat{\rho}_M(\vec{\lambda})}$,

this implies that $\hat{\rho}_M(\vec{\lambda})$ is Schur-concave in $\vec{\lambda}$. Thus by the properties of Schur-concave functions, if $\vec{\lambda}^A$ majorizes $\vec{\lambda}^B$ we must have

$$\hat{\rho}_M(\vec{\lambda}^A) < \hat{\rho}_M(\vec{\lambda}^B).$$

The final result follows by taking the limit as $M \rightarrow \infty$.

As an initial example of the application of this result, consider a model in which the discount function $g(s, \lambda)$ in the example in (G2) declines exponentially, i.e.

$$g(s, \lambda) = (1 + \lambda)^{-s}.$$

This discount function satisfies $\log g(s, \lambda) = -s \log(1 + \lambda)$, which is strictly convex in λ . Thus the result applies – more disagreement about the ‘social wellbeing discount rate’ λ *decreases* the consensus long run PRSTP.

We can extend this finding to a more general class of models by assuming that $g(s, \lambda) = \tilde{g}(\lambda s)$, i.e. the parameter λ acts to rescale the time variable s . Following Prelec (2004) we will say that $\tilde{g}(s)$ exhibits *decreasing impatience* if $\log \tilde{g}(s)$ is a convex function of s for $s > 0$. Discount functions that exhibit decreasing impatience have the form $\tilde{g}(s) = e^{-h(s)}$ where $h(s)$ is a concave function. The rate of increase of $h(s)$ (which measures impatience) slows as the time horizon s increases.

COROLLARY 1: *Assume that $\tilde{g}(s)$ exhibits decreasing impatience, and that the parameter vector $\vec{\lambda}^A$ majorizes $\vec{\lambda}^B$. Then*

$$\hat{\rho}(\vec{\lambda}^A) < \hat{\rho}(\vec{\lambda}^B).$$

Thus, for example, in a hyperbolic model (see e.g. Prelec, 2004) we would

have

$$(G8) \quad \tilde{g}(s) = (1 + s)^{-(1+p)} \Rightarrow g(s, \lambda) = \tilde{g}(\lambda s) = (1 + \lambda s)^{-(1+p)}$$

where $p > 0$ is a parameter. $\tilde{g}(s)$ is log convex in s , so more disagreement about λ reduces the consensus PRSTP in this model.

7) DETAILS OF CALIBRATION

The data I use to calibrate the model and generate the results in Figures 1a and 1b are taken from a recent survey by Drupp et al. (2015). They surveyed expert economists who have published papers on social discounting, asking for their opinions on, amongst other things, the appropriate values of the pure rate of social time preference and the elasticity of marginal social utility. The distribution of respondents' views on these two parameters is plotted in Figure H1.

To calibrate the values of γ, α_i in (20), I exploit the fact that when $x = 1$ the model reduces to a set of N homogeneous exponential models of non-paternalistic intertemporal preferences. Such models have been studied by e.g Saez-Marti and Weibull (2005); Galperti and Strulovici (2017). The latter authors in particular provide an axiomatic characterization of homogeneous exponential non-paternalistic preferences.

When $x = 1$, decision makers' social preferences can be represented as follows:

$$(H1) \quad V_{\tau}^i = U^i(c_{\tau}) + \gamma \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} (\alpha_i)^s V_{\tau+s}^i,$$

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and $\gamma \in (0, \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha})$. It is straightforward to show (see e.g.




Figure H1. : Experts' recommended values for the pure rate of social time preference (ρ_i), and the elasticity of marginal utility (η_i) for appraisal of long run public projects, from the Drupp et al. (2015) survey. 173 responses were recorded. The dashed box depicts data points that fall inside the 5 – 95% ranges of both parameters. The red cross indicates the location of the median values of ρ_i and η_i .

Galperti and Strulovici, 2017) that these preferences have the following equivalent representation:

$$(H2) \quad V_{\tau}^i = U^i(c_{\tau}) + \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \beta(\delta_i)^s U^i(c_{\tau+s}), \text{ where } \beta = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + 1}, \delta_i = (1 + \gamma)\alpha_i.$$

Notice that if we make the change of variables $\alpha_i = \tilde{\delta}_i/(1 + \gamma)$ in (H1), and then take the limit as $\gamma \rightarrow \infty$, equation (H2) implies that the resulting

preferences have the representation

$$(H3) \quad V_{\tau}^i = \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \tilde{\delta}_i^s U^i(c_{\tau+s}).$$

Thus in this limit the exponential homogeneous non-paternalistic model has an equivalent representation as discounted utilitarian time preferences.

To calibrate the discount factors α_i , I assume that the data in Figure H1 correspond to paternalistic views on the long run PRSTP (i.e. $x = 1$). Equation (H2) tells us that in this case type i 's long run utility discount factor is $(1 + \gamma)\alpha_i$. I will treat γ as a free parameter of the model, and thus calibrate α_i so that

$$(H4) \quad \alpha_i = \frac{e^{-\rho_i}}{1 + \gamma},$$

where ρ_i is the observed value of type i 's opinion on the utility discount rate. From (H2) the discount factor of type i at $s = 1$ is given by

$$\frac{1}{1 + \gamma^{-1}} e^{-\rho_i} \approx e^{-(\gamma^{-1} + \rho_i)}$$

when γ^{-1} is small. Thus e.g. $\gamma = 100$ corresponds to an additional 1% discount rate on the immediate future, over and above the long run discount rate ρ_i . To make the model a close approximation to discounted utilitarianism when $x = 1$, but also ensure that all types place positive weight on all future wellbeing measures (which requires γ be finite), I pick γ^{-1} to be small, but non-zero, i.e. $\gamma^{-1} = 0.1\%$.

In addition, I assume that types believe the social utility function is iso-

elastic, i.e.

$$(H5) \quad U^i(c) = \frac{c^{1-\eta_i}}{1-\eta_i}$$

for some $\eta_i > 0$. This implies that the elasticity of marginal social utility is constant and equal to η_i , and I simply calibrate η_i to be each respondent's preferred value of this elasticity.

REFERENCES

- Friedland, Shmuel.** 1981. "Convex spectral functions." *Linear and Multilinear Algebra*, 9(4): 299–316.
- Kingman, J.F.C.** 1961. "A convexity property of positive matrices." *Q J Math*, 12(1): 283–284.
- Marshall, Albert W., Ingram Olkin and Barry C. Arnold** 2010. "Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and its applications." *Springer*, New York, 2nd edition.
- Prelec, Drazen.** 2004. "Decreasing Impatience: A Criterion for Non-stationary Time Preference and "Hyperbolic" Discounting." *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 106(3): 511–532.