

## The Anatomy of the DMA Process An Example of Responsive Regulation

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
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## It is complicated!

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#### Regulatory instruments

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- Informal tools
  - Bilateral interactions EC-Gatekeepers, EC-Business users
  - **Multilateral** interactions

- Formal tools
  - Gatekeepers: compliance officers and reports
  - Commission: specification and non-compliance decisions

### Methodology

- Semi structured interviews with 21 stakeholders
  - 3 gatekeepers, 14 business users, 2 regulators, 2 CSOs
- Small set but consistency
  - Among answers
  - With enforcement Commission decisions

Still in learning phase



# 1. Informal Interactions Bilateral EC-Gatekeepers

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- Gatekeepers
  - **Different** strategies, some very legalistic

#### Commission

- Different institutional cultures across departments COMP/CNECT
  - Antitrust approach has dominated at the start while the DMA is a regulatory instrument (Case T-1077/23 Tik-Tok designation)
- Reluctance to signal
  - Compliance acceptability: no Guidelines (contrary to JFTC)
    - May delay compliance and encourage incremental approah
  - **Enforcement** strategies

# 1. Informal Interactions Bilateral EC-Business users and others

- Less intense than with gatekeepers
- Black box approach

- Little coordination among business users and mostly reactive mode
- Expectations no met
  - Risk of dis-engagement

# 1. Informal Interactions Multi-lateral

- Much less intense than bilateral dialogues
  - Open workshops very scripted and not always useful
  - Fear factor of retaliation
- Why multi-lateral dialogues?
  - Information level playing field (e.g. choice screens and A/B testing)
  - Coordination among business users
  - Enforcement effectiveness
- How multi-lateral dialogues?
  - Steered by the Commission
  - Between **experts**: engineers ....
  - With digital and standard business process tools

# 2. Formal Interactions Gatekeeper compliance tools

- Compliance officers
  - Minimalist approach: limited role and not very visible inside and outside the firm
  - Maximalist approach: focal point for external engagement and opinion on effectiveness of the compliance measures
- Compliance reports
  - Not informative and standardised enough
    - Need KPI on process and output which are consistent across time and across gatekeepers
  - Not on continuous basis
    - Need update when big changes in products

## 2. Formal Interactions Commission enforcement tools

- Specification proceedings
  - Not yet at the request of gatekeepers
    - As they fear a maximalist approach
  - 2 ex officio re Apple interoperability (March 2025): process and wearables
    - Economic significance and after long informal dialogue
    - Quite detailed and extensive reporting obligations
      - yet compliance paths should be decided by gatekeepers
    - De facto general application

## 2. Formal Interactions Commission enforcement tools

- Non-compliance proceedings
  - 2 decisions so far Apple steering and Meta use of personal data (April 2025)
  - No clear (public) prioritization
    - Immediate and visible effects, complaints and lobbying intensity, previous antitrust experience
    - Guidelines on prioritization: significance and impact, resources and risks
  - No clear relationship between informal and formal tools
  - How far the Commission will go in clarifying compliance paths

#### 3. Conclusions

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- From antitrust to regulatory process
- Transparency and information level playing field
  - More multi-lateral meetings at different levels (legal, technical ...)
  - Better compliance reports and officers
- Predictability
  - Enforcement prioritization
  - Concrete objectives to be achieved
  - More clarity on the content of obligation and compliance acceptability
- Regulatory trust