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DTSTART:20261025T030000
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DTSTART:20260329T020000
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UID:calendar.142596.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260525T195934Z
CREATED:20260519T111001Z
DESCRIPTION:Li Fei (University of North Carolina)\, “Algorithmic Attention 
 and Content Creation on Social Media Platforms*”\, Economics of Platforms 
 Seminar\, June 4\, 2026\, 14:00–15:00\, room Online\, Zoom.\n\nWe study th
 e revenue-maximizing allocation of attention on an ad-funded social\nmedia
  platform governed by content recommendation algorithms. Attention is cost
 ly\nand serves a dual role: it can be directly monetized through advertisi
 ng\, or it can be\nallocated to creators to increase exposure\, strengthen
  effort incentives\, and thereby\ngenerate more attention thanks to better
  content. This tension creates a trade-off between monetization and produc
 tion incentives. In a two-sided model with heterogeneous viewers and creat
 ors under private information\, the optimal recommendation\nmix includes c
 ontent that is ex post suboptimal for some viewers in order to leverage\nc
 ross-side network externalities. Two-sided complementarities amplify infor
 mational\ndistortions and overturn the standard no-distortion-at-the-top i
 ntuition. When advertising markets are strong\, monetary transfers substit
 ute for attention-based incentives.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260604T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260604T160000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260520T001001Z
LOCATION:June 4\, 2026\, 14:00–15:00\, room Online\, Zoom
SUMMARY:Economics of Platforms Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2026-algorithmic-attention-and-
 content-creation-social-media-platforms
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