ONLINE APPENDIX

A Extension: continuum of types

Agents differ in their prosociality v, according to a uniform distribution on $[0, v_{max}]$, where $v_{max} < \infty$. Denote the average v by $\bar{v} = v_{max}/2$. Besides their intrinsic motivation v to do good and their extrinsic motivation (the cost of the action), they also care about their reputational payoff $R \equiv \mu\widehat{v}$, where $\widehat{v}$ is their reputation and μ the (known) intensity of their image concerns.

A.1 Direct elicitation

The supply of prosociality under *DE* is $\bar{a}^{DE}(c) \equiv 1 - \frac{v^{DE}(c)}{v_{max}}$, where the cutoff $v^{DE}(c)$, when interior, solves

$$v^{DE}(c) - c + \mu\Delta = 0$$

and $\Delta \equiv \mathbb{E}(v|v > v^*) - \mathbb{E}(v|v < v^*) = \mu\bar{v}$.[10] We can define v's implicit bid as

$$\begin{aligned} b^{DE}(v) &\equiv \max\left\{c \mid a^{DE}(v, c) = 1\right\} \\ &= \max\left\{c \mid v \geq v^{DE}(c)\right\} = \min\{v + \mu\bar{v}, c_{max}\} \end{aligned}$$

and the image-induced inflation in the willingness to pay (henceforth, WTP) as

$$x^{DE}(v) \equiv b^{DE}(v) - v = \min\{\mu\bar{v}, c_{max} - v\}.$$

A.2 Multiple-Price-List

We consider a uniform cost distribution (as is the case in most experiments, including the one conducted in this paper) with $g(c) = 1$, meaning that we normalize $c_{max} = 1$. An agent's utility when having type v and bidding b is:

$$U(v, b) \equiv \int_0^b (v - \tilde{c})d\tilde{c} + \mu R(b) = vb - \frac{b^2}{2} + \mu R(b)$$

We look for a *separating equilibrium* on an interval $[0, v^\dagger]$ combined with pooling at $c_{\max} = 1$ on $(v^\dagger, v_{max}]$ (a fully separating equilibrium corresponds to $v^\dagger = v_{max}$).

[10] Corner solutions are:

- $v^{DE}(c) = 0$ when $c \leq \mu\bar{v}$, and
- $v^{DE}(c) = v_{max}$ when $c \geq v_{max} + \mu\bar{v}$.

Let $b(v)$ stands for the equilibrium bid of type v. In the separating part of the equilibrium

$$b(0) = 0,$$

and $b(v) = \max_b\{vb - \frac{b^2}{2} + \mu\hat{v}(b)\}$, which satisfies:

$$\frac{db}{dv}[b(v) - v] = \mu.$$

Finally, types $v > v^\dagger$ select $b(v) = 1$: they behave in an observationally deontological (or price insensitive) way, choosing $a = 1$ at any $c \leq c_{max}$ At the jump point $v^\dagger$ (when interior), this type gains extra reputation $\mu[M^\dagger(v^\dagger) - v^\dagger] = \mu\left[\frac{1-v^\dagger}{2}\right]$ by pooling with higher types in this way, but increases the cost of signaling from $\left[b(v^\dagger) - v^\dagger\right]^2/2$ to $\left[1 - v^\dagger\right]^2/2$.

And so,

$$(1 - v^\dagger)^2 - (b(v^\dagger) - v^\dagger)^2 = \mu(v_{max} - v^\dagger). \tag{9}$$

This jump point could be 0 (everyone mimics “Kantian” behavior"), or could be v_{max} when the equilibrium is fully separating. We will consider all of these cases when comparing *DE* and *MPL*. Let

$$x^{MPL}(v) \equiv b(v) - v$$

denote type v's inflation of WTP. Solving for the differential equation yields, for $v < v^\dagger$,

$$x^{MPL}(v) = \mu\left[1 + W(-e^{-1-v/\mu})\right],$$

where $W : [-e^{-1}, \infty) \to [-1, \infty)$ is the Lambert W-function, i.e., the inverse function of xe^x. Since $W(-e^{-1}) = -1$, we have $x^{MPL}(0) = 0$. Moreover, $x^{MPL}(v)$ goes to μ as v goes large, because $W(0) = 0$. Note that $x^{MPL}(v)$ is strictly increasing in v, and so a fortiori is $b^{MPL}(v)$. Moreover, the inflation is increasing in μ:

$$\frac{\partial x^{MPL}}{\partial \mu} = 1 + w + \frac{v}{\mu} \cdot \frac{w}{1+w} = \frac{1 + w - w\ln(-w)}{1+w}$$

where $w = W(-e^{-1-v/\mu}) \in [-1, 0)$, and using

$$we^w = -e^{-1-v/\mu} \implies \frac{v}{\mu} = -\big(\ln(-w) + w + 1\big).$$

The derivative of x^{MPL} with respect to μ is positive because the numerator $1 + w - w\ln(-w)$ equals 0 at $w = -1$ and is increasing in w (the denominator is obviously positive).

A.3 Comparing *DE* and *MPL*.

Depending on the magnitudes of v_{max} and μ, different cases may happen.

Case 1: $\frac{2}{\mu} \leq v_{max} \Leftrightarrow c_{max} \leq \mu\bar{v}$. Behavior of all types is observationally deontological, under both *DE* and *MPL:*

$$\forall v: \quad b^{MPL}(v) = b^{DE}(v) = 1.$$

Case 2: $\frac{1}{\mu} \leq v_{max} < \frac{2}{\mu} \Leftrightarrow \bar{c} \leq \mu\bar{v} < c_{max}$. Behavior is always observationally deontological under *MPL,* but not under *DE:*

$$\forall v: \quad b^{MPL}(v) = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad b^{DE}(v) = \min\{v + \mu\bar{v}, 1\}.$$

Case 3: $\leq v_{max} < \frac{1}{\mu}$ (this can only happen when $\mu < 0.5$). The two curves do not intersect because $\Delta \geq 1$. Moreover, b^{MPL} jumps to c_{max} at $v^\dagger \in (0, v_{max})$, but there could be two cases:

(a) If $v^\dagger < 1 - \mu\bar{v}$ (that is, $b^{DE}(v^\dagger) = v^\dagger + \mu\bar{v} < 1$), then b^{MPL} jumps above b^{DE} at $v^\dagger$.

(b) Otherwise, b^{MPL} jumps to c_{max} when b^{DE} is already there. Thus b^{MPL} is below b^{DE} everywhere.

Proof. Suppose first that the two curves intersect. Then we have:

$$\mu\bar{v} = \mu + \mu W(-e^{-1-v/\mu}) \Rightarrow W(-e^{-1-v/\mu}) = \bar{v} - 1 = \frac{v_{max}}{2} - 1 \geq 0,$$

while $W(-e^{-1-v/\mu})$ is always negative, a contradiction. Therefore, the two curves cannot intersect when $\Delta \geq 1$.

Moreover, MPL is fully separating if and only if

$$b(v_{max}) = v_{max} + \mu + \mu W(e^{-1-v_{max}/\mu}) \leq 1.$$

But here, $v_{max} \geq 2$ and we know that $\mu + \mu W(e^{-1-v/\mu}) > 0$ for all v. Thus, MPL cannot be fully separating, and $v^\dagger < v_{max}$. Furthermore, we know that

$$(1 - v^\dagger)^2 - (b(v^\dagger) - v^\dagger)^2 = 2\mu(\bar{v} - \frac{v^\dagger}{2}),$$

which shows that $v^\dagger \neq 0$: $v^\dagger = 0$ would imply that $1 = 2\mu\bar{v} = \mu v_{max}$, a contradiction.

Therefore, because DE reaches $c_{max} = 1$ at $1 - \mu\bar{v}$, either $v^\dagger < 1 - \mu\bar{v}$, and MPL jumps above b^{DE} at $v^\dagger$, or MPL jumps to c_{max} when DE is already there. Q.E.D.

Case 4: $v_{max} < \min\{2, \frac{1}{\mu}\}$
Denote the potential crossing point by $\hat{v} = -\mu\big[\ln(1 - \bar{v}) + \bar{v}\big] > 0$. How does $\hat{v}$ compare with $v^\dagger$, where MPL jumps?

(a) If $\hat{v} \leq v^{\dagger}$, then two curves intersect at $\hat{v}$, and we have

$$b^{MPL}(\hat{v}) = b^{DE}(\hat{v}) = -\mu \ln(1-\bar{v}).$$

This case includes the situation where MPL is fully separating. Indeed, whenever MPL is fully separating the two curves intersect and none of them reaches c_{max}.

(b) If $\hat{v} > v^{\dagger}$, b^{MPL} jumps above b^{DE} at $v^{\dagger}$, and they do not intersect.

Proof. The only claim that we have to prove in Case 4 is that: *whenever MPL is fully separating the two curves intersect and none of them reaches* c_{max}. Note that MPL can be fully separating only under Case 4's conditions, i.e. $v_{max} < \min\{2, \frac{1}{\mu}\}$. Moreover, when MPL is fully separating, $v_{max} \leq b(v_{max}) \leq 1$, and so, $\bar{v} \leq 0.5$. Considering these, we next prove that $\hat{v} = -\mu\big(\ln(1-\bar{v}) - \bar{v}\big) < 2\bar{v} = v_{max}$ for any $\bar{v} \leq 0.5$. Since $\mu < \frac{1}{v_{max}} = \frac{1}{2\bar{v}}$ and $-\big(\ln(1-\bar{v}) + \bar{v}\big) > 0$, we have:

$$\hat{v} = -\mu\big(\ln(1-\bar{v}) + \bar{v}\big) < \frac{-\ln(1-\bar{v})}{2\bar{v}} - \frac{1}{2}.$$

To prove that

$$\frac{-\ln(1-\bar{v})}{2\bar{v}} - \frac{1}{2} < 2\bar{v},$$

we show:

$$h(\bar{v}) \equiv -\ln(1-\bar{v}) - \bar{v} - 4\bar{v}^2 \leq 0 \quad \forall \bar{v} \in [0, 0.5].$$

This is true because $h(0) = h'(0) = 0$ and $h''(v) = \frac{1}{(1-\bar{v})^2} - 8 < 0 \; \forall \bar{v} \in [0, 0.5]$.

Finally, as we showed, the two curves intersect once and only once in the interval $[0, v_{max}]$, because MPL is fully separating. Moreover, after the intersection, $b^{DE}(v_{max})$ is below $b^{MPL}(v_{max})$. Therefore, $b^{DE}(v_{max}) < b^{MPL}(v_{max}) \leq 1$. Q.E.D.

Comparing DE and MPL for large and small μ. It is easy to see that, fixing v_{max}, for μ large (but not excessively large, i.e. we are in Case 2), all contribute under MPL, but not under DE. In contrast, as μ becomes small:

- If $v_{max} < 2$, Case 4(a) applies and b^{MPL} cuts b^{DE} at some v converging to 0 as μ goes to 0, and remains higher afterward.

- If $v_{max} \geq 2$, Case 3(a) applies and b^{MPL} is below b^{DE} before $v^{\dagger}$ and jumps above b^{DE} at $v^{\dagger} < 1 - \mu\bar{v}$.

Proof. Note that $v_{max} < \frac{1}{\mu}$ for small μ. When $v_{max} < 2$, Case 4 applies. Moreover, since $\hat{v}$ goes to 0 and $v^{\dagger}$ goes to $\min\{1, v_{max}\}$ as μ goes to 0, we have $\hat{v} < v^{\dagger}$ for small μ. On the other hand, when $v_{max} \geq 2$, Case 3 applies. Moreover, $v^{\dagger} < 1 - \mu\bar{v}$ for small enough μ, by the following lemma (putting $k = \bar{v}$ and $\alpha = 1$). We actually prove a stronger version than is needed here, as this will prove useful later on. Q.E.D.

Note that $v^\dagger$ depends on μ. Thus, we sometimes use $v^\dagger_\mu$ to emphasize this point.

Lemma 1. *When $2 \leq v_{max} < \frac{1}{\mu}$, for any k and α such that $\alpha > \frac{1}{2}$ or ($\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$ and $k < 2\bar{v} - 1$), there exists $\delta > 0$ such that for all $\mu < \delta$:*

$$v^\dagger_\mu < 1 - (k\mu)^\alpha.$$

Proof. Let us define

$$h(v, \mu) \equiv (1 - v)^2 - (b(v) - v)^2 - 2\mu(\bar{v} - \frac{v}{2}).$$

Note that $v^\dagger_\mu$ must solves $h(v^\dagger_\mu, \mu) = 0$. Moreover, $h(0, \mu) = 1 - 2\mu\bar{v} > 0$, and $h(1, \mu) = -2\mu(\bar{v} - \frac{1}{2}) < 0$. Additionally,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial h(v, \mu)}{\partial v} &= -2(1 - v) - 2(b'(v) - 1)(b(v) - v) + \mu \\ &= -2(1 - v) - 2\mu + 2(b(v) - v) + \mu = 2(b(v) - 1) - \mu < 0.\end{aligned}$$

So $v^\dagger_\mu$ exists and we can prove that $v^\dagger_\mu < 1 - (k\mu)^\alpha$ by showing $h(1 - (k\mu)^\alpha, \mu) < 0$. We have:

$$h(1 - (k\mu)^\alpha, \mu) = (k\mu)^{2\alpha} - \Big(\mu + \mu W(-e^{-1-\frac{1}{\mu}+k^\alpha\mu^{\alpha-1}})\Big)^2 - 2\mu\bar{v} + \mu(1 - (k\mu)^\alpha).$$

Therefore, denoting $w = W(-e^{-1-\frac{1}{\mu}+k^\alpha\mu^{\alpha-1}})$,

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d}{d\mu}h(1 - k\mu^\alpha, \mu) &= 2\alpha k^{2\alpha}\mu^{2\alpha-1} - 2(\mu + \mu w)\Big(1 + w + \mu \cdot \frac{1}{\mu^2}\big(1 + (\alpha - 1)(k\mu)^\alpha\big)\frac{w}{1 + w}\Big) \\ &\qquad - 2\bar{v} + 1 - (1 + \alpha)(k\mu)^\alpha \\ &= 2\alpha k^{2\alpha}\mu^{2\alpha-1} - 2(1 + w)\Big(\mu + \mu w + \big(1 + (\alpha - 1)(k\mu)^\alpha\big)\frac{w}{1 + w}\Big) \\ &\qquad - 2\bar{v} + 1 - (1 + \alpha)(k\mu)^\alpha.\end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\frac{d}{d\mu}h(1 - (k\mu)^\alpha, \mu)|_{\mu=0} = 1 - 2\bar{v} + 2\alpha k^{2\alpha}\mu^{2\alpha-1}|_{\mu=0} = \begin{cases} 1 - 2\bar{v} & \text{if } \alpha > \frac{1}{2} \\ 1 - 2\bar{v} + k & \text{if } \alpha = \frac{1}{2} \end{cases}.$$

This is negative since $\bar{v} > 1$, and when $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$ we have $k < 2\bar{v} - 1$. Moreover, $h(1, 0) = 0$. Therefore, for μ close enough to zero, $h(1 - (k\mu)^\alpha, \mu) < 0$. Q.E.D.

Comparing average inflations. Let us also compute the average bid inflations from 0 to v, $A^{MPL}(v)$ and $A^{DE}(v)$. We do not multiply by the uniform density $f(v) = \frac{1}{v_{max}}$, which means we calculate averages times v_{max}. For $v \leq 1 - \mu\bar{v}$ we have:

$$A^{DE}(v) = \int_0^v x^{DE}(s)ds = \int_0^v \mu\bar{v}ds = \mu\bar{v}v.$$

Moreover, for $v \leq v^\dagger$ we have:

$$A^{MPL}(v) = \int_0^v x^{MPL}(s)ds = \mu v + \mu \int_0^v W(-e^{-1-s/\mu})ds.$$

Denoting $w = W(-e^{-1-s/\mu})$, we have $we^w = -e^{-1-s/\mu}$ by the definition of Lambert W function, and so,

$$s = -\mu\big(\ln(-w) + w + 1\big) \implies ds = -\mu\big(\frac{1}{w} + 1\big)dw.$$

Define

$$\begin{aligned} AW(v) \equiv \int_0^v W(-e^{-1-s/\mu})ds &= -\mu \int_{-1}^{W(-e^{-1-v/\mu})} (1+w)dw \\ &= -\mu\Big(W(-e^{-1-v/\mu}) + \frac{1}{2}W(-e^{-1-v/\mu})^2 + \frac{1}{2}\Big). \end{aligned}$$

Let us focus on the case where μ is small. Therefore, $W(-e^{-1-v/\mu}) \approx 0$, and the first-order approximation is:

$$AW(v^\dagger) \approx -\frac{\mu}{2} \implies A^{MPL}(v^\dagger) = \mu v^\dagger + \mu AW(v^\dagger) \approx \mu v^\dagger.$$

- Suppose $v_{max} < 2$ and denote $v^+ = \min\{v^\dagger, 1 - \mu\bar{v}\}$. Thus,

  $$A^{DE}(v^+) = \mu v^+ \bar{v} < \mu v^+ \approx A^{MPL}(v^+)$$

  Moreover, for $v > v^+$ we know that b^{MPL} is above b^{DE} because b^{MPL} cuts b^{DE} at $\hat{v}$ close to 0, when μ is small. Therefore,

  $$A^{DE}(v_{max}) < A^{MPL}(v_{max}).$$

- On the other hand, if $v_{max} > 2$, then $v^\dagger < 1 - \mu\bar{v}$, as we showed before. Let us ignore the part after $1-\mu\bar{v}$, since both bids are c_{max}. Focusing on values up to that point,

$$\begin{aligned}
A^{MPL}(1-\mu\bar{v}) &= A^{MPL}(v^\dagger) + \int_{v^\dagger}^{1-\mu\bar{v}} (1-s)ds \\
&= A^{MPL}(v^\dagger) + \frac{1}{2}\big((1-v^\dagger)^2 - (\mu\bar{v})^2\big) \\
&\approx \mu v^\dagger + \frac{1}{2}(1-v^\dagger)^2.
\end{aligned}$$

Furthermore,

$$A^{DE}(1-\mu\bar{v}) = \mu\bar{v}(1-\mu\bar{v}) \approx \mu\bar{v}.$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}
(A^{MPL} - A^{DE})(1-\mu\bar{v}) &\approx \mu v^\dagger + \frac{1}{2}(1-v^\dagger)^2 - \mu\bar{v} \\
&> \mu v^\dagger + \frac{1}{2}(2\bar{v} - \frac{3}{2})\mu - \mu\bar{v} = \mu(v^\dagger - \frac{3}{4}).
\end{aligned}$$

The inequality holds for small enough μ, and comes from Lemma 1, using $k = 2\bar{v} - \frac{3}{2}$ and $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$. Consequently, since $v^\dagger$ goes to 1 as μ goes to zero, for small enough μ we have:

$$A^{DE} < A^{MPL}.$$

Thus, the average inflation factor is always higher under *MPL* for μ small when the distributions of types and costs are both uniform. Note that we only considered first-order approximations with respect to μ and found that $A^{MPL} - A^{DE}$ is positive and of order μ.

B Decision Screens

Figure B.1: Decision Screen DE



Figure B.2: Decision Screen MPL

Your Decisions

Please click here to be reminded of the precise meaning of 'saving a life'

Option A				Option B
	A		B	
I save a human life		1		I choose 0 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		2		I choose 10 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		3		I choose 20 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		4		I choose 30 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		5		I choose 40 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		6		I choose 50 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		7		I choose 60 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		8		I choose 70 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		9		I choose 80 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		10		I choose 90 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		11		I choose 100 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		12		I choose 110 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		13		I choose 120 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		14		I choose 130 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		15		I choose 140 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		16		I choose 150 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		17		I choose 160 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		18		I choose 170 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		19		I choose 180 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		20		I choose 190 € as payment for myself
I save a human life		21		I choose 200 € as payment for myself

Confirm decisions

C Robustness Experiment

In the main experiment, we showed how image concerns lead to differences in moral behavior between elicitation methods. One concern is that there are factors present in our experiment that lead to differences between DE and MPL independent of image concerns.

In particular, the previous literature has identified two main factors that could potentially confound the comparison between the two elicitation methods in our case.

First, in our experiment, only a subset of subjects had their decision implemented for real. In the MPL treatments, another randomization takes place, which is absent in DE: if selected for payout, one decision of the price list is randomly selected. If subjects violate the independence axiom and view these two randomization processes not separately but rather as a meta-lottery, this could potentially affect the comparison. This issue is also present in the many experiments that study decisions over lotteries and pay only one lottery out for real. In this context, it is usually assumed that subjects evaluate the different random processes in isolation, an assumption that has been repeatedly validated empirically[11]. It is natural to assume that subjects also perceive the two processes in isolation in our experiment since they were introduced and explained at two different points in the instructions.

The second factor is the so-called compromise effect (Andersen et al., 2006; Birnbaum, 1992; Simonson, 1989). When presenting a price list, the focus lies perceptually on the center. This in turn could change the attractiveness of the options appearing in the middle of the price list, biasing answers away from the subject's true valuations. To control for this effect, we carefully selected the DE value to correspond to the value precisely in the middle of the price list in the MPL treatments. As such, it seems unlikely that differences in perceptions could explain discrepancies between the elicitation methods.

Therefore, we would not expect differences between DE and MPL in our experiment once image concerns are absent. Nevertheless, in order to document this empirically, we conducted a robustness experiment, which is explained next.

C.1 Setup and Treatments

For the robustness experiment, we used a good that is unrelated to prosocial and moral considerations, so that image concerns are plausibly absent. For this non-moral good, we chose a 35 € voucher for the University of Bonn's online shop. With the voucher, subjects can buy sweatshirts, T-shirts, and accessories related to the university. The voucher cannot be returned and is only valid for purchases in the shop. There were two between-subject treatments: *DE No-Image* and *MPL No-Image*. In the former, subjects could choose between 10 € and the voucher, while in the latter they faced a price list from 0€ to 20€ in 1€ increments. Note that this closely mimics the decisions in the main experiment. The only difference is that all values are divided by 10. As in the main experiment, subjects were paired with another subject, and only a subset of subjects had their choices implemented for real.

Accordingly, instructions for the decisions were identical, with the sole difference being that descriptions related to the saving a life paradigm were replaced with descriptions of

[11] See e.g., Starmer and Sugden (1991), Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden (1998) and Hey and Lee (2005).

the voucher. Consequently, any factors influencing the comparison between *DE* and *MPL* in the main experiment should also manifest in the robustness experiment.

C.2 Procedure

Subjects were recruited from the same subject pool as the main experiment, with the restriction that they had not previously participated in the main experiment. The experiment was conducted as a virtual lab experiment since in-person lab sessions were not possible due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. That is, the experiment started and ended at a prespecified date and time, and the experimenter was available during the experiment in case of problems.

In total, 366 subjects (227 female, mean age 26.88, SD 7.87) took part, 188 in the *MPL No-Image*, and 178 in the *DE No-Image* treatment, respectively. The experiment lasted on average 13 minutes, for which the subjects received a show-up fee of 3€. Subjects were grouped in virtual sessions consisting of roughly 24 subjects, and one pair was randomly selected for payout out of each virtual session. Exactly as in the main experiment, for these two subjects, either their DE decision was implemented or a randomly chosen decision from the MPL list.

C.3 Results

Assessing subjects' general valuation of the voucher, we observe considerable variation in switching behavior in the *MPL No-Image* treatment. In total, 76% had an interior switching value, meaning they preferred the voucher in the initial decision but switched to preferring the monetary value at some point. The variation compares quite favorably to the *MPL-Low Image* treatment, where this was the case for 72% of subjects. Comparing the choice at 10 € in *MPL No-Image* with *DE No-Image*, we find that 29.8% choose the voucher in *MPL* and 25.3% in *DE*. This difference is small in magnitude and not statistically significant (p = 0.35; two-sided Fisher's exact test). It is also in the opposite direction of what we find in the main experiment for the *Low Image* case, which is the natural comparison. Table C.1 replicates this null result in an OLS-regression, with column (2) using the same variables as control variables as in the main experiment, compare Table 1, columns (2) and (4). Thus, we do not observe any meaningful differences between the two elicitation methods in our setting once image concerns are removed.

References

Andersen, Steffen, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten Igel Lau, and E. Elisabet Rutström (2006). "Elicitation using multiple price list formats ". Experimental Economics, 9(4), 383-405

Table C.1: Regression analyses of the effect of the elicitation method on voucher choice

Dependent variable:	Choice of Voucher (vs. 10€)	
	(1)	(2)
MPL No-Image	0.045	0.051
	(0.047)	(0.047)
Constant (*DE No-Image*)	0.253	0.227
	(0.033)	(0.047)
Controls		X
Observations	366	366
R^2	0.003	0.039

The table shows OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include age, gender, income, religiousness, educational level, and high school grade.

Birnbaum, Michael H. (1992). "Violations of Monotonicity and Contextual Effects in Choice-Based Certainty Equivalents ". Psychological Science, 3(5), 310-315.

Simonson, Itamar (1989). "Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and Compromise Effects ". Journal of Consumer Research, 16(2), 158.

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D Instructions

D.1 Announcement by the Experimenter

The following text was read aloud by the experimenter after all subjects were placed in their cubicles, establishing common knowledge among all subjects of a session. The content depended on the image treatment.

D.1.1 Treatment *Low Image*

Welcome to today's study. In today's study, you will make decisions on a computer. These decisions will take place under complete anonymity. To ensure this, we will now apply the following procedure: You should all have two notes with your cubicle number in front of you. We will soon collect one of the two notes and randomly draw one out of all collected. The person in the drawn cubicle is responsible for the payment in today's study. At the end of the study, we prepare sealed envelopes with your payments. Those envelopes are then passed to the soon to be randomly drawn person, who will hand them out to each of you sequentially in the adjacent room. The envelopes are designed so that you cannot see the contents from the outside, i.e., not on weight or similar clues. Hence at no time can there be a connection drawn between your payment and your decisions. Please hold now one of the notes with your cubicle number onto out of your cubicle. (Responsible person is drawn and placed in the adjacent room) The study will begin shortly. If you have at any time have questions, just hold your hand out of the cubicle.

D.1.2 Treatment *High Image*

Welcome to today's study. In today's study, you will make decisions on your computer. Your decisions will subsequently be evaluated by a committee consisting of three students from the University of Bonn. For this, after you have made your decisions, you will go to the adjacent room, where your decisions will be projected on a wall with a projector. You will then briefly communicate your decisions to the committee, and the committee will evaluate them. Afterward, you will receive the result of the evaluation. Detailed information about your decisions, the committee, and the evaluation will be given to you at the appropriate time on your computer. The study will begin shortly. If you have at any time have questions, just hold your hand out of the cubicle.

D.1.3 Further Procedure

After the text was read aloud, in the *Low Image* conditions the experimenter then collected one note from each subject indicating their respective cabin number. All notes were thrown into a bag, and one was drawn in front of all participants to make clear that the person responsible for the payment procedure was a randomly determined participant. In the *High Image* conditions, subjects were shown the adjacent room and the setup with the committee, which consisted of student research assistants. The members of the committee did not interact with the subjects in any way.

D.2 Introduction

All further instructions were displayed on the subjects screens. The following introduction was the same for all treatments.

D.2.1 Welcome to the study

Welcome, and thank you for your interest in today's study!
For your participation, you will receive a fixed payment of 12€ given to you at the end. In this study, you will make decisions on the computer. Depending on how you choose, you can earn additional money.
During the entire study, communication between participants is prohibited. Please turn off your phone so that other participants are not disturbed. Please only use the designated functions on the computer and make the entries with the mouse and keyboard. If you, at some point, have questions, please make a hand signal. Your question will be answered at your seat.
On the next screens, you will receive specific information about participation in this study. To proceed, click "Next".

D.2.2 Your Partner

As part of this experiment, a partner has been assigned to you. This partner is a participant in today's experiment, just like you. He or she was randomly assigned to you and will receive the same instructions as you.
In today's experiment, you and your partner will both receive the exact same information and subsequently face the exact same decisions. These decisions have certain consequences, which will be described in detail later.
At the end of today's experiment, one pair is randomly drawn from all participants in today's experiment. Only the decisions of this pair will be implemented, as described in the instructions. Please note: The random draw of a pair is completely independent of the participants' decisions. Each pair has the same probability of being drawn. Since your decision can be actually implemented for real, you should think carefully about how you will decide in the experiment.

Figure D.1: Typical appearance of a tuberculosis patient.

D.2.3 Information about Tuberculosis

What follows is important information that is relevant to the decisions you will later be asked to make. It concerns the illness tuberculosis and its possible treatment. Please read through all the information carefully.

What is Tuberculosis?

Tuberculosis – also called Phthisis or White Death – is an infectious disease, which is caused by bacteria. Roughly one-third of all humans are infected with the pathogen of Tuberculosis. Active Tuberculosis breaks out among 5 to 10% of all those infected. Tuberculosis is primarily airborne. This is also why quick treatment is necessary.

Tuberculosis patients often suffer from very unspecific symptoms like fatigue, the feeling of weakness, lack of appetite, and weight loss. At an advanced stage of lung tuberculosis, the patient coughs up blood, leading to the so-called rush of blood. Without treatment, a person with Tuberculosis dies with a probability of 43%.

How prevalent is Tuberculosis?

In the year 2014, 6 million people have been recorded as falling ill with active Tuberculosis. Almost 1.5 million people die of Tuberculosis each year. This means more deaths due to Tuberculosis than due to HIV, malaria, or any other infectious disease.

Is tuberculosis curable?

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations agency for international public health, "tuberculosis is preventable and curable". Treatment takes place by taking antibiotics several times a week over a period of 6 months. It is important to take the medication consistently. Since 2000, an estimated 53 million lives have been saved through effective diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis.

The success rate of treatment for a new infection is usually over 85%.

The preceding figures and information have been provided by the WHO and are freely available. Click here for more details.

Figure D.2: A worker from Operation ASHA delivers medication to a tuberculosis patient.

Operation ASHA

Operation ASHA is a charity organization specialized since 2005 on treating Tuberculosis in disadvantaged communities. The work of *Operation ASHA* is based on the insight that the biggest obstacle for the treatment of Tuberculosis is the interruption of the necessary 6-month-long regular intake of medication.

For a successful treatment, the patient has to come to a medical facility twice a week – more than 60 times in total – to take the medication. Interruption or termination of the treatment is fatal because this strongly enhances the development of a drug-resistant form of Tuberculosis. This form of Tuberculosis is much more difficult to treat and almost always leads to death.

The Concept of *Operation ASHA*

To overcome this problem, *Operation ASHA* developed a concept that guarantees regular treatment through immediate spatial proximity to the patient. A possible non-adherence is additionally prevented by visiting the patient at home.

By now, *Operation ASHA* runs more than 360 treatment centers, almost all of which are located in the poorer regions of India. More than 60,000 sick persons have been identified and treated that way.

Operation ASHA is an internationally recognized organization, and its success has been covered by the New York Times, BBC, and Deutsche Welle, for example. The MIT and the University College London have already conducted research projects about the fight against Tuberculosis in cooperation with *Operation ASHA*. The treatment method employed by *Operation ASHA* is described by the World Health Organization (WHO) as "highly efficient and cost-effective".

The Impact of a Donation to *Operation ASHA*

It is now possible to save people from death by Tuberculosis by donating to *Operation ASHA*.

Figure D.3: Relationship between the donation and the saving of a life



To save a person's life means here to successfully cure a person with Tuberculosis, who otherwise would die because of the Tuberculosis. A donation of 350€ ensures that at least one human life can be expected to be saved. The information used to calculate the donation amount is obtained from public statements from the World Health Organization (WHO), peer-reviewed research studies, Indian Government statistics, and published figures from *Operation ASHA*.
In the calculation, information was conservatively interpreted, or a pessimistic number was used so that the donation amount of 350€ is in the case of doubt higher than the actual costs to save a human life. In addition, in the calculation of the treatment success rate of *Operation ASHA*, the mortality rate for alternative treatment by the state tuberculosis program in India and the different detection rates for new cases of Tuberculosis are included.
In the context of this study, an agreement made with *Operation ASHA* will ensure that 100% of the donation will be used exclusively for the diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis patients. This means that every Euro of the donation amount goes directly to saving human lives, and no other costs will be covered. Based on a very high number of cases, the contribution of a donation of 350€ can be simplified visualized as follows:
With a donation of 350€ 5 additional patients infected with Tuberculosis can be treated through *Operation ASHA*.
If these 5 persons are not treated through *Operation ASHA*, it is expected that one patient will die.
If, through the donation of 350€ all 5 patients are treated, it is expected that no patient will die.
Based on this experience, this means that through a donation of 350€ the life of a human will be saved. The relationship between a donation of 350€ and the saving of a human is illustrated in the following graphic: [Figure D.3 here]

Summary

Tuberculosis is a worldwide common bacterial infectious disease. The success rate of medical treatment of a new disease is very high. Nevertheless, close to 1.5 million people die every year from Tuberculosis. The biggest obstacle to the curing of Tuberculosis is the potential stopping of continuous treatment with antibiotics. The concept of *Operation ASHA* is therefore based on the immediate proximity to the patient as well as the control and recording of the regular intake of medication. Through a donation of 350€ to *Operation ASHA*, a life will be saved.

How is the donation connected to the saving of a life?

The donation of 350€ already accounts for the fact that someone inflicted with the illness could have survived without treatment by *Operation ASHA*; i.e., instead of through *Operation ASHA*, they could have received treatment through other actors (such as the public health system). The amount is, therefore, sufficient for the diagnosis and complete treatment of multiple sufferers.

What does it mean to "save a life"?

To save a life means here the successful curing of a person suffering from Tuberculosis, who otherwise would die because of Tuberculosis. In particular, this means that the amount of the donation is sufficient to identify and cure so many tuberculosis patients that there is at least one person among them who otherwise could be anticipated to have died of Tuberculosis.

Note

Click on "Next" once you have finished carefully reading through the information.

You can only click on the button "Next" once you have spent at least 5 minutes on the tabs of this page.

D.3 Treatment *DE Low Image*

D.3.1 Your Decision

You will soon have the possibility to choose between two options: option A and option B. Both options are as follows:

Option A

Option A: I save a human life. By choosing option A, you save a human life. Specifically, by choosing option A, you instigate a donation of 350,00€ that will ensure that at least one person is saved from death by Tuberculosis, just as described before. If you choose option A, you will not receive an additional payment.

Option B

Option B: I choose X€ as payment for myself. By choosing option B, you will receive an additional payment at the end of the experiment. In addition, the absence of your donation will cause the death of a human life.

Additional Payment

Before today's experiment, various amounts between 0€ and 200€ were taken into account for the amount of money you will receive when choosing option B, from which 100€ was selected. Your partner sees exactly the same options as you and makes a decision just like you. So your partner also decides between option A (saving a human life) and option B (keeping 100€ to himself).

Summary

You will decide on the next page of the screen by choosing between option A and option B. By choosing option A, you save a human life. By choosing option B, you receive an additional payment of 100€. On the next page, you will receive details about the payment procedure.

D.3.2 Further Procedure

After you confirmed your decision on the decision screen, a screenshot will be taken from this decision screen. From the decision screen of your partner, a screenshot will be taken in the same way. Thereafter, some additional questions will follow. After you have answered these questions, you will get the screenshot with the decision of your partner displayed, and your partner will get the screenshot with your decision. You will not receive any further information about your partner, and your partner will not receive any further information about you.

After you received the screenshot, please remain seated until you are called with your cabin number. Then you can go into the adjacent room to pick up your compensation for today's experiment. You will be called one by one so that there is no contact with other participants of the experiment.

Who will be in the adjacent room?

In the adjacent room, you will find the participant who was randomly selected from all participants at the start of the study.

How do you receive your payment?

This participant will give you a sealed envelope with your payment. The selected participant has already received the envelope sealed. Since this participant is only responsible for the payment, this participant has not completed the study and therefore has no knowledge of the decisions to be made. Therefore, this participant does not know what you chose, how you decided, or how much money you received, exactly as explained at the beginning of the study. By handing in your note with your cabin number, you will receive the envelope intended for you.

Data protection

The subsequent analysis of all data is carried out anonymously so that your decision can never be linked to your person. Your anonymity is therefore always guaranteed, and the information about your decision is only used for anonymized data analysis.

Please note:

This is not a thought experiment: All information given in these instructions is true. In particular, all actions are performed exactly as they are described. This fundamentally applies to all studies of the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research, as well as to this study.

If you still have separate questions, you may send them to experimente@briq-institute.org after the study.

D.4 Treatment *DE High Image*

D.4.1 Your Decision

You will soon have the possibility to choose between two options: option A and option B. Both options are as follows:
Option A
Option A: I save a human life. By choosing option A, you save a human life. Specifically, by choosing option A, you instigate a donation of 350,00€ that will ensure that at least one person is saved from death by Tuberculosis, just as described before. If you choose option A, you will not receive an additional payment.
Option B
Option B: I choose X€ as payment for myself. By choosing option B, you will receive an additional payment at the end of the experiment. In addition, the absence of your donation will cause the death of a human life.
Additional Payment
Before today's experiment, various amounts between 0€ and 200€ were taken into account for the amount of money you will receive when choosing option B, from which 100€ was selected. Your partner sees exactly the same options as you and makes a decision just like you. So your partner also decides between option A (saving a human life) and option B (keeping 100€ to himself).
Summary
You will decide on the next page of the screen by choosing between option A and option B. By choosing option A, you save a human life. By choosing option B, you receive an additional payment of 100€. On the next page, you will receive details about the payment procedure.

D.4.2 Further Procedure

After you confirmed your decision on the decision screen, a screenshot will be taken from this decision screen. From the decision screen of your partner, a screenshot will be taken in the same way. Thereafter, some additional questions will follow. After you have answered these questions, you will get the screenshot with the decision of your partner displayed, and your partner will get the screenshot with your decision. You will not receive any further information about your partner, and your partner will not receive any further information about you.
After you received the screenshot, please remain seated until you are called with your cabin number. Then you can go into the adjacent room to pick up your compensation for today's experiment. You will be called one by one so that there is no contact with other participants of the experiment.
Who will be in the adjacent room?

In the adjacent room, you will find a person who will make the payment. As mentioned before, there will also be a committee consisting of three other persons in the adjacent room. These three persons are students of the University of Bonn and were specially selected for this task.

What is the task of the committee?

The task of these three persons is to assess the decision you and your partner have taken. Specifically, the assessment is about how moral your behavior and the behavior of your partner is. Apart from the assessment, the three persons will not interact with you (or with your partner) in any way, and the rating will not influence at all the consequences of your decisions or your payment.

What information does the committee receive?

In order for the committee to make the assessment, the two screenshots of the decision of you and your partner are projected side by side onto the room's wall using a projector, visibly for all persons in the adjacent room. You are identified by (and only by) your cabin number. For better identification, based on your decision and that of your partner, you must also say the following two sentences aloud. The first sentence refers to your decision, the second sentence to your partner's decision.

Sentence 1 in case you chose option A: "I have decided not to take 100€ as payment for myself and instead decided to save a human life."Sentence 1 in case you chose option B: "I have decided to take 100€ as payment for myself instead of saving a human life."

Sentence 2 in case your partner has chosen option A: "My partner has decided not to take 100€ as payment for himself and instead decided to save a human life."Sentence 2 in case your partner has chosen option A: "My partner has decided to take 100€ as payment for himself instead of saving a human life."

In summary, you have to say two sentences, and the following information will be visible to everyone in the room:

- The decision you and your partner faced.
- Which option you and your partner have chosen. This means it is displayed whether you chose to save a human life or the additional payment of 100€ and whether your partner chose to save a human life or the additional payment of 100€.

How does the assessment work?

The committee will assess your decision using a scale. For this, each one of the three persons of the committee selects one of the following five values:

1 - very immoral 2 - rather immoral 3 - neutral 4 - rather moral 5 - very moral.

The three persons of the committee will submit an assessment for your decision as well as the decision of your partner.

How do you receive your payment?

After the committee has assessed the decisions, the committee will give you the assessments of both your decision and the decision of your partner, and the person responsible for the payments will give you your payment. In the event that you have decided to donate, you will receive a donation confirmation.

Data protection

The subsequent analysis of all data is carried out anonymously so that your decision can never be linked to your person. Your anonymity is therefore always guaranteed, and the information about your decision is only used for anonymized data analysis.

Please note:

This is not a thought experiment: All information given in these instructions is true. In particular, all actions are performed exactly as they are described. This fundamentally applies to all studies of the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research, as well as to this study.

If you still have separate questions, you may send them to experimente@briq-institute.org after the study.

D.5 Treatment *MPL Low Image*

D.5.1 Your Decision

You will soon have the possibility to choose in 21 decision scenarios between two options: option A and option B. Both options are as follows:

Option A

Option A: I save a human life. By choosing option A, you save a human life. Specifically, by choosing option A, you instigate a donation of 350,00€ that will ensure that at least one person is saved from death by Tuberculosis, just as described before. If you choose option A, you will not receive an additional payment.

Option B

Option B: I choose X€ as payment for myself. By choosing option B, you will receive an additional payment at the end of the experiment. In addition, the absence of your donation will cause the death of a human life.

Additional Payment

The additional payment that you receive from choosing option B varies in each of the 21 decision scenarios. In the first scenario, the payment is 0€ and then increases incrementally in each scenario thereafter by 10€ up to a payment of 200€. Therefore, the decision scenarios look as follows:

Automatic Completion Help

So that you do not need to click as much, we have activated an automatic completion help that automatically fills out the fields for you. As soon as you choose an amount from option B, we assume that you would choose all respectively higher payments from option B. Likewise,

when you choose option A in a row, we assume that you would choose option A over all respectively lower payments from option B.
Please note: You can always change your decisions until you clicked on “Confirm Decisions”. Therefore, only click on that button when you are certain how you want to decide.

Payment

After you have selected one of the two options for each of the 21 decision scenarios, one of them will be randomly selected for real implementation. This means that the consequences of this decision will be implemented exactly as stated. Each of the 21 scenarios has the same probability of being selected. Therefore, since each of your decisions is potentially relevant, it is in your interest to decide in every scenario as if that decision is being implemented for real.
Your partner sees exactly the same 21 decision scenarios as you and, like you, makes a decision for every scenario. Furthermore, for you and your partner, the same decision scenario will be randomly selected. Thus, both your decision and the decision of your partner for this scenario will be implemented.
The following examples elaborate on this. Assume that decision scenario 2 is randomly selected, and you chose option A, while your partner chose option B. Then you save a human life and your partner will receive 10€. If, on the contrary, both of you choose option B, then both of you will receive 10€. If both of you choose option A, then two human lives will be saved. Assuming that decision scenario 21 is randomly selected, and you chose option B, while your partner chose option A. Then, you will receive 200€ and your partner saves a human life. If, however, both of you chose option B, then both of you will receive 200€. If both of you chose option A, then two human lives will be saved.

Summary

On the page after next, you will make a decision for 21 scenarios, and in each decision, you can choose between option A and option B. By choosing option A, you save a human life, whereas by choosing option B, you receive an additional payment. After you have reached all of your decisions, one of the 21 scenarios will be chosen randomly for you and your assigned partner. Thereafter, the consequences of the chosen decision are realized, i.e., in the case that you chose option A under this scenario, a donation will be made towards the saving of a human life and in the case that you chose option B, you receive the respective amount from the selected scenario. The same applies to your partner. On the next page, you will receive details about the payment procedure.

D.5.2 Further Procedure

After you confirmed your decisions on the decision screen, a screenshot will be taken from this decision screen. From the decision screen of your partner, a screenshot will be taken in the same way. Thereafter, some additional questions will follow. After you have answered these questions, you will get the screenshot with the decisions of your partner displayed, and your partner will get the screenshot with your decisions. You will not receive any further information about your partner, and your partner will not receive any further information about you.

After you received the screenshot, please remain seated until you are called with your cabin number. Then you can go into the adjacent room to pick up your compensation for today's experiment. You will be called one by one so that there is no contact with other participants of the experiment.

Who will be in the adjacent room?

In the adjacent room, you will find the participant who was randomly selected from all participants at the start of the study.

How do you receive your payment?

This participant will give you a sealed envelope with your payment. The selected participant has already received the envelope sealed. Since this participant is only responsible for the payment, this participant has not completed the study and therefore has no knowledge of the decisions to be made. Therefore, this participant does not know what you chose, how you decided, or how much money you received, exactly as explained at the beginning of the study. By handing in your note with your cabin number, you will receive the envelope intended for you.

Data protection

The subsequent analysis of all data is carried out anonymously so that your decisions can never be linked to your person. Your anonymity is therefore always guaranteed, and the information about your decisions is only used for anonymized data analysis.

Please note:

This is not a thought experiment: All information given in these instructions is true. In particular, all actions are performed exactly as they are described. This fundamentally applies to all studies of the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research, as well as to this study.

If you still have separate questions, you may send them to experimente@briq-institute.org after the study.

D.6 Treatment *MPL High Image*

D.6.1 Your Decision

You will soon have the possibility to choose in 21 decision scenarios between two options: option A and option B. Both options are as follows:

Option A

Option A: I save a human life. By choosing option A, you save a human life. Specifically, by choosing option A, you instigate a donation of 350,00€ that will ensure that at least one person is saved from death by Tuberculosis, just as described before. If you choose option A, you will not receive an additional payment.

Option B

Option B: I choose X€ as payment for myself. By choosing option B, you will receive an additional payment at the end of the experiment. In addition, the absence of your donation will cause the death of a human life.

Additional Payment

The additional payment that you receive from choosing option B varies in each of the 21 decision scenarios. In the first scenario, the payment is 0€ and then increases incrementally in each scenario thereafter by 10€ up to a payment of 200€. Therefore, the decision scenarios look as follows:

Automatic Completion Help

So that you do not need to click as much, we have activated an automatic completion help that automatically fills out the fields for you. As soon as you choose an amount from option B, we assume that you would choose all respectively higher payments from option B. Likewise, when you choose option A in a row, we assume that you would choose option A over all respectively lower payments from option B.

Please note: You can always change your decisions until you clicked on “Confirm Decisions”. Therefore, only click on that button when you are certain how you want to decide.

Payment

After you have selected one of the two options for each of the 21 decision scenarios, one of them will be randomly selected for real implementation. This means that the consequences of this decision will be implemented exactly as stated. Each of the 21 scenarios has the same probability of being selected. Therefore, since each of your decisions is potentially relevant, it is in your interest to decide in every scenario as if that decision is being implemented for real.

Your partner sees exactly the same 21 decision scenarios as you and, like you, makes a decision for every scenario. Furthermore, for you and your partner, the same decision scenario will be randomly selected. Thus, both your decision and the decision of your partner for this scenario will be implemented.

The following examples elaborate on this. Assume that decision scenario 2 is randomly selected, and you chose option A, while your partner chose option B. Then you save a human life and your partner will receive 10€. If, on the contrary, both of you choose option B, then both of you will receive 10€. If both of you choose option A, then two human lives will be saved. Assuming that decision scenario 21 is randomly selected, and you chose option B, while your partner chose option A. Then, you will receive 200€ and your partner saves a human life. If, however, both of you chose option B, then both of you will receive 200€. If both of you chose option A, then two human lives will be saved.

Summary

On the page after next, you will make a decision for 21 scenarios, and in each decision, you can choose between option A and option B. By choosing option A, you save a human life, whereas by choosing option B, you receive an additional payment. After you have reached all of your decisions, one of the 21 scenarios will be chosen randomly for you and your assigned partner. Thereafter, the consequences of the chosen decision are realized, i.e., in the case that you chose option A under this scenario, a donation will be made towards the saving of a human life and in the case that you chose option B, you receive the respective amount from the selected scenario. The same applies to your partner. On the next page, you will receive details about the payment procedure.

D.6.2 Further Procedure

After you confirmed your decisions on the decision screen, a screenshot will be taken from this decision screen. From the decision screen of your partner, a screenshot will be taken in the same way. Thereafter, some additional questions will follow. After you have answered these questions, you will get the screenshot with the decisions of your partner displayed, and your partner will get the screenshot with your decisions. You will not receive any further information about your partner, and your partner will not receive any further information about you.

After you received the screenshot, please remain seated until you are called with your cabin number. Then you can go into the adjacent room to pick up your compensation for today's experiment. You will be called one by one so that there is no contact with other participants of the experiment.

Who will be in the adjacent room?

In the adjacent room, you will find a person who will make the payment. As mentioned before, there will also be a committee consisting of three other persons in the adjacent room. These three persons are students of the University of Bonn and were specially selected for this task.

What is the task of the committee?

The task of these three persons is to assess the decisions you and your partner have taken. Specifically, the assessment is about how moral your behavior and the behavior of your partner is. Apart from the assessment, the three persons will not interact with you (or with your partner) in any way, and the rating will not influence at all the consequences of your decisions or your payment.

What information does the committee receive?

In order for the committee to make the assessment, the two screenshots of the decisions of you and your partner are projected side by side onto the room's wall using a projector, visibly for all persons in the adjacent room. You are identified by (and only by) your cabin number. For better identification, based on your decisions and the decisions of your partner, you must

also say the following two sentences aloud. The first sentence refers to your decisions, the second sentence to your partner's decisions.
Sentence 1: "I have decided from a payment of X€ onwards to take the payment for myself instead of saving human life."
Sentence 2: "My partner has decided from a payment of X€ onwards to take the payment for himself instead of saving human life."
The payment X denotes the amount of money for which you switched from option A to option B for the first time. If you have not decided to take the money in any decision-making situation, i.e., have not switched, you have to say the following as the first sentence:
Sentence 1: "I have decided for no amount to take the payment for myself instead of saving human life."
Similarly, if your partner has not decided to take the money in any decision-making situation, you must say the following second sentence:
Sentence 2: "My partner has decided for no amount to take the payment for himself instead of saving human life."
In summary, you have to say two sentences, and the following information will be visible to everyone in the room:

- The complete list of all 21 decision scenarios described before.
- How you and your partner have chosen in each of these scenarios. This means that for each payment amount, one can see whether you have decided to save a human life or the additional payment and whether your partner has decided to save a human life or the additional payment.

How does the assessment work?
The committee will assess your decisions using a scale. For this, each one of the three persons of the committee selects one of the following five values:
1 - very immoral 2 - rather immoral 3 - neutral 4 - rather moral 5 - very moral.
The three persons of the committee will submit an assessment for your decisions as well as the decisions of your partner.
How do you receive your payment?
After the committee has assessed the decisions, the committee will give you the assessments of both your decisions and the decisions of your partner, and the person responsible for the payments will give you your payment. In the event that you have decided to donate, you will receive a donation confirmation.
Data protection
The subsequent analysis of all data is carried out anonymously so that your decisions can never be linked to your person. Your anonymity is therefore always guaranteed, and the information about your decisions is only used for anonymized data analysis.

Please note:
This is not a thought experiment: All information given in these instructions is true. In particular, all actions are performed exactly as they are described. This fundamentally applies to all studies of the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research, as well as to this study.
If you still have separate questions, you may send them to experimente@briq-institute.org after the study.

D.7 Robustness Experiment

D.8 Introduction

All instructions were displayed on the subjects' screens. The following introduction was the same for both treatments of the robustness experiment.

D.8.1 Welcome to the study

Welcome, and thank you for your interest in today's study!
Please note that you can take part in this study only once. Furthermore, you may only participate if you have registered for this study in our participation database (`experimente.bonneconlab.uni-bonn.de`).
For your full participation, you will receive a fixed payment of 3€. In this study, you will make decisions on the computer. Depending on how you choose, you can earn additional money. After the study, you will receive all payments, i.e. both the remuneration for your participation and any additional payments based on your decisions, by bank transfer.
On the next screens, you will receive specific information about participation in this study.
To proceed, click "Next".

D.8.2 Your Partner

As part of this experiment, a partner has been assigned to you. This partner is a participant in today's experiment, just like you. He or she was randomly assigned to you and will receive the same instructions as you.
In today's experiment, you and your partner will both receive the exact same information and subsequently face the exact same decisions. These decisions have certain consequences, which will be described in detail later.
Payment
At the end of today's experiment, one pair will be randomly drawn from every 24 participants in the experiment. Only the decisions of this pair will be implemented, as described in the instructions. Please note: The random draw of a pair is completely independent of the participants' decisions. Each pair has the same probability of being drawn. Since your

decision can be actually implemented for real, you should think carefully about how you will decide in the experiment.

D.8.3 Information

What follows is some information that is relevant to the decisions you will later be asked to make. It concerns the official shop of the University of Bonn.
The Campus Store Uni-Bonn is the official shop of the University of Bonn. Here you can purchase various products such as T-shirts, sweatshirts or mugs with the logo and design of the Uni-Bonn.
The Uni-shop is located at the information point in the main building. There is also an online shop, which can be reached via the website: `https://www.campusstore-unibonn.de`. The online shop dispatches all goods within 2-3 working days.
Voucher
The next decisions will concern a voucher for the Uni-shop, namely a voucher worth 35€. The voucher can only be redeemed in the online shop and cannot be converted into money.

D.9 Treatment *DE No-Image*

D.9.1 Your Decision

You will soon have the possibility to choose between two options: option A and option B. Both options are as follows:
Option A
Option A: I choose the voucher. By choosing option A, you will receive the voucher for the Uni-shop. Specifically, option A allows you to receive a voucher worth 35€, which you can redeem in the Uni-shop (and only there). If you choose option A, you will not receive an additional payment.
Option B
Option B: I choose 10€ as payment for myself. By choosing option B, you will receive an additional payment of 10€ at the end of the experiment, but you will not receive the voucher.
Additional Payment
Before today's experiment, various amounts between 0€ and 20€ were taken into account for the amount of money you will receive when choosing option B, from which 10€ was selected. Your partner sees exactly the same options as you and makes a decision just like you. So your partner also decides between option A (voucher) and option B (keeping 10€ to himself/herself).
Summary
You will decide on the next page of the screen by choosing between option A and option B. By choosing option A, you receive a voucher. By choosing option B, you receive an additional

payment of 10€. On the next page, you will find details about the payment procedure.

D.9.2 Further Procedure

After you confirmed your decision on the decision screen, a screenshot will be taken from this decision screen. From the decision screen of your partner, a screenshot will be taken in the same way. At the end of today's experiment, you will get the screenshot with the decision of your partner displayed, and your partner will get the screenshot with your decision. You will not receive any further information about your partner, and your partner will not receive any further information about you.

Data protection

The subsequent analysis of all data is carried out anonymously so that your decision can never be linked to your person. Your anonymity is therefore always guaranteed, and the information about your decision is only used for anonymized data analysis.

Please note:

This is not a thought experiment: All information given in these instructions is true. In particular, all actions are performed exactly as they are described. This fundamentally applies to all studies of the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research, as well as to this study.

If you still have separate questions, you may send them to experiment@briq-institute.org after the study.

D.10 Treatment *MPL No-Image*

D.10.1 Your Decisions

You will soon have the possibility to choose in 21 decision scenarios between two options: option A and option B. Both options are as follows:

Option A

Option A: I choose the voucher. By choosing option A, you will receive the voucher for the Uni-shop. Specifically, option A allows you to receive a voucher worth 35€, which you can redeem in the Uni-shop (and only there). If you choose option A, you will not receive an additional payment.

Option B

Option B: I choose X€ as payment for myself. By choosing option B, you will receive an additional payment at the end of the experiment, but you will not receive the voucher.

Additional Payment

The additional payment that you receive from choosing option B varies in each of the 21 decision scenarios. In the first scenario, the payment is 0€ and then increases incrementally in each scenario thereafter by 1€, up to a payment of 20€. Therefore, the decision scenarios look as follows:

Automatic Completion Help

So that you do not need to click as much, we have activated an automatic completion help that automatically fills out the fields for you. As soon as you choose an amount from option B, we assume that you would choose all respectively higher payments from option B. Likewise, when you choose option A in a row, we assume that you would choose option A over all respectively lower payments from option B.

Please note: You can always change your decisions until you clicked on "Confirm Decisions". Therefore, click on that button only when you are certain how you want to decide.

Payment

After you have selected one of the two options for each of the 21 decision scenarios, one of them will be randomly selected for real implementation. This means that the consequences of this decision will be implemented exactly as stated. Each of the 21 scenarios has the same probability of being selected. Therefore, since each of your decisions is potentially relevant, it is in your interest to decide in every scenario as if that decision is being implemented for real.

Your partner sees exactly the same 21 decision scenarios as you and, like you, makes a decision for every scenario. Furthermore, for you and your partner, the same decision scenario will be randomly selected. Thus, both your decision and the decision of your partner for this scenario will be implemented.

The following examples elaborate on this. Assume that decision scenario 2 is randomly selected, and you chose option A, while your partner chose option B. Then you will receive the voucher and your partner will receive 1€. If, on the contrary, both of you chose option B, then both of you will receive 1€. If both of you chose option A, then you and your partner will each receive the voucher. Assuming that decision scenario 21 is randomly selected, and you chose option B while your partner chose option A, then you will receive 20€, and your partner will receive the voucher. If, however, both of you chose option B, then both of you will receive 20€. If both of you chose option A, then you and your partner will each receive the voucher, etc.

Summary

On the page after next, you will make a decision for 21 scenarios, and in each decision, you can choose between option A and option B. By choosing option A, you receive a voucher, whereas by choosing option B, you receive an additional payment. After you have reached all of your decisions, one of the 21 scenarios will be chosen randomly for you and your assigned partner. Thereafter, the consequences of the chosen decision are realized, i.e., in the case that you chose option A under this scenario, you will be given the voucher and in the case that you chose option B, you will receive the respective amount from the selected scenario. The same applies to your partner. On the next page, you will receive details about the payment procedure.

D.10.2 Further Procedure

After you confirmed your decision on the decision screen, a screenshot will be taken from this decision screen. From the decision screen of your partner, a screenshot will be taken in the same way. At the end of today's experiment, you will get the screenshot with the decision of your partner displayed, and your partner will get the screenshot with your decision. You will not receive any further information about your partner, and your partner will not receive any further information about you.

Data protection

The subsequent analysis of all data is carried out anonymously so that your decisions can never be linked to your person. Your anonymity is therefore always guaranteed, and the information about your decisions is only used for anonymized data analysis.

Please note:

This is not a thought experiment: All information given in these instructions is true. In particular, all actions are performed exactly as they are described. This fundamentally applies to all studies of the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research, as well as to this study.

If you still have separate questions, you may send them to experiment@briq-institute.org after the study.