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TZID:Europe/Paris
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DTSTART:20261025T030000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:calendar.143908.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260916T175849Z
CREATED:20260729T121001Z
DESCRIPTION:Martin Besfamille (Pontifica Universidad Catolica de Chile)\, “
 Tax Evasion\, Exclusionary Practices\, and Competition Policy”\, Industria
 l Organization seminar\, TSE\, September 9\, 2026\, 12:30–13:30Public Econ
 omics Seminar\, TSE\, September 9\, 2026\, 12:30–13:30\, Toulouse\, room A
 uditorium 4.\n\nTax evasion creates significant market distortions\, allow
 ing non-compliant firms to gain an unfair cost advantage over efficient\, 
 formal competitors. Despite this\, major competition authorities often ove
 rlook evasion as a form of unfair competition. This paper investigates the
  tension between tax enforcement and competition policy using a Cournot-ol
 igopoly model. Our analysis reveals that while tax evasion incentivizes in
 cumbents to adopt costly exclusionary behaviors to deter entry\, antitrust
  agencies typically focus only on the resulting non-competitive reactions.
  We find that to maximize consumer surplus\, competition authorities must 
 endogenize the impact of evasion\, aligning their enforcement strategies w
 ith tax policy to mitigate market-entry distortions.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260909T133000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260909T143000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260901T001001Z
LOCATION:TSE\, September 9\, 2026\, 12:30–13:30TSE\, September 9\, 2026\, 1
 2:30–13:30\, Toulouse\, room Auditorium 4
SUMMARY:Industrial Organization seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2026-tax-evasion-exclusionary-p
 ractices-and-competition-policy
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