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UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON

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CONTACT DETAILS

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EDUCATION

2012-present	PhD Candidate, Department of Economics, University College London
	Advisors: Adam M. Rosen (primary), Aureo de Paula
	Expected Completion: June 2017
2011-2012	MRes in Economics, University College London
2009-2011	MSc in Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Summa cum Laude
2006-2009	BSc in Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Summa cum Laude

REFERENCES

Aureo de Paula
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University College London, Drayton House
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Elena Pastorino
Department of Economics
University of Minnesota, 4-133 Hanson Hall
1925 Fourth Street South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
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TEACHING AND RESEARCH FIELDS

Research fields	Econometrics, Applied Microeconomics
Teaching fields	Econometrics, Applied Microeconomics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Fall 2016-2017	Econometrics (PhD Economics, UCL)
	TA for Andrew Chesher and Daniel Wilhelm
Spring 2015-2016	Econometrics (PhD Economics, UCL)
1 0	TA for Richard Blundell and Lars Nesheim
Spring 2014-2015	Economics of Industrial Relations (UG Economics, UCL)
1 0	TA for Parama Chaudhury
Fall 2013-2014	Econometrics (MSc Economics, UCL)
	TA for Martin Weidner
Fall, Spring 2012-2013	Quantitative Economics and Econometrics (UG Economics, UCL)
	TA for Magne Mogstad and Aureo de Paula

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT

2016	UCL, Research Assistant to Elena Pastorino and Aureo de Paula
2014-2015	Bank of Italy, Researcher, Financial Stability Directorate
2013	IFS/CeMMAP, Research Assistant to Adam M. Rosen

CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

2016	EEA-ESEM Annual Congress (Geneva), IAEE Annual Conference (Milan),
	ENTER Jamboree Conference (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), Duke,
	European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (Edinburgh,
	scheduled), SAEe (Bilbao, scheduled)
2014	Bank of Italy, Zurich Initiative on Computational Economics (University
	of Zurich, poster session)
2013	Stats in Paris on networks (ENSAE, poster session)

SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

2013-2017	Ricardo Scholarship, UCL
2016	Graduate School Conference Fund, UCL
2012-2013	Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance Scholarship
2006-2011	University of Tor Vergata scholarship

JOB MARKET PAPER

An Econometric Model of Network Formation with an Application to Board Interlocks between Firms

This paper provides a framework for studying identification in a network formation model. Network formation is modelled as a static game with complete information and pure strategy equilibrium. Links formed by players have directions. Payoffs depend on some players' characteristics partially observed by the researcher and on an externality, or spillover effect (hereafter SE), that goes beyond direct connections - i.e., player i's payoff from forming a link with player j monotonically depends on the number of additional players creating a link with j. This implies that parameters in players' payoffs are partially identified without further assumptions on equilibrium selection. The set of admissible parameter values (sharp identified set) is derived. Even if restrictions are added, conducting inference on the sharp identified set is prohibitively complex when there are four or more players. To attenuate the computational difficulties, the focus is on a larger set of parameter values (outer set) obtained by bounding the empirical probability of any network section being the unique equilibrium, and the

probability of such a network section being a possible equilibrium, in a local game of the network formation game. The suggested outer set shows advantages over other outer sets in the literature (Tamer, 2003; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009; Sheng, 2014), in terms of computational tractability and width. A 95% confidence region for the characterised outer set is computed using data on board interlocks between Italian firms. Results reveal that SE has a positive sign, i.e., firm i's payoff from forming a board interlock with rival j increases with the number of additional competing firms creating a board interlock with j. In view of the co-optation theory in corporate governance, this seems to support the idea according to which the higher the number of competitors with a director sitting on j's board, the stronger their capacity to influence j's decisions and align them with the group's interests.

Working papers

Does a linking probability that increases with nodes' in-degree better fit the empirical in-degree probability distribution of social networks?

Work in progress

Using the LASSO in linear models with interval data

Estimating spillover effects in the formation of financial networks