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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:TSE
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TZID:Europe/Paris
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DTSTART:20181028T030000
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DTSTART:20180325T020000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:calendar.141285.field_date.0@www.tse-fr.eu
DTSTAMP:20260424T193858Z
CREATED:20260109T151001Z
DESCRIPTION:Nikhil Agarwal (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)\, “An Em
 pirical Framework for Sequential Assignment:The Allocation of Deceased Don
 or Kidneys”\, Industrial Organization seminar\, TSE\, October 8\, 2018\, 1
 4:00–15:30\, room MS001.\n\nA transplant can improve a patient’s life whil
 e saving several hundreds of thousandsof dollars in healthcare expenditure
 s. Organs from deceased donors\, like many otherscarce public resources (e
 .g. public housing\, child-care\, publicly funded long-term care)\,are rat
 ioned via a sequential offer waiting list. The theoretical trade-offs in d
 esigningthese mechanisms are not well understood and depend on agent prefe
 rences. This paperestablishes an empirical framework for analyzing the tra
 de-offs involved in designingsequential offer waiting lists and applies it
  to study the allocation of deceased donorkidneys. We model the decision t
 o accept an organ while on the waiting list as anoptimal stopping problem 
 and use it to estimate the value of accepting various kidneys.Our estimate
 s show that while some types of organs are preferable for all patients(e.g
 . organs from young donors)\, there is substantial match-specific heteroge
 neity invalues. We show how to use these estimates to solve for the equili
 bria of counterfactualmechanisms. These techniques are then used tofind me
 chanisms that improve on designgoals such as improving the match quality o
 f transplants and reducing organ waste.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20181008T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20181008T153000
LAST-MODIFIED:20260113T095129Z
LOCATION:TSE\, October 8\, 2018\, 14:00–15:30\, room MS001
SUMMARY:Industrial Organization seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.tse-fr.eu/seminars/2018-empirical-framework-sequen
 tial-assignmentthe-allocation-deceased-donor-kidneys-0
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