BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Date iCal//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.20.2//
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:TSE
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Paris
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20261025T030000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:20260329T020000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
RDATE:20270328T020000
TZNAME:CEST
END:DAYLIGHT
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:calendar.143699.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260716T222835Z
CREATED:20260716T121001Z
DESCRIPTION:Patrick Lahr\, “Extreme Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening”\
 , Economic Theory Seminar\, Toulouse: TSE\, September 15\, 2026\, 11:00–12
 :15\, room Auditorium 3.\n\nWe characterize the extreme points of the set 
 of incentive-compatible\nmechanisms for screening problems with linear uti
 lity. Our framework subsumes\nproblems with and without transfers\, such a
 s monopoly pricing\, principal-optimal\nbilateral trade and barter exchang
 e\, delegation and veto bargaining\, or belief\nelicitation via proper sco
 ring rules. In every problem with one-dimensional\ntypes\, extreme points 
 admit a tractable description. In every problem with\nmulti-dimensional ty
 pes\, extreme points are dense in a rich subset of incentivecompatible mec
 hanisms\, which we call exhaustive mechanisms. Building on these\ncharacte
 rizations\, we derive parallel conclusions for mechanisms that can be\nrat
 ionalized as (uniquely) optimal under a fixed objective. For example\, in 
 the\nmulti-good monopoly problem\, mechanisms that uniquely maximize reven
 ue for\nsome type distribution are dense among all incentive-compatible an
 d individually\nrational mechanisms. The proofs exploit a novel connection
  between menus of\nextreme points and indecomposable convex bodies\, first
  studied by Gale (1954).
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260915T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260915T131500
LAST-MODIFIED:20260716T221001Z
LOCATION:Toulouse: TSE\, September 15\, 2026\, 11:00–12:15\, room Auditoriu
 m 3
SUMMARY:Economic Theory Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2026-extreme-points-multi-dimen
 sional-screening
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
