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DTSTART:20261025T030000
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UID:calendar.143944.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260902T091940Z
CREATED:20260901T101001Z
DESCRIPTION:Sandro Shelegia (University of Pompeu Fabra\, Barcelona)\, “Imp
 ressing the Algorithm”\, Economics of Platforms Seminar\, September 3\, 20
 26\, 14:00–15:00\, Online\, room Online.\n\nWe study how platform ranking 
 design shapes sellers’ off-platform pricing when the\nplatform learns prod
 uct appeal from on-platform sales. Because those sales depend\non cross-ch
 annel pricing\, ranking creates a career-concerns force: by restraining of
 fplatform\ndiscounts\, the seller shifts demand on-platform and improves f
 uture exposure.\nThus\, even without conditioning directly on off-platform
  prices\, a sales-based algorithm\ncan reproduce the incentive effects of 
 explicit price-parity restrictions. But because the\nplatform also relies 
 on on-platform sales to infer seller appeal\, a sales-based algorithm\nmay
  distort promotion decisions and reduce welfare. We compare sales-based al
 gorithms\nwith rules that condition directly on off-platform prices and sh
 ow that a price-parityclause\nalgorithm can attain the first best.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260903T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260903T160000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260902T001001Z
LOCATION:September 3\, 2026\, 14:00–15:00\, Online\, room Online
SUMMARY:Economics of Platforms Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2026-impressing-algorithm
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