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DTSTART:20251026T030000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:calendar.141716.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260510T180429Z
CREATED:20260202T111001Z
DESCRIPTION:Martino Banchio (Bocconi University)\, “Dynamic Threats to Cred
 ible Auctions”\, Economic Theory Seminar\, Toulouse: TSE\, March 10\, 2026
 \, 11:00–12:15\, room Auditorium 3.\n\nA seller wants to sell a good to a 
 set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller ha
 s private information about her cost\, it is impossible for a static mecha
 nism to achieve the optimal revenue. In particular\, even the optimal firs
 t-price auction is not credible. We show that the English auction can cred
 ibly implement the optimal mechanism\, unlike the optimal Dutch auction. F
 or symmetric mechanisms in which only winners pay\, we also characterize a
 ll the static auctions that are credible: They are first-price auctions th
 at depend only on the seller’s cost ex-post via a secret reserve\, and may
  profitably pool bidders via a bid restriction. Our impossibility result h
 ighlights the role of public institutions\, and helps explain the use of d
 ynamic mechanisms in informal auctions. (joint with A. Skrzypacz and F. Ya
 ng. )
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260310T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20260310T121500
LAST-MODIFIED:20260305T011001Z
LOCATION:Toulouse: TSE\, March 10\, 2026\, 11:00–12:15\, room Auditorium 3
SUMMARY:Economic Theory Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2026-dynamic-threats-credible-a
 uctions
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