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UID:calendar.143699.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260819T114159Z
CREATED:20260716T121001Z
DESCRIPTION:Patrick Lahr (Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay)\, “Extreme
  Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening”\, Economic Theory Seminar\, Toulou
 se: TSE\, September 15\, 2026\, 11:00–12:15\, room Auditorium 3.\n\nWe cha
 racterize the extreme points of the set of incentive-compatible\nmechanism
 s for screening problems with linear utility. Our framework subsumes\nprob
 lems with and without transfers\, such as monopoly pricing\, principal-opt
 imal\nbilateral trade and barter exchange\, delegation and veto bargaining
 \, or belief\nelicitation via proper scoring rules. In every problem with 
 one-dimensional\ntypes\, extreme points admit a tractable description. In 
 every problem with\nmulti-dimensional types\, extreme points are dense in 
 a rich subset of incentivecompatible mechanisms\, which we call exhaustive
  mechanisms. Building on these\ncharacterizations\, we derive parallel con
 clusions for mechanisms that can be\nrationalized as (uniquely) optimal un
 der a fixed objective. For example\, in the\nmulti-good monopoly problem\,
  mechanisms that uniquely maximize revenue for\nsome type distribution are
  dense among all incentive-compatible and individually\nrational mechanism
 s. The proofs exploit a novel connection between menus of\nextreme points 
 and indecomposable convex bodies\, first studied by Gale (1954).
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260915T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260915T131500
LAST-MODIFIED:20260723T001001Z
LOCATION:Toulouse: TSE\, September 15\, 2026\, 11:00–12:15\, room Auditoriu
 m 3
SUMMARY:Economic Theory Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2026-extreme-points-multi-dimen
 sional-screening
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